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Preface
The intensifying ecological devastation of the planet is being registered
across scientific disciplines and activist, artistic, or more broadly cul-
tural endeavours in ways that rethink the temporal dimensions of a
catastrophe that can no longer be considered ‘looming’. In many polit-
ical contexts — trying to get scientists heard, mobilizing state power
and international agreements to curb the extractivist rapaciousness of
global capitalism — it might still seem essential to create a sense of
urgency, of a rapidly closing interval, last chance, now or never. Yet
taking stock not only of the planetary sum totals of global climate
change but its present local manifestations, the devastations of neo-
colonial extractivism, the irreversible extinctions of countless species,
destruction of ecotopes on land and in the sea, has produced a growing
awareness that in many crucial senses, it is ‘too late’ — that the time
can no longer be given as ‘five minutes to midnight’ but has moved a
lot closer to the dead of night, whether this is being regarded primarily
as a question of the cumulative loss of biodiversity as part of what is
now known as the ‘sixth mass extinction’ or as the approach of sev-
eral ‘tipping points’ of global climate change, such as the current ice
sheet disintegrations in the polar regions, the greenhouse gas release
triggered by the loss of permafrost, and irreversible desertifications.
The complexion of ecology, over these last years, has turned from juicy
green to dark and brittle.
The most decisive recent interventions, while acknowledging the
overwhelming pessimist thrust of ecological thought, have tried to use
a more complex, more differentiated account of the temporality of
environmental ruination in order to reflect on the diminished possi-
bilities for life in these ruins while avoiding familiar registers both of
science fiction dystopias and self-healing planets.
Thus, while both Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing and Timothy Morton
habitually invoke ‘the end of the world’, they try to salvage, describe,
and mobilize a distinct new dimension of ecological thought — no
longer extrapolating future scenarios to be averted, but vindicating
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different natures, enlarged and broken temporal frames, meshes of life
worn, torn, and stitched.
Timothy Morton characterizes the uncanny time of ‘hyperobjects’,
such as climate change, based not only on their temporal vastness
— they stretch into an unknowable future, he says, ‘like the empty
streets […] in the paintings of Giorgio de Chirico’ while also predat-
ing any awareness of them — but also on their ‘temporal undulation’,
an abyssal veiling or withdrawal:1 ‘The undulating fronds of space
and time float in front of objects.’2 If Morton’s hyperobject thus has
to remain uncannily out of reach, its time is ‘radically different from
human-scale time’, approaching the present from a future beyond cal-
culation, prognosis, projection.3 This is the heterotemporal reservoir
Morton mobilizes in the deliberately paradoxical exhortation to allow
the present to be changed by the withdrawing future of hyperobjects.
In his 2014 Wellek Lectures titled Dark Ecology, Morton will beckon
even further, into what he calls ‘the third darkness, the sweet one,
past the second darkness, the uncanny one’.4 The unknowable future
emanating from hyperobjects, the ‘ontological mystery’, is supposed to
be passed (or, with Morton’s recoded concept, ‘subscended’)5 towards
an ethical ‘future coexistence’.6
For Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, too, the future to be mobilized by a
radical ecology is one of coexistence, but she remains committed to a
time-scale that contrasts starkly with Morton’s temporal immensities.
The temporal horizon she sketches ‘at the end of the world’ is not
demonstratively ‘posthuman’ but of deliberately modest dimensions;
1 Timothy Morton,Hyperobjects: Philosophy andEcology after the End of theWorld (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), part i, chapter ‘Temporal Undulation’,
pp. 55–68 (p. 55)
2 Ibid., p. 63.
3 Ibid., p. 197. The strangeness of the postulated temporality forces Morton’s stylistic
hand: ‘The undulating temporality that hyperobjects emit bathes us in a spatiotemporal
vortex that is radically different from human-scale time.’ Part ii of Hyperobjects deals
with ‘The Time of Hyperobjects’, pp. 99–201.
4 Timothy Morton, Dark Ecology: For a Logic of Future Coexistence, The Wellek Library
Lectures in Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), p. 5. The
first darkness enumerated (‘we usually don’t get past the first darkness, and that’s
if we even care’) is the nihilism and depression that comes with the realization of
environmental doom.
5 Ibid., p. 116.
6 Ibid., p. 160.
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the futurity brought into play is not one of mysterious withdrawal but
of the surprise encounter with a matsutake mushroom: ‘If we open
ourselves to their fungal attraction, matsutake can catapult us into
the curiosity that seems to me the first requirement of collaborative
survival in precarious times.’7 Rather than the descent into doom that
Morton cultivates and that is to spawn a purgatory of ontological
mystery to arrive at a paradise of bittersweet non-human coexistence,
Tsing looks for a curiosity without speculative violence, a surprise
thoroughly lodged in the small entanglements of gathering practices,
embodied as much in her subjects as in her own writing.8 The goal,
in Tsing’s words, is the preparation of an idea of a ‘third nature’ in
contrast to both the ‘first nature’ of ecological relations (human and
non-human alike) and the ‘second nature’ of ‘capitalist transformations
of the environment’:
My book then offers ‘third nature,’ that is, what manages to live
despite capitalism. To even notice third nature, we must evade
assumptions that the future is that singular direction ahead.
Like virtual particles in a quantum field, multiple futures pop
in and out of possibility; third nature emerges within such
temporal polyphony.9
For Tsing, this temporal polyphony grows from the spore-carrying
aleatorics of devastation and ruination itself, yet it is looped into the
entangled unity of dispersal and discovery of repetitive, mundane,
everyday gathering practices.
This modest proposal for a heterotemporal futurity ‘at the end of
the world’ can be contrasted with Donna J. Haraway’s response to the
ongoingness of environmental disasters, global climate change, and
extinction events — in Haraway’s words: ‘unnecessary killings of on-
goingness’.10 Haraway launches an audacious ‘no future!’, a plea against
futurity as such, against fantasies of ecological securitizations or sus-
7 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of
Life in Capitalist Ruins (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), p. 2.
8 Ibid., p. viii.
9 Ibid.
10 Donna J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2016), p. 1.
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tainabilities, but also against the deadlines of totalized environmental
catastrophe:
[M]any of us are tempted to address trouble in terms of mak-
ing an imagined future safe, or stopping something from hap-
pening that looms in the future, of clearing away the present
and the past in order to make futures for coming generations.
Staying with the trouble does not require such a relationship
to times called the future.11
For Haraway, the energies wasted on imagining futures dark or bright,
vast or modest, would have been better spent on widening the present,
rendering it diverse and messy enough so that it begins to function as
a ‘hot compost pile’. Indeed, a kind of generalized, or rather sprawl-
ing, tangling understanding of composting, home to an ‘opportunistic,
dangerous, and generative sympoiesis’, provides, for Haraway, the
only possibility of resurgence.12 Yet not only is ‘eschewing futurism’
the precondition for present-tense composting, but the collaborative
tangle of the compost heap in turn is the only way to avoid futural
fixations:
Alone, in our separate kinds of expertise and experience, we
know both too much and too little, and so we succumb to
despair or to hope, and neither is a sensible attitude. Neither
despair nor hope is tuned to the senses, to mindful matter, to
material semiotics, to mortal earthlings in thick copresence.13
Haraway openly embraces the circular structure of this rejection of fu-
turity, it provides the very heat of the composting present, the pressure
with which finitude, mortality, corruptibility are taken off their grand
temporal scaffoldings.14
It seems telling that no matter how radically different these three
critical responses to the current environmental catastrophe might
seem, they all proceed through a reimagining of time — not an epochal
break within time, neither dawn of a new age nor posthuman aftermath,
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., pp. 4 and 168.
13 Ibid., p. 4.
14 Ibid., p. 32: ‘Ecosexual artists Beth Stephens and Annie Sprinkle made a bumper
sticker for me, for us, for SF: “Composting is so hot!”’.
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but a non-anthropocentric reconfiguration of temporality as such, a
settling into a time understood anew: whether as the extreme dilation
afforded by hyperobjects, the nooks of gathering futures, or a steaming
pile of compacted co-presencing.
This intense and diverse work on the temporal implications of
the way in which ecological devastation is being thought also needs
to be understood, of course, as a response to the headline-grabbing
attempt to confront anthropogenic planetary change by inscribing it
in the grander scale of geological epochs. The efforts to define and
establish this epoch under the name ‘Anthropocene’ has taken centre
stage since it was launched by the Anthropocene Working Group of
the Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy of the International
Commission on Stratigraphy in 2009. The relative merits of this un-
dertaking have been hotly debated over the last decade. At issue is
the question of temporal scale: The assignation proffers a widening
of the scope, which often translates into an elevation of the envir-
onmental impact of a global humanity past its local conflicts, ‘daily
squabbles’, the political project-making predominant in considerations
of brighter futures, and in particular the supposedly roughly equally
disastrous environmental impacts of capitalist and socialist econom-
ies.15 The convergence between certain ideas of globalization and the
supposedly uniform planetary impact captured in the term Anthro-
pocene has prompted vehement opposition. The very categories of
the global and the planetary tend to obliterate the vast environmental
inequities of today, insufficiently acknowledged, let alone addressed, in
the NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) of the UNFCCC
(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) Paris
Agreement and the carbon market it established both for ITMOs (In-
ternational Transfers of Mitigation Outcomes) and emergent practices
of corporate carbon offsetting.16 Yet more importantly, they keep from
15 This point has been most forcefully pursued by Dipesh Chakrabarty since his seminal
‘The Climate of History: Four Theses’, Critical Inquiry, 35.2 (Winter 2009), pp. 197–
222. See also Chakrabarty, ‘The Human Condition in the Anthropocene’, in TheTanner
Lectures on Human Values, 35, ed. by Mark Matheson (Salt Lake City: University of
Utah Press, 2016), pp. 139–88, available online: <https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/
Chakrabarty%20manuscript.pdf> [accessed 1 August 2020].
16 The preamble of the Paris Agreement only half-acknowledges calls for climate justice,
right alongside beliefs in a ‘Mother Earth’, as it ‘not[es] the importance for some
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view the extent to which the current situation is the outcome of cen-
turies of colonizations and the ongoing mutations of colonial power
and its ever intensifying extractivist devastations. As Kathryn Yusoff
admonishes:
Seeking to monumentalize Anthropocene history is an at-
tempt to reclaim an ‘innocence’ around this geohistory. The
histories of the Anthropocene unfold a brutal experience for
much of the world’s racialized poor and without due attention
to the historicity of those events (and their eventfulness); the
Anthropocene simply consolidates power via this innocence
in the present to effect decisions that are made about the fu-
ture and its modes of survival.17
For Yusoff, geohistory can acknowledge the planetary change caused
by extractivism and industrialization only to the extent that it acknow-
ledges its own involvements in these projects, that is, as long as it is
willing to give up its supposed ‘scientific’ innocence, the ‘objectivity’
licensed to the natural sciences. It is indeed hard to see how the elev-
ation of the name of humankind in the geological period assignation
can help but remain complicit in the radical modes of dehumaniza-
tion bound up with ecological exploitation and destruction. Yusoff’s
observation of the dehistoricizing implications of talk of an ‘Anthro-
pocene’ exceeds the genealogy of geology through which it is filtered.
She rightly insists that the temporal scale itself is not the problem.
The enlarged temporal frame dehistoricizes inasmuch as it invites the
sublime contemplation of an earth before (and now also after) human-
kind and thus still passes over into a familiar conception of ‘prehistory’,
itself a secular heir of Christian salvation history, which justified the
enslavement of non-European peoples with their presumed existence
‘outside of history’.18
of the concept of “climate justice”, when taking action against climate change’. See
UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, ‘Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Proposal
by the President’ (Bonn: UNFCCC Secretariat, 2015) <https://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf> [accessed 1 August 2020].
17 Kathryn Yusoff, A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2018), pp. 11–12.
18 On the cultural impact of the modern invention of ‘prehistory’ see Préhistoire. Une
Énigme moderne, ed. by Cécile Debray, Rémi Labrusse, and Maria Stavrinaki (Paris:
Centre Pompidou, 2019). For the anthropological division of peoples inside and
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In light of these fraught attempts to address the current ecolo-
gical catastrophe under the sign of an ‘Anthropocene’, the nature of
Morton’s, Tsing’s, and Haraway’s interventions becomes clearer: No
matter how far they diverge in their conceptions, they all reject the
anthropocentrist contortion and, in some sense, irony of the name ‘An-
thropocene’, refusing to scale along the very name of a species whose
exceptionalism this undertaking can only emphasize, even in its crit-
ical inflection. They all radically decentre the human and its temporal
scales, insist on its entanglements, involutions, but also scatterings and
dispersals. The question being negotiated among the three authors in
question — but many more alongside them — concerns their search
for the most effective way to breach the divide between natural history
and a history of humankind, between the anthropos and its milieus:
through composting, hyperobjects, or the errant dispersal of mush-
room and gatherer.
This reconsideration of entangled, layered times, scales, durations,
and the attendant turn away from evental futurity also informs the
present collection and its title-giving consideration of weathering.
Its authors’ reflections on the diverse modalities of ‘weathering’ is
premised on an acknowledgment of the fact that the impact of environ-
mental catastrophes is being registered already, and disproportionately
so in regions of the globe at a decisive distance from first-world hyper-
consumption, a distance defined, still, by the long arm of neocolonial
extractivist and exploitative schemes. To insist that environmental
damage is not looming past a future horizon but is already being
weathered and unevenly, injustly so, means to forgo patent illusions of
sustainability or resilience and the ways in which they have amalgam-
ated with neoliberal doctrines over the last decades. But the invocation
of ‘weathering’ also means to emphasize a certain passivity with which
cataclysmic change, often diffuse and slow (according to some time
scales), is being registered and endured. There are clear affinities —
yet also notable differences — to figures of vulnerability and exposure,
but also resilience and endurance, around which new forms of political
and ethical theorizing have emerged that distance themselves from
outside of history see Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes
its Object, foreword by Matti Bunzl, new edn (New York: Columbia University Press,
2014).
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notions of agency, sovereignty, autonomy, and self-determination and
instead, often inspired by Emmanuel Levinas, produce an enriched
understanding of passivity as a potential to think responsivity other-
wise.19
In search of an extension of these explorations into an environ-
mental ethics, Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker have,
already in 2014, suggested the term weathering as a keyword for ‘a
feminist ethos of responsivity towards climatic phenomena’.20 Provid-
ing a New Materialist expansion of ‘insurgent vulnerabilities’,21 they,
too, suggest a modified temporality to account for an entanglement
beyond the nature-culture divide, one they term ‘thick time’, charac-
terized by what they term a ‘nonchronological durationality’.22 For
Neimanis and Loewen Walker, the term ‘weathering’ mainly signals
a radical shift in the relation to global climate change as something
everyone is already immersed — and implicated — in: ‘We recognize
our own implications in the climate conditions around us, thick with
co-labored temporalities that we are also making possible.’23 And yet
Neimanis and Loewen Walker derive from this a particular ‘duty’ for
19 See, among many, Vulnerability in Resistance, ed. by Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti,
and Leticia Sabsay (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016). Butler acknowledges
and discusses the Levinasian inspirations of this ethics of vulnerability in several texts,
for example in her Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London:
Verso, 2004), chapter 5: ‘Precarious Life’. But it is important to note that Levinas’s
resolutely anthropocentric ethics had been grafted onto ecology even earlier by, among
others, John Llewelyn, The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A Chiasmic Reading
of Responsibility in the Neighborhood of Levinas, Heidegger and Others (London: Mac-
millan, 1992) and Silvia Benso, The Face of Things: A Different Side of Ethics (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2000).
20 Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering: Climate Change and the
“Thick Time” of Transcorporeality’, Hypatia, 29.3 (2014), pp. 558–75 (p. 558).
21 Ibid., pp. 566 and 573. Like the notion of ‘transcorporeality’ in the subtitle, this is a
reference to the work of Stacy Alaimo, in this case to: ‘Insurgent Vulnerability and
the Carbon Footprint of Gender’, Women, Gender, and Research (Kvinder, Køn og
Forskning, Denmark), 3–4 (2009), pp. 22–35. In her Exposed: Environmental Politics
and Pleasures in PosthumanTimes (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016)
— which is interested in ‘[p]erforming exposure as an ethical and political act’ and in
how to ‘occupy exposure as insurgent vulnerability’ (p. 5) — Alaimo, in turn, suggests
that ‘[p]erforming exposure can catalyze that very sense of weathering’ (p. 82) that
Neimanis and Loewen Walker are proposing.
22 Ibid., p. 561.
23 Ibid., p. 573.
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‘specifically human agents in a posthuman context […] to direct this
reponsivity in particular ways’.24
The present volume and its authors are more reluctant when it
comes to reconstituting this kind of exceptionalist ‘human guardian-
ship’, however intricately tangled or passively inflected. The emphasis,
instead, lies here on the enormous richness of what the English lan-
guage calls ‘weathering’. Thus, for example, weathering might appear to
be a surface phenomenon; or it can seem to be generally unwelcome.
And yet, even the most dramatic storm or profound inner turmoil
can be said to have been weathered; and weathering also denotes a
host of cultural techniques that makes use of the elements in drying
fruit or varnishing artefacts. It seemed imperative to the participants
of this project to explore the semantic richness of the term that refuses
all symmetries, deranges etymological sequencing, and can hardly be
divvied up into literal and figurative uses. Its semantic spread seems
at times as diffuse as the phenomena it describes, its impact deeply
ambivalent, to say the least.
Yet if the diverse considerations and interventions presented in
this volume engage with one another and tangle in often unforeseen
ways, this is a result of a longer process and exchange: The authors
of this volume had convened as the primary researchers of the two-
year research project ‘ERRANS environ/s’ in 2018, under the auspices
of the ICI Berlin. The project, concluding part of the six-year ER-
RANS cycle of the Institute, followed the research project ‘ERRANS,
in Time’ and indeed emerged from the latter, inheriting many of its en-
gagements with non-linear temporalities, questions of temporal scales,
standstills, and reversals. ERRANS environ/s had been devised to
track the wider scientific and cultural impact of ecology, of notions
such as milieu and environment, as one of diffusion, scatter, disper-
sion, and blurring rather than totalization. Over the course of the first
year of research, the group chose the term ‘weathering’ to focus its
reflections, which were presented in a workshop in the Fall of 2019.
The individual contributions were elaborated and expanded under
difficult circumstances, the COVID-19 outbreak becoming a ‘Public
24 Ibid.; emphasis in original. The imperative continues: ‘Our call is […] for those of
us living in privileged, high-consumption situations to direct our responsivity more
consciously, in a way more closely attuned to that which we are affecting.’
xvi PREFACE
Health Emergency of International Concern’ in January 2020 and a
‘Pandemic’ by March, effecting a dispersal of the research group, which
continued and concluded its work under distancing provisions.
While the contributions appear clustered in the table of contents,
this certainly does not suggest that the plurality of disciplines, ap-
proaches, theoretical interventions, choices of subject matter allow for
any kind of systematization whatsoever. Quite on the contrary, the
section headings (Elements, Traces, Layers, and Floods) seek to effect
a refractive multiplication rather than any logic of subsumption. The
first contributions, gathered as ‘Elements’, seek to show the expanse
of weathering, semantically, logically, but also historically. The second
cluster, ‘Traces’, considers the interaction between weathering and the
particular figure of the trace, its degradation, but also the idiom — in-
cluding the linguistic boundaries of the idiomatic idiosyncracies with
no exact parallel outside of the English language. The essays gathered
under ‘Layers’ show that an attention to weathering might start on a
surface but ultimately invites a model of layered complexity, whether
this applies to environmental policy, the violence of border regimes,
or the role of revolutionary contingencies. And the final grouping,
‘Floods’, quite directly engages with an elemental dimension, water,
which has been figuratively tied to forgetting and erasure.
Weathering becomes a principle of this presentation insofar as its
collection implies an exposure and inasmuch as the authors were aware
of the fact that the resulting process should not be considered arrested
and preserved in print (and digital object identification) but invites a
mutability that, ultimately, remains incalculable.
*
The section ‘Elements’ begins with a chapter by Christoph F. E.
Holzhey, who engages the nature–culture divide with the generative
ambivalences of weathering in both language and physics. Taking the
different uses of the enantiosemic and ambitransitive verb as indic-
ative of the human’s fraught relationship with its environment and
itself, the chapter analyses multiple ways in which ‘weathering’ can in-
volve subject–object relations, objectless subject–predicate relations,
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or even subjectless processes, and proposes to think them with mech-
anics, thermodynamics, and chaos theory.
The brief explorations of radiation exposures that Alison Sperling
presents within the second chapter draw primarily from nuclear art
and culture and contribute to the field of nuclear aesthetics, which has
long been fixated on the problem of visibility and the representation
of nuclear residues. The examples draw primarily from photographic
technologies and other aesthetic registers that capture visual residues
of radiation. The challenges of nuclear aesthetics are also political and
social. This constellation of objects and inquiries is meant to explore
the fraught political, environmental, and social relations between ra-
diation, visibility, toxicity, through the concept of exposure. They offer
feminist glimpses into other ways of thinking exposure, as it develops
in relation to (often imperceptible) toxicity that is not inscribed into a
logic that partitions the passive victim of suffering from some pure or
unaffected subject. They are examples that are both forms of exposure
specific to the nuclear while also, perhaps, helping to expose more
nuanced and complex ways of understanding forms of exposure that
extend beyond nuclearity.
In ‘Weathering the Afterlife’, Nicolò Crisafi and Manuele Gragno-
lati investigate the meteorological phenomena represented in Dante
Alighieri’s Commedia and their interrelation with the subjectivity of
the dead in Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven. Examining how the dead
weather the afterlife and how the elements affect them, in turn, the
essay takes the complex enantiosemy of the word ‘weathering’ as a
conceptual guiding thread for the exploration of dynamics of exposure
(Inferno), vulnerability (Purgatorio), and receptivity (Paradiso).
Daniel Liu addresses ‘Scaling from Weather to Climate’. One of
the theoretical tensions that has arisen from Anthropocene studies is
what Dipesh Chakrabarty has called the ‘two figures of the human’,
and the question of which of these two figures of the human inheres in
the concept of the Anthropocene more. On the one hand, the Human
is conceived as the universal reasoning subject upon whom political
rights and equality are based, and on the other hand, humankind is
the collection of all individuals of our species, with all of the inequal-
ities, differences, and variability inherent in any species category. This
chapter takes up Deborah Coen’s argument that Chakrabarty’s claim
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of the ‘incommensurability’ of these two figures of the human ignores
the way both were constructed within debates over how to relate local
geophysical specificities to theoretical generalities. It examines two
cases in the history of science: Martin Rudwick’s exploration of how
geologists slowly gained the ability to reconstruct the history of the
Earth in deep time, and Coen’s own history of Austrian climate sci-
ence, a case where early assumptions about the capriciousness of the
weather gave way to theories of climate informed by thermodynamics
and large-scale data collection.
The section ‘Traces’ opens with an essay about rust co-authored
by Amelia Groom and M. Ty. Iron usually plays the part of strength,
stubbornness, and impenetrability, but rust registers the dimension of
time in the material, reminding us that it always carries the potential
for its own decomposition. While great expense is incurred to stave
off iron’s oxidization, Groom and Ty read the uselessness that rust
precipitates as an interruption of the instrumental logics that sustain
racial capitalism. Looking to the rusted ring that became Elsa von
Freytag-Loringhoven’s Enduring Ornament (1913), they consider how
the discarded and defunctionalized lend themselves to ornamental
redeployment. The essay then turns to works by the contemporary
American artists David Hammons and Andrea Fraser, both of which
turn Richard Serra’s rusty steel sculptures into a backdrop for fleeting
gestures of impromptu reclamation. Attending to questions of sus-
ceptibility and monumental weathering, these reflections look to rusty
leakages that play out the impossibility of refusing the environment.
Rust, the authors suggest, is a material archive of exposure that does
not keep itself, but flakes apart and seeps away.
Damiano Sacco’s chapter addresses the question of weathering by
considering its excess to the conceptual dimension and relating it to
what Jacques Derrida names (the) ‘trace’. The study of the ‘logic’ of
weathering/the trace is confronted with Giorgio Agamben’s critique
of Derrida’s project. Their two different conceptions of language, of its
presuppositional structure, and of its order of ‘metaphysical presence’
are considered, in particular by turning to Werner Hamacher’s work on
these and related matters.
‘Glaze: Or Formulas to Get through Bad Weather’ is a short story
by Umut Yıldırım set during the military junta of 1980 in Istanbul.
PREFACE xix
On the run and underground with her family, Ö searches for ways to
bestow meaning on numerous encounters her father had with thieves.
The section ‘Layers’ starts out with the chapter ‘Weathering
Weather: Atmospheric Geographies of the Guiana Shield’ by Yolanda
Ariadne Collins. It argues that paying attention to the weather and its
associated processes of geological, biological, and social weathering
can destabilize knowledge traditions that insist on dichotomies.
Looking to specific histories and current conditions in Guyana
and Suriname, this chapter shows how notions of weathering can
accommodate a wide range of referents, ranging from the weathering
of rock to socio-political and historical afterlives of violent colonial
displacements.
Following Hannah Arendt’s remarks on refugee camps as spaces
of ‘worldlessness’, Anja Sunhyun Michaelsen examines how, in films
on European asylum facilities, systemic violence ‘makes itself known’
in images of nature. The chapter ‘“Locked out in nature”’ shows how
nature separates and isolates (La Forteresse, Forst), constitutes a sphere
of domination and control (View from Above), and functions directly
as a murder weapon (Purple Sea). Nature, in these films, indicates the
Outside within, haunted by the latent and ghostly presence of systemic
violence.
Entitled ‘On Bad Weather: Heidegger, Arendt, and Political Be-
ginnings’, Facundo Vega’s chapter restages Hannah Arendt’s Ausein-
andersetzung with Martin Heidegger regarding ‘political beginnings’.
Sketching Heidegger’s exceptionalist account of ‘new beginnings’ and
Arendt’s dispute with him in relation to the tension between the
spheres of ‘philosophy’ and ‘politics’, Vega traces her position about
‘political founding’. According to Vega, Arendt invites us to recognize
the ‘principle of an-archy’ innate to ‘political beginnings’, which cannot
be absorbed by exceptionalist invocations of the ‘history of Being’.
The final section ‘Floods’ begins with Marlon Miguel’s chapter
‘Representing the World, Weathering its End: Arthur Bispo do
Rosário’s Ecology of the Ship’. The chapter explores the intrinsic
relationship between weather/weathering and the imaginary of the
sea, which features in the work of artist Arthur Bispo do Rosário. Bispo
was a black man who spent most of his life in psychiatric institutions.
There is an important interplay between his psychotic deliriums
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and the production of hundreds of objects, many of them ships or
forms that relate to the sea. These objects open up a discussion on
decoloniality as they are embedded with marks left by the transatlantic
slave trade.
Claudia Peppel’s chapter is entitled ‘Enduring Rain’. Over the six
months in which Vajiko Chachkhiani’s Living Dog Among Dead Lions
was exhibited at the Georgian Pavilion at the 57th Venice Biennale in
2017, heavy rain was pouring inside the installation. This artificially
generated process provokes thoughts on the nature of the here and
now as well as of the afterlife and of the future appearance of the hut’s
water-sensitive insides. Eventually, the spaces and furniture exposed to
rain and water stagnation will begin to rot and disintegrate, and mould
and moss might grow over them. Its viewers feel caught between what
they see and what they hope to see; between their perceptions and
expectations, in an exceptional time zone where ‘natural’ weathering
is being performed as a subject of meditative observation. The chapter
is followed by a conversation between Vajiko Chachkhiani and Claudia
Peppel. Entitled ‘Life Never Stops Being Violent’, it focuses on the role
of extreme weather conditions and the vulnerability to weathering in
Vajiko Chachkhiani’s work, especially in the piece Living Dog Among
Dead Lions.
In ‘Confined Weathers: Graciela Iturbide and Mario Bellatin’s The
Bathroom of Frida Kahlo/Demerol without Expiration Date’, Delfina
Cabrera asks: What is the work of weathering in an enclosed space?
What if that space was the bathroom of the famous Mexican painter
Frida Kahlo? Defying prudeness and asepsis, writer Mario Bellatin and
photographer Graciela Iturbide enter that intimate room and through
a series of artistic interventions give Kahlo’s weathered legacy a new
afterlife. The logic of the archive is their guiding principle: in order to
protect what has been locked inside, they must expose it and return it
to common use.
ARND WEDEMEYER




Between Language and Physics
CHRISTOPH F. E. HOLZHEY
INTRODUCTION
Proverbially unpredictable, the weather presents many challenges and
ambivalences both on the level of (human) language and of (nat-
ural) science. Many languages have a particular, rather peculiar class
of ‘weather verbs’, which are arguably as ‘ill-behaved’ as the weather
itself. Nothing seems more banal than to speak about the weather,
wondering whether it will be warm or cool today, whether it will rain
or storm. Yet, linguists still discuss the ‘it that does the raining in Eng-
lish and many other languages’.1 They ask, for instance, whether ‘it’
is a dummy, expletive pronoun or whether ‘it’ refers rather to an ‘all-
encompassing’, ‘total environment’.2 Perhaps this wavering between
1 Ronald W. Langacker, Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, 2 vols (Stanford, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 1991), ii: Descriptive Application, p. 365, quoted by Beth Levin
and Bonnie Krejci, ‘Talking about the Weather: Two Construals of Precipitation
Events in English’, Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics, 4.1 (2019), Art. 58, pp.
1–29 (p. 1) <https://doi.org/10.5334/gjgl.794>.
2 Dwight Bolinger, Meaning and Form, English Language Series, 11 (London: Longman,
1977), pp. 78, Dwight Bolinger, ‘Ambient It Is Meaningful Too’, Journal of Linguistics,
9.2 (1973), pp. 261–70 (p. 261) <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022226700003789>,
and Wallace L. Chafe, Meaning and the Structure of Language (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 101–02.
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all and nothing should be taken as an indication that the subject of
the weather is an ill-posed question. Indeed, what Noam Chomsky
calls the ‘weathering-it’ conjures up the kind of ‘grammatical habit’ and
‘seduction of language’ that Friedrich Nietzsche insistently considered
as the source of misguided beliefs.3 Following Nietzsche’s reasoning,
the question of the (grammatical) subject of weather verbs can indeed
be said to transport an erroneous and detrimental dualism that takes
all change, alteration, and becoming to be conditioned and caused by
a radically different, separate subject — essentially the Cartesian ego
conceived as substance, being, and free will.
Correcting the Cogito by an ‘it thinks’ is insufficient for Nietzsche,
insofar as the doing remains doubled by a fictive doer — leading to
3 Noam Chomsky, Lectures onGovernment andBinding, Studies in Generative Grammar,
9 (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1981), pp. 324–25; Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche,
Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. by Adrian Del Caro, The
Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, 8 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2014), Beyond Good and Evil, §17, p. 19 and Genealogy of Morality, i-13, p. 236. To
quote the passages to which I will return more fully, Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good
and Evil (1886): ‘it is a falsification of the facts to say: the subject “I” is the condition
of the predicate “think.” It thinks: but that this “it” is precisely that old famous “ego” is
only an assumption, an assertion, to put it mildly, and by no means an “immediate
certainty.” In fact too much is already claimed with this “it thinks”: even this “it”
contains an interpretation of the process and doesn’t belong to the process itself. Here
the concluding is done according to grammatical habit, namely “thinking is an activity,
to every activity belongs something that is active, therefore— .” Following basically the
same scheme, the older atomism looked at every effective “force” for that little particle
of matter in which it resides, and from which it produces effects, that is, the atom;
more rigorous minds finally learned to do without this “earth residuum,” and perhaps
someday we will even accustom ourselves, logicians included, to doing without this
little “it” (into which the honest old ego has vanished)’ (§17, p. 19). In On Genealogy
of Morality (1887), Nietzsche further expands on this ‘grammatical habit’, referring
to the ‘seduction of language (and the basic errors of reason petrified in it), which
understands and misunderstands all effecting as conditioned by something that effects,
by a “subject.” For instance, just as ordinary people separate lightning from its flashing
and take the latter as its doing, as the effect of a subject that is called lightning, so too
popular morality separates strength from the expressions of strength, as if behind the
strong one there were an indifferent substratum free to express strength or not to. But
there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind the doing, effecting, becoming;
the “doer” is merely tacked on as a fiction to the doing — the doing is everything.
The people basically double the doing when they have the lightning flashing; this is
a doing-doing: it posits the same occurrence once as cause and then once more as its
effect. Natural scientists do no better when they say “force moves, force causes” and
so on — despite all its coolness, its freedom from affect, our entire science still stands
under the seduction of language and has not gotten rid of the false changelings foisted
upon it, the “subjects” (the atom for instance is such a changeling, likewise the Kantian
“thing in itself”)’ (pp. 236–37).
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a redundant ‘doing-doing’ as he notes in a related text, which takes
the common separation of ‘lightning from its flashing’ as example for
language foisting in subjects everywhere. Suggesting that the natural
sciences succumb to the same seduction when they speak of forces that
move and are to be localized in matter, Nietzsche claims that ‘more
rigorous minds finally learned to do without this “earth-residuum”’,
and looks forward to the day when we ‘accustom ourselves, logicians
included, to doing without this little “it” (into which the honest old
ego has vanished [zu dem sich das ehrliche alte Ich verflüchtigt hat])’.4
However, such attempts at overcoming the last anthropo-
morphism — even in impersonal weather verbs with expletive
or all-encompassing subjects — risk reinforcing anthropocentric
oppositions and generating new human, or indeed overhuman,
figures. If talking about the weather is a well-tried manner of
establishing sociality, the unpredictable power of the elements,
weather conditions, or atmospheric agencies conjure up an abyss
of chaos as the sublime ground for (re)newed constitutions of the
human.
As I shall suggest, such an anthropogenic function of the weather
is sedimented in the verb ‘to weather’ insofar as this verb seems to
be the precise obverse of impersonal weather verbs: in its manifold
and multivalent uses, it takes for granted the activity and effects of the
elements and considers them as implicit, impersonal background for
subjects that are always human or, at least, anthropocentric.
At the same time, I will argue that if weathering has a semantic
history that is anthropocentric, its multivalent grammar also points
to a process of weathering that not only precedes oppositions of sub-
ject and object, culture and nature, or language and science but that
can also be understood as the ground from which such oppositions
emerge. And while language may not be able to do without the subject,
reading the ambivalences of linguistic weathering with those of sci-
entific weathering opens the possibility of re-working time-honoured
4 Ibid., p. 19. Walter Kaufmann’s translates the bracket as ‘which is all that is left of the
honest little old ego’, which suggests to my mind more accurately that the ego is still
present in this ‘it’. See Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude
to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. by Walter Arnold Kaufmann (New York: Vintage
Books, 1989), §17, p. 24.
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dualistic oppositions so that they come to matter otherwise, that is,
in a less anthropocentric manner. The idea here is not that science
can avoid the linguistic predicate-subject separation, which tends to
substantialize the subject even before it is opposed to an object, but
rather that physics, for instance, in seeking to model unpredictable
phenomena on the basis of natural laws, conjures up other kinds of
‘subjects’, which may help keep the grammatical subject from default-
ing into an emphatic human subject.5
CO-CONSTITUTIVE WEATHERING
In their 2014 article ‘Weathering: Climate Change and the “Thick
Time” of Transcorporeality’, Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen
Walker propose to create ‘weathering’ as a concept ‘to counter the
fallacy of a bifurcated understanding of “nature” and “culture” — or
of weather and humans’.6 They draw on feminist new materialist and
posthumanist approaches that highlight the fundamental entangle-
ment, mutual imbrication, and inseparability of ‘human and nonhu-
man natures’.7 In particular, they invoke Stacy Alaimo’s notion of
‘transcorporeality’, which stresses ‘the extent to which the substance
of the human is ultimately inseparable from “the environment”’,8 and
propose an ‘understanding of ourselves as weather bodies’:9
We seek to cultivate a sensibility that attunes us […] toward
ourselves and the world as weather bodies, mutually caught
up in the whirlwind of a weather-world, in the thickness of
climate-time. In short, as weathering.10
5 In other words, the general strategy could be described as countering a dualism
of substance, which would oppose the human to the nonhuman, by a dualism of
method — or more precisely a complementary of methods, which takes the risk of
universalizing both anthropomorphism (or vitalism) and mechanism in order to attend
in either case to the emergence of differences that have not been pre-supposed.
6 Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering: Climate Change and the
“Thick Time” of Transcorporeality’, Hypatia, 29.3 (2014), pp. 558–75 (p. 560) <https:
//doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12064>.
7 Ibid., p. 563
8 Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 2 cited by Neimanis and Loewen Walker,
‘Weathering’, p. 563.
9 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, p. 560.
10 Ibid., p. 561.
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Neimanis and Loewen Walker seek to radicalize their notion of weath-
ering further by drawing on Karen Barad’s theory of ‘intra-action’,
according to which separable entities (onto)logically do not precede
their relations but co-emerge through them. While Alaimo’s transcor-
poreality allows for relations of contiguity, continuity, or immersion,
they maintain that intra-action clarifies the claim that ‘humans and
nonhuman climate and weather phenomena are co-constitutive. We
are mutually emergent, coextensive. Together, we weather the world.’11
Moving from ‘Transcorporeal Weather’ to ‘Transcorporeal Tem-
poralities’, Neimanis and Loewen Walker enlist the notion of intra-
action to radicalize the collapse and co-constitution of distinctions
even further and extend them to space, time, and matter. The principal
target remains the belief that human bodies can be separated from their
environment. They had already made the intriguing and subtle sugges-
tion that it is not enough to speak of immersion: ‘the weather and the
climate are not phenomena “in” which we live […] but are rather of us,
in us, through us.’12 Referring to Claire Colebrook’s observation that
‘our attempts to externalize climate deny the fact that we are already
entangled in its forces and flows’, they now move to a critique of the
‘exteriorization’ and ‘spatialization of time’. In particular, they object
to narratives of sustainability, progress, or apocalypse that ‘rely on a
linear earth time where past, present, and future make up a time-line
of human progression’.13 It is in order to counter such an exterioriza-
tion and spatialization of time that Neimanis and Loewen Walker turn
again to Barad’s notion of intra-action to consider ‘the co-constitutive
functionings of matter and meaning that collapse any notion of distinct
space and time into an “iterative becoming of spacetimemattering”’.14
Shifting attention towards non-spatialized temporalities thus ends up
involving the collapse of all distinctions — of and within space and
time as well as matter and meaning into what one might well call space-
11 Ibid., p. 564.
12 Ibid., p. 559.
13 Ibid., pp. 569 and 567.
14 Ibid., p. 569, quoting Karen Barad, Meeting theUniverseHalfway:QuantumPhysics and
the Entanglement of Matter andMeaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007),
p. 234.
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timematteringsemiosis15 — so as to be able to think their intra-active
co-emergent co-constitution.
The move from ‘Transcorporeal Weather’ to ‘Transcorporeal Tem-
poralities’ does not imply that Neimanis and Loewen Walker abandon
weathering. On the contrary, it is meant to lead them deeper into
weathering as ‘the intra-active process of a mutual becoming’ through
which ‘humans and climate change come to matter’. Thus, they make
the striking claim that ‘matter is weathering in its making of temporal-
ity’.16 Such a concept of weathering ‘means to think of bodies as part
and parcel of the making of time […]. Our very bodies, thoughts, ac-
tions, and behaviors make the present, past, and future’.17 Understood
as a ‘making of temporality’, weathering leads them to the provocative
‘claim that we are time’ — or at least to the notion of ‘a time that we
weather together’.18
Time, here, has taken the place of the world in the rallying cry
‘Together we weather the world’. Such formulae are intriguing and
highly suggestive, but upon closer inspection, the sense of weathering
emerging from them is quite ambivalent, difficult to ascertain, and
hard to retain. Indeed, they may serve rather as examples for the dif-
ficulty of fully grasping the ‘profound conceptual shift’ that the notion
of intra-action represents in Barad’s own words. Whereas the more
common idea of ‘interaction’ presumes the ‘prior existence of inde-
pendent entities or relata’, the notion of ‘intra-action’ insists that ‘relata
do not preexist relations’ and claims instead that they ‘emerge through
specific intra-actions’.19 Such a definition of intra-action is both com-
pelling and easily repeated. However, articulating or even just thinking
relations without preexisting relata — or, for that matter, the very no-
tions of ‘preexisting’, ‘preceding’, or processes of co-emergence without
a linear (temporal or logical) order — remains hard without getting
seduced by the duplications, separations, and reifications of language.
15 Other than ‘spacetimemattering’, Barad often uses ‘ontoepistemological’ and occasion-
ally ‘ethico-onto-epistemology’ (Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 409n10).
16 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, pp. 560 and 569.
17 Ibid., p. 569.
18 Ibid., p. 570.
19 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, pp. 139–40.
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A sentence such as ‘Together, we weather the world’ no doubt
describes a relational process, but insofar as it has a clear subject-
predicate-object structure, it invariably conveys the sense that these
identifiable, distinct elements precede their relation in the sentence. As
Neimanis and Loewen Walker had previously defined ‘weathering’ as
‘mutual worlding’, the sentence should be read as ‘Together, we mutu-
ally world the world’, which becomes even more redundant and tauto-
logical if one remembers that ‘we are the world’ insofar as ‘humans and
nonhuman climate and weather phenomena are co-constitutive’ and
‘we are mutually emergent, coextensive’. In other words, by identifying
the relata preceding the relation, one arrives at a triplicating but also
manifestly circular ‘The world worlds the world’, while what emerges
from the original formulation is not only the separation of ‘we’ from
the ‘world’, but also a subject-object relation with a defiant predicate
resonating well with how weathering is commonly used as a transitive
verb when one says, for instance, ‘the crew weathered the storm’.
My point here is not to criticize some particular, perhaps unfortu-
nate formulations, but rather to note that when invoking intra-action
to emphasize the ontological indeterminacy of anything preceding re-
lations, one should not forget that this is only the premise for the
claim that intra-action is meant to account for the co-constitution of
separable entities. Such co-constituted entities seem to acquire strong,
separable identities — stronger than what is suggested by contiguity,
continuity, or immersion, which intra-action supposedly radicalizes.
Indeed, the process of intra-active co-constitution is often referred
to as a ‘coming to matter’,20 but what is remarkable is that the co-
constitution happens here in and through common language. If ‘To-
gether, we weather the world’ has any referent and describes anything,
it is the imaginary of a ‘we’, of a ‘world’, and of their mutual constitution
that the sentence performatively produces. While the notion of intra-
20 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, adopt this pervasive language of mattering
in another formulation that works to equate weathering with intra-active processes: ‘it
is through weathering — the intra-active process of a mutual becoming — that humans
and climate change come to matter’ (p. 560). However, the premise and claim of intra-
action that relata come to matter through the relation rather than preexisting it, is
immediately contradicted by the subsequent sentence offering an alternative definition
by way of conclusion: ‘Weathering, then, is a logic, a way of being/becoming, or a
mode of affecting and differentiating that brings humans into relation with more-than-
human weather’ (p. 560).
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action may well succeed in dispelling the belief in separate entities
being ontologically pre-given, it is far less clear to what extent new-
materialist talk of mattering through intra-active, agential separation
does not yield to the seduction of language of foiling subjects into
everything and doubling or even tripling processes into a doing-doing
or world-worlding world.
Again, there is much to be said for taking the risk of anthropo-
morphizing in order to help balance the alternative risk of anthropo-
centrism, but it requires critical, methodological self-reflection if the
twin risks are to be avoided. The problem with the way in which Nei-
manis and Loewen Walker create the concept of weathering is not
so much that it involves a performative contradiction, which as such
may well be unavoidable if language is always performative and enacts
divisions into separable entities that appear to have pre-existed their
(linguistic) relation.21 Such a temporal entanglement, whereby lan-
guage produces what it presupposes, could well be considered part of
their critique of ‘linear time’ and correspond to the ‘cultivation of the
sensibility of thick time’ they propose and describe. However, what
would warrant critical reflection is the deliberate gesture of ‘concept-
creation’,22 which implies sovereign, anthropocentric subjects that can
create a concept such as ‘weathering’ ex nihilo (even as it explicitly
draws on theoretical sources) and disregard the multiple significations
that centuries of language use have sedimented into that signifier.
Disclaimers here seem insufficient and function rather as disavow-
als, denials, or negations in Sigmund Freud’s sense of Verneinung,23 as
when the authors distance themselves from both anthropomorphism
and human exceptionalism,24 but otherwise quite consistently seek to
reduce distances and deny the relevance of scale, thereby suggesting a
21 For an attempt to move beyond this logic of presupposition arguably characterizing
the experience of language from Aristotle to Derrida, see Damiano Sacco’s chapter ‘The
Weathering of the Trace: Agamben’s Presupposition of Derrida’ in this volume.
22 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, p. 560.
23 Highlighting the difficulty of retain the ambiguity of this term in translation, Jean
Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis (London:
Hogarth, 1973) conclude their entry on negation, Verneinung, (dé)négation by high-
lighting three closely related assertions in Freud’s analysis: ‘taking cognizance of what
is repressed’ and engaging in ‘a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed’, and
‘thinking frees itself from the restrictions of repression’ (p. 263).
24 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, pp. 563–64.
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strict symmetry and even equivalence in relations of mutuality and in
figures such as ‘weather bodies’. In particular, they explicitly question
common distinctions between climate and weather based on different
time-scales and aim ‘to reduce the distance between the enormity of
climate change and the immediacy of our own flesh’, or again they
propose to ‘bridge the distance of abstraction [which they criticize in
climate discourse] by bringing climate change home’.25
Similarly, Barad’s disclaimer that she does not intend to ‘make
general statements […] about all entanglements, nor to encourage
analogical extrapolation from [her] examples to others’26 sits uneasily
with the far-reaching consequences she and others draw from the no-
tion of intra-action as ‘mutual constitution of entangled agencies’. After
all, Barad’s neologism is only spelled out and specified in a precise,
technical sense for the example of quantum diffraction experiments
and their interpretation in terms of Niels Bohr’s particle-wave comple-
mentarity. Barad’s point that quantum entanglement is not limited to
microscopic scales and can therefore apply also on macroscopic scales
in a literal rather than analogical manner, is well taken, but in practice,
when entanglement is invoked to deny the relevance of scale, literality
seems to be a question of language rather than physics.27
Seeking to negotiate between conflicting risks perhaps always runs
the worse risk of disavowal, that is, of glossing over internal tensions,
while reproducing what is to be avoided. Immunizing itself against
critique, disavowal fosters a voluntarist decisionism concerning, for
instance, the question of when separability is to be rejected in favour of
25 Ibid., pp. 562 and 559. The formulation ‘bringing home’ is introduced indirectly
through the initial reference to Rachel Slocum, ‘Polar Bears and Energy-Efficient
Lightbulbs: Strategies to Bring Climate Change Home’, Environment and Planning D:
Society and Space, 22 (2004), pp. 1–26.
26 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 74.
27 In addition to the ‘caveat’ on using weather and climate interchangeably — justified
by suggesting that distinguishing time scales means to ‘promote a spatialized view
of climate time’ — there are further examples of disclaimers that I would read as
disavowals, that is, as acknowledging that there is something to what is explicitly
denied. For instance, there are the caveats that the ‘shift away from the “stop climate
change” temporal narrative is not for us a weakening of possibilities for ethico-political
engagement’ and that their proposal does not seek to ‘denigrate other feminist analyses
of climate change that underline the gendered, racialized, and colonial power politics
at play’ (‘Weathering’, p. 561), or the ‘clarifications’ in which Neimanis and Loewen
Walker distance themselves from holism and from a perspective on processes ‘bound
to the human mind’ (ibid., pp. 570–71).
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inseparable entanglements and when it is to be embraced as the mode
in which anything ‘comes to matter’. In order to negotiate conflicting
risks, it may be better to focus on the opportunities that are in apparent
conflict and envisage the possibility of fully endorsing heterogeneous
accounts, even if they are mutually incompatible and cannot be pic-
tured together. Such a possibility is envisaged by Bohr’s principle of
complementarity, which plays a decisive role in Barad’s inspiring ad-
vancement of the diffractive methodology that Donna J. Haraway had
proposed as alternative to ‘reflection’. While I find the development
of an ontology of indeterminate matter through a method of comple-
mentary diffraction compelling, I would highlight that this approach
crucially relies on disparate scales and insist on retaining the method
across different scales and fields rather than extrapolate the ontology
linearly or even simply unchanged. In particular, it may be productive
to think of the relation between the weather and human bodies, nature
and culture, physics and language as entangled and perhaps even in
some sense as intra-active, but not in the same sense in which electrons
are entangled and materialize through the measurement process: un-
like entangled electrons, each side of the relation has already come to
matter — if anything ever does.
The weathering article by Neimanis and Loewen Walker makes it
admirably transparent that the appeal of new-materialist theories and
notions such as intra-action often lies in opening up possibilities by
enabling a ‘new imaginary’ — a way to ‘reimagine our bodies’, ‘reima-
gine climate change’, and ‘reimagining our literal inextricability from
that towards which we are called to respond’ — rather than in provid-
ing a less human-centred, somehow more direct account of matter.
No doubt, the ‘reimagination of ourselves as weather bodies […] is
already a politics’.28 However, it is more difficult to see how a politics
of reimagination and intensive feeling can be reconciled as such with
the declared premises and aims of new-materialist and posthumanist
approaches, such as the explicit critique of human exceptionalism and
of the bifurcation of nature and culture. At least in its general outline,
it ultimately seems rather to be a fully anthropocentric, humanist, even
idealist politics. Perhaps in response to such reservations, the 2018
28 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, p. 572.
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article ‘Weathering’, which Neimanis co-authored with Jennifer Mae
Hamilton, appears more anchored and explicit in associating weath-
ering with ‘specific feminist, antiracist and decolonial intersectional
attentiveness’.29 For instance, it exemplifies its expanded, ‘naturalcul-
tural’ understanding of the weather by making contact with Christina
Sharpe’s notion of weather as ‘totality of our environments’ and ‘total
climate’ characterized as ‘antiblack’, and helpfully situates weathering
‘between the neo-liberal heroics of resilience and the victim politics
of vulnerability’.30 In these contexts, the image of intra-active, co-
constitutive weathering is particularly provocative, and while probing
its specific political potential falls beyond the purview of this chapter, I
will concentrate on exploring its logic both on the level of language and
on the level of physical reality to which Barad’s argument lays claim.
WEATHERING THE DICTIONARY
Creating weathering as a concept of co-constitutive worlding is
provocatively counter-intuitive insofar as both ‘co-constitution’ and
‘worlding’ suggest constructive processes. Even if one takes these
processes also as undermining the autonomy of the subject, the most
common use of the noun ‘weathering’ is rather more destructive: The
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines the noun as the ‘action
of the atmospheric agencies or elements on substances exposed to
its influence; the discoloration, disintegration, etc. resulting from
this action’.31 However, especially the verb ‘to weather’ is actually
remarkably ambivalent. Now usually associated with disintegration,
deterioration, and decay — or at least the risk thereof — its first
meaning was ‘1. to subject to the beneficial action of the wind and
sun; to air’.32 The subentries in the OED indicate that ‘weathering’
29 Astrida Neimanis and Jennifer Mae Hamilton, ‘Open Space Weathering [sic, according
to the journal’s citation recommendation]’, Feminist Review, 118.1 (2018), pp. 80–84
(p. 83) <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41305-018-0097-8>.
30 Neimanis and Hamilton, ‘Weathering’, pp. 81 and 83, Christina Sharpe, In the Wake:
On Blackness and Being (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016), p. 104.
31 ‘weathering, n.’, in OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) <https://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/226660> [accessed 10 May 2020].
32 ‘weather, v.’, in OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) <https://www.
oed.com/view/Entry/226641> [accessed 22 February 2020].
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was initially understood as a cultural technique encountered in such
diverse contexts as hawking (the ‘sport or practice of chasing birds
or small animals by means of trained hawks’), house- and farm-work
(airing linen, drying harvested crop), or handicraft (exposing clay for
brick- or tile-making).33
While the second meaning is formulated quite neutrally in terms
of a change through exposure, the several sub-entries indicate that a
complete reversal to the weather’s detrimental effects has taken place:
2. To change by exposure to the weather
a. transitive. To wear away, disintegrate, or discolour by atmos-
pheric action. […]
b. intransitive. To become worn, disintegrated, or discoloured
under atmospheric influences. […]
c. In passive, esp. of a crop: To be deteriorated by too long
exposure to bad weather.
d. intransitive. To wear (well or ill) under atmospheric influ-
ences.
The final sub-entry (2d), which could suggest a return to a neutral
sense of change, only serves to confirm the full reversal in relation to
the beneficial weathering of hawking and other cultural techniques.
Indeed, ‘wearing well’ merely seems to mean ‘wearing less badly’, and
the only sample phrase is: ‘For outside work, boiled oil is used, because
it weathers better than raw oil.’
Subsequent entries, which often invoke a nautical context, entail
another kind of reversal without entirely restoring the initial, beneficial
meaning.34 Weathering here refers to the ability to resist or escape
detrimental, even disastrous effects: ‘to get safely round’ (3b), ‘to with-
stand and come safely through (a storm)’ (4a), ‘to sustain without
disaster’ (4b), or ‘to pass through and survive (severe weather)’ (4c).
The previous meaning of weathering as a deteriorating change is im-
plied here as a threat or risk, but the verb is now used in an opposite
sense, namely as successful opposition to such a change.
33 ‘hawking, n.1’, in OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) <https://
www.oed.com/view/Entry/84775> [accessed 6 June 2020].
34 The nautical associations of weathering are emphasized by the Marlon Miguel’s chapter
‘Representing the World, Weathering its End: Arthur Bispo do Rosário’s Ecology of the
Ship’ in this volume.
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The final, rather specialized meanings listed in the OED return to
specific cultural techniques. One of them is directly beneficial, namely
‘6. To set (the sails of a windmill) at the proper angle to obtain the
maximum effect of the wind-force’; while the other one consists again
rather in avoiding detrimental effects, namely the technique in archi-
tecture ‘to slope or bevel (a surface) so as to throw off the rain’ (7).
Of course, many words are polysemic, but the OED definitions
suggest that the verb ‘to weather’ may be regarded, more radically,
as enantiosemic, that is, as having mutually opposite meanings. Such
words, which are their own antonyms, are more common than one
might expect, and include in English, for instance, ‘to cleave’ (to adhere
or separate), ‘to sanction’ (to approve or penalize/boycott), or ‘to rent’
(to purchase use of something or sell it).35 The verb ‘to weather’ is even
more peculiar insofar as it can be said to be doubly enantiosemic and
confound oppositions both of activity and quality: Usually signifying
a deteriorating change, it can also mean, on the one hand, successfully
opposing such a change and, on the other hand, undergoing a benefi-
cial change.
While context often clarifies the intended meaning, the coinci-
dence of opposites in a single word remains highly unstable. Some-
times, enantionyms are true homonyms, that is, words that have
different etymological origins and just happened to have become
homographs and homophones in the course of linguistic evolution.36
But the possibility of opposite meanings coming together in a word
through condensation, contraction, reduction, or equivocation can
also be indicative or evocative of a generative kernel from which
such oppositions have emerged in the first place and from which
diverse meanings continue to emerge. The puzzling, vertiginous im-
plications of such productivity appears reflected in the ongoing pro-
liferation of terms proposed to name this category of words: from
‘Janus word’, which seems to be the only one to have found its way
into the OED, to ‘self-antonym’, ‘auto-antonym’ or ‘autantonym’, ‘con-
35 Mark Nichol, ‘75 Contronyms (Words with Contradictory Meanings)’ <https://
www.dailywritingtips.com/75-contronyms-words-with-contradictory-meanings/>
[accessed 15 June 2020]. The list includes ‘Weather: To withstand, or to wear away’.
36 See ‘Janus Words’, Online Etymology Dictionary (2019) <https://www.etymonline.
com/columns/post/janus-words> [accessed 15 June 2020]. An often-cited example
is ‘to cleave’.
16 WEATHERING AMBIVALENCES
tronym’ or ‘contranym’, as well as ‘enantionym’, ‘enantiadrome’, and
‘antagonym’.37 Going further back, there is the notion of ‘primal
words [Urworte]’, Carl Abel’s thesis of their ‘antithetical meaning [Ge-
gensinn]’, and the analogy that Sigmund Freud establishes with the
logic and language of dreams.38 Highlighting that a ‘no’ does not seem
to exist for dreams, which ‘feel themselves at liberty, […] to represent
any element by its wishful contrary’, Freud notes:
[T]he most ancient languages behave exactly like dreams in
this respect. In the first instance they have only a single word
to describe the two contraries at the extreme ends of a series
of qualities or activities […]; they only form distinct terms
for the two contraries by a secondary process of making small
modifications in the common word [Urwort].39
Without necessarily endorsing Abel’s and Freud’s claims concerning
the historical evolution of languages and acknowledging that many
enantiosemic words have separate etymologies that only happened to
converge into single words, I maintain that the double enantiosemy
of ‘to weather’ is more than a contingent, historical accident. Instead,
my suggestion is that it is indicative of an undecidability that lies
at the heart of the fraught relationship humans entertain with their
environment and allows for manifold articulations. While such an
understanding of weathering resonates with the concept Neimanis
and Loewen Walker develop by drawing on contemporary theories
of transcorporeality and intra-action, I consider it as a case less of
‘concept-creation’ than of learning from the experience and peculiar
logic sedimented and implied in the word’s enantiosemic uses. If the
appeal of weathering lies in its generativity and beneficial potentials,
37 Cf. Burcu I. Karaman, ‘On Contronymy’, International Journal of Lexicography, 21.2
(2008), pp. 173–92 <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijl/ecn011>, David-Antoine Williams,
‘Poetic Antagonyms’, The Comparatist, 37.1 (2013), pp. 169–85 <https://doi.org/10.
1353/com.2013.0009>.
38 Carl Abel, Über den Gegensinn der Urworte (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm Friedrich,
1884) and Sigmund Freud, TheStandard Edition of the Complete PsychologicalWorks of
Sigmund Freud, 24 vols (London: Hogarth, 1953–74), iv: The Interpretation of Dreams
(1900) (1953), p. 318.
39 Freud, Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 318–19. Concerning primal words, Freud also
suggests that what is today symbolically related was ‘probably united in prehistoric
times by conceptual and linguistic identity’ and draws on Hans Sperber’s thesis on the
sexual reference of all primal words (p. 352).
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a critical question is understanding the conditions under which the
effects of weathering may reverse from detrimental to beneficial and
may open possibilities beyond such cultural techniques as hawking and
setting sails. The weather sciences and ultimately physics are no doubt
indispensable for understanding the conditions of beneficial weather-
ing, but the conditions are also a matter of politics, of socio-economic
and cultural values, of psychology, and ultimately of language, which
structures thought and experience. While this chapter remains focused
on weathering’s language, I seek to develop it in ways that may resonate
and interfere with its physics.
ANTHROPOCENTRIC GRAMMAR OF WEATHERING
Whereas the OED traces the historical development of word use,
the Merriam-Webster dictionary (MWD) takes a more systematic,
grammatical approach. It distinguishes on a first, hierarchical level
between transitive and intransitive uses of the verb, and then, on a
second level, between two transitive meanings:
transitive verb
1: to expose to the open air: subject to the action of the
elements




: to undergo or endure the action of the elements.40
This scheme can help clarify the grammar of weathering by being more
consistent than the OED, which likewise organizes different meanings
on two levels and foregrounds the transitive/intransitive distinction,
but uses this distinction on both levels and entangles it with other cat-
egories such as ‘passive’ or even ‘figurative’, ‘nautical’, and ‘architecture’.
For example, the OED entries one and four have the heading ‘transi-
tive’ and five is entitled ‘intransitive’, while three is entitled ‘nautical’
40 ‘Weather’, in Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster,
2020) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/> [accessed 20 February 2020].
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and has subheadings ‘3.a. transitive’, ‘3.d. intransitive’, and ‘3.b. figur-
ative’.41 Clearly, ‘figurative’ or ‘nautical’ exclude neither each other nor
the categories of ‘transitive’ or ‘intransitive’. Indeed, in this case the
figurative use ‘to get safely round’ is not just transitive but corresponds
well to Merriam-Webster’s second transitive meaning of ‘to bear up
against and come safely through’.
The simplicity of the MWD scheme is deceptive and would require
considerable commentary to unfold all its implications. No doubt, the
historical use of weathering is richer and more nuanced, but I would
like to give some indications of how the MWD’s compact grammatical
scheme suggests another story, one that is less historical than logical,
reductive, but also constructive, ultimately leading to a generative ker-
nel of indistinction and the possibility of as yet uncommon uses.
The compact three-fold definition formalizes well the double re-
versal from beneficial to detrimental exposure via successful resistance
on which I have already remarked. However, what is perhaps most
significant is that the MWD definitions conjure up an anthropocentric
division of nature and culture. The grammatical subject of weathering
indeed always seems to be human or an object of human interest, such
as ships that have weathered storms. It is true that one can also speak
of rocks that weather even if they have no specific human interest.
But although there is a sense in which the activity of the weather or,
more generally, ‘the action of the elements’ are always implied, the
possibility of the elements becoming the subject of weathering is not
envisaged. In other words, weathering is an anthropocentric predicate
insofar as it excludes the weather or the elements as core argument in
the subject function.
One might say that weathering denies the agency of the elements
by excluding them from the subject position, but my claim concerning
the anthropocentric bias of weathering needs to be articulated more
carefully. After all, one could say that the elements are excluded as sub-
jects only because their action is taken for granted and already implied
in the predicate ‘to weather’. Yet, as already mentioned, a characteris-
tically anthropocentric mode of relating to nature is precisely to take
41 Altogether, the OED has seven headings on the first level and fifteen subheadings on
the second level. Some first level entries have no subdivision and others as many as
four.
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nature for granted as a (back)ground for the figure of the human and
their actions.42 This also means that emphasizing the activity or even
agency of nature is insufficient to counter anthropocentrism. There
is indeed good reason to maintain that the elements are the primary
source of all weathering activities, while humans are at best reactive if
not entirely passive. But such a simple reversal of activity and passivity
merely re-affirms the anthropocentric nature-culture divide as long as
it involves predicates that enforce that divide. In other words, weath-
ering is anthropocentric not because it denies agency of the weather as
such — it does not preclude the existence of other predicates taking the
weather as active subject — but insofar as it is premised upon a divide
such that the weather is contained in the predicate (and possibly other
arguments the predicate controls), but excluded as subject.
This analysis of weathering’s anthropocentric bias indicates a pos-
sible strategy for countering it, namely to insist that there is no pre-
given divide that would preclude the weather as subject of different
forms of weathering; to expand accordingly the use of weathering at the
risk of anthropomorphism; and thereby to allow for an exploration of
how nature and culture may be understood as more entangled and/or
became separated through weathering.
The OED actually allows for such an expanded use of weathering
with some qualifications. As already mentioned, it includes the transi-
tive use 2a ‘to wear away, disintegrate, or discolour’ and gives a couple
of examples in which atmospheric phenomena or processes such as
clouds, smoke, or percolation do the weathering.43 At the same time
it notes that the verb is then ‘chiefly in passive’, meaning that the agent
42 Cf. Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, which repeatedly opposes the ten-
dency to externalize weather or climate: ‘When we hold onto the belief that we can
separate our human bodies from climate (close our doors, resist the winds), we main-
tain a worldview of relating to the earth, rather than worlding with it. As Colebrook has
argued, our attempts to externalize climate deny the fact that we are already entangled
in its forces and flows’ (p. 567, emphasis in the original); ‘The consequence of time’s
exteriorization is that, we, as bodies, are conceived as only ever in time, subject to
forces that carry on beyond and outside of us. The weather/environment serves only
as background, thus making for a particular mode of relating to the earth, as though
human beings are somehow separate from the natural elements’ (p. 568).
43 The sample phrases are: ‘The rain-cloud hangs low..overhead; the smoke hovers
around; and they weather the fines sculptured surface’ and ‘It [sc. percolation] acts also
very powerfully in weathering the rocks through which the water passes’ (‘weather, v.’,
in OED Online; ellipsis and square bracket in the original).
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is in a peripheral function or omitted entirely: the rock is weathered
by persistent rain or it is weathered tout court.44 While one sees here
how the agency of the weather is at once presumed and pushed into
the background, this is only the beginning of what becomes visible
and available to analysis when this less common use of weathering is
included. In particular, I would like to ask to what extent this use of
weathering is distinct from the other uses or can be related to them,
and ultimately what the different weathering verbs have in common
other than their name.
AMBIVALENT WEATHERING OF A STORM
I propose to augment the three-fold scheme of the Merriam-Webster
dictionary by explicitly adding the missing transitive use of weathering,
which takes the weather or the elements as subject, and place it along-
side the second transitive meaning of weathering (see Table 1 below).
Sample sentences of these two uses have the same basic subject-
predicate-object structure and differ only insofar as the weather is,
in one case, the object and, in the other, the subject. Corresponding
formally to a simple interchange of subject and object, they can be
combined into a single, seductively simple sentence, such as: ‘I weather
the storm as the storm weathers me.’45 This sentence could well be
taken as paradigmatic for a transitive sense of weathering that relates
nature and culture without being anthropocentric. Indeed, the sen-
tence suggests symmetry, relationality, mutuality, perhaps even a form
of co-constitution.
44 Of the seven examples for this entry 2a, only the two quoted in the previous footnote
are in the active voice. Curiously, the transitive definition 2a itself already has the
‘atmospheric action’ in a peripheral position: ‘to wear away […] by atmospheric action’
or indeed ‘to change by exposure to the weather’. It is as if the transitive subject were
here not atmospheric action or the weather but once again human beings, that is, as
if the whole second definition were ultimately just the malignant counter-part to the
first definition of ‘subjecting to the beneficial action of the wind and sun’.
45 Note that dictionaries tend to define verbs without specifying the subject, as if the
verbs could be universally used for any subject, while they do often specify the kind
of object that comes with certain uses: ‘to air (linen, etc.)’, ‘to expose (land, clay for
brick- or tile-making)’, ‘To set (the sails of a windmill)’, ‘to slope or bevel (a surface)’,
etc. In order to mark the anthropocentrism veiled by the universalism of the subject,
I find it necessary to specify not only the object but also the implied subject, using in
this case ‘I’ and ‘the storm’.
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However, there is something instructively wrong here — not in
the introduction of posthumanist weathering nor in the sentence com-
bining it with the more common, anthropocentric transitive use, but in
being led astray by the polysemy of both the predicate ‘weathering’ and
the conjunction ‘as’, which here should be read temporally or causally
rather than as establishing an equivalence. I may manage to weather the
storm while it weathers me, but I do not weather it ‘just as’ it weathers
me.
The suggestion of symmetrical co-constitutional relations is ac-
tually plausible for similar sentences with predicates such as fighting
or attracting: A arguably cannot fight, attract, or repel B if B does not
also fight, attract, or repel A — at least not if one understands such
verbs in a mechanical sense cohering with Isaac Newton’s third law
‘actio=reactio’: every action not only elicits a reaction but is precisely
equal (and opposite) to it, which means, among other things, that
neither comes first, and it is arbitrary which one is called action and
which reaction. A simple example would be the mutual gravitational
attraction between earth and moon, or the (electromagnetic) repul-
sion preventing a building from falling to the centre of the earth and
keeping it on the ground.
However, applying Newton’s third law can be tricky. The law
resonates strangely with Michel Foucault’s dictum ‘[w]here there is
power, there is resistance’ and with his relational understanding of
force and power that views resistance as a condition for power relations
rather than a passive reaction to a power that that would precede it.46
Yet, a balance of attractive and repulsive forces between two bodies
by no means implies that a building could not collapse under its own
weight. Two different kinds of forces, such as gravity and electromag-
netism (ensuring rigidity), are at work here, and there is no law of
equality or reciprocity for their relationship. Instead, they are quite
independent from one another, each action eliciting a reaction in the
other body, and there is equilibrium only if and when they balance each
other out.
46 Cf. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (New York: Pantheon, 1978), i: An
Introduction, pp. 92–97.
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I may weather the storm while it weathers me, but there is no guar-
antee that I will succeed: although the two instances of weathering in
this sentence are equally transitive, they do not only exchange subject
and object but also have no necessary relationship between them. [To
this extent we are far from being coextensive, let alone co-constitutive.]
The deceptive symmetry can be grasped even more compactly through
the ambivalent formulation of ‘the weathering of a storm’. Grammat-
ically, the genitive can be subjective or objective, that is, it can be the
agent or the patient to yield a storm that weathers things or a storm
that is being weathered. There may be symmetry in grammar but there
is none in the action. The difference here is not so much in scale — a
storm is generally much larger than anything that may weather it — but
in kind: a storm threatens everything within its scope with death and
destruction, whereas that which weathers the storm only saves itself
and need have no effect on the storm.
Transitive weathering thus splits into two meanings that are quite
independent from one another even if they are equally relational and
mutually opposed. To make this explicit, one could write as defin-
ing phrase ‘2α I weather the storm while 2β the storm weathers me’.
The grammatical reversibility of weathering — the possibility of in-
terchanging subject and object in its transitive use — therefore does
not imply relations of symmetry, mutuality, and co-constitution, as
it does with verbs for fighting or mutual attraction and repulsion. In-
stead it is the result of weathering’s specific enantiosemy that makes
it appear as its own reciprocal complement. What I mean by this
is that transitive weathering behaves in many ways like predicates
that change into a contrary, reciprocal predicate when their subject
is interchanged with another argument and that form couples such as
‘attack–defend’, ‘inflict–suffer’, or ‘show–watch’, except that it takes the
same word for both meanings. In other words, the grammatical revers-
ibility of weathering implies the couple ‘2αweathering–2βweathering’,
where 2αweathering involves self-preservation, sustained identity, and
survival, and 2βweathering denotes destruction, disintegration, and
death. Reducing even further, an equation of life and death could be
said to lie at the core of weathering’s enantiosemy.
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FANTASY AND WEATHERING WEATHERING
Insisting on transitive weathering as enantiosemic and split into two
different meanings is ambivalent insofar as it can both re-enforce onto-
logical divisions and suggest different strategies of countering them.
The division is reproduced if the contrary meanings are understood to
be uniquely determined by the subject, that is, if a human(-centred)
subject implies self-preserving 2αweathering and an atmospheric sub-
ject implies destructive 2βweathering. However, the division is under-
mined by insisting not merely on the atmosphere’s agency, but on
the possibility of human and non-human agents each being capable of
being the subject of both 2αweathering and 2βweathering.
The enantiosemy of weathering — joint by common use and
experience — makes it rather difficult to imagine and convey the pos-
sibility that I could weather the storm just as it weathers me, that is,
that I 2βweather it, wear it out, and make it decay; or that the storm
could weather me just as I weather it, that is, that it 2αweathers me,
resists being worn out, and safely comes through all my attempts to
annihilate it.
At the same time, the enantiosemy of weathering may be sug-
gestive in indicating that such exercises in logical permutations and
pedantic differentiations may be unnecessary and that there actually is
a continuity between contrary meanings, that is, that some common,
perhaps non-differentiated, ground exists from which they emerge.
While such a continuity goes counter a logic of non-contradiction and
is therefore hard to think, it can be dreamt and, in some languages, also
said.
What I am proposing here is that the enantiosemy of weathering,
its multiple reversals, and grammar can be read with Freud’s remarks
on antithetical primal words in his Interpretation of Dreams and his
analysis of the vicissitudes of drives, which he tightly links to ‘gram-
matical transformations’.47 At one point, he derives masochism from
sadism, which he considers as a ‘pair of opposites’, through a change
from active to passive aim, which he calls ‘reversal into its opposite’,
and through an interchange of subject and object, which he describes
47 Jean Laplanche,Life andDeath inPsychoanalysis, trans. by Jeffrey Mehlman (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 143n7.
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in two steps: first, the object of sadism is given up through a ‘turning
round upon the subject’s own self ’ and secondly, another person is
sought to take over the role of the subject. Noting that only the final
stage corresponds to what is commonly called masochism, Freud also
highlights the necessity of assuming the existence of the intermediate
stage, which he explicitly describes in grammatical terms as a change
from the ‘active voice […] not into the passive, but into the reflexive,
middle voice’.48
Jean Laplanche scolds Freud here for clouding his remarkable
grammatical analysis by confusing the reflexive voice (e.g., to hit one-
self) and the middle voice, which is somehow between or beyond the
active and the passive. Unlike Ancient Greek, English and most other
modern language have no verb form for the middle voice, but Romance
languages, for instance, often approximate it through a particular use
of the reflexive. Laplanche invokes the French example ‘se cogner
[to knock oneself]’ and distinguishes between an accidental knocking
oneself against a chair in the dark (corresponding to the middle voice)
and an intentional knocking of one’s head against the walls (which is
more properly reflexive).
While Laplanche privileges the properly reflexive form for its clear
distinction of subject and object over the middle form, where the terms
‘remain in something of a state of coalescence’,49 in the context of my
chapter, the intermediate stage between opposites is most promising
precisely when it coalesces rather than distinguishes subject and ob-
ject, activity and passivity. An intermediate stage characterized by a
‘reflexive, middle voice’ plays a pivotal role also in Freud’s discussion of
the pair of opposites ‘scopophilia [voyeurism]—exhibitionism’, where
he links this stage to a much earlier, autoerotic stage, which he under-
stands as the ‘source of both the situations represented in the resulting
pair of opposites’.50
Questions of original autoeroticism and of a primary, reflexive
masochism have been much debated as Freud remains notoriously
48 Freud, ‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psy-
chological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London:
Hogarth, 1953–74), xiv: On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on
Metapsychology, and Other Works (1914–1916) (1957), pp. 109–40 (pp. 126–28).
49 Laplanche, Life and Death, p. 143n7.
50 Freud, ‘Instincts and Their Vicissitudes’, p. 130; emphasis in the original.
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— but also overtly — ambiguous, contradictory, or undecided about
them.51 In a beautiful essay on original fantasies, fantasies of ori-
gin, and origins of fantasy, Jean Laplanche and Jean-Betrand Pontalis
have insisted on this question for an understanding of the origin of
sexuality in the properly psychoanalytic sense as a deviation from bio-
logical needs ‘into the field of fantasy’ and/or through a ‘breaking in of
fantasy’.52
Rather than speculating further on the onto- or phylogenetic ori-
gin of an emergent splitting off of a specifically psychoanalytical — and
human — order from the order of nature, I will return to the MWD’s
three-fold anthropocentric definition of weathering and my pairing of
the central transitive definition with a weathering that — at the risk
of anthropomorphizing — takes the elements as subject. Perhaps even
more speculatively, I would like to propose that this scheme can tell
another story, which, rather than by emergent splittings, proceeds by
a progressive reduction that may well end up turning weathering into
a primal weather verb that does not even have a subject.
PROGRESSIVE VALENCY REDUCTION
The story I propose progresses by reducing what linguists call a verb’s
‘valency’. This notion is taken from chemistry, where it indicates the
number of bonds an atom can establish with other atoms such as
hydrogen, and refers to the number of arguments controlled by a
predicate. Transitive verbs are typically divalent — taking a subject
and an object — or trivalent, when they also take an indirect object,
while intransitive verbs are typically monovalent. Most languages have
valency-lowering and valency-raising mechanisms, such as the passive
51 In a footnote added nine years later, in 1924, Freud just comments his rejection of the
existence of primary masochism by saying: ‘In later works […] I have expressed an
opposite view’ (p. 128n2).
52 Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, ‘Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality’, in
Formations of Fantasy, ed. by Victor Burgin, James Donald, and Cora Kaplan (London:
Routledge, 1989), pp. 5–34 (p. 25). The original title, which I paraphrased, is ‘Fan-
tasme originaire, fantasmes de origines, origines du fantasme’, Les Temps Modernes,
19.215 (1964).
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1 I weather a hawk 3
2 α) I weather the storm as β) the storm weathers me 2
3 I weather 1
4 [It] weathers 0
Table 1. Definition of weathering on the basis of the MWD, making the implied
subject explicit, splitting the second definition by adding 2β (see above), and
adding an understanding of weathering as an avalent weather verb (see below). The
number at the end of the lines indicate the verb’s valency.
or reflexive, which lower the valency, or the causative, which raises it:
‘to make someone do something’.53
Like the historically oriented OED, the MWD begins with weath-
ering as a cultural technique. Grammatically, this transitive use of
weathering is divalent: in weathering a hawk or weathering linen there
are two arguments: subject and object. Yet, as the definition ‘to subject
to the action of the elements’ suggests, the verb’s valency is effectively
increased to three. Two agents indeed seem to be present, not only
the grammatical, usually human, subject of the sentence, but also the
weather, the air, the sun, or other atmospheric elements. Although
grammatically divalent, the historically first use of weathering thus
involves a triangulation: to weather hawks or linen means that one has
the weather weather them.
On this view, the second transitive use of weathering involves a
reduction of the number of predicate arguments, leading to a semantic-
ally as well as grammatically binary subject-object relation: to weather
a storm or crisis. However, upon closer inspection, it is hard to see
how this transitive use could be obtained from the first one through
valency-reduction, which points rather to its opposite 2β: I weather a
hawk = I have the elements weather a hawk → the elements weather a
hawk.
53 For an overview of the wide range of valency changing mechanisms and case studies
in different languages, see Changing Valency: Case Studies in Transitivity, ed. by Robert
M. W. Dixon and Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000).
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Proceeding to the third meaning in the MWD involves a further
reduction of valency. In rocks that weather, there is a subject but no
object and weathering as an intransitive verb is monovalent. Verbs that
can be both transitive and intransitive are sometimes called ‘ambitran-
sitive’ or ‘labile’ verbs.54 But here, too, it is hard to see how such a use
could be derived from the original transitive use 2α, whereas it comes
rather easily from 2β: The storm weathers me = I am weathered by the
storm ≈ I am weathered → I weather. There is something quite remark-
able in the last step from the passive (which is already monovalent) to
the intransitive insofar as grammatically it involves a reversal from the
passive to the active. Yet, it is linguistically not that unusual and is the
mode of valency reduction of so-called ‘patientive ambitransitives’. A
standard example in English is the verb ‘to break’: I break the cup =
The cup is broken by me ≈ The cup is broken → The cup breaks.
Adding the use 2β thus facilitates an understanding of the three-
fold MWD scheme in terms of a progressive reduction of valency. In a
way, this is just the result of 2β making explicit the ‘action of the elem-
ents’, which 1 and 3 take for granted but place in the background. One
might indeed object that if one considered the first use (i.e., weathering
hawks) as trivalent, one should now also say that the intransitive verb
is effectively divalent insofar as the weather remains implied as agent.
In other words, one might say that the use 2β was not entirely absent in
the MWD but effectively contained in 3. If this observation can further
the strategy of countering the anthropocentric nature-culture divide
by insisting on the agency of the elements, I would now like to sug-
gest that there is also something to be said for taking the grammatical
reduction of valency from 2β to 3 more seriously.
While transitivity is premised upon a separation of subject and
object, which easily aligns with nature and culture — regardless of
whether one says ‘I weather the elements’ or ‘the elements weather
me’ — intransitivity can do without a system–environment distinction
and makes no reference to the environment. Is there not indeed a
sense in which everyone and everything weathers and does so ‘by
itself ’, without any particular external influence? This would mean
understanding intransitive weathering not as an implicit or ‘agentless’
54 Ibid., p. 4.
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passive that disavows the ‘action of the elements’, taking it for granted
and placing it in the background, but rather as a kind of reflexive or
middle voice, perhaps as an activity that turns against itself when it
finds no object, or, vice versa and more radically, as an ‘anticausative’
verb from which a subject-object distinction co-emerges without being
implied.55 It could even mean understanding intransitive weathering
as a form of reflexive masochism or, with Freud’s re-articulation of
primary masochism in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, as a manifestation
of the death drive.
Weathering in this sense is a correlate of ageing or the passage of
time, as Romance languages using the same word for ‘weather’ and
‘time’ suggest.56 Even though some things age well and growing up
and maturing are often welcomed, and even though some storms and
crises may be weathered, deterioration, decay, and death appears as
ineluctable fate of all temporal existence. In other words, ‘the action
of the elements’ undergone or endured in intransitive weathering may
well be just a way of speaking of a law of nature. A famous law quickly
comes to mind: the second law of thermodynamics, the law of increas-
ing entropy, which is often invoked to define the arrow of time.
Perhaps there is a good reason, then, that using weathering for
‘the action of the elements’ is uncommon and that this action is taken
for granted or even dismissed. Not only would it be a pleonasm to
say that ‘the weather weathers’, but following Nietzsche one could
insist that the process of weathering is all there is and that a subject
is added only out of grammatical habit producing a ‘doing doing’.
‘The weather’ and ‘the elements’ would then only be abstract fictions
without real existence. All there is then is the process of weathering
55 Cf. Dixon and Aikhenvald on the distinction between the ‘prototypical passive’, where
the agent is named, the ‘agentless passive’, where the agent is implied — ‘the glass is
broken (implied: by someone)’ — and the ‘anticausative’, where an agent is neither
stated nor implied: ‘the glass broke’ (p. 7). (In this case, the object is explicitly assumed
as grammatical subject, and my suggestion of co-emergence gestures already further
towards an avalent ‘it weathers’.) Concerning the term ‘middle’, the authors warn that
it is used with a ‘frightening variety of meanings’ — including the anticausative and re-
flexive — lacks in ‘typological clarity’, and often amounts to a ‘(general) intransitivizer’
(p. 11–12).
56 On the association of weather and time, or weathering and change, see Niccolò Crisafi
and Manuele Gragnolati’s chapter ‘Weathering the Afterlife: The Meteorological Psy-
chology of Dante’s Commedia’ in this volume.
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that takes place in everything — in the elements themselves — without
the intervention of some subject or agent. In other words, weathering
would be an avalent weather verb after all: ‘it weathers’, and even
speaking of an ‘it’ may be already saying too much.
But what about the more positive meanings of weathering: the
possibility of weathering storms and crises, or even the beneficial
actions of the weather? Do they have an intransitive, even avalent cor-
relate or substrate from which they can be imagined to emerge, or are
they in inherently bound to human subjects?
No doubt the positive evaluation of weathering is to a large extent
anthropocentric. The outright beneficial character of the elements in
the first use indeed seems due to cultural mediation — be it because we
channel the actions of the elements, because the weathering is good for
us but not the hawk (not to speak of sun-dried tomatoes or raisins), or
because weathering hawks means temporarily lifting their confinement
and putting them back in their element. Most strikingly, the OED
counts the meaning ‘to expose […] to the pulverizing action of the
elements’ under the rubric ‘to subject to the beneficial action of the
wind and sun’, which sounds violent and could even appear sadistic if
the utility for ‘brick- or tile-making’ were not mentioned in my ellipsis.
However, there is also a sense in which beneficial weathering can
be understood with respect to an entity’s identity, self, or unity as a
system rather than human utility. Garments that are being weathered
lose their odour and other contaminations, making them less suscept-
ible to moths, for instance. Weathering here purifies; it takes off what
is not essential, making the object more durable. Clothes that are dried
in the open air do not rot, nor will grapes and tomatoes, for instance.
Perhaps this weathering takes out some life — or the potential for
unwanted life, like mould — but even disregarding human utility, it
seems distinguishable from entropic processes of disintegration and
dissipation that involve homogenization and a loss of structure and
order. Indeed, it lays bare what persists, such as an underlying structure
otherwise hidden under a superficial, perhaps only ornamental layer
(as it is in plastered buildings or artworks).
In other words, weathering can accentuate a thing’s identity in its
constitutive difference from the environment by enacting the differen-
tiation of that which in it weathers and that which does not. Or, more
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suggestively, weathering constitutes identity by enacting a differenti-
ation between two kinds of weathering, between ‘what 3weathers’ and
‘what 2αweathers the elements’.
Again, one could insist that intransitive 3weathering is really a pas-
sive form that implies the environment as agent and therefore presup-
poses a self that is distinguished from the environment. But one might
also take the valency reduction more seriously and extend instead
the intransitive meanings of weathering. In this way, if I argued that
the ordinary intransitive use of weathering forms with 2βweathering a
patientive ambitransitive pair, 2αweathering could well be considered
part of an agentive ambitransitive pair, where the intransitive simply
omits the transitive object. Examples in English include eating but
also winning. Not only does ‘to come safely through’ — the MWD
definition for 2αweathering — resonate with winning, but it is also
itself intransitive, and perhaps one can hear in intransitive weathering
not just resignation but also defiance: ‘I weather!’.57
With such a doubling of intransitive weathering, a sense of iden-
tity becomes conceivable that relies not on a pre-given distinction
from the environment — the subject-object opposition of transitive
verbs — but that is instead constituted through the internal differ-
entiation of ‘what αaweathers’ and ‘what βpweathers’. The additional
superscript is necessary because one can also imagine another per-
mutation of having the two transitive meanings of weathering enter the
two varieties of ambitransitivity, arriving at both a βaweathering and a
αpweathering of the elements (subjective genitive).58 For a full account
of self-constituted identity that does not rely on ontological divisions,
the intransitive weatherings must not, of course, predetermine their
57 While defiant weathering may provide a (politically) unattractive model insofar as it
approaches ‘neoliberal resilience’ (Neimanis and Hamilton, ‘Weathering’, p. 83) or a
‘macho model’ of subjectivity, which Crisafi and Gragnolati exemplify with Capaneus
in Dante’s Comedy (‘Weathering the Afterlife’, p. 74), one can also think of the gay
anthem during the AIDS pandemic ‘I will survive’, which its singer Gloria Gaynor
adapted in 2017 for hurricane victims into ‘Texas Will Survive’, Twitter, 31 August
2017 <https://twitter.com/gloriagaynor/status/903027825443254273> [accessed 5
July 2020]).
58 If ‘I αaweather’ comes from dropping the object in ‘I αweather the storm’ and ‘I am
being βweathered [by the storm]’ leads to ‘I βpweather’, the storm can βaweather by
dropping the object in ‘The storm βweathers me’ or by turning the passive ‘The storm
is αweathered [by me]’ into an intransitive ‘the storm αpweathers’.
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possible subjects. That is, in principle, one would have to allow for a
fourfold intransitive weathering for both ‘the elements’ and other, in
particular human, subjects, or ultimately just an avalent four-fold ‘it
weathers’.
TOWARDS A PHYSICS OF FOUR-FOLD WEATHERING
No doubt, we have long left behind even less common uses of weath-
ering, and there is also no reason to assume that every verb should be
doubly ambitransitive. However, the combinatorics of valency reduc-
tion on the one hand raises critical questions worth exploring further.
What would it mean if attempts at going beyond fixed subject-object
binaries led to a proliferation of monovalent or eventually avalent
weatherings? Does it suggest that the problem of binaries repeats itself
in a different guise? Or could one take weathering’s enantiosemy —
the use of the same word ‘weathering’ for all the different meanings
that can be kept separate only with considerable analytical effort — as
a hint that weathering defies language, logic, and reason, that one can
only attempt to get to a fuller account by bringing together all these
different, contrary meanings even though they cannot be pictured to-
gether, and that it forms an ultimately ungraspable kernel from which
all the distinctions emerge that are retroactively used to project out
complementary aspects?
On the other hand, I would maintain that the linguistic combina-
torics can be productively related to different material phenomena
and some thorny questions in the history and philosophy of physics. I
have already suggested that thermodynamics and its second law of ir-
reversible entropy production and dissipation strongly resonates with
ubiquitous intransitive weathering, which now should be specified as
βpweathering. However, the second law continues to raise profound
questions and elicit much debate. Insofar as it defines an arrow of
time — an irreversible tendency towards larger entropy, disorder,
equilibrium, and homogeneity — it confirms the intimate connection
between weather and time suggested by Romance languages. As such,
it is arguably necessary for any kind of phenomenal experience.
Yet while often regarded as the most fundamental law, the second
law is alternatively, sometimes even simultaneously, considered as re-
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1 I weather a hawk
2 I αweather the storm The storm βweathers me
3 I αaweather I βpweather /
[the storm] am βweathered [by the storm]
The storm αpweathers / The storm βaweathers
is αweathered [by me] [me]
4 αaweathers βpweathers
[it] αpweathers βaweathers
Table 2. Completing the three MWD definitions of weathering (in bold) by allow-
ing the storm to be the subject and considering both αweathering and βweathering
as both agentive ambitransitives and patientive ambitransitives.
ducible to more fundamental laws at lower scales and/or in profound
conceptual conflict with these laws.59 The basic reason for the conflict
is that physics tends to theorize fundamental laws as reversible and
conservative rather than dissipative, that is, despite its early twentieth-
century revolutions, it continues to follow the paradigm of Newtonian
mechanics and its laws of inertia and conservation, which it extends
from energy and momentum to other quantities and information. The
basic conflict between classical mechanics and thermodynamics can be
aligned with the difference between α-weathering connoting persist-
ence and β-weathering connoting decay, deterioration, and loss. More
precisely, the conflict here corresponds to the difference between
αaweathering (a persisting obtained from the active ‘I αweather [the
storm]’) and βpweathering (a decaying obtained from the passive ‘I am
being βweathered [by the storm]’).
Furthermore, there is the counter-intuitive claim — forcefully ad-
vanced especially by Ilya Prigogine, the 1977 Chemistry Nobel Prize
winner for his work on dissipative structures — that it is the second
59 While the literature on this topic is vast, a helpful point of entry may be Craig
Callender, ‘Taking Thermodynamics Too Seriously’, Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part B, 32.4 (2001), pp. 539–53.
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law that accounts for the emergence of order and structure.60 Prigo-
gine’s claim is remarkably hard to grasp in its provocatively general
ramifications. It is often emphasized, for good reasons, that a key point
for making the self-organized order and growth of living organisms
consistent with the second law is to consider them as open systems
that exchange energy with their environment and, more specifically,
discharge more entropy into their surroundings than they ingest.61 To
this extent, one could say that the key insight is that organisms behave
like little storms that βaweather in the form of exhaling, sweating, defe-
cating, and urinating.
However, Prigogine goes further to suggest that self-organization
is not merely compatible with the second law but follows from it, that
is, that a system’s identity and organization emerge and persist thanks
to dissipation. It is as if α-weathering of mechanical persistence were
subsumed under thermodynamic β-weathering and pushed towards
an ambiguous vitalism. Such a move can already be found in Spinoza’s
notion of conatus as a ‘striving to persevere in one’s being’, which is
modelled upon mechanical inertia but tends to retain sense of desire
and teleology of upward progression.62
The basic issue remains how anything can emerge to grow in
the first place. Although the βaweathering verbs of excretion are all
intransitive, they — and the very notion of an open system — all
presuppose a distinction between system and environment. I would
argue that it is therefore misleading to say that a system’s identity and
organization can emerge through dissipation as such, and maintain
instead, as already indicated, that a differentiation between different
modalities of intransitive weathering is required, which can now be
60 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with
Nature (London: Heinemann, 1984).
61 In What Is Life? from 1944, Erwin Schrödinger highlights that ‘an organism feeds on
negative entropy’. While the related notion of ‘negentropy’ remains controversial, the
basic idea is clear: for a self-organizing organism to respect the second law of global
entropy increase, ‘the essential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds
in freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot help producing while alive’ (Erwin
Schrödinger, What Is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell with Mind and Matter
andAutobiographical Sketches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 71).
62 Cf. Christoph F. E. Holzhey, ‘Conatus Errans: Paradoxe Lust zwischen Teleologie und
Mechanik’, in Conatus und Lebensnot: Schlüsselbegriffe der Medienanthropologie, ed. by
Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky and Anna Tuschling, Cultural Inquiry, 12 (Vienna: Turia
+ Kant, 2017), pp. 66–123.
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specified as a differentiation of persisting αaweathering and dissipative
βaweathering.
Among the most familiar and deceptively simple examples from
physics with which to test out these ideas is the formation of crystals in
a super-cooled liquid. The process depends as much on the formation
of persistent bonds in the emergent solid as on the flow of energy
into the surrounding liquid, where it dissipates to increase the overall
entropy. Furthermore, the liquid keeps threatening to dissolve the nas-
cent crystal again, and it would quickly do so if its relative volume were
not so large that it can easily absorb and dissipate the crystallization
energy without being significantly affected by it. One could well speak
here of a mutual weathering and even of the co-emergence and co-
constitution of ‘things’ and their environment. Indeed, crystallization
provides a model with which to think through the intriguing but hard
to grasp notion of intra-action as process through which separable
entities emerge and materialize in relations without preexisting relata.
The model of crystallization helps understand, for instance, that mutu-
ality, co-extensiveness, and co-constitution need not imply symmetry
or similarity between the emergent entities, nor do they question the
solidity and durable persistence of what emerges. It is helpful in clari-
fying the roles of indeterminacy, virtuality, and contingency, but also
predictability. A closer analysis could thereby help sharpen the larger
claims and expectations attached to such notions as intra-action, co-
emergence, and co-constitution, even if — or rather precisely as —
it may disappoint insofar as the general trajectory is quite predictable
and progresses linearly from homogeneous liquid to immersed crys-
tals, leaving only — though, to be sure, significantly — their actual
location and shape open to a range of variation.
Much the same could be said about the more dynamic phe-
nomenon to which Prigogine repeatedly refers as paradigm for dis-
sipative structures, namely the spontaneous emergence of so-called
Bénard convection cells in a homogeneous layer of liquid that is
heated from below. This model relates in several ways to the multiple,
ambivalent meanings of weathering. Above all, it provides the basic
mechanism for the formation of wind patterns in the earth’s atmos-
phere under the effect of the sun’s influx of heat, which eventually gets
radiated in a more isotropic and entropic form into outer space. But
CHRISTOPH F. E. HOLZHEY 35
its closer analysis also gives an indication of what could be meant by
αpweathering, which in my analysis of the grammatical possibilities
of weathering remained perhaps most obscure: what does it mean to
consider αweathering as a patientive ambitransitive, that is, to say that
the storm αpweathers insofar as it is weathered by me? How could a
storm possibly be affected by my weathering it?
The attempt to model the weather through numerical calculations
of the equations governing atmospheric convection made meteoro-
logist Edward Lorenz a pioneer of so-called chaos theory. Repeating
his computer simulations, Lorenz discovered that the sequence of
convection patterns is extremely sensitive to initial conditions, mak-
ing the weather unpredictable for all practical purposes even when
it is assumed to be governed by fully deterministic and reversible
equations.63 This defining characteristic of chaos as understood in
mathematics and physics — the appearance of randomness and chance
in fully deterministic systems due to sensitivity to initial conditions
— is at the heart of the famous ‘butterfly effect’. As Lorenz himself
highlights in retrospect, this expression has a ‘cloudy history’.64 Often
traced to his 1972 paper entitled ‘Predictability: Does the Flap of a
Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set off a Tornado in Texas?’, it refers to the
possibility of small causes having large effects.65 It suggests, in particu-
lar, that what an organism does to persist can have far-reaching effects
— it can even set off a storm somewhere on the globe, or also prevent
it.
As Lorenz notes, ‘Perhaps the butterfly, with its seeming frailty
and lack of power, is a natural symbol of the small that can produce
the great.’66 However, the agency that the butterfly effect attributes
to everything, including the small and meek, is ultimately deeply am-
bivalent: its potentially enormous effects could seem to show the
63 See Edward N. Lorenz, ‘Encounter with Chaos’, in Edward N. Lorenz, The Essence of
Chaos (London: UCL Press, 1995), pp. 111–60, especially ‘Searching’, pp. 130–35.
Lorenz’s chance discovery is dramatized in the opening chapter ‘The Butterfly Effect’
of the best-selling book James Gleick,Chaos:Making aNewScience (London: Cardinal,
1988), which Lorenz credits for having established the butterfly effect as the ‘symbol
for chaos’ (p. 13).
64 Lorenz, Essence of Chaos, p. 14.
65 The talk given in 1972 is published in ibid., pp. 179–82.
66 Ibid. p. 15.
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irrelevance of scale, make everything possible, and even feed fantasies
of omnipotence, but they are utterly unpredictable and knowable only
retroactively. Furthermore, even if an agent knew what it was doing,
any intention, plan, or strategy would be foiled by myriads of equally
powerful and unpredictable agents. Whatever happens ultimately de-
pends on the constellation and behaviour of all agents, which are so
thoroughly entangled as to make the very notion of agency meaning-
less.
If anything, it is the weather that gains agency through the en-
tanglement of zillions of effective butterflies. As everything weathers
the weather, the weather is weathered and therefore could be said
to αpweather in an entirely unpredictable manner, behaving, for all
practical purposes, as if it had a mind of its own. Furthermore, if
αaweathering is above all about self-preservation, survival, and persist-
ing self-identity — the storm figuring only as a grammatical object but
not as the object towards which one’s action is directed — the point of
chaos theory could be said to assert much the same of αpweathering.
Chaos as understood by mathematics and physics is not pure ran-
domness. Instead, it is defined in terms of a causally fully determined
dynamic and involves a peculiar and ambivalent kind of unpredict-
ability. If the figure of the butterfly ultimately established itself for
chaos theory, it is arguably because it symbolizes not only the ‘small
that can produce the great’, but also another defining aspect of chaos,
namely the presence of so-called ‘strange attractors’, which constrain
and govern the apparently random behaviour of chaotic systems. An
attractor represents a small subset of possible configurations or dy-
namic patterns towards which a dynamic system is ‘attracted’ no matter
where it begins. In the simplest case, the attractor is a point, such
as the bottom of a well where a ball will end up whichever way it is
thrown in. The attractors of chaotic systems are ‘strange’ insofar as they
have a very complicated, so-called fractal geometry (Figure 1 shows an
example). This strangeness accounts for the appearance of randomness
as a system will be attracted to a different part of its attractor when the
initial conditions are slightly different. Yet the attractor itself can be
understood as a system’s signature, that is, as a robust, intrinsic telos
towards which the system will evolve and to which it will return when
disturbed.
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Figure 1. A Julia Set <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Julia_set_(chartreuse).png>.
Among the earliest and most famous attractors is the one that
Lorenz found while modelling some aspects of atmospheric convec-
tion. In its by now customary representation, it happens to resemble a
butterfly (see Figure 2), which provides another genealogy and mean-
ing of the butterfly effect.67 In this case, the butterfly would be the
symbol less of small external causes having large effects in systems
that are very sensitive to initial conditions and therefore effectively
random than of the robust identity of the system itself, which is drawn
to sets of patterns in a way that is no doubt highly irregular, but still
characteristic and recognizable like the dazzling colours of a butterfly’s
wings.
Combining the two genealogies, the butterfly can symbolize a pro-
found ambivalence of chaotic systems like the global weather system.
On the one hand, it highlights their frailty and instability if even the
flap of a single, frail butterfly can cause or prevent the occurrence of
67 See Robert C. Hilborn, ‘Sea Gulls, Butterflies, and Grasshoppers: A Brief History of
the Butterfly Effect in Nonlinear Dynamics’, American Journal of Physics, 72.4 (2004),
pp. 425–27 (p. 425) <https://doi.org/10.1119/1.1636492>. Lorenz himself remains
agnostic: ‘A number of people with whom I have talked have assumed that the butterfly




Figure 2. The Lorenz Attractor aka Butterfly Attractor
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:
Lorenz_system_r28_s10_b2-6666.png>.
a storm. But the utter unpredictability resulting from this sensitivity,
which leads to an inextricable entanglement with all elements, is only
half the reason of why the weather behaves as if it had a mind of its
own. Just as importantly, the weather behaves on the other hand in
a manner that is not random but indeed of its own, always moving
towards and along the intricately folded lines of its strange attractor,
which characterizes the weather system and endows it with its own
robust autonomous identity and idiosyncratic dynamic.
According to Lorenz, the strange attractor of the global weather
system is ‘simply the climate’,68 and it imposes an indeed remarkably
68 Lorenz, Essence of Chaos, p. 48.
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stable identity on the weather. While explaining a difficulty in numer-
ical weather simulations, he asks his readers to ‘imagine an enormous
creature from outer space that swoops down close to the earth, reaches
out with a giant paddle, and stirs the atmosphere for a short while
before disappearing’.69 Such a drastic intervention will have violent
effects, of course, but Lorenz maintains that they will quickly dissipate;
the perturbation of the weather will then be ‘hardly detectable and the
weather will be back to normal, although the particular sequence of
weather patterns will undoubtedly not be the one that would have de-
veloped without the disturbance.’70 Clearly, Lorenz was not thinking
of climate change here, but his argument does not deny its possibility
and remains instructive in understanding how one can insist both on
the weather’s resilient autonomy and on its instability, unpredictabil-
ity, and sensitivity: Even after an enormously powerful intervention
from outer space, the weather system quickly returns to ‘normal’ (that
is, to its strange attractor), but at the same time the particular sequence
of weather patterns (where and when a tornado forms, for instance)
remains susceptible to even the most minute interventions.
While much more could be said about chaos theory, its premises,
and consequences, I will conclude by proposing that it can provide
useful models with which to think some of the ambivalences of weath-
ering that the enantiosemic uses of the word have revealed. In par-
ticular, by engaging with profound ambivalences of un/predictability,
im/potency, and dis/entanglement it may help grasp the peculiar kind
of subject evoked when one uses weather verbs and says ‘it storms’,
‘it rains’, ‘it is hot’, or ‘it is cold’. What remains perhaps necessarily
ambivalent is the question of whether the weather as subject anthropo-
morphizes the weather or deflates the notion of a subject. As noted at
the outset, it may be preferable to err on the side of anthropomorphism
and exclude an anthropocentric dualism in which the human (subject)
constitutes itself in opposition to the (nonhuman) elements. Yet blur-
ring all distinctions runs the risk of re-asserting through disavowal an
emphatic autonomous subject with a vengeance, making the subject
omnipotent by considering everything inseparably entangled, denying
69 Ibid., p. 96.
70 Ibid., pp. 96–97.
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the relevance of scale, and allowing for decisionist agential cuts that
determine what comes to matter and what is left to draw on. What
I am suggesting instead is to trouble human exceptionalism through
the peculiar subject of weathering that transpires when weathering is
methodologically situated in both language and physics and grasped in




On an overcast afternoon in Paris in 1896, Henri Becquerel opened
a dark drawer and accidentally discovered spontaneous radioactivity.
He had been studying the absorption of sunlight by phosphorescent
uranium salts, hypothesizing that they might re-emit the sunlight as
X-rays. But the weather in Paris in late February was not so agreeable
to his experiments, and Becquerel, waiting for the next sunny day to
test his theory, placed the wrapped photographic plates and uranium
salts in his desk drawer. On 1 March, he opened the drawer and de-
veloped the plates to find that the image of the salt crystals on the plate
was actually amazingly clear. He had discovered that uranium emitted
radiation without any sunlight, a phenomenon that his student Marie
Curie would later coin ‘radioactivity’.
This well-rehearsed historical moment of the chance discovery of
radioactivity is one marked by a process of exposure without light.
Indeed, Becquerel would later learn that non-phosphorescent uranium
compounds also had the same effect on the photographic plate, con-
firming that the radiation from non-luminescent uranium compounds
had the identical effect of rendering an image visible without the
presence of light. This moment of chance marks a profound shift in
visibility. Thus, early nuclear physics paired with early photographic
42 RADIATING EXPOSURES
technologies contributed to an unseating of (unassisted) vision as
the epistemic centre of human experience. As John O’Brian writes in
the introduction to Camera Atomica, ‘Wherever nuclear events occur,
photographers are present. They are not there only to record what
happens, but also to assist in the production of what happens.’1 The
photographic image, with or without the use of light, is not (only, if at
all) a representation or a reproduction of the nuclear event, but actively
participates in the construction of the nuclear regime.
In ‘La Nucléarisation de monde’, Jaime Semprun writes that
‘[b]ecause nuclear fission acts on the very structure of inorganic mat-
ter […], from now on there is no longer anything to see’.2 Sven
Lütticken likewise identifies the emergence of the nuclear regime as
‘exacerbat[ing] a certain modern crisis of the aesthetic’, one that ‘con-
firms that the aesthetic is a practice and theory of crisis’.3 This early
non-luminescent exposure, rendering visible an image of otherwise
imperceptible radiation, remains a touchstone of nuclear aesthetics,
as well as of the broader crisis of representation that the discovery
of the nuclear sciences participated in ushering in. This crisis identi-
fied by both Lütticken and Semprun manifests itself in the sciences,
as physicist and philosopher Karen Barad’s account4 of microscopic
technologies that render the atom ‘visible’ has demonstrated,5 as well
as in art and culture more broadly as ‘reality’ recedes from the visual
field. With scientific technologies, the crisis of representation is a crisis
1 John O’Brian, ‘Introduction: Through a Radioactive Lens’, in Camera Atomica, ed. by
John O’Brian, Art Gallery of Toronto (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2014), pp. 11–
29 (p. 11).
2 Jamie Semprun, La Nucléarisation du monde (France: IVREA Press, 1986). Eng-
lish translation accessed via Libcom.org: <https://libcom.org/library/nuclearization-
world-jaime-semprun> [accessed 3 July 2020], p. 30.
3 Sven Lütticken, ‘Nuclear Aesthetics: Beyond Big Bangs’, kunstlicht: Journal for Visual
Art, Visual Culture, and Architecture, 39.3–4 (2018), pp. 13–19 (p. 14).
4 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement
of Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007) <https://doi.
org/10.1215/9780822388128>. She details, for example, the way in which scanning
tunnelling microscopes (STM) are not operating as magnifying tools but rather as
‘an encounter that engages the sense of touch rather than sight’ (p. 52). In this way,
realism, following Ian Hacking, is without representation, it is intervening rather than
representing.
5 Barad troubles the idea of sight through Ian Hacking, arguing that ‘seeing’ the micro-
scopic is not the same as merely ‘looking’ — the latter being passive and the former
active, an intervention (see previous footnote).
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precisely because where one feels as though these technologies should
render ‘reality’ more visible, when in fact they have the opposite effect.
Writing of the atomic radiation unleashed in the U.S. bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II, Akira Mizuta
Lippit describes a related crisis, one of the constitution of the human
body.6 Lippit claims a sudden ‘excess of visuality’ that ‘threatened
the material and conceptual dimensions of human interiority and ex-
teriority’.7 He also connects this crisis to technologies of interiority
developed fifty years earlier, namely psychoanalysis, the X-ray, and
cinema. Here the excess of the visible following penetrating radiation
is the fragility of the body, its interiority made violently external.
The X-ray, and later, the atomic bombs, caused a ‘destructive visu-
ality, a visibility born from annihilation’.8 Of X-Ray technology he
writes that it is a ‘method of dissecting the human body into minute
planes’.9 He continues by likening the consequences of the X-ray for
the visuality of the human to those of the atomic bomb: ‘Like the X-
ray, total visibility brought total destruction […] the body reduced
to sawdust. An atomic body, avisual.’10 To return to the provocative
claim by Semprun, rather than gaining further access to ‘the real’ or
generating excessive visibility, the mediation of knowledge about sub-
atomic particles through technological means actually demands that
representation must move beyond the threshold of the visible, perhaps
to point to its own destruction — ‘there is no longer anything left to
see’.
The brief explorations of nuclear exposures I offer in what fol-
lows draw primarily from nuclear art and culture or nuclear aesthetics,
which have long been fixated on the problem of visibility and the
representation of nuclear residues. As Lütticken has argued, the chal-
lenges of nuclear aesthetics are also political and social. Following
6 Akira Mizuta Lippit, Atomic Light (Shadow Optics) (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press 2005), p. 4. Thanks to Arnd Wedemeyer for this reference, and to pushing
me here on whether the crisis is excessive visuality or, conversely, the annihilation of
the visual, which is not solved here but hopefully better points to a relation where they
are not such easily distinguishable conditions from one another.
7 Ibid., p. 4.
8 Ibid., p. 48.
9 Ibid. Lippit here is drawing from Catherine Waldby’s work on The Visible Human
Project (2000), where she traces the VHP back to X-ray technology.
10 Ibid.
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Joseph Masco,11 Lütticken points to the ways in which the ‘poverty
of human perception’, which according to him became evident in the
late nineteenth century with the revelations of film and photographic
technologies, has only ‘continued to widen in the post-war nuclear
regime’.12 These explorations do not mean to undermine the ongoing
violence of the nuclear regime, the many lives that exposure to radi-
ation through militarism and colonialism, extractivist projects, or the
disposal of toxic waste has taken, and continues to put at risk around
the world. Instead, they are meant to explore the fraught concept of ex-
posure in ways specific to nuclearity and to radiation, while recognizing
that: ‘Nuclearity is not the same everywhere […]. Nuclearity is not the
same for everyone […]. Nuclearity is not the same at all moments in
time.’13 They offer glimpses into other ways of thinking exposure, as it
develops in relation to a (in varying ways, imperceptible) toxicity that
is not inscribed into logics that partition the passive victim of suffering
from some pure or unaffected subject.14 They are examples that are
both forms of exposure specific to the nuclear while also, perhaps,
helping to expose more nuanced and complex ways of understanding
forms of exposure that extend beyond nuclearity.
The effects of long-term radiation are impossible to quantify or to
know conclusively through scientific techniques, as countless scientific
studies of irradiated ecologies and biological populations continue to
demonstrate. There are no scientific tools that can separate natural
from artificial radiation, no confirmed method of tracing cellular or
genetic degradation with full certainty back to a specific nuclear event
or catastrophe. While there are clear correlatations between, for ex-
ample, elevated thyroid cancer in children following Chernobyl, there
is no ‘data’ that can clearly make the connection. This is why envir-
onmental justice scholar and advocate Michelle Murphy, following
11 Joseph Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post Cold-War New
Mexico (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006) <https://doi.org/10.1515/
9781400849680>.
12 Lütticken, ‘Nuclear Aesthetics’, p. 13.
13 Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2012), p. 15. I encountered this passage in part of an epigraph that
opens Kyveli Mavrokordopoulou and Ruby de Vos’ introduction to the issue ‘Nuclear
Aesthetics’, kunstlicht: Journal for Visual Art, Visual Culture, and Architecture, 39.3–4
(2018), pp. 6–12 (p. 6).
14 Thanks to M. Ty for helping me to clarify this point.
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Eve Tuck, calls for taking stock of environmental toxicity outside of
what she calls a ‘data of damage’.15 Murphy demonstrates the ways in
which toxic chemicals are often treated as if they are discrete entities
or molecules, and how, ‘[a]s a result, the infrastructure of chemical
relations that surround and make us largely resides in the realm of the
imperceptible.’ In other words, the ‘fullness of our chemical relations
ends up being largely conjectural’. She argues that ‘technoscientific
research […] tends to proceed by measuring the damage chemicals do
to bodies’ which tends to ‘amplify the burdens of settler-colonial and
racist violence’.16 Instead, she argues that we must think against a data
of damage, an approach especially relevant in the realm of radiotox-
icity. Origin as contaminant is so dispersed, and so imperceptible, that
it is impossible to trace a singular moment of object of contamination.
Murphy and Tuck’s argument is important because radiation exposure
presents particular problems to those affected by it and in need of
care or reparations; its damage is neither quantifiable nor verifiable in
scientific terms. Forms of radiation exposure, thus, draw attention to
immeasurable consequences of vulnerability and forms of embodied
knowing that are often rejected under regimes of knowledge that rely
solely on scientific verification.
The condition of being exposed can mean one is or has been par-
ticularly vulnerable or in a state of heightened risk. But it’s not always
true that the result of exposure is thought only in negative terms. One
can be purposely exposed to a virus in the form of a vaccine in order to
safeguard against infection; one can find oneself exposed to new ideas
for the first time, to feel liberated or opened up in new ways. One might
describe feeling exposed after a secret about them is revealed, turned
inside-out, made vulnerable. The notion of exposure is often tem-
porally, relationally, and sometimes spatially situated. It can require
duration, pliability, resilience. Exposure, in colloquial uses, seems to
imply a kind of porosity or laying bare but also captures an indetermin-
acy that helps to ask larger questions of weathering the nuclear. How
might exposure to radiation resist being marked or measured, and in
the spirit of this collection, how might these forms of exposure help us
15 Michelle Murphy, ‘Alterlife and Decolonial Chemical Relations’, Cultural Anthropo-
logy, 32.4 (2017), pp. 494–503 <https://doi.org/10.14506/ca32.4.02>.
16 Ibid., p. 496.
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to think through unperceivable weathering that resists its registration
by the human sensorium?
In Exposed: Environmental Politics&Pleasures in PosthumanTimes,
Stacy Alaimo describes exposure as a kind of political act by way of
nuclear catastrophe:
Performing exposure as an ethical and political act means to
reckon with — rather than disavow — such horrific events
and to grapple with the particular entanglements of vulner-
ability and complicity that radiate from disasters and their
terribly disjunctive connection to everyday life in the indus-
trialized world. To occupy exposure as insurgent vulnerability
is to perform material rather than abstract alliances, and to
inhabit a fraught sense of political agency that emerges from
the perceived loss of boundaries and sovereignty.17
For Alaimo, exposure is performed, reckoned with, occupied, and in-
habited. The ‘horrific event’ Alaimo references here is the Chernobyl
catastrophe of 1986 and the ‘total unprotectedness’ that suddenly
came to define biopolitical subjectivity with regard to the claims and
actions of the state, especially in Ukraine and Belarus.18 What the
Chernobyl explosion and the subsequent massive dispersal of radio-
active particles into the atmosphere demonstrate is that the nuclear
Anthropocene ushers in forms of exposure that rapidly and dramatic-
ally undermine the sovereignty of the embodied self. If the Anthropo-
cene has revealed existence itself as already a state of exposure, thinking
radiation exposure troubles the distinction between a supposedly pas-
sive state of absorption and the fraught occupation of vulnerability as
forms of biopolitical agency.
2
Michael Marder and Anaïs Tondeur’s collaborative project The
Chernobyl Herbarium is a 2016 rayogram-essay of 30 fragments,
17 Stacy Alaimo, Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), p. 5 <https://doi.org/10.5749/
minnesota/9780816621958.001.0001>.
18 Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens After Chernobyl (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 216 <https://doi.org/10.1515/
9781400845095>.
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one for each year since Chernobyl in 1986.19 On alternating pages
with short texts written by Marder are pages depicting Tondeur’s
herbarium specimens, grown in the radioactive soil of the Chernobyl
exclusion zone and arranged on photosensitive paper. The result is a
luminescence of the vegetal object surrounded by a darkness, awash
only with spots of light and indiscernible, sweeping markings. These
images are ‘the visible record of an invisible calamity’ as Tondeur
‘liberates luminescent traces without violence, avoiding the repetition
of the first, invisible event of Chernobyl and, at the same time,
capturing something of it’.20 Radioactive soil, out of which the plant
is nourished and sustained, is registered in the plant and then on
the paper as a brightness, an outline, a ‘shimmer behind [a] shining’.
Marder writes that the plants which ‘assimilated the imperceptible
and the inconceivable’ are ‘[i]n the thick of infinite openness and
exposure’.21
Structuring the text is a story that Marder relates from his boy-
hood. Travelling on a train to Anapa on 26 April 1986, neither Marder
nor anyone on board one is yet aware of what has happened 1200 kilo-
metres northwest. By May — Marder would be in Anapa all Summer
that year — radiation readings would reach 60 mR/hr (milliRoentgens
per hour), a value some 300 times higher than the ‘normal’ levels of
0.2 mR/hr.22 Marder asks: ‘How many layers or levels of exposure are
there before us? Who is the exposing and who or what the exposed?’.23
The text is entirely occupied with the boundaries and mediations of
the detectable, the rayograms serving as imprints of the assimilation of
invisible radioactivity transferred as a form of light onto the page. Are
these images of ‘excess’ as Marder describes them, or put differently,
of a trace?
The Chernobyl Herbarium has one fragment titled ‘Exposure’, but
the entire project might be understood as a meditation on the concept.
19 Michael Marder and Anaïs Tondeur, The Chernobyl Herbarium: Fragments of an Ex-
ploded Consciousness (London: Open Humanities Press, 2016) <https://doi.org/10.
26530/OAPEN_606220>.
20 Ibid., p. 14.
21 Ibid., p. 20.
22 Ibid., p. 18.




Figure 1. Anaïs Tondeur, Phaseolea, Exclusion Zone, Chernobyl.
Radiation level: 1.7 Microsieverts/hr. Rayogram on Rag paper, 24x36
cm, 2016, ongoing, courtesy of the artist.
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Exposure is thus differentiated and theorized along various planes and
scales of vulnerability, adaptability, and resilience:
This openness spelled out unfathomable vulnerability, the in-
capacity to defend oneself from a threat that was unknown
and undetectable by the sensorium. One is ineluctably passive
in the face of radioactivity […]. [Plants] are more adaptable:
soybeans experimentally grown in Chernobyl’s radioactive
environment have displayed drastic changes in their protein
makeup, enabling them to improve their resistance to heavy
metals and to modify their carbon metabolism […]. Their
exposure to the world is one of piece with learning from
the world and giving plenty of things back to it. Only our,
human, exposure betokens pure vulnerability, passivity, help-
lessness.24
If the exposed human is objectified, made passive (‘Those of us who
have been [in radiation’s] eerie neighbourhood have resembled ob-
jects’), vegetal exposure is agential responsiveness that resists, that
pushes back. Marder: ‘Vegetal life is not merely exposed; it is exposure,
exteriority, outwardness.’25
Tondeur’s images do produce a sense of exteriority, a vibrancy
particular to plant-life in the exclusion zone or other irradiated spaces.
Marder seems to want to ontologically split vegetal and human life,
to distinguish between forms of exposure that are ‘pure vulnerability,
passivity’ for the human and, in a kind of metaphysical slide, deem
vegetal life as itself exposure. In one sense, Marder’s idea that ‘the
human’ can only experience exposure as something that happens to
oneself, that delimits agential capacity and renders the subject helpless,
is one interpretation of exposure that I am attempting to question in
this paper. Marder points to the ex in human experience in order to say
that only in ‘limit circumstances’ can the human experience exposure
‘on our skin’, as a kind of externality embodied by the vegetal or as a life-
form as itself exposure. Ex, from Latin for ‘out’, is drawn out in Marder’s
account in order to claim that plants are always outside of themselves,
always moving outward, growing. But the skin is perhaps more of an






Figure 2. Anaïs Tondeur, Linum usitatissimum, Exclusion Zone,
Chernobyl. Radiation level: 1.7 Microsieverts. Rayogram on Rag paper,
24x36 cm, 2016, ongoing, courtesy of the artist.
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bars the human from performing exposures in a more vegetal mode.
In feminist science studies, especially in the work of Murphy, Alaimo,
and Nancy Tuana, they have reminded us of the porosity of the skin
and indeed the ways in which the human body is itself always passing
materials both into and outside of itself. Rather than a closed bounded
subject, the human is in a constant relation with the world and with
others that is perhaps much more exposed and external than Marder
seems to grant here. The danger of such a distinct splitting of the
vegetal and the human may reinstate the bounded human subject that
posthumanism has worked to undo. And yet, at the end of the section,
Marder points to the provocative notion that exposure might also
unite the human and the vegetal: ‘What did our [human?] exposure
amount to? Did it prepare the grounds for a trans-human solidarity?’,
suggesting that exposure may also provide an opening for a kind of
trans-species alliance.
3
In August of 1945, Julian H. Webb, a physicist in the research depart-
ment of Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York, took it upon himself
to investigate a sudden flurry of complaints from customers of Kodak
X-ray film. The film was reported by consumers to be ‘fogged’ by black
spots that Kodak then attributed to a contamination of the cardboard,
which encased that batch of film. Webb was able to trace the paper
from the packaging back to a mill in Vincennes, Indiana, situated on
the Wabash River. Testing the run of paper produced on 6 August,
Webb discovered a new artificially radioactive particle with strong
beta-activity and a half-life of approximately thirty days, Cerium-141,
and in doing so, also happened upon the discovery of a confidential
nuclear weapons test detonation that had occurred on 16 July nearly
2000 miles away.26
Indeed, Kodak film in Indiana had registered the world’s first nuc-
lear explosion; the now infamous Trinity Test had taken place without
public knowledge two weeks earlier in Alamogordo, New Mexico.
26 Julian H. Webb, ‘The Fogging of Photographic Film by Radioactive Contaminants
in Cardboard Packaging Materials’, Physical Review, 76.3 (1949), pp. 375–80 <https:
//doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.76.375>.
52 RADIATING EXPOSURES
Radioactive fallout had blown thousands of miles, and found its way
into the paper mill through the river water, causing the disturbance
in any film that was packaged with the paper produced on 6 August.
It would take Webb four years to publish his highly sensitive findings.
He finally did in 1949, writing with a certain clarity: ‘The most likely
explanation of the source of this radioactive contaminant appears to
be that it consisted of wind-borne radioactive fission products derived
from the atom-bomb detonation in New Mexico on July 16, 1945.’ It
would seem that what was exposed on film in turn exposed an entirely
new and covert industry that could neither hide nor control the planet-
ary effects of nuclear weapons tests that have since come to define the
start of the ‘nuclear Anthropocene’.27
In 1951, having been through something like this six years prior,
Kodak again registered high levels of radiation in snowfall, this time
along the shores of Lake Ontario. They registered a complaint with
the National Association of Photographic Manufacturers, who then
telegrammed the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC replied that
a major test, what would later be revealed as test ‘Able’, had in fact
taken place, but that the situation was not of any threat to public
health. But Kodak’s general manager threatened to sue the government
should the company or its film stock suffer serious damage as a result
of testing, and the AEC responded with an offer. Presumably in an
effort to avoid a major lawsuit, the AEC would provide Kodak with
maps of all weapons tests prior to their occurrence that would detail
areas of potentially heavy fallout and adjust their operations and manu-
27 It is outside of the scope of this short paper to detail the discussion about when
the Anthropocene begins and the Holocene ends. As the previous footnote shows,
scientists have in recent years have claimed that the Anthropocene is set in motion
at the beginning of the atomic era. But in the humanities, scholarship on the An-
thropocene tends to mark it with a much deeper history, one inherently tied to the
transatlantic slave trade or to early agriculture practices. But in the sciences, see as
examples of studies that mark the Anthropocene as beginning in the Nuclear Age:
Colin N. Waters and others, ‘Can Nuclear Weapons Fallout Mark the Beginning of the
Anthropocene Epoch?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 71.3 (2015), pp. 46–57 <https:
//doi.org/10.1177/0096340215581357>, Jan Zalasiewicz and others, ‘When Did the
Anthropocene Begin? A Mid-Twentieth Century Boundary Level Is Stratigraphically
Optimal’, Quaternary International 383 (2015), pp. 196–203, and Gary J. Hancock,
Stephen G. Tims, L. Keith Fifield, and Ian T. Webster, ‘The Release and Persistence of
Radioactive Anthropogenic Nuclides’, Geological Society, London, Special Publications,
395.1 (2014), pp. 265–81 <https://doi.org/10.1144/SP395.15>.
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facturing accordingly, solidifying a decade-long relationship between
the largest photographic film manufacturer and the U.S. industry of
nuclear militarism, a double exposure (at least).
4
An elaborate, golden, three-tiered chain necklace with deep-blue jew-
els sits in a glass case. Inheritance, as this work is titled, is part of the
exhibition ‘Invisible Forces’ at ArtLaboratory Berlin featuring works
by artists Erich Berger, Mari Keto, and Martin Howse.28 The necklace
is displayed in a row of deconstructed parts of a concrete box that has
housed it in order to keep handlers from being exposed to its radio-
activity. Next to the parts read the following instructions, engraved on
a copper plate:
This jewelry box contains your inheritance: a necklace and
earrings crafted from gold, silver, thorite, thorianite, and ur-
aninite; an electroscope with spare leaves for detecting the
jewelry’s radiation, a glass rod with a piece of fur to electro-
statically charge the electroscope; a timer for recording the
time and these instructions for the ritual of measurement.
A generation ago when the box was last opened, the jewelry
proved unready for wear and was locked away. Today you will
perform the ritual of measurement with your elder to find out
if you can wear the jewelry, or it you need to lock it away again
for another generation.
The display instructions continue with detailed instructions about
how to proceed with the ritual of testing the jewellery every hundred
years for its eventual wear-ability. Thus, the inheritance is the legacy of
atomic science (including, among other things, nuclear weapons test-
ing and deployment, mining projects, nuclear energy, nuclear waste
disposal) transposed onto a family heirloom, passed down for innu-
merable generations.
The artists, Berger and Keto, write in the exhibition text that the
piece ‘attempts to address the long time component of nuclear waste
28 ‘Invisible Forces’ ran from 19 October to 8 December 2019 at ArtLaboratory Ber-
lin, Prinzenallee 34, 13359 Berlin, curated by Regine Rapp and Christian de Lutz.
The necklace is part of the artists’ ongoing work, ‘The Inheritance Project’ <http:




Figure 3. Erich Berger and Mari Keto, INHERITANCE, 2016, jewellery
close-up, gold, silver, uraninite, thorite, thorianite, courtesy of the artists.
by transferring it into the intimate and caring concept of a family
without compromising the deep time aspect’. The work invites con-
templation about the nature of inheritance by way of multiple vectors,
including the ways in which nuclear waste is an inheritance that oper-
ates on a vastly different timescale than that of the human lifespan —
the jewelry can only be tested every hundred years. By imbuing the
family heirloom with the deep toxic time of nuclear waste, perhaps
it is easier to conceive of just how long this waste lives on past the
finite temporality of human life. But the piece also suggests something
desirable about radioactivity, jewels behind a casing that cannot be
touched for entire lifetimes.
Naturally, there are other temporalities at play here, too, that of
a certain class and economic status, of aesthetics and materials of
a certain historical moment or place; its very status as an heirloom
suggests a moment of importance in the act of passing down, and of
transmission. But the piece is challenging in that it is difficult to think
of nuclear inheritance as a tender or intimate act, or as existing within
normative family structures within which acts of inheritance such as
this would be located. In a way similar to that of Inheritance, atomic
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artwork installations often exhibit items that emit radioactivity, or that
claim to — gallery goers threatened (though perhaps largely fabricated
or imagined) with exposure to low-levels of radiation. Suggesting the
risk of exposure, however fabricated or exaggerated it might be, can
indeed expose fears of that which one cannot simply perceive. But
it can also expose a kind of privilege that does not contemplate or
alleviate the violence of the nuclear regime, but rather contributes to
its dangerous seduction.
5
‘Dark tourism’, a term introduced by John Lennon and Malcolm Foley
in 1996, describes recreational travel to places marked by death and
suffering. While scholars of ‘dark’ or ‘disaster’ tourism have come up
with a number of reasons for why people flock to these kinds of sites,
most will agree that it’s often too difficult to parse. Some have recently
argued, for example, that visitors to dark sites gain satisfaction from
observing the sites of violence and conflict (Debbie Lisle), or that they
seek commemoration of a tragedy (Lennon and Foley).29 Dark tour-
ism, a fairly recent field of research,30 remains therefore a controversial
ethical enterprise.
As a site often considered, alongside the Nazi Death Camps, to
define the enterprise of disaster tourism, the Chernobyl 2600 square
km exclusion zone in Ukraine attracts an estimated 10,000 tourists
every day.31 On the Chernobyl Welcome Tour website, one of the more
popularly booked tours of the zone, they promise that radiation ex-
posure during the excursion will not exceed 3-4 microsieverts, ‘which
29 For a brief summary of tourism studies and dark tourism that I turn to in this section,
see these citations and others in Ganna Yankovska and Kevin Hannam, ‘Dark and Toxic
Tourism in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone’, Current Issues in Tourism, 17.10 (2014),
pp. 929–39 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13683500.2013.820260>.
30 See Philip Stone, ‘Dark Tourism — an Old Concept in a New World’, The Tourism
Society Journal, 125 (2005), p. 20 <http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/29705/>.
31 See Nicholas Hryhorczuk, ‘Radioactive Heritage: The Universal Value of Chernobyl
as a Dark Heritage Site’, Qualitative Inquiry, 25.9–10 (2019), pp. 1047–55 <https:
//doi.org/10.1177/1077800418787553>.
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is the equivalent to around 4 hours on an intercontinental flight’.32
For one hundred and nineteen euros, visitors are bussed from Kiev to
Chernobyl and escorted around parts of the zone, including walking
right up to the protective sarcophagus of the blown reactor. Each per-
son also receives a portable dosimeter — a small Geiger counter — to
measure radiation levels throughout the tour. The tours paradoxically
promise both risk and safety; they are extreme and dangerous but sup-
ply tourists with the necessary technologies to measure their risk along
the way.
In their study of tourism in Chernobyl, Ganna Yankovska and
Kevin Hannam suggest thinking about the phenomenon not only as
dark tourism but as ‘toxic tourism’, a term developed by Phaedra C.
Pezzullo to describe tours to sites of environmental degradation in the
United States.33 Interested in the ways in which toxic tourism might
open up possibilities for building solidarity by focusing on the relation-
ship between environmental and social degradation, Yankovska and
Hannam also point to the strangeness that inheres in people’s desire to
visit (still) toxic sites. As one of the tour guides they interviewed de-
scribes critically, ‘People [that visit Chernobyl] […] are not interested
in real history and valid information anymore. What is more, they want
to risk their lives and find adrenalin instead of appreciation and me-
morialization of the past.’34 Exposure, in this context, is sought out in
a way that some of the tour guides reported as an unethical response to
historical tragedy. Although an individual dosimeter can pick up levels
of atmospheric radiation, the ways in which low-level radiation affects
biological life over generations remains, of course, largely speculative.
Countless studies of life in the zone have been done and though many
have found significant changes to specific species under study as well
as to the larger ecological relations within the zone, nearly all studies
conclude that there is still too little known about the effects of radiation
poisoning that will last at least 20,000 years more into the future.
32 See ‘Chernobyl 1 Day Tour’, Chernobylwel.come (Bratislava: radioPROactive, 2018)
<https://www.chernobylwel.com/tour/7/chernobyl-1-day-tour> [accessed 29 July
2020].
33 Phaedra C. Pezzullo, Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of Pollution, Travel, and Environmental
Justice (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2007).
34 Quoted in Yankovska and Hannam, ‘Dark and Toxic Tourism’, p. 936.
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There are scholars of dark tourism that claim that the draw to
post-disaster or toxic sites is the fixation on death or suffering, or
the desire to contemplate one’s own mortality. Focused primarily on
tourist responses to the fatalities of historical catastrophes, rarely do
these studies think deeply about the specificity of tourism in irradi-
ated zones, where tourists decidedly put themselves at some level of
radiation risk, however slight or downplayed by local authorities. What
marginal, perverse, conscious, or unconscious desires draw people to
these kinds of sites of exposure? Somehow the dual but conflicting
assurance of both high risk and personal safety that provides tour-goers
to assure themselves of either one at any given time, an experience
that plays out as a kind of seeking of exposure while also requiring the
promise of protection.
5.5
Bionerd23, a Youtube-er with 157,000 followers, has pub-
lished/posted over seventy self-made videos from within the
Chernobyl exclusion zone since 2013. The videos show bionerd23
walking freely around Chernobyl, filming a nearby rabid fox, getting
bitten by ants, and picking up radioactive glass shards with her bare
hands. Wearing an army-patterned jacket and a closely shorn buzz-cut,
she takes samples and tests them in the videos in order to dispel
supposed myths about the levels of toxicity that are said to exist in the
zone. In one of her most-watched videos, she picks an apple near the
iconic Ferris wheel inside the zone and eats it on camera.35
6
Aldona, a quiet, twelve minute film by Lithuanian artist Emilija
Škarnulytė, follows Aldona, the artist’s grandmother, around her
35 See ‘Chernobyl Wild Zone: Radioactive Rabies, Autumn Fruit and Foxes’, online video
recording, YouTube, 30 September 2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u_
ZvHMGXdbE> [accessed 24 February 2020], and Dan Nosowitz, ‘The Woman Who
Ate Chernobyl’s Apples’, online video recording, Atlas Obscura, 15 April 2015 <https:
//www.atlasobscura.com/articles/the-woman-who-ate-chernobyl-s-apples>




Figure 4. Film Still from Aldona, dir. by Emilija Škarnulytė, 2013,
courtesy of the artist.
property and through Grūtas Park in southeastern Lithuania.36 The
park, an open-air museum, was opened in April 2001 by businessman
Viliumas Malinauskas on his private property, without taxpayer
money. The park is an odd tourist destination with a complicated
relationship with Lithuanian’s Soviet heritage; it displays recuperated
Soviet-era sculptures and large-scale stone monuments of Marx,
Lenin, and Stalin.37 Aside from the ways in which the park has caused
debate amongst Lithuanians for its unclear relation to the past, the
museum site itself is located nearby to the Grūtas Forest, where
Lithuanian partisans lost a bloody war against the Communist Red
Army.38
36 Aldona was part of the exhibition ‘Presence in the Absence’, 18 January – 21 February
2020, which I visited at the Alexander Levy Gallery Berlin, Germany.
37 For a discussion of Grūtas Park and dark or what the authors call ‘thanatourism,’
see Rami K. Isaac & Laurencija Budryte-Ausiejiene, ‘Interpreting the Emotions of
Visitors: A Study of Visitor Comment Books at the Grūtas Park Museum, Lithuania’,
Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism, 15.4 (2015), pp. 400–24 <https:
//doi.org/10.1080/15022250.2015.1024818>.




Figure 5. Emilija Škarnulytė, photograph from the shooting of Aldona,
2013, courtesy of the artist.
In the film, Aldona makes her way through the park without the
use of sight; the exhibition catalogue tells us that she has been blind
since Spring of 1986, a likely result of the Chernobyl explosion in
April of that year. Walking through the park, we watch as she runs
her hands along the gigantic stone bodies of (once-memorialized, then
discarded, now somewhat revived) Soviet figures now confined in
what has been called a kind of enactment of imprisonment: a network
of wire fences and canals surround the park, and several watch towers
circle the park’s territory. In other scenes, we watch Aldona’s solitary
domestic activities: she peels apples, listens to the radio, rinses the
dishes. The only sounds are those of birds and the wind blowing
through the trees.
The film is part of a larger body of work that has established
Škarnulytė as a significant artist within nuclear art and culture. Here,
she invokes the nuclear past of Lithuanians in the Soviet-era, chan-
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nelled through the familial.39 Aldona’s blindness may be the result of
exposure to radiation. But neither Aldona nor the framing of the film
seem to mourn her blindness, but instead the piece imagines Aldona’s
relation to the past as it is structured by a non-visual sensorium. In
addition to challenging the perceptual registers on which radiation can
be catalogued, the film also focuses in on the temporalities of radiation
that are often infinitely expanded outwards by refocusing viewers’ at-
tention on the intimate, the domestic. Fallout of decades past is not
a violence in this film, at least not only violence, but attached to a
tenderness that Aldona has learned and which the quietness of the film
allows viewers to see and hear — the flies buzzing on delicately peeled
fruits, the old radio, the lapping of water in Aldona’s coffee mug. The
temporality of living with radiation, or more precisely not really ever
being sure if and how one is living with radiation, is diffused through
(nuclear) history, as well through a domestication of radiation that is
rendered not (only, or merely) traumatic, but tender and soft.
7
Since around 2015, a wave of very particular journalistic stories
have been revisit aging, still-radioactive exclusion zones.40 The
phenomenon emerged perhaps in response to commemorations
of the fifth anniversary of the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, 2011. Focused largely on Fukushima
and Chernobyl but including Three Mile Island, Bikini Atoll, areas
around the Nevada Test Site, and the Semipalatinsk site, what I
39 Soviets sent an estimated 7,000 Lithuanians to labour camps and into other
services providing cleanup efforts for Chernobyl, performing work like dous-
ing flames or building dams to filter radiation from nearby rivers. Lithuanian
borders are about 450 kilometres from Chernobyl. See Andrius Sytas, ‘New
Tours, Painful Reminders in Lithuania After Hit Chernobyl Show’, Reuters,
31 July 2019 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lithuania-chernobyl/new-tours-
painful-reminders-in-lithuania-after-hit-chernobyl-show-idUSKCN1UQ1WF> [ac-
cessed 19 July 2020].
40 As part of my project as a Fellow at ICI Berlin, I have been working on questions of
radioactive wildernesses and irradiated natures. I’ve collected over fifty articles from
popular media sources such as Grist, The Guardian, The Atlantic, The Independent,
Huffington Post, The New York Times and others of varying levels of credibility. The
headlines declare that the flora and fauna are flourishing and proliferating wildly since
(and in fact because of) nuclear catastrophe and radiation exposure.
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identify as a surge in ‘popular’ interest in irradiated zones seems to
have become quite suddenly fixated on the question of how these
exposed areas have fared over time. Implicit in this fascination is the
understanding that (low-level) radiation exposures are not singular
in their temporality or moment, but rather are forms of exposure
that develop more so over impossibly long periods of time and about
which there is still very little conclusive data. Evacuated of the human,
zones of alienation are the new test sites of the nuclear age. As dozens
of articles pronounce almost unanimously — Nature has reclaimed
its space, overgrown and rampant, feral and unyielding — it may be
toxic, but it flourishes nonetheless in the absence of human polluters,
hunters, and settlers. As National Geographic proclaims in a Youtube
video to their 14.5 million subscribers: ‘30 Years After Chernobyl:
Nature Is Thriving’.41
I conclude with these ‘reports from the zone’ in order to return to
the questions with which I opened this incomplete archive of things.
What is exposure when taken from the frame of victimhood, passivity,
and vulnerability. How can exclusion zones, like those I’ve referenced
above, be both toxic and a site of flourishing at once; to go even fur-
ther, what is exposure when it is celebrated, sought out, empowering
— something one can be resilient in the face of, or feel queerly in-
timate towards?42 This paper hopes to raise these questions through
exposures that resist weathering as either an absorption/projection of
experience, or as a form of resilience. I have also pointed to the ways in
which exposure is often understood as a process made legible primarily
through the register of visuality, whereas radiation forces a different set
of questions around what it is to weather imperceptibly, even unknow-
ingly. Indeed, to think radiation, to radiate exposures outward (as well
as countless forms of imperceptible toxicities in the Anthropocene, in
different ways), not only grapples with the unknowable, it necessitates
41 National Geographic, ‘30 Years After Chernobyl: Nature Is Thriving’, online
video recording, YouTube, 20 April 2016 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E-
h15wX14po> [accessed 4 July 2020].
42 Disability studies and crip theory have done a lot of important work on the question
of toxic intimacies, which lie outside of the scope of this short paper, but which I
have explored elsewhere. For an excellent example of this scholarship which has deeply
informed my thinking here, see Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering,
and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012).
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forms of not-knowing. To weather exposures of these sorts is, thus,
crucially a speculative practice, a challenge to ways of tending to a
profoundly contaminated world, and a confrontation with impossibly
deep, nonhuman temporalities.43
43 I am indebted to the editors, Arnd Wedemeyer and Christoph Holzhey for their
attentive and thorough comments on an earlier draft, which I could only partially
attend to here. I also extend gratitude to the fellows at ICI Berlin who workshopped
the idea of weathering together for months and who helped my thinking along for this
paper. A special thanks to Anja Sunhyun Michaelsen and M. Ty for their invaluable
comments on the first draft.
Weathering the Afterlife
The Meteorological Psychology of Dante’s Commedia
NICOLÒ CRISAFI AND MANUELE GRAGNOLATI
In this essay, we investigate the meteorological psychology of Dante’s
Commedia, which we define as the way in which human subjectivity
is expressed and constituted in its exposure to weather phenomena.1
Weathering provides us with a guiding thread to study this relation
in a twofold way. First, we take weathering in the strict etymological
sense of the word, as an action associated with the weather, such as
rain, wind, and snow. In Dante’s representation of Hell, Purgatory,
and Heaven, these weather phenomena affect the dead exposed to
the elements, for example, with the aim of punishing them, trans-
forming them spiritually, or rewarding them. The second meaning
of weathering that we bring to this analysis is more conceptual, as
a notion belonging to a special class of words called enantiosemic.
Enantiosemic words, sometimes called Janus words and named for
their ability to look in two directions at once, bind together opposite
connotations. As Christoph Holzhey explains in his chapter in this
volume, the term ‘weathering’ is a complex case of enantiosemy. On
the one hand, it can be used to express the action of wearing something
1 We are especially grateful to Y. Ariadne Collins, Vittoria Fallanca, Elena Lombardi,
Francesca Southerden, and Alison Sperling for their insight and feedback on an early
draft of this paper; and to the editors of this volume Christoph F. E. Holzhey and Arnd
Wedemeyer for their comments and revisions on the last one.
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down, as well as the opposite action of resisting wear. On the other
hand, the word can be used to describe processes that are detrimental
but also for those that are beneficial.2 In what follows, we interrogate
the different dimensions of the concept of weathering and trace and
track their relations to the meteorological psychology of the Com-
media. As we will see, in the three realms of Dante’s afterlife, the dead
weather in different ways: the damned of the Inferno experience their
punishments with helplessness and sometimes defiance; the purging
souls ofPurgatorio are shielded from adverse weather and progressively
learn to embrace their vulnerability; and the blessed of Paradiso are
exposed to an unexpectedly extreme environment but fully open to it.
A NOTE ON WEATHERING AND MEDIEVAL METEOROLOGY
Any discussion of weathering that occurs outside of the English lan-
guage must contend with the fact that the word is arguably untrans-
latable: no direct translation of the term ‘weathering’, in a Romance
language, does justice to the distinctive enantiosemy of wearing down
and resisting wear that we have highlighted above. Moreover, Italian
does not have a word exclusively dedicated to the weather but must
make do with the polysemous word ‘tempo’. It is a fascinating word
in its own right. Similarly to the French ‘temps’, the Spanish ‘tiempo’,
and the Portuguese ‘tempo’, Italian ‘tempo’ accommodates three main
meanings into one term: firstly, it refers to ‘il tempo che fa’, the weather;
secondly, it connotes ‘il tempo che passa’, time; and thirdly, ‘il tempo
dei verbi’, the tense of verbs, the temporality of an action.3 It is perhaps
by attending to these three meanings simultaneously that one can ac-
cess the connotations of the English term, ‘weathering’, as the action
2 On the enantiosemy of ‘weathering’ see Christoph F. E. Holzhey’s chapter in this
volume. For the analysis of how enantiosemy plays in the poetic language of Dante’s
Paradiso, see Sara Fortuna and Manuele Gragnolati, ‘Dante after Wittgenstein: “As-
petto”, Language, and Subjectivity from Convivio to Paradiso’, in Dante’s Plurilingual-
ism: Authority, Knowledge, Subjectivity, ed. by Sara Fortuna, Manuele Gragnolati, and
Jürgen Trabant (Oxford: Legenda, 2010), pp. 223–48.
3 For this distinction and its untranslatability in another Romance language, French,
see ‘Temps’, in Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, ed. by Barbara
Cassin, Emily Apter, Jacques Lezra, and Michael Wood (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2014).
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or process by which the weather wears something down and affects it
with change over time.
The definition of weather as that which produces change was
central to medieval meteorology. In Dante’s time, the discipline was
largely informed by Aristotle’s Meteorology, a treatise that Dante men-
tions twice in the Quaestio de aqua et terra (14 and 83) and that
circulated in two Latin translations as well as through the mediation of
influential scholastic commentaries such as those by Albert the Great
(c. 1200–1280) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274).4 Meteorology
was understood as part of natural philosophy, the branch of know-
ledge that studied ‘things of Nature’, which are characterized by the
fact that they ‘move and change’.5 Aristotle’s Meteorology followed his
other works on change in general (Physics), the movements of the stars
and heavens (On the Heavens), and change undergone by matter on
Earth (Generation and Corruption). The area of Aristotelian meteoro-
logy in the Middle Ages included ‘all the transient phenomena which
are caused by the action of Heat and Cold and which involve […] the
transformation of the “simple bodies” [i.e., the elements earth, water,
air, and fire] one into another’.6 Aristotle and his medieval comment-
ators studied a wider range of phenomena than modern meteorology,
focussing on the so-called ‘sublunary’ world in its entirety, from the
4 Dante Alighieri, Quaestio de Aqua et Terra, ed. by Francesco Mazzoni, in Opere, dir. by
Marco Santagata, 2 vols (Milan: Mondadori, 2011–14), pp. 693–880. See Enrico Berti,
‘De Meteoris (Meteorologica)’, in Enciclopedia Dantesca Italiana (1970), <http://
www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/de-meteoris_(Enciclopedia-Dantesca)> [accessed 18
March 2020]; Patrick Boyde, Dante Philomythes and Philosopher: Man in the Cosmos
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chapter 3: ‘Meteorology’, pp. 74–95;
also Alison Cornish, ‘The Vulgarization of Science: Dante’s Meteorology in Context’, in
Science and Literature in Italian Culture from Dante to Calvino: A Festschrift for Patrick
Boyde, ed. by Pierpaolo Antonello and Simon A. Gilson (Oxford: Legenda, 2004), pp.
53–71.
5 Aristotle, Physics, ed. by Francis Macdonald Cornford and trans. by Philip H. Wick-
steed, rev. edn, 2 vols, Loeb Classical Library, 228 and 255 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1934–57), i, pp. 16–17 (i. xii. 185a12–13) (cf. Dante Alighieri,
Dante’s ‘Il Convivio’, trans. by Richard H. Lansing, Garland Library of Medieval Lit-
erature, 65 (New York: Garland, 1990): ii. xiv. 8–11). As Alison Cornish notes,
‘Meteorology is technically absent and poetically present in the Commedia for one
thing because it deals with change, which is the fundamental advantage the living have
over the dead. The mutation of vapour into water, wind, frost, comet or earthquake
serves as an analogue for the spiritual transformation that the poem’s characters have
already undergone’ (‘The Vulgarization of Science’, p. 54).
6 Boyde, Dante Philomythes, p. 74.
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surface of the Earth and its atmosphere to the sphere of the Moon.
As such, meteorology investigated celestial bodies that are now con-
sidered part of astronomy (such as the Milky Way, comets, shooting
stars and meteors) as well as the weather phenomena of the lower
atmosphere that are more readily associated with modern meteoro-
logy (such as the formation and transformation of clouds, rain, mist,
dew, frost, snow, and hail through such processes as evaporation and
condensation). Most importantly for our purposes, meteorology was
concerned with weather as an agent of environmental change. It dis-
cussed, for instance, the ways in which the formation of rivers and
their exsiccation can gradually transform the geological configuration
of their environment through phenomena that modern geology identi-
fies with erosion, rising sea levels, desertification, and emersion of land
masses.7 This corruptibility of the Earth, its inherent exposure to wear
and tear, was the defining characteristic of the entire ‘sublunary’ world.
For Aristotle and his medieval commentators, then, weather was al-
ways already weathering: a process whereby atmospheric phenomena
arise and affect the world.
A FROZEN INFERNO
Writing within this framework, Dante is interested in the weather
mainly insofar as it affects human beings. Whereas in his other works
such as Convivio, De vulgari eloquentia, and Monarchia this anthropo-
centric interest focuses primarily on the effects of local climates and
earthly temporality on laws, customs, and language,8 the Commedia
— in line with its existential and moral focus — delves deeper into
the relation between the elements and human subjectivity. Dante’s
7 Aristotle, Meteorologica, ed. and trans. by Henry D. P. Lee, rev. edn, Loeb Clas-
sical Library, 397 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 105 (i. xiv.
351a19–353a28).
8 For Dante’s references to how local climates affect customs and laws see Dante Ali-
ghieri, Monarchia, trans. by Prue Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996): i. xiv. 6; for the ways sublunary temporality (‘tempo’/‘tempus’) wears down
(and renews) language, see Dante Alighieri, De vulgari eloquentia, trans. by Steven
Botterill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): i. ix. 6; Convivio i. v. 9;
and Paradiso xxvi, 124–38. For a discussion of the latter three passages, see Elena
Lombardi, The Syntax of Desire: Love and Language in Augustine, the Modistae, Dante
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), pp. 129–40.
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eschatological poem does so by dramatizing different modes in which
the shades of the dead relate to the atmospheric phenomena, affecting
them in the three very different realms of the afterlife. How do the souls
relate to this force? Do they defy it, avoid it, or embrace it? Can their
exposure be perilous and beneficial at the same time?9
In Hell, the realm of the afterlife represented in the first part
of Dante’s poem, brutal exposure to the elements characterizes the
experience of many damned. Here we find a harsh, bare exposure
to weather. In Hell, atmospheric phenomena are the means to inflict
physical suffering on the damned (what contemporary theologians
called poena sensus) and are designed to play a role in the divine
punishments precisely for their concrete capacity to hurt, strike, scald,
deform, consume, freeze, blind the dead through the aerial bodies that
the separated souls can create in the Afterlife.10 One is tempted to
relate this insistence on weather as punishment to the Biblical story
of the Flood in Genesis 6. In Inferno, extreme weather announces itself
even before Dante sees it first-hand, when the ferryman of the dead,
Charon, defines the infernal realm in terms of ‘eternal darkness, […]
heat and chill’ (Inferno iii, 85).11 Inferno displays some of the most
extreme weather of the entire Commedia: tempestuous winds, putrid
precipitations, a rain of fire, icy winds, hailstorms. The damned are
completely exposed to the violence of the elements and helpless to
them. In the second circle of Hell, for instance, ‘a hellish [storm], that
never rests’ (Inferno v, 31) buffets the lustful, the first damned affected
by physical pain that Dante meets on his journey (Figures 1 and 2).
9 On some positive aspects of ‘exposure’, see Alison Sperling’s chapter in this volume.
10 Medieval theologians insisted that fire of Hell and Purgatory is physical and struggled
to justify how a soul separated from its body could feel corporeal pain. Dante imagines
that when the soul separates from its body at physical death and gets to the afterlife, it
can create a body of air that allows it to have a shape and continue to express sensorial
faculties. See Manuele Gragnolati, Experiencing the Afterlife: Soul and Body in Dante
and Medieval Culture (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2005), pp. 67–
87.
11 Quotations from Dante’s poems are taken from La Commedia secondo l’antica vulgata,
ed. by Giorgio Petrocchi, 2nd edn, 4 vols (Florence: Le Lettere, 1994). All translations
from the Commedia are taken from Robert and Jean Hollander’s three-volume edition
of Inferno (New York: Doubleday/Anchor, 2000), Purgatorio (2003) and Paradiso
(2007). The notable expression ‘aere sanza tempo’ (timeless air; Inferno iii, 29) is
generally taken to refer to the absence of any succession of day and night in Hell
but could also be read as a pun on the other connotation of the Italian ‘tempo’: the
atmosphere of Hell might be ‘timeless’ yet it is anything but ‘weatherless’.
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Figure 1. ‘The hellish storm, which never rests…’ (Inferno v, 31). Project
VORTEX-99, Occluded Mesocyclone Tornado, 3 May 1999, Anadarko,
Oklahoma. Credit: OAR/ERL/National Severe Storms
Laboratory/Wikimedia Commons.
Their punishment is an early example of an important structuring
principle of Dante’s afterlife — called contrapasso in Infernoxxviii, 142
— whereby the form of the punishments in Hell and Purgatory fits, by
analogy or contrast, the sin that has been committed on Earth. Thus,
as the lustful were buffeted by the passions in life, in Hell a real wind
now ‘sweeps [the] spirits in its headlong rush, | tormenting, whirls and
strikes them’ (Inferno v, 32–33); ‘propel[s] the wicked spirits. | Here
and there, down and up, it drives them’ (42–43). The storm carries
them away in a manner that matches the lack of control over their
desire on Earth. Among the yells, cries, and laments, the lustful are
also heard swearing against the action of the elements and the divine
power that regulates them (35–36), manifesting that hatred is the only
form of protest available to them against the punishment that afflicts
them.12
12 The dead that are waiting to cross the Acheron river ‘Bestemmiavano Dio e lor parenti’
(Inferno iii, 103). Blasphemy as an act of defiance against the punishment is also ex-
pressed by Vanni Fucci (Inferno xxv, 1–3) and of course, the emblematic blasphemer,
Capaneus in Inferno xiv, discussed below.
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Figure 2. ‘[S]weeps [the] spirits in its headlong rush, | tormenting,
whirls and strikes them’: the torment of the lustful (Inferno v, 32–33).
William Blake, HELL canto 5, 1824–27, pen, ink and watercolour,
Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery. Credit: Wikimedia Commons.
If the lustful lose autonomy of movement yet seem to maintain
their physiognomy, the gluttons of the next circle are also cruelly
disfigured in their appearance. As ‘[h]eavy hailstones, filthy water, and
snow | pour down through the gloomy air’ (Inferno vi, 10–11) and
drown them into a malodorous mud, their anguish consumes them to
the point that they are almost unrecognizable (41, 43–45).13 As in the
case of the lustful, the punishment of the gluttons functions in analogy
with their sin and the filthy rain tormenting them replicates the effects
that excessive eating and drinking has on the body.
It is among the dead of Inferno xiv–xvii that the ‘logic’ informing
the damned’s brutal exposure to the infernal punishment is laid bare. A
fiery rain batters and burns those that have been violent against God —
blasphemers, sodomites, and usurers: ‘in slow descent, | broad flakes of
13 See the ‘piova | etterna, maladetta, fredda e greve’ (Inferno vi, 8–9); ‘[g]randine
grossa, acqua tinta e neve | per l’aere tenebroso si riversa; | puta la terra che questo
riceve’ (10–12); ‘le ombre che adona | la greve pioggia’ (32–33).
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Figure 3. ‘[I]n slow descent, | broad flakes of fire showered down’
tormenting the violent (Inferno xiv, 28–29). Detail of a miniature by
Bartolomeo di Fruosino, Inferno xiv, 14th century, MS It. 74, f. 42,
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris. Credit: gallica.bnf.fr / BnF.
fire showered down | as snow falls in the hills on windless days’ (Inferno
xiv, 28–30) (Figure 3).
These shades struggle to pat themselves down to ease the pain
from the rain of fire (xiv, 40–42; xvii, 46–51), and are excoriated,
blackened, and disfigured by their punishment (xv, 26–28; xvi, 30
and 35). The case of Capaneus is the most emblematic here: he was
one of the mythical seven kings that assaulted the Greek city of Thebes
and is encountered by Dante under the rain of fire that torments the
blasphemers. Dante inquires about him:
chi è quel grande che non par che curi
lo ’ncendio e giace dispettoso e torto,
sì che la pioggia non par che ’l maturi?
NICOLÒ CRISAFI AND MANUELE GRAGNOLATI 71
(Who is that hero who seems to scorn the fire
and lies there grim and scowling
so that the rain seems not to ripen him?)
(Inferno xiv, 46–48)
In a paradoxical way, Capaneus is both utterly helpless and proudly
weather-resistant. On the one hand, he is prostrated by the rain of
fire (‘lies there’, 47) which, according to one interpretation of the
adjective ‘torto’ (47), contorts him under the pain of his torment. On
the other hand, he compensates for this helplessness with ‘scorn’ (46),
remaining defiant and resistant to any change.14
One could think that Capaneus’s ability to face the extreme
weather of Hell without it annihilating his body or bending his will and
desires represents a successful form of ‘weathering the storm’. How-
ever, the rest of the episode reframes Capaneus’s resistance as his own
major limit. As will become apparent in the Purgatorio, what is missing
in Capaneus according to the conceptual framework of the poem —
and what is impossible in Hell — is the leap from the exposure to pain
to the realization of its beneficial potential. In this attitude, he is em-
blematic of the kind of weathering that is specific to the atmospheric
phenomena of Hell as a place of hopeless damnation, where ‘one of
the features of […] punishment is the incapacity of the damned to
perceive their own damnation in any way beyond the brutality of their
physical torment’.15 Capaneus remains fixed in his rage, arrogance, and
hatred, which the punishment does not wear down. When Capaneus
proudly claims that Hell does not change him (‘What I was alive, I
am in death’, 51) and continues blasphemously to challenge God in
14 TheCommedia’s authoritative editor Giorgio Petrocchi prefers to amend the text of line
48 to ‘non par che ’l marturi’ (‘seems not to torture him’, as translated by Hollander),
meaning that Capaneus appears psychologically unaffected or physically unhurt by
the torment of the rain of fire; but if we follow the manuscript tradition, the reading
‘maturi’ (‘seems not to ripen him’) places the emphasis on Capaneus resisting the
opportunity to be ripened by the experience of torment, i.e., by developing some
insight into his sinful past. See Gragnolati, Experiencing the Afterlife, pp. 115–16; and
‘Gluttony and the Anthropology of Pain in Dante’s Inferno and Purgatorio’, in History in
the Comic Mode: Medieval Communities and the Matter of Person, ed. by Rachel Fulton
and Bruce W. Holsinger (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 238–50
(pp. 244–45).
15 Elena Lombardi, TheWings of the Doves: Love andDesire in Dante andMedieval Culture
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), p. 48.
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the same way as he did on Earth (52–60), Virgil — Dante’s guide
through the afterlife — explains that the identity boasted by Capaneus
is actually part of the infernal punishment itself, which consists in the
dull and never-ending repetition of sin: ‘O, Capaneus, | because your
pride remains unquenched | you suffer greater punishment. | In your
anger lies your agony’ (62–65).16 Indeed, as Mark Cogan explains, the
fiery rain and the heat tormenting the damned in the seventh circle
of Hell are ‘an exact replica of his sin itself ’ and reflect the passionate
wrath and unjustified irascibility of the sin of violence, and blasphemy
in particular.17
This paradigm of weather-resistance, of exposure without change,
can be read as a hallmark in the subjectivity of the Inferno as a whole.
One critic has termed this condition as the ‘tragedy of rigidity’,18
whereby the aerial bodies of the damned are constantly exposed to
the elements while the souls continue to be stuck in their Earthly sin
and to experience its devastating effects. This experience of fixation,
entrapment, and spiritual impermeability is most poignantly expressed
in the climate of the last zone of Inferno, at the very bottom of Hell.
There the condition of utmost desolation is symbolized by a freezing
cold, a negative weather made of the absence of light, warmth, and
any possibility of change of state. The traitors, who for Dante have
enacted the worst perversion of humanity, lie icebound in the frozen
lake Cocytus (Figure 4) and are tormented by a glacial wind produced
by the wings of Lucifer, himself stuck in the ice (Inferno xxxiv, 46–
52).19
These extreme conditions constitute a limit case of what ‘weather-
ing’ can mean. Glacial temperatures are a kind of weather whose action
16 Ironically, Capaneus expresses his defiance through meteorological imagery (Inferno
xiv, 52–60): ‘the pagan Capaneus still defies Jupiter to take his vengeance by hurling
thunderbolts until the arms of his giant smiths will be weary from forging them’
(Boyde, Dante Philomythes, p. 81).
17 Marc Cogan, The Design in the Wax: The Structure of the ‘Divine Comedy’ and its
Meaning (South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1999), pp. 53–58, quotation
on p. 58.
18 Thomas M. Greene, ‘Dramas of Selfhood in the Comedy’, in From Time to Eternity:
Essays on Dante’s ‘Divine Comedy’, ed. by Thomas G. Bergin (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1967), pp. 103–36 (p. 107).
19 The atmospheric conditions of the pit of Hell are also described directly or indirectly
in Inferno xxxii, 22–75; xxxiii, 94–128; xxxiv, 4–9, 22.
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Figure 4. ‘I saw a thousand faces purple | with the cold’: the traitors
frozen in Lake Cocytus (Inferno xxxii, 70–71). Gustave Doré, Inferno
xxxii, 1861, wood engraving. Credit: gallica.bnf.fr / BnF.
expressly consists, not in gradually wearing down or consuming, but
in congealing into a fixed state. The Commedia takes ice as the ultimate
symbol of infernal subjectivity:20 exposed to the punishment torment-
ing their body without spiritually softening their soul, the damned are
petrified, trapped in their sin, and unable to change or improve.21
20 Hegel takes freezing as emblematic of the individuals as depicted in the Commedia.
Although the passage concerns all three realms, we think that his description perfectly
captures the specificity of infernal weathering: ‘For as individuals were in their passions
and sufferings, in their intentions and their accomplishments, so now here they are
presented for ever, solidified into images of bronze. […] [O]n this indestructible foun-
dation the figures of the real world move in their particular character, or rather they
have moved and now in their being and action are frozen and are eternal themselves
in the arms of eternal justice’ (G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art,
ed. and trans. by Thomas Malcolm Knox, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), ii,
p. 1104 (part III. section 3. chapter. C. A. 3. ββ). For a reflection on this passage, see
Erich Auerbach, ‘Dante and the Romantics’, in Time, History, and Literature: Selected
Essays of Erich Auerbach, ed. by James I. Porter, trans. by Jane O. Newman (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 141–42.
21 See Manuele Gragnolati, Amor che move: Linguaggio del corpo e forma del desiderio in
Dante, Pasolini e Morante (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 2013), pp. 79–83.
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THE REGULATED ATMOSPHERE OF PURGATORIO
With its macho model of defiance against the weather and disavowal
of his own vulnerability, Capaneus can be read as a version of the
autonomous, closed, self-righteous subject that has been associated
with Western modernity and ‘the violent practices of domination, ex-
clusion, and devastation of which the subject itself is an accomplice’.22
While this subject has been the object of critique and deconstruction
for over a century, recently, feminist scholar Adriana Cavarero, in the
wake of Judith Butler, has ‘concentrate[d] on the category of relation to
rethink a subjectivity marked by exposure, vulnerability, and depend-
ence’.23 Moving now to Purgatorio, we are interested in exploring how
it presents a model of subjectivity that resonates with this appreciation
of vulnerability and suggests possibilities and conditions for its pro-
ductivity. In particular, we will show how Dante’s Purgatory provides
a regulated environment in which vulnerability can flourish and allow
for the souls’ spiritual improvement and for the gradual weathering
down of their disorderly dispositions and past fixations.
The Church’s official recognition of the otherworldly realm of
Purgatory in the late thirteenth century was relatively recent in Dante’s
time and had nothing like the extensive literary and iconographic
tradition of Hell and Heaven to support it.24 Unfettered by tradition,
Dante had free rein in representing Purgatory as he pleased, and he
devised it as a mountain lying in the Southern Hemisphere of the
Earth, yet free from earthly weather. Earthly meteorology plays no
role in the punishments that take place in its seven terraces. If, on
this count, Purgatorio is deliberately set apart from the atmospheric
torments of Inferno, its suspension of adverse weather would seem to
22 See Adriana Cavarero, Inclinations:ACritique ofRectitude, trans. by Amanda Minervini
and Adam Sitze (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), p. 12.
23 Cavarero, Inclinations, p. 11. Judith Butler’s work to which Cavarero is referring is
Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004). For a
more recent discussion of the political value of vulnerability, see Vulnerability in Resist-
ance, ed. by Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti, and Leticia Sabsay (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2016), especially the ‘Introduction’ by Butler, Gambetti, and Sabsay,
pp. 1–11, and the essay by Judith Butler, ‘Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance’, pp.
12–27.
24 Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1984).
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share the assumption that exposure is inextricable from harm. The
early cantos open on beautiful clear skies (Purgatorio i, 13) and breezy
(117, 123), sunlit (122) landscapes that will characterize the mountain
as a whole, yet, as we will now see, they are also haunted by flashbacks
and reminders of weather as a harmful force.
A first reminder is offered by Dante’s guide Virgil who explains that
in the afterlife the souls are given a body of air precisely for its capacity
to suffer pain.25 Extreme heat and freezing colds are central to Virgil’s
definition of the body of air as capable of being affected by physical
torment:
A sofferir tormenti, caldi e geli
simili corpi la Virtù dispone
che, come fa, non vuol ch’a noi si sveli.
(The power that fits bodies like ours
to suffer torments, heat, and cold
does not reveal the secret of its working.)
(Purgatorio iii, 31–33)
‘[T]ormenti, caldi e geli’ here echo the line ‘ne le tenebre etterne, in
caldo e ’n gelo’ that defines Hell in the parallel canto (Inferno iii, 85;
quoted in the previous section). The new context is notable for the
absence of the adjective ‘etterno’. The verb ‘sofferir’ (31) works like the
enantiosemic ‘weathering’, its opposite connotations ‘to bear’ and ‘to
feel’ expressing comparable dynamics. By speaking of the experience
of torment in atmospheric terms, then, the tercet above articulates a
theme of the wider Purgatorio where the torments have a weathering
effect on the souls even though weather phenomena are deliberately
toned down in the canticle and never directly harnessed as instruments
of torment as they are in Inferno.
The harmful potential of the weather is thematized more directly
in the tales of Manfred of Hohenstaufen (Purgatorio iii) and Jacopo del
Cassero, Buonconte da Montefeltro, and Pia dei Tolomei (Purgatorio
25 Perhaps because as a virtuous pagan of Limbo he is unacquainted with Purgatory, Virgil
does not say more here. Later in the canticle the poet Statius will give the technical,
precise explanation that when the soul separates from its earthly body and gets to the
afterlife, it can indeed create a body of air that has not only an appearance but also all
the senses and can therefore be affected by physical pain (Purgatorio xxv, 19–108).
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v), which foreground the extreme vulnerability of the mortal body to
weather phenomena. These shades portray their earthly body as fluid,
fragile, easily dispossessed — a body susceptible to being weathered
and wounded irrecoverably.26 The controlled environment in the ter-
races of Purgatory proper will eventually allow the dead to reclaim
the experience of physical torment into a means for spiritual healing;
however, at this early stage of Antepurgatory, the souls appear to be
haunted still by fear of the potential dangers of physical exposure and
vulnerability on Earth.27 Such is the emblematic case of the noble-
man Buonconte da Montefeltro, whom Dante meets among those who
repented at the last minute before dying a violent death. Buonconte
relates the dissolution of his own corpse on Earth as it fell prey to
the force of the elements, embodied by a torrential flood. His speech
contains the most extended description of the causes and effects of
precipitation and the formation of rivers in the Commedia, which ac-
curately follows Aristotle’s Meteorology.28 The rains and ensuing flood
freeze, sweep, undo, spin, overcome, cover, and enclose Buonconte’s
corpse:
Ben sai come ne l’aere si raccoglie
quell’umido vapor che in acqua riede,
tosto che sale dove ’l freddo il coglie.
[…] mosse il fummo e ’l vento
per la virtù che sua natura diede.
Indi la valle, come ’l dì fu spento,
26 See Gary Cestaro, Dante and the Grammar of the Nursing Body (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), pp. 109–34. As Cestaro argues: ‘the souls of
antepurgatory had come to depend upon the apparent solidity of their temporal bodies
as emblematic of a stable individual identity. They had not paid sufficient attention to
the inherent fluidity of bodies so evident — as canto 5 dramatically attests — in the
text of the created universe. Purgatorio v shows us that temporal identity mistakenly
depends upon bodily integrity, for just as the elemental body (of a person, of the earth,
of the universe) is fragile and fluid, so is earthly personhood in time’ (p. 110)
27 Antepurgatory is the first of the three parts of Purgatorio, which constitutes a transi-
tional, dilatory space before the proper purgation can begin (Purgatorio i–ix).
28 Buonconte’s tale is demonic in origin (Purgatorio xxv, 111–112) yet the description
of its formation through the condensation (‘si converse’, 117) of vapour (‘umido
vapor’, 110) into water (‘acqua’, 110, 117) at higher altitudes and lower temperatures
(‘tosto che sale dove ’l freddo il coglie’, 111), which results in it falling down as
rain (‘la pioggia cadde’, 118) is verisimilar and scientifically accurate according to
Aristotle’s Meteorologica, pp. 68–121 (i. ix–xiv. 346b16–353a28), and indeed, with
some terminological tweaks, to modern meteorology.
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[…] coperse
di nebbia; e ’l ciel di sopra fece intento,
sì che ’l pregno aere in acqua si converse;
la pioggia cadde, e a’ fossati venne
di lei ciò che la terra non sofferse;
e come ai rivi grandi si convenne,
ver’ lo fiume real tanto veloce
si ruinò, che nulla lo ritenne.
Lo corpo mio gelato in su la foce
trovò l’Archian rubesto; e quel sospinse
ne l’Arno, e sciolse al mio petto la croce
ch’i’ fe; di me quando ’l dolor mi vinse;
voltòmmi per le ripe e per lo fondo,
poi di sua preda mi coperse e cinse.
(Surely you know how a column of moist air,
rising to colder heights, condenses
and once again is changed to water.
[…] natural power
[…] roused the fog and wind.
Then, when the day was spent, he shrouded
the valley […]
in mist, and darkened the sky with clouds
so that the pregnant air was turned to water.
The rain fell and the overflow that earth
could not absorb rushed to the gullies
and, gathering in surging torrents, poured
headlong down the seaward stream
with so much rage nothing could hold it back.
At its mouth the blood-red Archiano found
my frozen corpse and swept it down the Arno,
undoing at my chest the cross
my arms had made when I was overcome by pain.
It spun me past its banks and to the bottom,
then covered and enclosed me with its spoils.)
(Purgatorio v, 109–29)
As a soul who has suffered a violent death, Buonconte is doubly aware
of the vulnerability of his body. His powerful description is a reminder
that in contrast to what happens in the Afterlife, vulnerability on Earth
has limits: the living do not possess the same capacity for limitless
harm that is proper to the body-of-air of the dead, and exposure will
eventually result in annihilation (Figure 5).29
29 On the limits and sustainability of intensity and receptivity, see Rosi Braidotti, ‘Inten-
sive Genre and the Demise of Gender’, Angelaki, 13.2 (2008), pp. 45–57 (p. 52).
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Figure 5. Buonconte’s dispossessed body: ‘the blood-red Archiano found
| my frozen corpse and swept it down the Arno’ (Purgatorio v, 124–25).
Gustave Doré, Purgatorio v, 1868, wood engraving.
Credit: gallica.bnf.fr / BnF.
Antepurgatory plays this scene of unchecked vulnerability over
and over again, intertwining it, more often than not, with the violence
of the elements. This is seen in the first place with the tale of the
excommunicated king Manfred, whose body is wounded and broken
(‘rotta la persona’, Purgatorio iii, 118) and whose bones (‘l’ossa del
corpo mio’, 127) are left at the mercy of the elements (‘Or le bagna
la pioggia e move il vento | di fuor dal regno, quasi lungo ’l Verde,
| dov’ e’ le trasmutò a lume spento’ [Now the rain washes and the
wind stirs them | beyond the Kingdom, near the Verde’s banks, there
| where he brought them with his torches quenched], 130–32). The
scene is then repeated in the tale of the murdered Jacopo del Cassero,
who graphically describes his death by blood loss (‘lì vid’io | de le mie
vene farsi in terra laco’, Purgatorio v, 83–84) ‘as bodily blood flows
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back to join marsh, lake, and sea’.30 Lastly, after Buonconte’s tale, the
dissolution of the earthly body also closes the canto in the pithy line
by Pia dei Tolomei, who was apparently murdered by her husband:
‘Siena made me, in Maremma I was undone’ (Siena mi fé, disfecemi
Maremma; Purgatorio v, 134). As these episodes show, there is only
so much an earthly body can weather. Having established this, the
rest of Purgatorio will shelter the purging shades from the inclement
weather and sharpen the focus of their punishments in a regulated
atmosphere where vulnerability can be reclaimed and turned into a
means for positive transformation. It is on this regulated atmosphere
that we reflect in the second part of this section.
The most distinctive feature of the purgatorial environment is a
negative one: the absence of any adverse weather. The mountain of
Purgatory is still part of Earth but, beginning with the seven terraces
of Purgatory proper where the souls purge the residue of their earthly
sins and recuperate their original perfection, its atmosphere is subject
to a special dispensation. The microclimate of Purgatory proper is
explained to Dante and Virgil by the Latin poet Statius, whom they
encounter at the completion of his purgatorial process when he is
ready to ascend to Heaven. Statius describes Purgatory as a regulated
environment, free from weather changes:
Cosa non è che sanza
ordine senta la religïone
de la montagna, o che sia fuor d’usanza.
Libero è qui da ogne alterazione:
di quel che ’l ciel da sé in sé riceve
esser ci puote, e non d’altro, cagione.
Per che non pioggia, non grando, non neve,
non rugiada, non brina più su cade
che la scaletta di tre gradi breve;
nuvole spesse non paion né rade,
né coruscar, né figlia di Taumante,
che di là cangia sovente contrade;
secco vapo non surge più avante
ch’al sommo d’i’ tre gradi ch’io parlai.
(The mountain’s holy law does not allow
anything disordered or that violates its rule.
30 Cestaro, Dante and the Grammar, p. 124.
80 WEATHERING THE AFTERLIFE
Here nothing ever changes.
Only by that which Heaven gathers from Itself,
and from nothing else, can any change be wrought
so that not rain nor hail nor snow
nor dew nor hoarfrost falls above
the gentle rise of those three steps below.
Clouds, dense or broken, do not appear,
nor lightning-flash, nor Thaumas’ daughter,
who appears in many places in the sky down there,
nor does dry vapor rise beyond the highest
of those three steps of which I spoke.)
(Purgatorio xxi, 40–53)
The prevalent rhetorical mode in these lines is one of negation, which
appear eleven times over fourteen lines, concentrating in the negative
list of weather phenomena that are not in Purgatorio: rain, hail, snow,
dew, hoarfrost (46–47); clouds, lightning-flash, rainbows, dry vapour
(which caused winds) (49–50, 52). The phenomena excluded are not
only those that were harnessed in Hell as punishments (wind in the
circle of the lustful; rain, hail, and snow in the circle of the gluttons;
lightning evoked by Capaneus in the circle of the violent; hoarfrost in
the circle of the traitors) but also those that are represented in a more
positive light in the liminal spaces of the shores of Antepurgatory and
Eden (dew) and in Heaven (rainbows). This atmospheric regulation
by exclusion is conceived in terms of order, rule, and norm: with two
double negations we are told that the sacred rule cannot be affected
by anything ‘without order’ or ‘outside the norm’ (41–42).31 The rest
of the quote gives this atmospheric control a positive spin, as the
exclusion of bad weather in this regulated environment is described
in the language of freedom: ‘Libero è qui da ogne alterazione’ (The
mountain is free from all change; 43).
31 Manfredi Porena has understood the phrase ‘sacra religïone | de la montagna’ (Pur-
gatorio xxi, 40–41) to refer not to the constitution of the mountain but more specific-
ally to the ‘community of the purging souls’. If this interpretation is correct, then the
verb ‘senta’ (‘to feel’, ‘to be affected’, 41) would support the idea that the purging souls
cannot feel or be affected by any distracting weather forces. See Manfredi Porena on
Purgatorio xxi, 40–42; references to commentaries of the Commedia are taken from
the Dartmouth Dante Project available online at <https://dante.dartmouth.edu/>
[accessed 8 April 2020].
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Freedom is a keyword of Purgatorio, strategically placed through
the beginning, middle and end of the cantica.32 The freedom to be
attained in Purgatory is not conceived in terms of a positive liberty to
do whatever one pleases but as a negative liberty from unorderly dis-
position and affect; in other words, as control of one’s desires through
reason. There thus seems to be a relation between this specific form
of free subjectivity in the making and the atmosphere that enables it
in Purgatorio. Purgatory, the realm predicated on the possibility of
controlling passion and effecting (spiritual) change, is itself tightly
controlled and free from all (atmospheric) change. To some of the
readers of this paper in the early twenty-first century, the status of
Dante’s Purgatory as a fantasy of controlling and even harnessing the
weather in a protected, productive, and well-structured environment
may evoke problematic fantasies of geoengineering as a strategy to alter
the effects or pace of climate change.33 There is certainly a sense in
which the atmospheric regulation is conceived, anthropocentrically,
as a space for the souls to undertake their normative spiritual path.
However, from the perspective of the souls of Purgatory, the mountain
is not an opportunity for asserting their mastery over their environ-
ment, but a place where they can experience, exercise, and achieve, in
all safety, a protected form of vulnerability. In this way, and in contrast
with the extreme exposure which the damned attempt to weather, or
that have the potential to annihilate the living, the vulnerability to pain
depicted in Purgatorio is channelled into a productive experience of
understanding and growth, a veritable transformation that gradually
32 Key passages are the opening canto, where Virgil famously refers to Dante as one
who goes searching for freedom (‘libertà va cercando’, Purgatorio i, 71); the discourse
of freedom is then theorised more at length in the central canti of the Commedia,
Purgatorio xvi–xviii, which discuss the theological doctrine of free will (‘libero
arbitrio’, Purgatorio xvi, 71); and the word returns as the poet reaches the top of the
mountain and Virgil proclaims that Dante’s will is finally free (‘libero, dritto e sano è
tuo arbitrio’, Paradiso xxvii, 143):
33 For a feminist critique of geoengineering in the face of climate change, see
Holly Jean Buck, Andrea R. Gammon, and Christopher J. Preston, ‘Gender and
Geoengineering’, Hypatia, 29.3 (2014), pp. 651–69. For a critique of architecture
that adopts instead strategies of resilience: Orit Halpern, ‘Hopeful Resilience’, e-
flux, 19 April 2017 <https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/accumulation/96421/
hopeful-resilience/> [accessed 8 April 2020]. We are grateful to Alison Sperling for
these insightful suggestions.
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wears down the wrong dispositions of the past and re-opens the self to
a correct form of love and desire.
This is the action of weathering in the Purgatory imagined by
Dante. Earthly or infernal weathering involves the violent action of
concrete weather phenomena; in Purgatory, these are suspended so
that a more meaningful and productive form of weathering can take
place, independent of the weather phenomena themselves but cap-
turing their transformational powers. It is a beneficial connotation
of ‘weathering’, like the action of airing one’s linen or ‘lifting [a
hawk’s] confinement and putting them back in their element’.34 What
is weathered away, in this weathering without weather, are the incrust-
ations, accretions, and bad habits accumulated over the course of a
lifetime, which targeted torments safely exfoliate, erode, and consume.
As the gatekeeper of Purgatory Cato of Utica puts it on the shores of
Antepurgatory, the mountain’s purpose is precisely to help these souls
shed their past accretions: ‘spogliar[si] lo scoglio | ch’esser non lascia
a voi Dio manifesto’ (shed the slough | that lets not God be known
to you; Purgatorio ii, 122–23).35 The punishments of Purgatorio, thus,
do not coincide with a senseless exposure but operate weathering with
focus, direction, and an end as a way to target, in progressive steps,
the seven deadly dispositions of Pride, Envy, Wrath, Sloth, Greed,
Gluttony, and Lust. In particular, the process of Dante’s Purgatory
is centred around the figure of the suffering Christ and imagined as
the experience of suffering that teaches the soul how to gradually
erode these dispositions and conform to Christ’s gratuitous and self-
less love.36 As an example of this targeted weathering, we will turn to
the sixth terrace, where the gluttons are punished not by the force of
the elements but by their own longing for sweet-smelling fruits and
a murmuring spring of fresh water, tantalizingly out of reach. Their
34 See Holzhey, ‘Weathering Ambivalences: Between Language and Physics’, in this
volume, p. 29.
35 This process can be conceived in terms of the ‘logic of supplementarity’ inherent in the
action of weathering, whereby something is gained through a process of weathering
away; thus in Purgatorio the process of purgation transforms the souls spiritually as
it erodes their disordered accretions. On the logic of supplementarity, see Damiano
Sacco’s chapter in this volume.
36 Manuele Gragnolati has written about the Christological paradigm of Dante’s Purgat-
ory and the concept of ‘productive pain’, Experiencing the Afterlife, pp. 89–137.
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Figure 6. ‘The sockets of their eyes resembled rings | without their
gems’: the emaciated gluttons (Purgatorio xxiii, 31–32). Detail of a
miniature by Priamo della Quercia, Purgatorio xxiii, 1440s, MS Yates
Thompson 36, f. 107, The British Library, London.
Credit: The British Library/europeana.
environment is idyllic in all other respects. Yet, in their purgation, these
souls are worn to their bare bones: emaciated, their eyes hollow, their
face pale, their skinned stretch out over their bones (Figure 6):
Ne li occhi era ciascuna oscura e cava,
palida ne la faccia, e tanto scema
che da l’ossa la pelle s’informava.
Non credo che così a buccia strema
Erisittone fosse fatto secco,
per digiunar, quando più n’ebbe tema.
Io dicea fra me stesso pensando: ‘Ecco
la gente che perdé Ierusalemme,
quando Maria nel figlio diè di becco!’.
Parean l’occhiaie anella sanza gemme:
chi nel viso de li uomini legge ‘omo’
ben avria quivi conosciuta l’emme.
(Their eyes were dark and sunken,
their faces pales, their flesh so wasted
that the skin took all its shape from bones.
I do not believe that Erysichthon had become
so consumed, to the very skin, by hunger
when he was most in terror of it.
I said to myself in thought:
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‘Behold the people who lost Jerusalem
When Mary set her beak into her son!’
The sockets of their eyes resembled rings
without their gems. He who reads ‘omo’’
in men’s faces would have easily made out the ‘m’.)
(Purgatorio xxiii, 22–33)
In addition to comparing the gluttons’ emaciation to two horrible cases
of starvation, the poem also associates it with Christ: the word ‘omo’
that the pilgrim reads on the face of the shades (32–33) recalls the
passage in John’s Gospel, where, during his Passion, the flagellated
Christ is crowned with thorns and presented by Pilate to the crowd
with the expression ‘Ecce homo’: ‘Ecce homo’ sounds very similar to
the Dantesque ‘legge omo’, and ‘Ecco’ (28) and ‘omo’ (32) are rhyme
words within four lines of each other.
In contrast with the damned from Hell, the distortion of the
shades’ features is a manifestation, not of sin, but of conforming to the
crucified Christ, his selfless love, and productive pain. In a paradoxical
way that does not mask the intensity of the suffering, the souls in Pur-
gatory embrace pain, through identification with Christ, as a form of
pleasure:
E non pur una volta, questo spazzo
girando, si rinfresca nostra pena:
io dico pena, e dovria dir sollazzo,
ché quella voglia a li alberi ci mena
che menò Cristo lieto a dire ‘Elì’,
quando ne liberò con la sua vena.
(And not once only, circling in this space,
is our pain renewed.
I speak of pain but should say solace,
for the same desire leads us to the trees
that led Christ to utter Elì with such bliss
when with the blood from His own veins He made us free.)
(Purgatorio xxiii, 70–75)
The gluttons become increasingly raw and exposed but in a protec-
ted, controlled, and well-structured environment that does not destroy
them but exfoliates their rigidity and allows them to recuperate the
original likeness with God that sin had hidden. In the process of
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purgation, disorderly dispositions are softened, and the souls learn
such virtues as humility, meekness, temperance, and generosity. They
can experience a form of vulnerability that overcomes self-righteous
and self-referential fixation and makes them ‘inclined’ and open to
others.37 Significantly, as Joan Ferrante has argued, the experience of
Purgatory also teaches the souls to reconstruct societal bonds, rebuild
a sense of community, and ‘become citizens of the ideal society’.38
Dante’s Purgatory is attractive in imagining the possibility for a
productive experience of pain, a viable vulnerability, and an inclined
subjectivity. At the same time, the importance of a highly regulated
environment would seem to correspond to the widespread view that
Butler, Gambetti, and Sabsay take as the starting point of their feminist
critique, namely ‘that vulnerability requires and implies the need for
protection and the strengthening of paternalistic forms of power’.39
However, Purgatory is meant as a transient rather than ideal state, and it
prepares the souls for Heaven, where, as we will see in the next section,
the weather conditions are far less restrained but the blessed no longer
need protection.
HEAVENLY HEAT
At the top of the mountain of Purgatory, what awaits the newly
weathered soul is the idyllic garden of Eden, a locus amoenus where
spring is eternal (‘qui primavera sempre e ogne frutto’ [here it is always
spring, with every fruit in season], Purgatorio xxviii, 143) and the
atmosphere is characterised by ‘un’aura dolce, senza mutamento’ (A
sweet breeze, without any change; Purgatorio xxviii, 7). This also is
a controlled environment, one last stop for the souls to experiment
37 On the ethical posture of inclination, see Cavarero, Inclinations. Both in Antepurgat-
ory and especially in the seven terraces of Purgatory proper, souls gather in groups
and assume postures defying straightness and autonomy. For instance, the indolent
Belacqua is found leaning over his knees among a group of late-repentants who are
resting in the shade (Purgatorio iv, 103–109), the proud are bent under the weight
of rocks (Purgatorio x, 130–39), the envious lean against the wall of the terrace and
against each other (Purgatorio xiii, 59–60), and the avaricious lie flat on the ground
(Purgatorio xix, 70–75).
38 Joan Ferrante, The Political Vision of Dante’s ‘Comedy’ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1984), pp. 198–252 (p. 198).
39 Butler, Gambetti, and Sabsay, ‘Introduction’, p. 1.
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Figure 7. ‘Nor will such shining have the power to harm us’ (Paradiso
xiv, 58). Detail of a miniature by Giovanni di Paolo, Paradiso xiv,
1440s, MS Yates Thompson 36, f. 154, The British Library, London.
Credit: The British Library/europeana.
with exploration and wandering a while longer, before their leap to
Heaven. Given this portrayal of Eden, one might expect the garden to
be an anticipation of what Heaven might look like — a place of im-
perturbable bliss and enjoyment, free from the distraction and pain of
the elements’ most adverse effects. However, Dante’s representation of
Heaven overturns this comforting expectation. In Paradiso the weather
is not controlled or sublimated but, on the contrary, its intensity is
dialled up. The weather of the canticle does not feature precipitations,
supernatural phenomena, freezing temperatures, or earthquakes but is
dominated instead by a relentless atmospheric condition of extreme
light and heat — we call this the heavenly ‘canicule’ after the heatwave
that hit the planet in the Summer of 2019, as we were beginning to
write this paper in France.
As Lino Pertile and Heather Webb pointed out, there is more fire
in Paradiso than in Inferno, and references to fire, heat, and burning
are accordingly much more numerous in the third canticle than in the
previous ones.40 The condition of being in Dante’s Heaven resembles
that of being exposed to a heatwave, which the blessed experience as a
40 Lino Pertile, ‘L’antica fiamma: La metamorfosi del fuoco nella Commedia di Dante’,
The Italianist, 11.1 (1991), pp. 29–60; Heather Webb, Dante’s Persons: An Ethics of the
Transhuman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 123–62, esp. p. 125.
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sensation of intense burning: they are ‘infiammati’ (inflamed; Paradiso
iii, 52) and ‘ard[ono]’ (burn; xxxi, 100). While light is the external
and visible indication of the divine love informing Heaven, fire also
manifests the intensity of the vision attained by the blessed souls and
that of the joy resulting from it:
La sua chiarezza séguita l’ardore;
l’ardor la vision, e quella è tanta,
quant’ha di grazia sovra sua valore.
(Its brightness answers to our ardor,
the ardor to our vision, and that is given
in greater measure of grace that we deserve.)
(Paradiso xiv, 40–42)
Having themselves become ‘sempiterne fiamme’ (eternal flames; xiv,
66) and ‘lucenti incendi’ (fiery lights; xix, 100), the blessed souls are
not only affected by the weather but also contribute to it insofar as
they radiate the heat they feel back to one another. In this way, far
from being simply immersed in the heatwave, the blessed are sources
of extreme heat in turn.41 As Heather Webb has shown, ardore qualifies
‘the intensity of attention that one person can offer to another’,42 and
the blessed souls’ ardent burning is a sign that they have overcome
any self-enclosure or rigidity and are now enjoying a form of radical
dispossession that merges them with God and opens them to others.
Yet, while the souls open up to the divine environment and melt
with it, they are not completely annihilated and, paradoxically, their
fusion occurs without fully dissolving them, their memories, desires,
or consciousness.43
The heat and burning running throughout the Paradiso culminate
in the final cantos of the poem. Dante the character’s final leap into
41 See Pertile, ‘L’antica fiamma’, pp. 31–32. The heavenly condition of exposure to the
heatwave and embodiment of it can be read as suggesting the collapse of distinctions
between human beings and their environment. For this idea in contemporary new
materialism and in particular in the work of Stacy Alaimo, and Astrida Neimanis and
Rachel Loewen Walker, see Christoph F. E. Holzhey’s chapter in the present volume.
42 Webb, Dante’s Persons, p. 125.
43 On the paradox of Heaven as at once losing and finding oneself, see Manuele Gragno-
lati, ‘Diffracting Dante’s Paradiso: Transformation, Identity, and the Form of Desire’, in
Reception, Translation, and Transformation of Italian Literature, ed. by Brian Richard-
son, Guido Bonsaver, and Giuseppe Stellardi (Oxford: Legenda, 2017), pp. 352–66.
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Transcendence can take place only when his ardour reaches its peak of
intensity:44
E io ch’al fine di tutt’ i disii
appropinquava, sì com’io dovea,
l’ardor del desiderio in me finii.
(And, as I neared the end of all desire,
I extended to its limit, as was right,
the ardor of the longing in my soul.)
(Paradiso xxxiii, 46–48)
However, if the heatwave is the hallmark of Dante’s Heaven, its status
should not be taken for granted. Spiritualizing interpretations main-
tain that, unlike the weather phenomena of Hell, it is entirely and
exclusively metaphorical, to be understood as a fire of love and de-
sire.45 In Lino Pertile’s view, emblematic of this position, the fire of
love is reified as a form of contrapasso in Inferno and has a therapeutic
purpose at the end of the terrace of the lustful in Purgatorio xxvii, 10–
57 (anticipated in xxv, 138–39), as a ‘real’ fire, with a flame that burns
literally; but in Heaven, it is reduced to a metaphor whose meaning
takes on positive connotations.46 Instead, in stressing the concrete-
ness of the extreme atmospheric conditions of Heaven and the intense
burning of the blessed, we insist on the literal character of the heavenly
canicule even as it acquires a spiritual dimension as a manifestation of
the love and vision of Transcendence that are disclosed in Heaven.
Paradiso reiterates that the light and heat of heaven are intense
enough to be destructive on any mortal body that were to be exposed
to them. For instance, they are so violent that they must be tempor-
arily tempered for the benefit of Dante, who is travelling through the
afterlife with his earthly body and would otherwise burn alive. This re-
straint, which is reminiscent of the suspension of weather inPurgatorio,
44 See Webb, Dante’s Persons, pp. 160–63. On this understanding of the term finii, see
Lombardi, The Wings of the Doves, p. 125.
45 ‘il fuoco del Paradiso, contrariamente a quello infernale, non fa fumo ne brucia nessu-
no, perché è tutto e soltanto metaforico, e fuoco d’amore e di desiderio, ove non sia
ardore di luce’ (Pertile, ‘L’antica fiamma’, p. 30). Curiously, Pertile concedes that the
spiritualising interpretations comes ‘at the risk of contradicting Dante himself ’ (ibid.).
46 Pertile, ‘L’antica fiamma’, p. 30.
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only lasts as long as Dante’s journey, thus indicating the physical vio-
lence of the heavenly canicule by human standards. Beatrice illustrates
its force by comparing it to the myth of Semele, who burned to ashes
the moment she chose to see the pagan god Zeus face-to-face in all his
splendour. For the protagonist Dante, who, exceptionally, is voyaging
through Heaven, the myth of Semele still functions as a cautionary
tale:
E quella non ridea; ma ‘S’io ridessi’,
mi cominciò, ‘tu ti faresti quale
fu Semelè quando di cener fessi;
ché la bellezza mia, che per le scale
de l’etterno palazzo più s’accende,
com’hai veduto, quanto più si sale,
se non si temperasse, tanto splende,
che ’l tuo mortal podere, al suo fulgore,
sarebbe fronda che trono scoscende.’
(She was not smiling. ‘If I smiled,’
she said, ‘you would become what Semele became
when she was turned to ashes,
for my beauty, which you have seen
flame up more brilliantly the higher we ascend
the stairs of this eternal palace,
is so resplendent that, were it not tempered
in its blazing, your mortal powers would be
like tree limbs rent and scorched by lightning.)
(Paradiso xxi, 1–12)
Beatrice explains that if she were to smile fully, she would risk annihil-
ating Dante’s mortal body with her radiance like a lightning strikes a
tree (11–12). Temporarily tempering her splendour (10), she makes
heaven safe for Dante, and lets herself be seen.
Such self-restraint and protectiveness, as Beatrice displays in this
passage, does not concern the fleshless souls of the blessed in their
constant exposure to their environment. Far from sheltered and insu-
lated, they are able to feel heavenly weather and burn with its ardour
without being harmed. Similar to Hell, there is no change here but
the blessed souls have a different way of ‘weathering the storm’ to the
impermeable rigidity of a Capaneus: they are able to sustain the full
intensity of the environment, yet they simultaneously demonstrate a
90 WEATHERING THE AFTERLIFE
radical receptivity to it, which is in turn an integral part of their bliss.
While this ability, at once to receive and endure paradisiac warmth, is
essential to the experience of the blessed souls, in the heaven of the Sun
Solomon explains that earthly bodies will also be unharmed once they
resurrect and reunite with their souls at the end of time:
né potrà tanta luce affaticarne:
ché li organi del corpo saran forti
a tutto ciò che potrà dilettarne.
(Nor will such shining have the power to harm us,
For our body organs shall be strengthened
to deal with all that can delight us.)
(Paradiso xiv, 58–60)
The organs of the resurrected body are exposed but ‘strengthened’
(59), the ‘shining’ (58) of the flesh is intense but does not ‘have the
power to harm’ them (58). The weather can be dialled up in Heaven
precisely because the blessed are ready to enjoy intensity without
annihilation (Figure 7).
Radically open even to the extreme conditions of its environment,
the ideal subjectivity represented in Paradiso is not self-involved or
defiant (as in Hell) or sheltered (as in Purgatory) but discovers that
it does not have to fear being radically receptive even as it is rad-
ically exposed. The weathering of Paradiso constitutes an answer to
the mitigated, ‘safe’ weathering of Purgatorio just as much as to the
antagonistic weathering of Inferno. Paradiso dramatically removes the
protected setting of Purgatorio and reveals a form of subjectivity that is
finally capable of abandoning all rigidity and closure even in the most
extreme of circumstances. Having relinquished aggressiveness, self-
enclosure, and pretence of autonomy, heavenly subjectivity neither
needs protection nor fears unmediated exposure, but is capable of
enjoying the blinding light without having to close itself off from its
burning intensity.
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Figure 8. ‘[S]o much of the sky seemed set on fire | by the flaming sun’
(Paradiso i, 79–80). Olafur Eliasson, The Weather Project, 16 October
2003 – 21 March 2004, Turbine Hall, Tate Modern, London.
Credit: Bradley Clark/Wikimedia Commons.

Scaling fromWeather to Climate
DANIEL LIU
The interaction of all meteorological elements at a particular
time in a particular place provides what we call the ‘weather’
[Wetter]. The weather is not an average atmospheric state, but
rather the total impression or total effect of actually occurring
atmospheric phenomena all at once within a particular, short
period of time, at a certain hour, or even more strictly in a given
moment. We speak of the weather of a certain day, but only of the
‘climate’ [Witterung] and hardly of the ‘weather’ of a whole year,
because the longer the period, the more manifold and heterogen-
ous are the weather phenomena that have occurred, which can
be summarized only through the term ‘climate.’ Climate already
indicates an abstraction, while weather is a real condition, an
individual event singled out of the changing sequence of climate
phenomena. A weather map shows the atmospheric phenom-
ena taking place over a part of the earth’s surface at a particular
moment. There is no such thing as a weather map for months
or a whole year, because the interplay of average temperature,
average cloud cover, average wind, average rainfall, or monthly
rainfall is not the weather.
Julius Hann, Lehrbuch der Meteorologie (1901), p. 483
The theme ‘weathering’ in this volume assumes a set of climatic forces
— both material and metaphorical — that act with some constancy
or predictability on an object, as well as specifying the kind or kinds
of temporalities with regard to the thing being weathered. One of our
94 SCALING FROM WEATHER TO CLIMATE
motivations for choosing ‘weathering’ as our theme is the clear and
distinct ambiguity of the concept. In English, at least, the concepts
‘weather’ and ‘weathered/weathering’ are at once global and local,
e.g., the way a thunderstorm is a locally contained event caused by
larger-scale climatological patterns; they invoke recent events, histor-
ical disruptions across a handful of centuries, and even processes that
stretch well into Earth’s deep history. The weathering or weathering
away of an object is temporally relative to both the object and the forces
acting upon it. Weather is also an omnipresent condition — there’s
good weather and bad weather, but there’s never no weather — and
yet, from within the ivory tower, it’s both containable and temporarily
escapable thanks to durable construction methods and modern cli-
mate control technologies like fibreglass insulation, air conditioning, a
steady supply of electricity, central heating, and cognitive dissonance.1
As a friendly concept, weathering manages to tick all of the boxes of
being everywhere and not everywhere at the same time, working as a
capacious-enough concept that’s both helpfully meaningful and vague,
impossible to ignore and (as aforementioned) conveniently ignorable
if need be.
Are all of these possible meanings of the weather actually com-
mensurable with one another? Or is part of the appeal their incom-
mensurability? One of the more powerful intellectual currents within
Anthropocene discourse and the environmental humanities is a stress
on incommensurability of individual thinkers or political actors when
compared to the geographical, geological, and historical scales of an-
thropogenic climate change. The problem of scaling individual experi-
ence — be it through pragmatic experience, social contract theory,
the Kantian a priori, the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness,
etc. — up to encompass the scale and nature of climate change has
been a manifest political problem around global climate science since
the mid-1980s, and has dramatically intensified since the early 2000s.2
1 Christina Sharpe, In theWake: OnBlackness and Being (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2016), chapter 4; on air conditioning see Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia: Eight
Lectures on the New Climatic Regime, trans. by Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Polity,
2017), pp. 123–24.
2 Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists
Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (New York:
Bloomsbury, 2010).
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A running exchange with Dipesh Chakrabarty, Julia Adeney Thomas,
Robert Stockhammer is a good case in point. In 2009, Chakrabarty
reflected that his own scholarship left him ill-equipped to conceptually
tackle the political crises of global climate change:
I realized that all my readings in theories of globalization,
Marxist analysis of capital, subaltern studies, and postcolonial
criticism over the last twenty-five years, while enormously
useful in studying globalization, had not really prepared me
for making sense of this planetary conjuncture within which
humanity finds itself today.3
In 2012, Chakrabarty sensed that the problem of scale was becom-
ing more acute within postcolonial historiography and theory, which
has emphasized differences of cultural experience juxtaposed against
processes of globalization. The sheer scale of climate change left ‘ex-
perience’ behind, in that, ‘We cannot ever experience ourselves as
a geophysical force — though we now know that this is one of the
modes of our collective existence. We cannot send somebody out to
experience in an unmediated manner this “force” on our behalf.’4 More
troublingly for Chakrabarty,
We now also have a mode of existence in which we […] are
‘indifferent’ or ‘neutral’ to questions of intrahuman justice
[…]. This is why the need arises to view the human simultan-
eously on contradictory registers: as a geophysical force and as
a political agent, as a bearer of rights and as author of actions;
subject to both the stochastic forces of nature (being itself
one such force collectively) and open to the contingency of
individual human experience; belonging at once to differently
scaled histories of the planet, of life and species, and of human
societies.5
Even though the individual versus the general will has long been a stock
problem in social contract theory, Stockhammer, following Chakra-
barty’s lead, has noted that global climate change in the last century
3 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses’, Critical Inquiry, 35.2
(Winter 2009), pp. 197–222 (p. 199) <https://doi.org/10.1086/596640>.
4 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Postcolonial Studies and the Challenge of Climate Change’, New
Literary History, 43.1 (2012), pp. 1–18 (p. 12) <https://doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2012.
0007>.
5 Ibid., p. 15, emphasis added.
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has created or intensified a fissure in the history of Western philosophy
that had remained hidden: the two separate concepts of humanity, the
rational homo of the philosophers and the species Anthropos of natural
history. Whereas homo gestures to the universality of human reason
and experience, the Anthropos signifies what is collectively common
despite human diversity and inequality. This distinction leads Stock-
hammer to write, ‘I am skeptical whether this model of individual
enlightenment [Homo] can directly carry over to seven billion spe-
cimens of the species [Anthropos]’, and, ‘The commonality of homo
is not comparable to the inequality within the Anthropoi.’6 Picking
up on Stockhammer’s terminology and highlighting the contradictory
or even ‘incommensurable’ concepts of the human, Chakrabarty re-
sponds,
By introducing new questions of scale — astronomical scales
for space, geological scales for time, and scales of evolutionary
time for the history of life — all in search of understanding the
relationship between the history of the planet’s atmosphere
and its life-carrying capacity, and thus promoting what may
be called a life, or zoecentric, view of the history of the planet,
the literature on global warming works at a tangent to the
completely homocentric narrative of globalization.7
Not that either Chakrabarty or Thomas believe this incommensur-
ability is only a hindrance. Thomas argues that just as paleobiology,
microbiology, and biochemistry ‘produce visions of “the human” that
are incommensurable with one another, as well as with the historian’s
usual conception of personhood and society’, for historians such in-
6 Robert Stockhammer, ‘Philology in the Anthropocene’, in Meteorologies of Modernity:
Weather andClimateDiscourses in the Anthropocene, ed. by Sarah Fekadu, Hanna Straß-
Senol, and Tobias Döring (= REAL: Yearbook of Research in English and American
Literature, 33 (Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto, 2017)), pp. 43–64 (pp. 49–50).
7 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Human Condition in the Anthropocene’, in The Tanner
Lectures on Human Values, 35, ed. by Mark Matheson (Salt Lake City: University of
Utah Press, 2016), pp. 139–88 (p. 159), available online: <https://tannerlectures.
utah.edu/Chakrabarty%20manuscript.pdf> [accessed 1 August 2020]. Chakrabarty
replaces Stockhammer’s term Anthropos with his quasi-Aristotelian zoe to come up
with ‘zoecentric’ history.’ On ‘human agency over multiple and incommensurable
scales’ see Chakrabarty, ‘Postcolonial Studies and the Challenge of Climate Change’,
p. 1.
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commensurability and diversity are usually strengths, or at least are
tolerated well enough.8
The historian of science Deborah Coen offers a different take on
such ‘incommensurability’, that scaling, as well as awareness of scale
effects, are themselves human concepts, and that the point at which
different scales become ‘incommensurable’ is not fixed:
The spatial and temporal dimensions of human life are histor-
ically and culturally contingent: they vary with differences in
life span, degree of mobility, communications technologies,
and cultures of remembering the dead. There is therefore no
fixed meaning to the ‘human scale’ that could be set in oppos-
ition to ‘the planetary’.9
In other words: How did we get to the point where individual experi-
ence, never mind community or even species experience, is assumed
to be so small, while conceptions of either regional environments
or planetary climates are assumed to be so large?10 The problem is
perhaps analogous, in early twenty-first-century political discourse, to
the way the individual’s experience has become politically and epis-
temologically unassailable against prevailing or ‘dominant’ narratives,
especially when dealing with the experiences of those who are margin-
alized, forgotten, or historically oppressed. In both, the relationship
between the general and the particular becomes undone, either by
accident or through acts of deliberate resistance.11 The question is not
so much one of whether all grand narratives and generalities need to
be done away with, but which generalities are now most useful, and
how the contours of general theories are negotiated. As Coen writes,
paraphrasing the nineteenth-century Austrian writer, Adalbert Stifter
(1805–1868): ‘In nature, as in human life […] often the little things
8 Julia Adeney Thomas, ‘History and Biology in the Anthropocene: Problems of Scale,
Problems of Value’, American Historical Review, 119.5 (December 2014), pp. 1587–
1607 <https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/119.5.1587>.
9 Deborah R. Coen, ‘Big Is a Thing of the Past: Climate Change and Methodology in the
History of Ideas’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 77.2 (April 2016), pp. 305–21 (p. 308)
<https://doi.org/10.1353/jhi.2016.0019>.
10 On the concept of regional, as opposed to local and national scales, see Jeremy Vetter,
Field Life: Science in the American West During the Railroad Era (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016).
11 Ibid., pp. 62–63.
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are most significant, once they are recognized as instances of a more
general pattern, perceptible to observers everywhere.’12
The concepts Homo, Anthropos, the human, and the Anthropo-
cene are not only abstractions, but extrapolations from a highly spe-
cific set of scientific and social scientific practices, and we need to
pay attention to how these extrapolations are made. Likewise, rigor-
ous conceptions of the weather and weathering demand more than
just conceptual gesturing or figuration: it requires paying attention
to the methods by which particular phenomena, experienced at the
individual or immediately local scales, are stitched together to create
accurate pictures of regional and ultimately global conditions. If we
take ‘weather’ in its most everyday sense, then we ordinarily say it is
the job of the weather reporter or meteorologist to take into account a
wide range of regional patterns and information coming from a variety
of well-placed sensors in order to generate a weather report, an an-
ticipation of how much rain, wind, dryness, or thunderstorms I can
expect in a given place. In this volume, by focusing on weather and
weathering, we are re-examining how we transform a single weather
event or the weathering of a single object into broader notions respect-
ively of climate or maintenance. In contrast to the way Stockhammer’s
figurative Homo and Anthropos are simply assumed to be universal, the
basic constructivist approach to the history and sociology of science
demands that we explain empirically how scientific concepts become
universal. There are, of course, a great many ways of doing so within
science studies, but in this essay, I will assume that this ‘how’ demands
examination of practices and methodologies. As the editors of a recent
special journal issue on ‘Experiencing the Global Environment’ have
written, ‘Ways of experiencing the global[…]are by necessity always
produced locally.’13
The remainder of this essay will examine two areas of scholarship
in the history of sciences of scaling: Martin Rudwick’s foundational
work on the history of geology and Deborah Coen’s recent study of
12 Deborah R. Coen, Climate in Motion: Science, Empire, and the Problem of Scale
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), p. 154.
13 Lino Camprubí and Philipp Lehmann, ‘The Scales of Experience: Introduction to the
Special Issue Experiencing the Global Environment’, Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part A, 70 (August 2018), pp. 1–5 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.
05.003>.
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the origins of physical geography and climatology. These two cases
provide important contrasts, illuminating the differences between nat-
ural philosophy and natural history, theory versus empirical research.
Rudwick has argued that the major theoretical innovation that estab-
lished modern geology was the shift from a relatively rigid style of
ahistorical and deterministic geotheory to a geoscience that is highly
attentive to historical contingencies of time and place. In other words,
geologists had to learn how to scale up from local particularities and
contingencies to reconstruct the history of the earth. Coen, by con-
trast, argues that modern climate science developed in the reverse
fashion, from the active attempt to collect and synthesize local dif-
ferences into physical theories of climatic change, effective at regional
and global scales. How does this relate to the volume’s overall theme
of weather/weathering? Obviously, in the case of climatography, ob-
servation and recording of the weather at special observatories and
stations was the new science’s empirical foundation. In the case of early
geology, scientists (Rudwick prefers the period-appropriate savants)
travelled looking for places where the weather had worn away the Earth
in a way that allowed one to see layers of different rocks or strata.
Both sciences deal with the earth as a physical system, both sciences
are clearly borne out by quite particular local human efforts, and both
sciences were fundamental in the late twentieth-century formulation
of the concept of the Anthropocene.
GEOLOGY: ENLIGHTENMENT IN ACTION
The evolutionary theorist and historian of science Stephen Jay Gould
(1941–2002) wrote in 1988 that Sigmund Freud had forgotten the
fourth great intellectual revolution of European scientific modernity.
Freud had enumerated three: Copernicus’ de-centring of the Earth
into one of a multitude of planets, Darwin’s demotion of man’s special
creation into the spectrum of the descent of species, and of course
Freud’s own revolution of subordinating rational action to the im-
pulses of the subconscious. The fourth revolution, which Freud missed
and Gould insisted upon, was the early nineteenth-century discovery
of geological and cosmological deep time, the extension of the his-
tory of nature to millions and billions of years, in both breadth and
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depth.14 But it has been Martin Rudwick’s contention since his 2005
book Bursting the Limits of Time and emphasized in the 2008 sequel
Worlds Before Adam that geology’s essential modernity is not in its
mere extension of time, a concept other sciences have potentially en-
tertained. Rather, Rudwick argues that modern geology embraced a
very particular kind of historicity and temporality unique to the history
of the geosciences. Modern geology for Rudwick — perhaps mod-
ernity generally — is characterized by emphasis on the contingency of
geohistory, not just its depth. Contingency in the history of nature
means, to Rudwick, that the history of nature is ‘as unrepeated, and
as unpredictable, as human history itself ’.15 Modern geological theory
that embraces this sense of deep historical contingency can help take
local and regional rock formations and reconstruct the past in stepwise
fashion. By analogy, this is akin to comparing the reconstruction of
the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens to theories of the state of
nature in moral philosophy: these clearly related endeavours to under-
stand the human and the subsequent history of humanity nevertheless
have totally different relationships to the distant and proximate past.
This sense of historical contingency is, Rudwick argues, the product
of the late eighteenth-century habit by natural philosophers to import
methodological concepts from the history of Christian theology, spe-
cifically Biblical chronology, into the theories of the Earth. Without
denying the importance of deep time, Rudwick’s contention is par-
ticularly useful in our general consideration of weather/weathering,
in that it insists on the duality of the contingency of particular events
alongside the universality of the laws that govern them.
It is perhaps easier to understand what this contingent histor-
icity is by contrasting it with the alternative temporalities that have
been extant in European intellectual history. It is also a helpful way of
qualifying what Rudwick means by history being unrepeatable and un-
predictable: to be more exact, this means that a genuinely contingent
human history or history of nature must be directionally cumulative
14 Stephen Jay Gould, Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of
Geological Time (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 1–2.
15 Martin J. S. Rudwick,Bursting the Limits of Time:TheReconstruction ofGeohistory in the
Age of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 6. See also Rudwick,
Worlds Before Adam: The Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Reform (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008).
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(and therefore unrepeatable), and it also must not be preordained.
For the most part, ancient Greek and Roman natural philosophy only
provided its Latinate and Arabic descendants with a conception of
nature as eternal, cyclical, and governed by forces that acted out of ne-
cessity. This was particularly true in Platonic cosmology, Aristotelian
cosmology, and Ptolemaic astronomy, which took the eternal rotation
of the stars around the earth, and the evident perfection of circles and
spheres as the archetypes for both nature and causality generally. This
kind of natural philosophy stood in stark contrast with the emphasis
on free will in Christian theology and the Biblical drama of salvation.
One of the great tasks of European and Arab scholarship through the
Middle Ages was precisely to find ways to reconcile Greek philosophy’s
emphasis on the eternal on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Mo-
saic theology’s emphasis on both the provisional nature of God’s will
and the voluntary nature of human faith. The histrionics surrounding
the papal Condemnations of 1277 was but one famous episode, with
church authorities alarmed by the radical Aristotelians’ claims that an
eternal universe was more logically consistent than the account of cre-
ation in Genesis.16
Additionally, the Aristotelian foundations of medieval Latin and
Arabic natural philosophy provided only very crude ideas for under-
standing different scales of natural phenomena. Privileging the eternal,
circular motion of the celestial sphere relegated the terrestrial as the
realm of linear, or ‘accidental’ as opposed to perfectly circular and
eternal ‘natural’ motion. The physics of the terrestrial sphere were
effectively governed by the natural motions of the four elements in Ar-
istotelian matter theory — i.e., that earth, water, air, and fire tended to
sort themselves in layers, with earth ‘falling’ to the centre of the cosmos
and fire rising to the interface of air and the celestial aether (e.g. in pre-
Newtonian definitions of gravity). In this cosmology, the elements’
terrestrial disorder meant this overarching, law-like tendency towards
order would be interrupted by the proliferation of local events and
causes. The terrestrial as the realm of the accidental proved to be
a source of inspiration for natural philosophers seeking to reconcile
16 David C. Lindberg, TheBeginnings ofWestern Science, 2nd edn (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007), chapter 10.
102 SCALING FROM WEATHER TO CLIMATE
the overarching eternalist framework of Greek metaphysics with the
demand for theological contingency: for example, for the Lutheran re-
former and pedagogue Phillip Melanchthon (1497–1560), elucidating
the providential meaning of accidents (generally, in the metaphysical
sense) was an essential way of fitting the Aristotelian natural philo-
sophical corpus into reformed Christianity based on justification by
faith alone.17
The terrestrial was therefore not historical so much as merely ac-
cidental, and terrestrial natural history was thus merely the corrupted
subset of a naturally eternal cosmos. At least when it came to nature,
Greek natural philosophy and its descendants up to the Scientific Re-
volution could explain specific natural phenomena with reference to
extremely local causes and agents (e.g., in theories of vision),18 but
they were not capable of wholesale discovery, ordering, and recon-
struction of events in time, deep or otherwise, according to Rudwick.
In contrast, Biblical chronology, dynastic chronicles, epics, and narra-
tives generally place events in a temporal sequence and seek to explain
their sequence with any number of causes. Nor did this lack of in-
terest in specific historical sequence substantially change during the
Scientific Revolution. The introduction of the new mechanical philo-
sophy by Descartes and the neo-Epicurean atomists in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries managed to replace the eternalism of Ar-
istotelian cosmology with a linear history of the universe, albeit one
strongly shot through with determinism. The mechanical philosophy’s
determinism was directional — linear motion was now ‘natural’, while
active intervention was required for circular motion — but although
it could in principle be used to reconstruct the history of the uni-
verse, in practice the mechanical philosophy’s explicitly abbreviated
causality limited scientists to ad hoc guesses about particular types of
geological events. These ad hoc ‘theories of the earth’ traced their lin-
eage to Descartes own theory of the creation of mountains in his 1644
Principia Philosophiæ (part 4, sections 41–44), in which Descartes sug-
gested mountains were caused by differential heating and cooling of
17 Sachiko Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Mel-
anchthon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
18 David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler, rev. edn (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 1996).
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the Earth by the Sun (Fig. 1). This kind of directional, if broadly de-
terministic theory culminated in Buffon’s theory of the cooling earth:
in his Histoire Naturelle (1749–89), he argued that all of the planets
formed when comets struck the Sun, tearing off lumps of superheated
material that cooled as over time. Inspired by the evident fact that
mines become hotter the deeper they are excavated, Buffon went as
far as commissioning a blacksmith to heat iron balls of different sizes,
and studied the way heat loss varied by the size of the sphere: based on
these studies, Buffon argued in print that the Earth was approximately
75,000 years old, though in private he speculated that it was as high as
10 million.19 Whatever the particular age of the Earth might be in these
theories, however, they were largely based on a premise that a small
set of initial conditions and mechanisms could account for the entire
course of geohistorical events in a deterministic, predictable fashion,
‘from Fireball to Snowball, under the constant laws of nature.’20 They
were, by definition, global in scope, albeit ‘global’ relative to cosmo-
logy, rather than relative to anything approaching human history of
human experience. This indoor theorizing was often dismissed as in-
dulgent speculation. Nevertheless, these kinds of ‘Fireball to Snowball’
theories by Buffon and others provided for a deeper history of the
Earth, now conceivably millions of years old.
They also created the first tentative link between theories of
the Earth’s development with a different domain of investigation:
geognosy, what today we might call stratigraphy, the description of the
ordering of layers of different kinds of rocks into strata (Figure 2). In
the eighteenth century and earlier, geognosy was a descriptive part of
the sciences of mining and quarrying: layers of rock were studied in
order to anticipate where in the Earth valuable ores or minerals could
be found. In most areas, the layers of rock formed regular sequences
from topsoil down to bedrock granite: mine engineers knew that these
sequences of strata were fairly regular across local and even regional
distances, since they had already dug into the earth or examined ex-
posed outcrops.21 The clearly layered and seemingly orderly sequence
19 Martin J. S. Rudwick, Earth’s Deep History: How It Was Discovered and Why It Matters
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), pp. 65–66.
20 Ibid.
21 Rudwick, Bursting the Limits of Time, chapters 2 and 4.
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Figure 1. Descartes’ ‘buckling crust’ theory of the Earth, from Principia
Philosophiæ (1644). The surface crust of the Earth (E) has pores or
cracks (1–7) that connect the atmosphere (B) and F, a layer of rarefied
matter beneath the Earth’s crust; when the sun heats the Earth, heated
fragments of F push themselves up through the crust E, but then cooled
air B sinks through the pores of the Earth’s crust, expanding this body
and causing the crust to buckle upward. These buckles cause both the
formation of mountains and press the lower masses D and C upward,
causing the creation of oceans at fragments 2–3 and 6–7.
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of strata had made early geotheory plausible, and early geotheory like-
wise tried to mobilize the regularity of rock strata to create theories of
the Earth. In what Rudwick calls the ‘standard model’ of pre-modern
geology, as the Earth cools, its surface becomes a giant ocean, and
further cooling causes minerals to precipitate and sediment into layers,
with each layer differing due to its relative age and by its chemical
composition.22 These theories could thus explain why ‘basement’ or
‘Primary’ rocks like granite, schist, gneiss, and marble were usually
found below the lighter, ‘Secondary’ rocks like sandstone, shale, and
limestone. Buffon’s and other theories following the standard model
could potentially take geognosy — ordinarily a descriptive, classifica-
tory, and structural science — and transform it into evidence of the
Earth’s deep history.
But the Earth is not so regular, and planetary-scale causal theor-
ies like the late eighteenth/early nineteenth-century standard model
struggled to account for the increasing amounts of local variation being
studied and recorded by miners, physical geographers, and mineralo-
gists. Critics of ‘Enlightenment rationality’ tend to miss the way that
amateur and expert savants in the eighteenth century also obsessively
collected examples of nature’s diversity, often desiring particularly
strange specimens that explicitly defied extant theories or rationaliza-
tions of nature. Strange or beautiful rocks and fossils would be removed
from their original context precisely for their peculiar or exemplary
character and be placed in mineralogical collections; these collected
specimens could be compared by simple visual examination, through
more advanced optical analysis, or even through more destructive
chemical analysis. Chemical analysis could raise some uncomfortable
questions about the standard model. Why, for instance, was heavy
basalt so often found in strata on top of, for example, lighter sediment-
ary strata like sandstone or limestone? Did this mean basalt was a
compressed sandstone? Or, as some geotheorists in the eighteenth
century suggested, was basalt volcanic in origin — thus adding unex-
pected complexity to the standard model of geological history?23
22 Ibid., pp. 172–74.
23 Ibid., pp. 62–63.
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Figure 2. Angular unconformity at Praia do Telheiro, near Sagres in
Algarve Portugal. It shows Late Triassic red and yellow planar
sandstones resting on top of tilted black shales and greywackes of
Carboniferous age, deformed during the Variscan orogeny. Photograph
by André Cortesão, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Angular_Unconformity_
at_Praia_do_Telheiro_in_Algarve_in_Portugal.png>.
The most broadly synthetic method of addressing these questions
about the Earth’s geological diversity would, by the middle of the nine-
teenth century, be found in physical geography and geognosy, which,
above all else, privileged outdoor fieldwork over the collection and
comparison of objects. The turn of the century in Europe witnessed a
unique boom in geological fieldwork, though the reasons for the boom
varied in different places: in Britain it became inexplicably fashionable
for leisured gentleman to explore their physical environments, while
in Central Europe minor and major states alike established mining
schools as a cameralistic response to the economic devastation of the
Seven Years’ War.24 Initially, both these amateur and professional en-
24 Ursula Klein, Humboldts Preussen: Wissenschaft und Technik im Aufbruch (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2015).
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deavours were much alike in scale but unlike in dimension. As already
mentioned, mining scientists in places like the Ore Mountains on the
border of Saxony and Bohemia sought to understand the local se-
quence of the Earth’s strata in order to anticipate where veins of ore
(and later coal) might be found before undertaking the costly work of
digging mine shafts. Mining savants above all, like Abraham Gottlob
Werner (1749–1817), thus sought to understand the sequence of
strata on the vertical axis in particular mining districts. Strata are not
simply layered in parallel sequences as the standard model — or, for
that matter, the Aristotelian model — would suggest, like a cake, but
rather many sit at different angles. Certain well-established strata could
be found in vastly different thicknesses in different places. Most critical
were unconformities, places where some strata might be layered at sharp
angles to others, or a stratum is highly uneven, or perhaps missing en-
tirely, or even found unexpectedly intruding on a predicted sequence.
Some unconformities are visibly evident, others quite subtle and vis-
ible only to someone looking for it; some strata simply do not show
clear orientation at all, looking more like a mass of rubble. These dif-
ficulties made expertise valuable particular in the professional setting
of mining and geognosy, but amateurs could nevertheless do the basic
work, since the basic instruments were quite minimal: all one needed
was a hammer, shovel, a hand lens, free time, and transportation to
seek out weathered cliff faces or hills with exposed layers of rock. At
the same time, long personal experience with the rocks of a local region
was necessary to understand all of the variation that was possible, and
to discriminate between similar-looking strata, in order to correlate the
sequence of formations from one place to another.25
The mining professionals had the advantage of being able to enlist
labour to dig, but they also considered their knowledge to be both
relatively localized and purely descriptive: initially, geognosy was not
tied to particular theories of the Earth or ideas about Earth’s history.
But over the course of the first half of the nineteenth century, as more
and more local areas had their strata mapped, the early geologists grew
increasingly confident that they could understand the stratigraphy of
25 Martin J. S. Rudwick, The Great Devonian Controversy: The Shaping of Scientific Know-
ledge Among Gentlemanly Specialists (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp.
37–54.
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whole regions by induction, without needing to direct empirical evi-
dence from each individual locale. Moreover, the growing network
of amateurs in Britain meant that studies of local formations could
be compared: by 1822 the Geological Society of London counted
313 members living in or near London, and an additional 328 ‘non-
resident’ members living overseas, all of whom received published
Proceedings that summarized members’ reports.26 The amateurs in Bri-
tain had the advantage of sheer numbers and a growing system of sci-
entific sociability that could coordinate the efforts of a larger number of
less-expert local explorers. These collective efforts would culminate in
some of the most impressive examples of the synthesis of experiential
knowledge in natural history: George Bellas Greenough (1778–1885)
and William Smith’s (1769–1839) grand geological maps of regions as
large as the entirety of England (Fig. 3), with Smith making his map
entirely through his own surveying work. By mid-century, British geo-
logists were crisscrossing the globe, taking advantage of global travel
secured by Britain’s naval supremacy, in order to conduct intensive
geological surveys in the field. The Scottish geologist Roderick Murch-
ison (1792–1871) made expeditions to nearly every corner of the
globe, from Australia to British-controlled India to the Russian Baltic:
his work in stitching together the stratigraphy of so many areas of the
Earth was not only in service of geological theory, e.g. determining
the global distribution of the sequence of strata, but equally import-
antly his work aided imperial and colonial authorities in planning gold,
coal, and other mining projects that ultimately sustained the imperial
endeavour. At every point in Murchison’s journey, the basic tools of
investigation were the same: travel to many locations, examine extant
outcroppings, map and chart formations along horizontal and vertical
axes.27
Identifying and associating the order of strata across such large
distances ultimately required more than just the examination of the
rocks themselves, the differences among which could be exceedingly
subtle, or, in the case of some unconformities, absent entirely. The
great success of unlocking the sequence of strata across the globe owed
26 Ibid., pp. 18–27.
27 Robert A. Stafford, Scientist of Empire: Sir Roderick Murchison, Scientific Exploration,




Figure 3. Part of William Smith’s map of geological sections in Somerset,
England, 1819, showing the sedimentary strata of sandstone, marl, and
limestone. William Smith, Section of the Strata through Hampshire and
Wiltshire to Bath, on the Road from Bath to Salisbury (London: John
Cary, 1819).
much to the growing recognition in the nineteenth century that the
order of rock strata were correlated to the kinds of fossils that geologists
and geognosists found in each of the strata. The distinctiveness of the
fossil bones, shells, and occasionally plants in each stratum became
aids for identifying the order of strata across regions where the rocks
themselves were not the same, or just hard to identify: Smith’s grand
maps of the strata of England owed much to his ability to use ‘char-
acteristic fossils’ to identify strata. But these observable consistencies
across strata and fossil beds eventually became a way to understand
both fossils and strata as clues for the reconstruction of a linear, pro-
gressive, and contingent history of the Earth. As early as 1801, the
naturalist Georges Cuvier (1769–1832) remarked, ‘the older the beds
in which these bones are found, the more they differ from those of
animals we know today.’28 As geologists and collectors alike started
to plot out where certain kinds of fossils were found — a task that
required experience both out in the field and inside the museum —
it became apparent that the top-most, ‘youngest’ strata bore fossils
that were similar to many known living species, while fossils in deeper,
‘older’ strata were often much stranger. Whereas in the late eighteenth
century early geologists had suggested that the presumably law-like
character of geological change might make the history of the Earth
cyclical or eternal, the fossil evidence accumulating in the early nine-
28 Georges Cuvier, ‘Espèces de quadrupèdes’ (1801), p. 260, quoted in Rudwick,Bursting
the Limits of Time, p. 424.
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teenth century seemed to show otherwise. The fossils that were being
found were simply not like bones of known animals, suggesting that
large scale extinctions accompanied the successive deposition of rocks
into strata. Moreover, as the correlations of fossil types and strata be-
came stronger, it became possible to imagine a reconstruction of the
actual past world that these fossils came from. A most dramatic case
in 1822 by the English theologian and geologist William Buckland
(1784–1856) demonstrated that it was even possible to reimagine not
only ecosystems, but even the daily lives of animals that lived in a
very distant time. The cave, discovered by miners in 1821 working in a
limestone quarry in Kirkdale, in Yorkshire, was filled with fossil bones
of elephants, hyenas, rats, horses, bears, oxen, and rhinoceroses. Yet
both the entrance of the cave and the cave itself was too small for any of
these larger animals to go in. Buckland realized that the cave must have
been home to a hyena den, and that the largest bones must have been
dragged into the cave by the hyenas, as shown by the toothmarks on
the large bones and abundant ‘calcareous excrement’ found within the
gravel and silt. The petrified dung would be the key to the reconstruc-
tion: by comparing the fossil excrement with specimens from English
zoos, Buckland demonstrated that the fossils were most likely dragged
in as scavenged food by the hyenas, and not washed into the cave —
either by periodic flooding or by Biblical deluge.29
Buckland’s reconstruction of the Kirkdale cave made it possible
to, as Rudwick puts it, ‘construct a conceptual time machine’ moving
backward from recent cases into the deep past.30 This kind of stitching
together of the past from localized elements into maps and narratives
stood in stark contrast to earlier attempts to create theories starting
from cosmological scales. As Rudwick argues in Earth’s Deep History,
by the middle of the nineteenth century geology had adopted many of
its conceptual frameworks not from geophysics but rather from secular
and sacred history: the coins, artefacts, and documents of history and
historiography were made analogous to the rocks, fossils, and forma-
tions of geology. Although elements of this analogy can be debated,
it nevertheless suggests how modern geology can be considered as a
29 Ibid., chapter 8.
30 Rudwick, Earth’s Deep History, p. 125.
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science of scaling up localized, individualized experience into grand
narratives of the history of the Earth.
CLIMATOLOGY: FROM EXPERIENCE TO THEORY
The epigraph at the top of this chapter, taken from the meteoro-
logy textbook by the Austrian climatologist Julius Hann (1839–1921),
highlights the fundamental epistemological difference marked by the
concepts ‘weather’ and ‘climate’: we can go outside and experience the
weather through our senses and instruments, but if we are to collect our
experience into knowledge about the climate, then we have to resort
to something other than experience. It does not follow that weather
is real and climate a fiction: it simply means that the two are grasped
by different means. The history of climatology and meteorology in
some sense runs in the opposite direction from the history of geology
and theories of the Earth. Whereas the latter began at cosmological
scales and gained local-historical granularity, the sciences of weather
and climate began with the assumption that local weather events were
both highly variable and highly place-specific. Climate science only
later acquired a theoretical generality that could tie large-scale move-
ments of air, water, and heat together with the particularities of a local
landscape.
Meteorology and weather forecasting have probably been prac-
ticed by every human society through some means, though the mod-
ern combination of ship-borne observation of navigable winds and
long-term records from weather stations to analyse large-scale cli-
matic phenomena began in the late-1700s, with the mobilization of
the thermometer, barometer, and hygrometer.31 Well into the nine-
teenth century, alerts for potentially catastrophic weather events re-
quired someone to directly observe an incoming storm — by ship in
many colonial coastal ports, by observation stations everywhere else.32
The historian Richard Grove has argued that the first global climatic
31 H. Howard Frisinger, TheHistory of Meteorology: To 1800 (New York: Science History
Publications, 1977).
32 See Robert M. Rouphail, ‘Cyclonic Ecology: Sugar, Cyclone Science, and the Limits
of Empire in Mauritius and the Indian Ocean World, 1870s–1930s’, Isis, 110.1 (March
2019), pp. 48–67 <https://doi.org/10.1086/702729>.
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event to be accurately recorded was probably the Great El Niño of
1790–1794, when the British imperial officials simultaneously recor-
ded barometric readings, droughts, and reports of crop failures in the
Caribbean, northern China, Australia, Mauritius, and most critically
Madras and Bengal.33 But noticing the simultaneity of far-flung events
does not amount to noticing and naming one climatic event: in the case
of the El Niño Southern Oscillation, a complete theory only emerged
in the 1960s, with major revisions made through the 1980s. Until the
1870s, the gathering of data and creation of meteorological maps and
tables had only a very limited theoretical payoff.34 As Deborah Coen
argues in Climate in Motion, taking climatology from rules of thumb
to scientific theories of global climate required new physical theories
of heat as well as literary techniques for describing movement across
scales.
For Coen, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a political entity
that was particularly suited for the creation of an integrated science
of climatology: a contiguous land empire that encompassed many
peoples, languages, and terrains. Coen argues that finding political
unity in the Empire meant searching for the forces and tensions that
tied together the parts into the whole through dynamics, rather than
simply assuming parts are instantiations of an a priori whole or natural
category.35 Mapping and collecting, which were so crucial to British,
Dutch, and Spanish imperial projects, were augmented by projects to
determine why diversity persisted across an integrated space: it was
important to fully catalogue local contrasts, but an additional step was
needed to turn this collection of facts into scientific knowledge.36
In Austrian climatology, the additional force came through differ-
ent applications of thermodynamics in order to explain the accumu-
lation, movement, and dispersal of atmospheric energy. For example,
33 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third
World (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 216–18; Richard Grove and George Adamson, El
Niño in World History, Palgrave Studies in World Environmental History (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), chapter 4.
34 Azadeh Achbari and Frans van Lunteren, ‘Dutch Skies, Global Laws: The British Cre-
ation of “Buys Ballot’s Law”’, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, 46.1 (February
2016), pp. 1–43 <https://doi.org/10.1525/hsns.2016.46.1.1>.
35 Coen, Climate in Motion, p. 32.
36 Ibid., pp. 139–42, 153.
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the Austrian geographer Alexander Supan (1847−1920) pioneered the
discovery and use of pressure and temperature gradients, mapped to
particular geographical regions, where atmospheric energy accumu-
lated and dispersed along predictable lines.37 Doing so revealed that
the distribution of climatic patterns was not itself driven by measured
wind speed, but rather by the movement the pressure systems that
drove the wind. But by far the most important climatological theory
to come out of imperial Austrian climate science was Max Margules’
(1856-1920) theory of the ‘available potential energy’ (APE) of the
atmosphere.38 Margules, a physicist at the Austrian Imperial Zent-
ralanstalt für Meteorologie und Geomagnetismus (ZAMG), argued that
the stability of pressure gradients themselves had to be accounted for
by measuring the energy capacity and (thermodynamic) work done
by moving masses of air and moisture. By considering the dynamics of
weather as ‘pendulous oscillations’ of unequal masses of air as a first
principle (Fig. 4), Margules’ APE model implies that winds, storms,
and pressure gradients were caused by the movement of warm and
cold bodies of air — a concept that is fundamentally a mathematical
abstraction of direct experience — and that movement of warmer
or colder air horizontally across the landscape has significant effects
on the vertical distribution of atmospheric heat, pressure, and mois-
ture.39 Here was the grand unifying theory: all weather phenomena
must be understood as the energetic effect of bodies of air moving
across the land and up and down the atmosphere, and the terrain itself
thus has a powerful effect on the movement of these masses of air. In
the 1950s, the American meteorologist Edward Lorenz (1917–2008)
would broaden Margules’ theory of storm generation into a general
theory of atmospheric circulation, a theory that makes the movement
of heat into the root cause of all weather phenomena.40
37 Ibid., pp. 172–74.
38 Ibid., pp. 199–202.
39 Max Margules, ‘On the Energy of Storms’, in The Mechanics of the Earth’s Atmosphere,
trans. by Cleveland Abbe (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 1910), pp. 533–95.
40 Edward N. Lorenz, ‘Available Potential Energy and the Maintenance of the General
Circulation’, Tellus 7.2 ( January 1955), pp. 157–67 <https://doi.org/10.3402/tellusa.
v7i2.8796>; Edward N. Lorenz, TheNature andTheory of the General Circulation of the
Atmosphere (Geneva: World Meteorological Organization, 1967).
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Figure 4. Max Margules’ 1904 schematic showing an initial state (above)
of vertically differentiated temperature (Tn) and pressure (Pn)
differences (spatially divided by Ph), which results in the subsequent
state (below) of horizontally differentiated layers of air at different
temperatures and pressures. Max Margules, ‘On the Energy of Storms’, p.
536.
CONCLUSION
Experience, Lino Camprubí and Phillip Lehmann argue, scales.41
Models and theories of the climate are not generated solely by abstrac-
tion, but historically come from people observing rolling clouds near
and far, measuring the fall of atmospheric pressure, feeling their skin
becoming clammier as the humidity rises: the dynamic experience of
the weather is not only felt by one individual, but by many, and these
experiences and measurements are recorded, sorted, and eventually
calculated to become the science of the climate. This is in large part be-
cause there is not one monolithic ‘experience’. Experience has different
modes of feeling and seeing that are augmented by time, technologies,
and, once accumulated, in expertise. The instruments and techniques
of experience in early geology were collections, reports, and eventually
maps and guides to landscapes. The scale of geographical and geo-
logical maps provides a good case in point: they are clearly generated
by experience, but a map in the hands of its user becomes a tool to
41 Camprubí and Lehmann, ‘The Scales of Experience’.
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augment experience as well. The study of the cumulative and recursive
effect of experiences turned into tools and representations has become
one of the core tenets of empirical science studies in the twenty-first
century,42 despite the fact that such recursiveness can lead to a sense
of vertigo and disorientation.43
In this essay I have tried to juxtapose two different ways experience
and science scaled. In Rudwick’s studies of the history of geology,
theories of the Earth originate from the Aristotelian and Cartesian
theories operating at essentially cosmological scales, and much of
what makes geology ‘modern’ is its contrasting ability to account for
very small-scale, local variations of phenomena within the context of
planetary laws. Coen’s account of the history of climatography and
climatology, in contrast, begins with the historically widespread as-
sumption of the local, small-scale specificity and variability of the
weather, and only through the use of high-quality record keeping and
modelling using thermodynamic laws does a picture of climatological
dynamics arise. In both, the interplay of natural history and natural
philosophy is centre stage, and one does not operate well without the
other.
But what are we to make of the kinds of distant theorizing and
exploration of nature, which in both of the cases presented here is
conceptualized largely as a world prior to or absent the human species
— the Anthropos and the Homo mentioned at the start of the essay?
As Julia Adeney Thomas observes of Chakrabarty’s original analysis of
the concept of the Anthropocene, the challenge is not only in scaling
as such, which would be a problem of method and methodology in
the historical sciences, but in what is being scaled. For Thomas, the
distinction between Homo and Anthropos, or ‘the Human’ and ‘the
human species’
is not something humanist historians can understand through
self-reflection in Wilhelm Dilthey’s sense, where historical
consciousness is ‘a mode of self-knowledge’, or in R. G.
Collingwood’s sense, where historical comprehension rests
fundamentally not on reconstructing the past but on reen-
42 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
43 Coen, ‘Big Is a Thing of the Past’, p. 309.
116 SCALING FROM WEATHER TO CLIMATE
acting ‘in our own minds the experience of the past.’ While
‘species’ may work for paleobiologists comparing, say, the
fossil records of Eemian biota from 130,000 years ago with
modern organisms, theirs is a labor of reconstruction as op-
posed to one of self-reflection or mental reenactment.44
I would like to close this meditation on weathering by suggesting
that this disjuncture Chakrabarty highlights between the human as a
political actor and humanity as a planetary force is loosely analogous to
the distinction between the self-reflective subject and the self-negating
analyst. During the early-1990s debates on historical and scientific
objectivity, the historian Thomas Haskell argued that attempts to cast
the concept of objectivity itself as both fictional and disingenuous ran
the risk of turning any historical scholarship into propaganda, and any
possible utterance into an expression of will:
But to shrug off the capacity for detachment as entirely il-
lusory — to claim that since none of the standpoints the
self is capable of imagining are really that of ‘the other’, but
are self-produced (as is certainly the case), and to argue that
all viewpoints therefore are indistinguishably contaminated
by selfishness or group interest or the omnipresent Nietz-
schean will — is to turn a blind eye to distinctions that all
of us routinely make and confidently act upon, and thereby
to blur all that distinguishes villainy from decency, veracity
from mendacity, in everyday affairs. Not to mince words, it is
to defame the species. Fairness and honesty are qualities we
can rightfully demand of human beings, and those qualities
require a very substantial measure of self-overcoming.45
Since these debates, historians of science have argued that objectivity
is itself a historically specific kind of subjectivity and set of values
that scientists work to cultivate, so much so that objectivity has it-
self become essentially synonymous with scientific knowledge and
practice.46 Haskell argues that the species — Stockhammer’s Homo
44 Thomas, ‘History and Biology in the Anthropocene’, p. 1592.
45 Thomas L. Haskell, ‘Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric Vs. Practice in Peter
Novick’s That Noble Dream’, History andTheory, 29.2 (May 1990), pp. 129–57 <https:
//doi.org/10.2307/2505222>.
46 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, ‘The Image of Objectivity’, Representations, 40
(1992), pp. 81–128; Theodore M. Porter, ‘The Objective Self ’, Victorian Studies 50.4
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— must be capable of some kind or kinds of detachment, alienation,
impartial judgement, and empathy towards the other, and this itself
requires a degree of personal cultivation. It is precisely this recasting
and scaling-up of the personal experience of the weather to a global
understanding of climate, and the scaling-down of geological theory to
understand one’s local landscape or patch of the Earth, that demands
personal experience as well as alienation from it.
(2008), pp. 641–47; Jimena Canales, A Tenth of a Second: A History (Chicago: Uni-





AMELIA GROOM AND M. TY
Truly great actor more seriously in character he carries — slips
into: than you — W.C. — are in what you try to show off
in: force.
Force ripples — vibrates life — muscle in action one visible form.
You: brittle — breaking — decaying iron — eaten by rustworm.
Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven, ‘Mineself — Minesoul — And
— Mine — Cast-Iron Lover’ (1919)
There have been occasional accidental spills onto the works,
including two separate vomiting incidents. Despite immediate
attention from on-site conservation staff, the acidity of the vomit
caused spots of clean etched metal to appear on the surface, which
were impossible to blend in with the rest of the work without
polishing the entire surface. A few brightly etched areas therefore
remain.
Sculpture conservators at the Tate reporting on the condition of




Figures 1 and 2. Ferruginous Variation, colour plates included in the
publication of George Maw’s paper ‘On the Disposition of Iron in
Variegated Strata’, The Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society of
London, 24 (1868), pp. 351–400.
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Maw’s paper begins: ‘Of those secondary changes which have modified
the original chemical and physical constitution of rocks none seem to
have more largely affected their aspect than the recombinations and
rearrangements of iron.’
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In his Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin remarks on the enthusiasm
with which capitalist modernity would come to greet iron construc-
tion.1 Celebrated for its strength, versatility, and durability, iron served
as the innumerable vertebrate of the railway system and as the ballast
of transitory spaces of exchange: bridges, shopping arcades, exhibi-
tion halls, train stations, luxury restaurants, and the reading rooms
of eminent libraries. When checkered by glass, iron allowed interior
spaces to be both sheltered and cascaded in light; trees could be housed
indoors, and greenhouses could grow gardens even in the freeze of
winter. Architecture also found a gateway to unprecedented vertical-
ity; by force of iron, colonial modernity extended its horizontal and
upward reach, with train tracks going distant and buildings breaching
the sky.
In the nineteenth century, iron also comes to exceed its functional
role and to assume an ascendant place in the capitalist imaginary. Cul-
tural investment in its magical properties amplifies to the extent that
the rings of Saturn were imagined as a cast-iron balcony, on which the
inhabitants of that faraway planet would step out for an evening stroll.2
Meanwhile, in symbolist literature, hairstyles were said to take inspir-
ation from the wrought-iron designs found in the built environment.3
When entering into metaphor, iron usually plays the part of
strength, stubbornness, impenetrability, tyranny — think of ‘iron
man’, an ‘iron will’, the ‘iron curtain’, ‘ruling with an iron fist’, or ‘the
iron control of the slavedriver’, as Frederick Douglass would name it.4
Lying in wait within iron, though, is the potential for its decomposition
into rust. As a gradual transition into soft powdery flakes, rust registers
the dimension of time in the material, reminding us that even iron is
susceptible to its own undoing.
Iron, thus, presents particular problems for the long term. For
archivists, paperclips and staples are prime enemies because, when
they start to rust, they discolour and erode the pages they fasten. For
1 See convolute F of Walter Benjamin, TheArcades Project, trans. by Howard Eiland and
Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
2 Ibid., p. 8. Benjamin refers here to an illustration from Jean Ignace Isidore Gérard
Grandville’s 1844 Un autre monde (1844).
3 André Thérive, ‘Les Livres’, Le Temps, 25 June 1936, cited in ibid., p. 553 [S5a,1].
4 Frederick Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass (Boston: De Wolfe, Fiske
& Co., 1892), p. 47.
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someone restoring an old house, small metal hinges, screws and latches
are an issue because, once rust comes onto the scene, it augments and
accelerates ruination. Similarly, a cotton jacket with plenty of life left
in it can be worsted by its metal buttons, fusing with rust and then
bleeding out, staining and eating away at the rest of the garment.5
While iron is thought of as a stronger material than the likes of paper,
wood, and cloth, its sensitivity to the elements can mark it out as the
centre of fragility. ‘[I]f there be one crevice through which a single drop
can fall,’ Douglass writes, ‘it will certainly rust off the slave’s chain.’6
Along with its etymological affiliation with red, the word ‘rust’ is
coloured by a history of uses, which include the sense of ‘degenerating
in idleness’ or becoming ‘impaired by inaction’.7 In old slang, to be
‘in rust’, meant to be out of work or resting; today we talk about an
acquired language or skill becoming ‘a little rusty’ when it seizes up
through disuse. Sometimes actual rust and its metaphoric senses of
dereliction and decay collapse into one another, as in the Rust Belt —
a derogatory epithet for the deindustrialized cityscapes of the United
States, stretching from the Great Lakes to New York, where economic
and population decline are signalled through enormous abandoned
mills and weapons plants that are literally rusting away.
At the same time, rust has also been an emblem of relentlessness:
it is a renowned insomniac. The title of Neil Young’s live album Rust
Never Sleeps (1979) came from the band Devo, whose members had
previously done graphic design work for Rust-Oleum, a company that
manufactures rust-preventative coatings.8
Like dust, rust puts everyone who has to deal with it into a
Sisyphean situation. ‘Stainless steel’ is a misleading name; it’s an iron-
derived metal that stains less, but it isn’t stain proof. ‘Rustproofing’ is
also an impossibility — it’s an optimistic term in the auto industry for
5 Recommended remedy, successfully tested by the authors on a sunny day on Tempel-
hofer Feld: saturate the rust stains with lemon juice and leave the garment in direct
sunlight. The stains will vanish, but the metal buttons will need to be removed and
replaced, or the rust will make a comeback.
6 Douglass, p. 130.
7 Cf. ‘Rust, n.1 and adj.’ and ‘Rust, v.1’, in OEDOnline (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2020) <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/169112> and <https://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/169115> [accessed 2 July 2020].
8 Jimmy McDonough, Shakey: Neil Young’s Biography (New York: Random House,
2010), p. 531.
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techniques of delay that always require periodic re-enactment. While
the oxides of other metals can form ‘passivating’ layers (which make
the metal less active by forming a stable sealant, cutting off further
oxidation), the default behaviour of rust is to expand on the surface and
then flake away, exposing new layers for further corrosion. Rust keeps
iron active, by always reaching out into the world and then breaking
off and inviting the world in, to keep gnawing away at the material’s
insides.
In modern economic and militaristic terms, this spells disaster.
The US government spends tens of billions of dollars every year in dir-
ect costs in the fight against rust. In 2004, the Department of Defense
declared war on rust with their new ‘corrosion prevention and control
program’, CorrDefense.9 As Jonathan Waldman chronicles in his book
Rust:The LongestWar, rust has been called ‘the pervasive menace’, ‘the
great destroyer’, ‘the ruthless enemy’, and ‘the evil’.10
Rusts are also pathogenic fungi, named so because of their
powdery, storm of Jupiter colour. Plants who have contracted rust
really do appear as though their stems and leaves are corroding away,
and when these fungi show up on crops they can wreak havoc. In
the nineteenth century, the arrival of a rust fungus on the island of
Sri Lanka led to the rapid and total collapse of its coffee industry,
which the British had coercively cultivated into one of the largest and
most lucrative in the world.11 After examining spores that had been
collected from plantations abroad, a chief botanist at Kew Gardens
named the fungus Hemileia vastatrix, the ‘half-smooth devastator’.
Enabled by colonial networks of transit, and by the imperial imper-
ative to consign land to monoculture, coffee rust threatened to become
a global epidemic. Spores of rust could ride on railways, steamships,
and airplanes trafficking the spoils of the plantation — could hang
on the clothes and bodies of labourers who travelled routes of trade.
9 See the hilariously bad video ‘Pentagon declares War on Rust’, uploaded to YouTube
by user noahmax6000 <https://youtu.be/qoME4gFEWFQ> [accessed 1 July 2020].
10 Jonathan Waldman, Rust:The LongestWar (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015), pp.
6–7.
11 British forces prepared the island for large-scale coffee production by destroying native
rice fields, carrying out massacres to deter rebellion, and placing the land at the
disposal of British planters, who recruited labour from a population that, until that
point, had largely practiced diversified subsistence farming within local communities.
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By 1920, the rust had reached many of the coffee-producing coun-
tries in Asia and Africa; by the 1970s it was starting to show up in
South America.12 Since then, fungicides and new strains of crop have
been engineered to resist rust’s proliferation. But la roya, as it’s called
in Central America,13 has continued to return with greater intensity
and at higher altitudes, as climate irregularities encourage its propaga-
tion.14As lands across the Americas succumb to rust and fall fallow,
farmers and wage labourers are pressed to migrate toward northern
borders that largely refuse them.
In the past, agricultural combat against rust remained a rela-
tively local affair. In ancient Rome, when large spreads of wheat had
reddened with rust, they used to say that foxes with torches tied to
their tails — running — had set the fields on fire.15 Robigalia was a
festival held by the Romans every spring, when they would ask the
goddess of rust, Robigo, to please stay away from the crops — offering
her red wine and the entrails of red puppies instead. In his account
of the sacrificial festival, Ovid records a prayer to Robigo that solicits
her to redirect her destructive powers towards weapons of destruction.
‘Forbear, I pray you, and take your rough hands from the harvest […].
Attack first not the tender crops, but harsh iron.’ ‘[M]ay the weapons of
war be stained with rust, and when anyone tries to draw a sword from
its sheath, may he feel it stick through long disuse’, bids the priest.16
Rust, if you must ruin things, at least ruin that which ruins; make your-
self useful by introducing uselessness into the instruments of violence.
‘Destroy first what can destroy others’ — this springtime petition
sees an ethics of anti-violence in rust’s capacity to de-functionalize:
12 See Stuart McCook, Coffee Is Not Forever: A Global History of the Coffee Leaf Rust
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2019).
13 The word also carries the sense of ‘blight’.
14 In Guatemala, The Federación de Cooperativas Agricolas has formed ‘Anti-Rust Bri-
gades’, which spray farms with fungicide. Jacques Avelino, Marco Cristancho, Selena
Georgiou, and others, ‘The Coffee Rust Crises in Colombia and Central America
(2008–2013): Impacts, Plausible Causes and Proposed Solutions’, Food Security, 7.2
(2015), pp. 303–21.
15 J.C. Zadoks, On the Political Economy of Plant Disease Epidemics (Wageningen: Wagen-
ingen Academic Publishers, 2008), p. 25.
16 Ovid, ‘A Prayer to Robigo’, Fasti, iv.905–32, quoted in Mary Beard, John North,
and Simon Price, Religions of Rome, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), ii: A Sourcebook, p. 32.
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rust could accomplish disarmament even if the will to power remained
unchecked. The naval and army commander Pliny the Elder likewise
sensed the promise of rust’s inhuman power, which, without directly
partaking in military contest, could render it inoperative. Writing in
his Naturalis Historia about the uses of iron in weaponry and war, he
reflects with particular despair on the missile, which he considers ‘the
most criminal artifice that has been devised by the human mind, for,
as if to bring death [...] with still greater rapidity, we have given wings
to iron and taught it to fly.’ He then considers rust, and concludes that
the ‘benevolence of nature’ has limited the power of iron by inflicting
rust on it as a penalty, ‘making nothing in the world more mortal than
that which is most hostile to mortality’.17
*
Rust can signal a once-functional object’s disuse, while also ensuring
its future uselessness. Think of a rusted bicycle or padlock; the less you
have used it, the less you can use it. It is perhaps appropriate, then, that
one of the only ways that the substance of rust is usefully put to work
is in that pursuit most commonly opposed to utility: the ornamental.
Through a reframing of stain as dye, rust lends itself to the production
of pigments for paints, inks, and cosmetics. It is only when the metals
are oxidized — when they have ‘breath put into them’, in John Ruskin’s
words — that they begin to function as colouring agents.18
When the artist Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven, walking
to New York’s city hall to get married for the third time in 1913, picked
up an abandoned rusty iron ring off the street and renamed it Enduring
Ornament, she was compelled perhaps by the object’s show of time in
colour — its mottled persistence through its fall from utility. Met by
her eye, rust is renewed as ready-made adornment.19
17 Pliny, Natural History, 10 vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938–62),
ix: Books 33–35, trans. by H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, 394 (1952), p. 231.
18 John Ruskin, ‘The Work of Iron in Nature, Art, and Policy’, in The Two Paths: Being
Lectures on Art and its Application to Decoration and Manufacture Delivered in 1858–9
(West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 2004), pp. 93.
19 Freytag-Loringhoven’s friend Marcel Duchamp would exhibit the ‘first’ readymade the
following year. Irene Gammel, Baroness Elsa: Gender, Dada (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2003), p. 161.
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Figure 3. Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven, Enduring Ornament
(1913), found rusted metal ring, approximately 3 1/2 inches in
diameter. Mark Kelman Collection, New York.
The artist most readily associated with rust today is probably the
American sculptor Richard Serra, whose uncompromising prowess of
production had earned him the title, ‘man of steel’.20 Serra’s work has
long pressed against the limits of infrastructural support, requiring ship
yards, big cranes, steel mills, outsourced labour, and lots of money.
20 The nickname also makes reference to Serra’s time working in a steel mill in Cali-
fornia during his student years. Calvin Tomkins, ‘Man of Steel’, The New Yorker,
5 August 2002 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/08/05/man-of-steel>
[accessed 2 July 2020].
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His enormous rusted metal sculptures make major demands on the
spaces they occupy. In her 1990 essay ‘Minimalism and the Rhetoric of
Power’, the feminist art historian Anna Chave recounts that Leo Cas-
telli Gallery had recently shored up the floors of their industrial loft,
so that the space could exhibit Serra’s works without totally collapsing
under their weight.21
The sheer heaviness of Serra’s sculptures is a primary component
of what is supposed to be impressive about them; their exact weights
and dimensions are routinely advertised in their official descriptions.
While making a clear bid to permanence, the extremity of their weight
also invests the objects with a potential violence, as testified by the
numerous injuries — and on one occasion, death — of workers who
have collapsed under the gravity of Serra’s abstractions while trying to
install them.22
*
In 1981, the artist David Hammons took a piss on T.W.U., one of
Serra’s massive assemblies of pre-weathered steel, which had been in-
stalled the previous year in the gentrifying downtown neighbourhood
of Tribeca. The sculpture was sponsored by a wealthy German gallerist,
and New York’s Public Art Fund website vaunts that it weighed more
than 72 tons (65,000 kilograms). The title of Hammons’s short-lived
intervention is Pissed Off.
21 Anna C. Chave, ‘Minimalism and the Rhetoric of Power’, ArtsMagazine, 64.5 ( January
1990), pp. 44–63 (p. 44).
22 In 1971, Raymond Johnson was killed by one of the 5212-pound steel plates com-
prising Serra’s ‘Sculpture No. 3’, which Johnson was helping to install at the Walker
Art Center in Minneapolis. His wife filed a lawsuit against Serra, whom the courts
acquitted from guilt. The fatality and trial did not seem to alter Serra’s practice of
producing sculptures so grandiose in their dimensions that anyone handling them
would be placed at risk of injury. In 1988, another of Serra’s enormous free-standing
works fell on top of installers Daniel Hafner and Joseph Gallo at Leo Castelli Gallery.
Gallo’s right leg was crushed, and later amputated. Of the incident, Serra has said the
following: ‘Some reporter asked me about my relationship to the accident. I don’t think
that my relationship is open to interpretation or speculation. I think it’s my relationship
to it. Rigging is a dangerous business. Danger is something that surrounds that activity.
The sculpture when it’s erected is not dangerous.’ Richard Serra, ‘Interview by Robert
Morgan’, in Richard Serra, Writings/Interviews (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1994), p. 191. See United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, Janet Johnson v.
Richard Serra, et al., March 10, 1975. Don Terry, ‘A 16-Ton Sculpture Falls, Injuring
2’, The New York Times, 27 October 1988, Section B, p. 6.





Figures 4–5. David Hammons, Shoe Tree (1981) and Pissed Off (1981).
Photographs by Dawoud Bey. Copyright Dawoud Bey; courtesy of
Stephen Daiter Gallery.
As is often the case with Hammons, the facts about this piece are
fuzzy.23 The artist had his friend Dawoud Bey document the act —
along with another work that is now known as ShoeTree (1981), where
twenty-five pairs of kicks were draped by their straps and laces over
the top of Serra’s three-story tall sculpture, turning his monument of
high art into just another prop for the transient idiom of the street. But
Hammons didn’t show the black-and-white photographs publicly until
nine years later, and they still leave us guessing about what happened
outside their frames, and what happened before and after the moments
they capture.
Do the pictures refer to a one-off event, or a sustained habit, or
a re-enactment for the purpose of documentation? Were the shoes
thrown up all at once, all by Hammons? Or did he gradually add to
shoes already flung, maybe over several days, maybe taking a piss each
23 See Elena Filipovic, David Hammons: Bliz-aard Ball Sale (London: Afterall Books,
2017) and Abbe Schriber, ‘“Those Who Know Don’t Tell”: David Hammons c. 1981’,






Figures 6–7. David Hammons, Pissed Off (1981). Photographs by
Dawoud Bey. Copyright Dawoud Bey; courtesy of Stephen Daiter
Gallery.
time? Was there an audience, besides Bey? And what happened with
the white cop who is shown talking to Hammons in a number of the
photographs? Is Hammons being arrested, or receiving a warning? Is
he talking his way out of a fine?
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In 1981 in New York City, anti-loitering campaigns and the crim-
inalization of ‘vagrancy’ were feeding into the city’s pro-development
agenda, as unemployment and homelessness were skyrocketing fol-
lowing large-scale withdrawals of social services. The industrial neigh-
bourhood of Tribeca had been recently re-zoned so that investors
could convert it into a new housing market; this was the first time ever
in New York’s history when loft housing was made legal for those who
weren’t artists.24 There was also a dearth of public lavatories in the city,
which meant that the only way one could avoid pissing in public was
to become a paying customer in a restaurant or bar, or else risk being
charged with indecent exposure.25 And, as the pictures of Hammons
and the officer remind us, gentrification was secured by anti-black poli-
cing.
Hammons exhibited the images for the first time in 1990, as part
of the group show Illegal America at Exit Art.26 A short statement he
wrote for the exhibition reads:
Pissed Off is about the fact that in New York City a man
doesn’t have any public access to relieve himself in a decent
manner. There is no way for a gentleman to relieve himself in
a gentlemanly way without having to buy a drink. Keeps the
rage going.27
*
Serra has been infamously iron-willed about the site-specificity of his
public pieces. In 1981 (the same year as Pissed Off), his Tilted Arc
was installed in a plaza outside a government building a few blocks
away from T.W.U. At 120 feet long and 12 feet high, the solid wall of
steel formed a domineering and blank-faced block to the area’s daily
commuters, who couldn’t see past it and had to take detours around
24 See chapter nine of Aaron Shkuda, The Lofts of SoHo: Gentrification, Art, and Industry
in New York, 1950–1980 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).
25 See Abbe Schriber, ‘“Those Who Know Don’t Tell”’.
26 Ibid. In addition to the Illegal America exhibition at Exit Art in 1990, the images were
also included in the exhibition catalogue David Hammons: Rousing the Rubble (New
York: P.S. 1 Contemporary Art Center, 1990).
27 The statement is reproduced in Abbe Schriber, ‘“Those Who Know Don’t Tell”’, p. 48.
134 ENDURING ORNAMENT
it.28 When hundreds of government workers petitioned for it to be
repositioned or relocated, the artist sued the public agency that had
commissioned the project, insisting that ‘to remove the work is to
destroy the work’.29
While Serra’s sculptures are specifically situated in public places
(and with public funding, in the case of Tilted Arc), they’re also meant
to be impervious to the lived realities of their surroundings.30 Des-
pite this, and despite the artist’s defensive resistance to the time of
contingency that comes after the execution of his authorial intention,
many of Serra’s site-specific works around the world have become
impromptu but well-established urinals. Something about their place-
ment in busy thoroughfares, combined with the degree of shelter and
privacy offered by their big rusty facades, makes them perfect spaces
for responding to nature’s calls. It’s safe to say that as long as cities fail
to provide adequate public facilities, Serra’s weatherproof monuments
will continue to have a stench of piss about them.
Quite against themselves, Serra’s outdoor sculptures also tend to
become broad canvases for public commentary — with messages in-
scribed in the rust, writing his facades out of their timelessness. As
soon as it was installed, the T.W.U. piece was customized by its neigh-
bourhood. The immensity of its scale and the starkness of its surfaces
made it well suited as a blank slate for graffiti and posters — so the
dubious claim to autonomous purity is actually what ensured that the
Minimalist sculpture became contaminated by the reality onto which
28 Chave cites Danny Katz, who worked as a clerk in the building at the plaza where Tilted
Arc was installed, who said: ‘It’s not a great plaza by international standards, but it is a
small refuge and place of revival for people who ride to work in steel containers, work in
sealed rooms, and breathe recirculated air all day. Is the purpose of art in public places
to seal off a route of escape, to stress the absence of joy and hope? I can’t believe this
was the artistic intention, yet to my sadness, this for me has been the dominant effect of
the work, and it’s all the fault of the location and position. I can accept anything in art,
but I can’t accept physical assault and physical destruction of pathetic human activity.
No work of art created with a contempt for ordinary humanity and without respect for
the common element of human experience can be great’ (Chave, ‘Minimalism’, p. 60).
29 Richard Serra, Writings/Interviews, p. 194. For more on the Tilted Arc debacle, see The
Destruction of Tilted Arc: Documents, ed. by Clara Weyergraf-Serra and Martha Buskirk
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
30 Chave cites Serra’s own account of what it means for him to conceive of a work for
a public place: ‘one has to consider the traffic flow, but not necessarily worry about
the indigenous community, and get caught up in the politics of the site’ (Chave,
‘Minimalism’, p. 58).
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it imposed itself. Paint was splattered on its surfaces, garbage tumble-
weeded around it, and there was, almost certainly, piss. Then David
Hammons comes along and participates in this existing repertoire of
furtive and improvisational urban practices, where authorship is blurry
or irrelevant, and where forms are necessarily transient.
*
Another work that has Serra’s big weathered walls in the background
is Andrea Fraser’s 2001 video Little Frank and His Carp.31 With just
over six minutes of shaky footage that was shot with hidden cameras,32
the video shows Fraser taking herself on a tour of the Guggenheim
Museum in Bilbao, which was designed by Frank Gehry, the titan of
contemporary architecture, whom Fraser’s title addresses in the dimin-
utive. Walking through the museum’s atrium with the official audio
guide pressed to her ear, its strap around her wrist, Fraser performs a
radical susceptibility to the disembodied voice, which instructs visitors
exactly where to go, how to feel, and how to appreciate what they are
looking at:
If you haven’t already done so, walk away from the desk where
you picked up this guide and out into the great high space of
the atrium. Isn’t this a wonderful place? It’s uplifting. It’s like a
gothic cathedral, you can feel your soul rise up in the building
around you.
Rather than resist the bathos of her automated tutor — by, say, turning
the device off — Fraser abandons herself to its powers of suggestion.
When the voice tells her to look up at the archways, her head follows.
When he directs her to turn around and admire the glass tower, she
31 This video can be viewed at UbuWeb <http://ubu.com/film/fraser_frank.html> [ac-
cessed 2 July 2020].
32 In an essay that accompanies this work, Fraser mentions how aggressively the Gug-
genheim Bilbao controls the circulation of images of the museum’s architecture; while
visitors are encouraged to touch the walls, they are strictly prohibited from taking any
photographs. Fraser also relays an anecdote of a local artist who, after making macaroni
shaped like Gehry’s building, was threatened with a lawsuit. The museum’s vigilance
about its own image makes the artist’s intervention in this site all the more provocative.
Andrea Fraser, ‘Isn’t This a Wonderful Place? (A Tour of a Tour of the Guggenheim
Bilbao)’, in MuseumHighlights:TheWritings of Andrea Fraser, ed. by Alexander Alberro
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 233–59 (p. 245).
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swivels on cue. When he speaks of the ‘heart of the museum’, she
touches her breast. When he explains pedantically that modern art
is ‘demanding, complicated, bewildering’, her brows contract in con-
sternation.
The artist never speaks, and while the video begins with the am-
bient sounds of the museum, the audio track is soon replaced with the
generic museal voiceover that arrives through the wand of information.
The camerawork also participates in the play of acquiescence, as it cuts
to show whatever she is told to look at. But this perfect compliance
— if not obedience — to the dictation of experience by the voice of
institutional authority gradually takes a turn, as a transgressive mode
of sensuality starts to emerge from the practice of listening all too well.
Every surface of this space curves, only the floor is straight.
These curves are gentle but in their huge scale powerfully
sensual. You’ll see people going up to the walls and stroking
them. You might feel a desire to do so yourself. These curving
surfaces have a direct appeal that has nothing to do with age
or class or education […]. This pillar is clad in panels of
limestone. Run your hand over them. Feel how smooth it is….
When the video is two and a half minutes in, Fraser bites her own
fist. By the fourth minute, she is hiking up her bright green dress to
reveal a white thong, and caressing her own ass as she presses herself
against Gehry’s curved pillar. She consummates the enjoyment of the
universal through its de-sublimation, and her impersonally prompted
exhibitionism recodes the solemnity of aesthetic education into the
comedy of the improperly erotic.33
When the narrator prompts her to pause the audio guide, she
does so, ambling to the next room to await further instruction. The
33 ‘These curving surfaces have a direct appeal that has nothing to do with age or class
or education’, the Guggenheim Bilbao’s voiceover insists, before explaining how the
building was made by computers and robots — as the product, in Fraser’s words, ‘of
a world in which the human labour of production does not exist’. While museum-
goers are instructed to touch the walls of the building and ‘feel how smooth it is’,
Fraser’s essay reflects on the social realities that are being smoothed-over here — from
local unemployment and poverty to the precarization of labour in and through art
institutions and the franchised spectacularization of museums made into ‘corporate
entertainment complexes’ (ibid.).







Figures 8–10. Andrea Fraser, Little Frank and His Carp (2001), standard
definition video. Video stills. Courtesy the artist.
video cuts to a museum-goer touching his hand to the wall where
Fraser has just had her encounter, before ending on a shot of Serra’s
180-ton, 15.85-meter-long Snake (1994-97) — a ‘big slab of rusty
steel’ (Fraser’s description) that critics have variously described as
‘undulating’ and ‘flirty’ in its ‘wanton curviness’.34 By the time she
arrives in the space, Fraser has libidinally charged the embodiment
34 Ibid., p. 243. Richard Cork, Breaking Down the Barriers: Art in the 1990s (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 515. Deborah Solomon, ‘Richard Serra Is Carrying
the Weight of the World’, The New York Times, 28 August 2019.
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of the abstract ‘phenomenological subject’35 that Minimalist artworks
like Serra’s are credited with inviting into engagement — and she
has roused platitudes about participatory art to the point of their
discomposure.
*
Fraser’s illicit encounter with the defiantly blank surfaces of the insti-
tution recalls an anecdote at the start of Anna Chave’s essay on the
relations of power that play out through Minimalist artworks. At the
Museum of Modern Art in New York, two teenage girls are interacting
with a polished brass box on the floor, which is an untitled Donald Judd
sculpture. Their first response is to kick it and laugh, then they use it
as a mirror to fix their hair, and finally they bend down and kiss their
reflections on its surface. Witnessing all this from a distance, Chave
recounts that she was struck by the fact that the museum guard who
stood nearby made no attempt to intervene. She goes on to argue that
‘the object’s look of absolute, or “plain power”’, as Judd described it,
‘helps explain the perception that it did not need or merit protecting’.36
The tendencies that came to define American Minimalism as it
emerged in the 1960s included the explicit use of industrial materials
and procedures, and the absence of any frame or plinth for the art
object. Positioned on the same ground as the viewer, the Minimalist
sculpture might have appeared more ‘exposed’, more vulnerable to be-
ing touched or attacked — except that the self-consciously hardy and
non-precious materiality, and the techniques of outsourced mass pro-
duction, served at the same time to negate any dimension of fragility.
Serra’s contribution to Minimalism was to render its objects on
an ever more monumental scale, and the installation at the Guggen-
heim Bilbao is one of his biggest-ever works. It occupies the museum’s
largest gallery, which was specifically built to house the installation as a
permanent centrepiece. ‘Contemporary art is big’, the official voiceover
in Fraser’s video explains, as she reaches the Serra room. ‘In fact, some
of it is enormous!’
35 See Hal Foster, ‘The Crux of Minimalism’, in Hal Foster, The Return of the Real: The
Avant-Garde at the End of the Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 35–71.
36 Chave, p. 44.
AMELIA GROOM AND M. TY 139
The curvaceous surfaces that we see Fraser enjoy in her video seem
to be left unaffected by her excessively compliant (and wonderfully
inappropriate) masturbatory caress. Similarly, Hammons’s piss and
shoes have got nothing on the immense solidity and claims to posterity
that are embodied in Serra’s work. They might cause some olfactory
disruption, and prove difficult to take down, but the stench would pass
within a matter of days, the shoes in some weeks, while the towering
steel walls would remain indefinitely and indifferently upright.37
By messing with registers of macho monumentalism, though,
these transitory interventions bring its humorlessness and impervious
self-importance into sharp relief. The steely indifference of Serra’s sur-
faces, along with the logic of final conquest that they embody, may
seem to impress a sense of futility on such leaky and libidinal gestures
as those enacted by Hammons and Fraser. But it is precisely by making
minimal claim to staying power that such acts of fleeting disturbance
underscore the ultimate futility of trying to close off the relationship
between an object and its world.
For decades, Serra has steeled his works against the weather by
using pre-treated COR-TEN, which is the generic trademark name for
US Steel’s weathering steel, whose alloy is designed to stave off the
weathering effects of the weather, by accelerating and then harnessing
the rusting process. Rust is welcomed onto the surface, but only as a
technique of controlled passivation: once the coating of oxidation has
formed over the exposed metal, it is supposed to stabilize and shut out
the environment, thereby eliminating the need for ongoing re-painting
or other costly anti-rust maintenance measures. This is the idea with
weathering steel; the steel is weathered so as to refuse the weather, with
a paradoxically protective layer of corrosion.38
When US Steel opened the US Steel Tower as their headquarters
in Pittsburgh in 1970, the building was supposed to be a showpiece for
their COR-TEN product, with columns of the weathering steel run-
ning right up the sixty-four story skyscraper. Within months, though,
37 Serra, apparently, was not pleased. Filipovic, David Hammons, p. 70.
38 In this sense, COR-TEN’s design is in keeping with the original architectural sense of
‘weathering’, which refers to the parts of the building that were meant to ‘throw off the
rain’ or otherwise stave the weather off. Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow,




Figure 11. US Steel Tower in Pittsburgh, as it appears in Google Maps
Street View.
as the COR-TEN underwent its initial phase of anti-corrosive cor-
rosion, the building started to bleed, with iron oxides seeping out
and staining the sidewalks and nearby buildings. Literally red-faced,
the corporation orchestrated an extensive clean-up effort. But Google
Maps Street View confirms that parts of the pavement around the
tower still have a rusty tinge to them.
We recently went to have an irl look at Serra’s big COR-TEN sculp-
ture that stands outside the Berliner Philharmonie, at the southern
edge of Tiergarten. Besides the presence of graffiti, garbage, weeds,
and an abandoned long-stemmed rose — which were not altogether
unexpected — we noticed that the solid metal panels are failing in
their weather resistance, and literally leaking out into their surrounds.
They’re standing strong, very strong and very still, but the ground
around them shows ornamental stripes of fluid red, where the rust is
carrying the resistant sculpture away from itself. This is rust: a gather-
ing of red that is followed by its own scattering; a material archive of
exposure that does not keep itself but flakes apart and seeps away.
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Figure 12. Richard Serra’s Berlin Junction (1987), giving off its red.
Photograph taken by the authors on 21 May, the Ascension Day of 2020.

TheWeathering of the Trace
Agamben’s Presupposition of Derrida
DAMIANO SACCO
The urgency of the question of the status of the trace can perhaps in
no way be justified, it can only be asserted. The trace ‘itself ’, Derrida
argues, cannot be done justice to — the trace, another name for justice,
cannot be justified. The urgency of the question of the trace is unfolded
in this essay alongside a principal axis instituted by the following
question: is it possible that the trace might be weathering away? Is it
altogether possible for the trace to weather away like a material trace
would, a trace imprinted in the mud or in the snow, a trace exposed
to the elements? It is not immediately clear how one should think
the weathering of the trace — to which elements would the trace be
exposed? To Heidegger’s earth? To his forgetting of air? To Nietzsche’s
fear of water? To everyone’s obsession with fire? Or is it the case,
instead, that the trace has in fact already withered away — that there
are no more traces to be found? Notwithstanding, one should at least
justify the possibility of addressing the question of the trace under the
heading of weathering, at least justify the possibility of articulating the
question alongside a guideline that does not immediately appear to
move in the vicinities of the trace. The principal standpoint from which
this reflection moves is then the one which enables the thinking of the
movement of the trace together with a certain notion of weathering.
When a building, a stone, or a monument are exposed to the elements,
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it can be argued that a certain logic of ‘supplementarity’ is at work, a
familiar kind of addition by subtraction or subtraction by addition: the
monument gains something by being weathered — it gains a new status
by something perhaps being removed or weathered off its surface, it
gains something through a subtraction — and, at the same time, the
monument loses something, its original status, through the additional
supplement or sedimentation of the elements — it loses something
through an addition. There is then an extent to which weathering,
according to this logic of supplementarity, as the deferral of an origin
that has always already been weathered, as an exposure to the elements,
as an exposure to the Other, as an exposure that precedes all fantasies
of self-presence, as the opening of temporality itself, but also, as will
be made clear in the other contributions to this volume, as the logic of
the archive — the logic of what remains alive of the dead and what is
already dead of the living — as the haunting of memory, as the work
of mourning, as the creation and erasure of physical traces — there
is an extent to which the movement of the trace and this notion of
weathering can be thought together.
The question at stake in this essay, however, is not that of weather-
ing, but rather that of the weathering of the trace (objective genitive).1
This question turns out to be problematic if approached from the
current standpoint, for the weathering of the trace would stand for a
weathering of weathering itself, for the trace of the trace ‘itself ’. This
is a well-known problem, or feature, of deconstruction: namely, the
aporia that arises when one attempts to think the possibility of a trans-
formation or weathering of the very opening of temporality, of spacing,
of the very exposure that first makes any weathering possible. To posit
that the trace is liable to any notion of transformation, modification,
or weathering would be to resort, precisely, to a possibility for change
for which the trace will have always been the very opening. This is
a feature that is known, in Aristotle (but not in Plato), as anhypo-
theticity (or, before Meillassoux’s intervention, more commonly as
1 The expression ‘weathering of the trace’ has two meanings: when the genitive is
taken as subjective, it attributes the performance of weathering to the trace, signalling
that the trace is the source or principle of weathering; when the genitive is taken as
objective, it is the trace to be subjected or exposed to weathering. This latter case will
be explored as the subject matter of the essay.
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elenchus): that is, the impossibility to attempt to refute (elenchein)
a certain principle, of non-contradiction in Aristotle’s case, without
having of necessity to resort to it. The question of the weathering of the
trace is then equivalent to that of anhypotheticity, a question of self-
referentiality with which continental thought seems to keep confront-
ing itself — by asking whether being is, whether the trace is, whether
die Sprache spricht, whether contingency is contingent, whether plasti-
city is plastic, whether weathering weathers, and so forth. According to
different topologies, the boundary of language — its limit — is either
simple or, rather, consists of a certain fold that turns in upon itself.
Deconstruction takes the following stance: there can be no trace of
the trace, no deconstruction of deconstruction, no autoimmunity of
autoimmunity, no hymen of the hymen, no glas of glas, no weather-
ing of weathering. Justice, another name for deconstruction, Derrida
states, is undeconstructible; the trace, as autoimmunity, is not liable
to any autoimmunitary reaction, be that a permanent autoimmunitary
disease or a seasonal allergy.2 The aim of this essay is to confront the
question of the anhypotheticity of the trace — the question of the
weathering of the trace — with the claim that the trace itself would
be inscribed in a certain history, not quite a temporal one, through an
inscription that it has not itself written — the trace would be inscribed
in a history that has come to an end. This is Agamben’s claim.
I
For over forty years, from his first Stanzas through to What Is Philo-
sophy?, Agamben has time and again engaged with the standpoint of
deconstruction: an engagement that has at times been overt, at times
covert, at times self-effacing, and at times, of necessity, unaware of
itself. In the impossibility to render justice to this pluri-decennial con-
frontation, the hope is that this inevitably partial re-enactment might
shed light on the question of rendering justice itself — to a text, to a
reading, to justice itself. If the principle of reason is one of reddendae
2 For a different approach to the question of anhypotheticity, which points to the
undecidability of the status of contingency, deconstruction, etc., see Damiano Sacco,
‘Of Apousia and Parousia: The Correlation between Heidegger and Meillassoux’, Pli,
30 (2019), pp. 141–63.
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rationis, the anhypotheticity of justice deals precisely with the im-
possibility of rendering justice to justice itself. The plan is to present
Agamben’s claim on the status of the trace and to then outline his own
proposal.
The principal claim made by Agamben is that, since Aristotle, our
experience of language has been shaped by one particular modus op-
erandi, to wit, the presuppositional one. Agamben argues that with Ar-
istotle we observe the inception of a structuring guideline throughout
which language will operate as a determinate apparatus (dispositivo):
namely, one that is responsible for the ‘the scission of being into a
hypokeimenon, something lying-at-the-base (the being named or in-
dicated of a singular existent, insofar as it is not said of a subject but
is a presupposition for every discourse) and that which is said on the
presupposition of it’.3 To predicate in language always means having
pre-supposed, a posteriori, the existence of a substratum or hypostasis
that precedes all predicates. Agamben writes:
As soon as there is language, the named thing is presupposed
as the nonlinguistic or the unrelated with which language
has established its relation. This presupposing power is so
strong that we imagine the non-linguistic as something unsay-
able and unrelated, which we somehow try to grasp as such,
without realizing that in this way we are simply trying to grasp
the shadow of language. In this sense, the unsayable is a genu-
inely linguistic category, which can be conceived only by a
speaking being.4
The trajectory of the history of Western metaphysics, a trajectory that
Heidegger and Derrida read as being indexed by certain order of pres-
ence, a metaphysics of presence — this trajectory is re-interpreted by
Agamben as that of the history of a certain experience of language,
precisely a language that is inherently presuppositional, that cannot
help but pre-suppose, after taking place, a prior, non-linguistic sub-
stratum that it itself constitutes retroactively. The self-presence of the
signified, namely the target of Heideggerian destruction and Derridean
3 Giorgio Agamben, The Use of Bodies, trans. by Adam Kotsko (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2016), pp. 131–32.
4 Giorgio Agamben, What Is Philosophy?, trans. by Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2018), p. 35.
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deconstruction, should be traced, according to Agamben, to the self-
presence of the retroactive positing of the linguistic presupposition,
the self-presence of the non-linguistic presupposition. The history of
metaphysics coincides then with the history of the presuppositional
experience of language: ‘It is in the structure of presupposition that
the interweaving of being and language, ontology and logic that consti-
tutes Western metaphysics is articulated.’5 The history of metaphysics,
rather than being constituted by a number of inscrutable sendings
destined by a giving that will forever elude being given itself — a giving
nevertheless constrained by the double binds of unconcealment and
concealment (Un-verborgenheit), disclosure and withdrawal (Enthül-
lung, Entzug), appropriation and expropriation (Ereignis, Enteignis) —
this history is rather to find its material inscription in the development
of a science of language as well as in the uncovering of the presup-
posing structure that underlies the Western experience of language.
An uncovering that follows the material conditions of ‘centuries of
humble analysis and grammatical education, through which language
[lingua, (langue)] has been extracted from speech [parola, (parole)]
and interiorized as knowledge’.6
This reading enables Agamben to ground the trajectory of the his-
tory of metaphysics — a trajectory that according to Heidegger moves
along an axis indexed by the objectification (Vergegenständlichung, Ob-
jektivierung) and constant presence (beständige Anwesenheit) of the
existent — on the development of a science of language that progres-
sively uncovers the logic of presupposition, of the self-presence of the
presupposed, of the institution of a subject of language, and so forth.
Moreover, both the inception and the conclusion of the history of
metaphysics find their own rationales: Aristotle’s inception marks the
beginning of the presuppositional experience of language, and, at the
5 Agamben, The Use of Bodies, p. 119.
6 Giorgio Agamben, ‘La parola e il sapere’, aut aut, 179–80 (September–December
1980), pp. 155–66 (p. 157; my translation): ‘It is sufficient to reflect, even for just a
moment, to realize that, while speech [parola], the concrete instance of discourse, is
something that can be experienced immediately and concretely, language [lingua] is
nothing but a construction of science that originates in speech. In order for something
like language to even just be conceived of, in order for it to become something firmer
and more real than speech, centuries, even millennia, of grammatical and logical
reflection on language have been necessary.’
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other end, the development of the modern science of linguistics that
takes place from Bopp through to Saussure and Benveniste marks the
accomplishment of this experience. Agamben writes:
This is the Copernican revolution that the thought of our time
inherits from nihilism: we are the first human beings who have
become completely conscious of language. For the first time,
what preceding generations called God, Being, spirit, uncon-
scious appear to us as what they are: names for language.7
And he continues:
The primordial character of the word is now completely re-
vealed, and no new figure of the divine, no new historical
destiny can lift itself out of language. […] If God was the
name of language, ‘God is dead’ can only mean that there is
no longer a name for language.8
Crucially, this reading provides Agamben with a foothold that enables
him to extend the history of metaphysics just enough to also include
Derrida and the trace. Derrida’s thought comes to represent, in Agam-
ben’s reading, the end of the trajectory beginning with Aristotle: the
end of the presupposing experience of language. Agamben’s gesture
consists in claiming that the trace, in not being able to escape the
presuppositional experience of language, rather brings it to its con-
clusion: the trace is, Agamben argues, presupposition of nothing but
of itself — the trace is inscribed in the history of metaphysics as self-
presupposition. The self-presence of the presupposed is forever deferred
by the trace precisely because the action of presupposition comes to be
shifted, at each turn, to act upon itself: the trace does not presuppose a
self-present signified, but rather keeps presupposing a presupposition
to each presupposition. The immediacy of the internal voice has always
already presupposed the mediation of an external writing, which in
turn can exist as a mediation or an externality only if it has presupposed
… and so forth, with the movement of arche-writing or trace standing
7 Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Idea of Language’, in Agamben, Potentialities, ed. and trans. by




precisely for the differing and deferral operated by the process of self-
presupposition. Agamben writes:
For there to be the signification of an intentionality and not
of an object, it is necessary that the term signify itself, but
signify itself only insofar as it signifies. It is thus necessary that
the intentio neither be a referent nor, for that matter, simply
refer to an object. In the semiotic scheme by which aliquid
stat pro aliquo, A stands for B, the intentio cannot indicate the
first aliquid or the second; it must, rather, above all refer to
the ‘standing for’ itself. The aporia of Derrida’s terminology
is that in it, one standing for stands for another standing for,
without anything like an objective referent constituting itself
in its presence. But, accordingly, the very notion of sense (of
‘standing for’) then enters into a state of crisis. This is the
particular rigour of Derrida’s terminology.9
The trace, as self-presupposition, is then inscribed in the history of the
presuppositional experience of language as its necessary completion.
According to a recurrent strategy, Agamben performs a gesture that
enables him to include a certain element in a system through its very
exclusion, namely to include the graphic element of the trace as the
negative, i.e. the inverse/reverse, of the history of onto-theology.10
Through a logic of the exception, a logic of ex-capio, the trace is in-
cluded in the history of metaphysics precisely by its conformity, albeit
by means of its negation, to the presuppositional structure of language,
i.e. by excluding or disenabling the retroactive presupposition of a ref-
erent. The weathering of the trace (subjective genitive) — the trace as
weathering — stands according to Agamben as the completion of the
history of metaphysics.11
9 Ibid., p. 212, translation modified.
10 See, e.g., Agamben, What Is Philosophy?, pp. 19–20 or Giorgio Agamben, Language
and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. by Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 38–40.
11 Agamben repeatedly grounds his assessment of the trace on Aristotle’s De Interpreta-
tione and on its ancient commentators. Agamben argues that the articulation between
phōnē and logos, between bare voice and signifying language, can take place only thanks
to the function of the letter, gramma, both element and sign of the voice: ‘Insofar as it
is the element of that of which it is a sign, it has the privileged status of being an index
sui, self-demonstration; like protē ousia, of which it constitutes the linguistic cipher, it
shows itself, but only insofar as it was in the voice, that is, insofar as it always already
belongs to the past. The gramma is thus the form of presupposition itself and nothing
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II
Before attempting to render justice to this reading, before asking
whether the trace can effectively be included through an exclusion or
whether it has the potential of deactivating the logic of the exception, it
will be necessary to provide a brief outline of Agamben’s own proposal.
Having delimited the domain of metaphysics by means of a certain
experience of language that runs from Aristotle to Derrida, Agamben
resorts to the Heideggerian need for a step-back-beyond in order to
move beyond the presuppositional history of language. This step back,
which according to Heidegger should prepare the springing board or
the run-up space for the leap (Satz) beyond metaphysics, is then quite
literally a step back from Aristotle, namely a certain return to Plato’s
theory of ideas and quest for a principle freed from all presupposi-
tions, an archē anypothetos. It is then exactly in the space articulated
by the two different notions of anhypotheticity that a confrontation
between Derrida and Agamben is to be staged. On the one hand, an-
hypotheticity as the impossibility to contest a principle without having
necessarily to resort to it (to argue that the trace would presuppose a
more original opening would precisely mean to resort to a notion of
presupposition that is a prerogative of the trace); on the other hand,
anhypotheticity as the attempt to do away with the logic of presuppos-
ition altogether, namely to turn to an experience of language that knows
nothing of presuppositions, be they simple or self-referential.
The entry point to this different notion of anhypotheticity is then
the following: if the unsayable, the non-linguistic, is nothing but the
else’ (Agamben, ‘The Thing Itself ’, in Agamben, Potentialities, pp. 27–38 (p. 37); see
also Agamben, ‘Tradition of the Immemorial’, in Agamben, Potentialities, pp. 104–15
(pp. 111, 113)). Signifying language, Agamben argues, is always articulated (enarth-
ros) and phōnē enarthros means phōnē engrammatos, vox quae scribi potest (Agamben,
‘Philosophy and Linguistics’, in Agamben, Potentialities, pp. 62–76 (p. 75)): ‘The let-
ter, as the interpreter of the voice, does not itself need any other interpreter. It is the
final interpreter, beyond which no hermēneia is possible: the limit of all interpretation’
(ibid., p. 37). He can therefore conclude: ‘What has reached completion is in fact not
the natural history of humanity, but that most special epochal history in which the
hermēneia of speech as a language [lingua] — that is, as an intentional intertwining of
terms, concepts, things, and letters that takes place in the voice through the grammata
— had destined the West’ (What is Philosophy?, p. 23). In the following it will be
shown that the trace, neither gramma nor phōnē, neither positing nor presupposing,
can neither be said to be within nor to be without the history of metaphysics.
DAMIANO SACCO 151
presupposition of language, the shadow that language necessarily casts
in its taking place, it is on the contrary the sayable (il dicibile), the
sayability of the sayable, that with which philosophy should concern
itself:
It is not the unsayable but the sayable that constitutes the
problem philosophy must at each turn confront again. The
unsayable is in fact nothing else than a presupposition of lan-
guage. […] The unsayable is a genuinely linguistic category,
which can be conceived only by a speaking being. […] On the
other hand, the sayable is a non-linguistic but genuinely onto-
logical category. The elimination of the unsayable in language
coincides with the exhibition of the sayable as a philosophical
task.12
Precisely the task of exhibiting, or even exposing, the pure sayability
of the sayable can, according to Agamben, be attended to by turning to
Plato’s theory of ideas. Neither does the idea, the ‘thing itself ’, have a
proper name nor is it homonymous with the thing: ‘the “circle itself ”
(autos ho kyklos) seizes the circle not at the level of signification but
in its pure having a name, in that pure sayability that alone makes
discourse and knowledge possible.’13 The specific performance of the
pronounautos is that of signalling a notion of sameness that, in contrast
to the notion of mere identity (ipse and das Selbe rather than idem or
das Gleiche), articulates the matter of thinking since the Heideggerian
intervention. A certain notion of sameness of being and thought comes
then to be articulated anew in Plato’s theory of ideas: the idea belongs
neither to thought nor to being, neither to langue nor to parole, it
does not substantialize or abstract an ideal world, but rather, as event
of language, deactivates and neutralizes these oppositions by joining
together the thing with its being named:
In this way, Plato problematizes the pure and irreducible
givenness of language. At this point — where the name is
resumed from and in its naming the thing, and the thing is
resumed from and in its being named by the name — the
12 Agamben, What Is philosophy?, p. 35.
13 Ibid., p. 58.
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world and language are in contact, that is, they are united only
by an absence of representation.14
The promise of a different experience of language is to be waged on the
contemplation of the event of language, on a suspension of what (quid)
is being said to attend to the fact that (quod) it is being said. According
to Agamben, in this shift, ‘the whole modern theory of signification is
called into question.’15 This is the step back from the presuppositional
experience of language that prepares for the leap beyond metaphysics:
Language, which for human beings mediates all things and
all knowledge, is itself immediate. Nothing immediate can
be reached by speaking beings — nothing, that is, except
language itself, mediation itself. For human beings, such an
immediate mediation constitutes the sole possibility of reach-
ing a principle freed of every presupposition, including self-
presupposition. Such an immediate mediation alone, in other
words, allows human beings to reach that arkhē anypotethos,
that ‘unpresupposed principle’ that Plato, in the Republic,
presents as the telos, fulfilment and end of autos ho logos, lan-
guage itself […]. There can be no true human community on
the basis of a presupposition — be it a nation, a language, or
even the a priori of communication of which hermeneutics
speaks. What unites human beings among themselves is not
a nature, a voice, or a common imprisonment in signifying
language; it is the vision of language itself and, therefore, the
experience of language’s limits, its end. A true community can
only be a community that is not presupposed.16
If the weathering of the trace, the trace as weathering, constitutes the
consummation of the history of metaphysics, it is then a notion of the
weather, a notion of the event of language freed of all presuppositions,
that which sets forth the promise of a different experience of language.
III
The principle of justice — the anhypotheticity of justice — precludes
the rendering of justice to the trace, the rendering of justice to justice.
14 Ibid., p. 65.
15 Ibid., p. 60.
16 Agamben, ‘The Idea of Language’, p. 47.
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There is nevertheless a minimal gap that separates the movement of
the trace from what Agamben refers to — a minimal gap that affords
a rendering of justice. Every positing (Setzung), in taking place, points
to a prior positing as to a presupposition (Voraussetzung) of its very
taking place: namely, in the very act of positing, it — the positing itself
— is presupposed to its own performance. The logic of positing and
presupposing, the logic of reflection, finds perhaps its most natural
fulfilment in being posited itself as one moment of the unfolding of an
ideal Substance/Subject, to wit, Hegel’s Spirit. Spirit, in positing its ob-
ject, finds itself as the very presupposition of this positing; that is to say,
Spirit finds itself — its own interiority — in the exteriority of the object
it has itself posited. Positing, by being posited itself, presupposes itself;
presupposition, in being itself posited becomes self-presupposition.
Given this logic of self-presupposition — namely, given the dialectics
between Setzung and Voraussetzung that locates in each positing a pre-
supposition which comes itself to be posited — then, the movement
or inscription of the trace can be said to be neither equal nor different,
neither internal nor external, to this economy of self-presupposition.
Between the restricted economy of self-presupposition and the gen-
eralized one of the trace, there is not a fully constituted difference,
but precisely the trace of a difference, the difference of a trace.17 The
stakes and the promise of the whole Derridean project lie precisely
in exhibiting and demonstrating, by means of an ex-hibiting that is a
de-monstration, that the very condition of possibility of the restricted
economy of Setzung and Voraussetzung, of positing and presupposing,
is a moment that of necessity exceeds this economy. The economy of
reflection is set into play neither by a positing nor by a presupposing,
but rather by the excess of an ex-positing or of an ex-posure: the excess
of an Aussetzung. The exposure that first makes possible this economy
and that, at the same time, exceeds the aegis of its logic — the abstract
negativity that cannot be drained by any determinate one, the gift that
precedes all notions of accountability, the unconditional hospitality
17 One should confront here with the claim found in Derrida’s 1964–65 seminar that
the ‘difference’ between Hegel and Heidegger, between Erinnerung and Destruktion, ‘is
thus as close as possible to nothing’. Jacques Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being
and History, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2016), p. 9.
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for the unposited Other, and so forth — this excess is found again, at
each step, within the economy itself in a certain distancing of positing
from itself: a distancing that does not quite amount to a full difference
precisely because it does not distance two positings, but a positing and
the other positing that will have been presupposed only by virtue of
this very distancing. The trace is therefore not simply presupposition
of itself, the trace does not institute a restricted economy of Setzung-
Voraussetzung, but rather renders the latter destitute — i.e. it renders
it justice — through the inscription of the generalized economy of
Setzung-Aussetzung-Voraussetzung. Accordingly, every positing takes
place by means of an exposure that is neither posited nor presupposed,
every presupposing takes place by virtue of a non-posited exposure of
positing, every exposure inscribes an economy of positing and presup-
posing.
Beyond Derrida — one could quote here a whole series of texts in
toto — it is perhaps Hamacher the one to have most insisted in letting
this structure emerge across the tradition. In Kant, where the very
fact that the order of the posited is taken as the order of being (‘The
concept of position or positing (Position oder Setzung) is completely
simple and is the same as the concept of Being’18) entails that positing
itself cannot quite be said ‘to be’: ‘it means that positing, affected by
something other than Being understood as position, never is — never
“is” according to its own sense of “is,” according to the sense of thetic
Being.’19 In Fichte:
Fichte’s proposition can be characterized in this way: in order
for the proposition to be able to realize its constative character
through which the identity of the I with itself is designated
as Being, it needs an absolutely nonrelational, performative
positing, a sheer act that can be neither the action of an I nor
an action in relation to an I, hence no action of consciousness
and no intentional correlate of consciousness.20
18 Werner Hamacher, ‘Premises’, in Hamacher, Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Litera-
ture from Kant to Celan, trans. by Peter Fenves (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1996), pp. 1–43 (p. 11; quoting from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason).
19 Ibid., p. 14.
20 Werner Hamacher, ‘Position Exposed: Friedrich Schlegel’s Poetological Transposition
of Fichte’s Absolute Proposition’, in Hamacher, Premises, pp. 222–60 (p. 234).
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In Hegel:
Hegel does not dissolve the aporia of understanding. On the
contrary, for him, the aporia constitutes the resistance from
which experience must rebound and turn back on itself. By
supposing that the incomprehensible has a meaning, spirit
understands it as its object and understands itself as its posit-
ing. […] [Spirit] takes the only path that the blockage of the
aporia leaves open: a path back to itself.21
And, of course, in Heidegger:
In the essay ‘On the Essence of Truth,’ he [Heidegger] does
not use the terminology of understanding and anticipation
but that of letting, leaving, and ex-posing: ‘As this letting-be,
it exposes itself to beings as such and transposes all comport-
ment into the open. Letting-be, that is, freedom, is in itself
ex-posing [aus-setzend], ek-sistent. Seen from the perspective
of the essence of truth, the essence of freedom shows itself as
exposure [Aussetzung] to the unconcealment of beings.’ […]
As the ex-posure of positing — the Aussetzung der Setzung, the
interruption of every positional act, the exposition of every
possible position — it draws on an opening, an unposited
space, and a place impossible to posit.22
It is from this standpoint that weathering, or the trace, appears not
simply as an infinite regression of an always-already weathered ex-
istent, but rather as the emergence of this economy by means of an
exposure to its unweatherable condition of possibility — an exposure
to the event of the weather. The weather, the factum of language, con-
stitutes the archē anypothetos, the giving of the economy of weathering
— an economy that will always contain the inscription of a trace that
cannot be weathered by anhypotheticity. In order to distance himself
from Derrida, Agamben misses the opportunity to see that this distan-
cing arises only by his mis-positing of the trace — a mis-positing that
reveals the two projects to be perhaps as close as they could be. For,
on the one hand, the event of language as archē anypothetos gives rise
21 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, pp. 7–9.
22 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, p. 38; quoting from Heidegger’s ‘On the Essence of Truth’.
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to an economy of positing and presupposing in which one can always
find the inscription of a trace, a trace that cannot be weathered by
anhypotheticity. Conversely, by virtue of its own anhypotheticity, the
trace precludes positing from positing itself by inscribing a distancing
within positing itself: the event of positing, the weather, constitutes an
archē anypothetos. To think the weathering or the anhypotheticity of
the trace amounts then to thinking the event of language, the event
of the weather, as archē anypothetos. Weather and weathering, event
of language and trace, abandoned being and exposed positing, archē
anypothetos and anhypotheticity of the lack of archē — but also, bando
and bande, potenza and puissance/potence, soglia and hymen, and so
forth — Agamben and Derrida’s projects are tangent to each other
without any possibility of being disjoined. One should mark each of
the following words by Hamacher: ‘Positing is exposed positing; aban-
doned by itself, it is thus ex-position.’23 This essay is perhaps only a long
exegesis of this one sentence, of the relation between the exposure of
positing and the exceptional bando of abandoned being.24 Hamacher
articulates this relation as follows:
It thus becomes clear that there can be a position — and thus
Being, subject, language, and understanding — only from
the ex-position of this position: only, therefore, from what
is precisely not an understanding of Being as position, not a
subject, not a language, and not an understanding — and is,
moreover, not a negation of any of these but the opening of
every one. Only as an ex-posed, abandoned subject is there
23 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, p. 15. One should confront once again with the ‘difference’
between Hegel and Heidegger as found in Derrida’s 1964–65 seminar, see previous
note.
24 See also Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’, in The Birth to Presence, trans. by Brian
Holmes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 36–47. Equivalent read-
ings could have been performed by substituting exposure (Aussetzung) with either the
de-posing (Ent-setzung) of positing (Setzung) or with its trans-posing (Über-setzung).
Hamacher writes: ‘Translation [Übersetzung] is the exposition of languages in lan-
guage […]. In it, language exposes positing itself and being as the position of another
being — or of another as being — which for its part presents itself not positively,
[…] but rather only as the movement of this ex-posure [Aus-setzung] and de-posing
[Ent-setzung] of positing [Setzung].’ Werner Hamacher, ‘Intensive Languages’, trans.
by Ira Allen and Steven Tester, MLN, 127.3 (April 2012), pp. 485–541 (p. 536). In
this regard, see also Heidegger’s discussion of the Grundstimmung of Entsetzung, Ben-
jamin’s work on translation, on the Entsetzung of the law, Paul’s katargēsis, Agamben’s
destituent potential, and so forth.
DAMIANO SACCO 157
a subject in the first place, and only as ex-posed, disrupted
language and understanding is there anything like language or
understanding at all.25
The guiding question of this essay, the question of the weathering of
the trace, is then inseparable from that of the event of the weather, of
the factum of language. The two questions point, albeit in opposite dir-
ections, to one and the same matter, to the constitutive impossibility to
think within language either an archē anypothetos or the anhypotheti-
city of a lack of archē. This rift within language, this internal fissure,
is not to be taken as an infinitely distant boundary that establishes a
limit with the real, but as the remnant of an encounter, the mark of the
loss that language has had to sustain in order to constitute itself, the
sacrifice through which language has had to make itself sacer, through
which language has had to abandon itself. The impossibility to think
the weathering of the trace and the failure to think the event of lan-
guage are — finally without any metaphoricity — the real, the Other
exposed to the Other, language exposed to itself:
The auto-parekbasis of language as such. It is the movement
that leaps out of the uncontainable excess of speaking over
the spoken, of positing over every positivity, of the act of
positing over its fixation in the position of subjectivity. […]
Language speaks as absolute ex-position: as ekbasis, as excess,
interruption, and opening up.26
There can be no trace ‘itself ’ and there can be no autos ‘itself ’.
IV
The urgency of the question at stake is seen to both propel the analysis
forward and to put a halt to it — precisely for a lack of time. Had the
question not been so urgent, one could have articulated the same logic,
one could have attempted to apply the same change of coordinates
25 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, p. 16.
26 Hamacher, ‘Position Exposed’, p. 254. Parekbasis marks the speech that the chorus
would give to the people in the middle of the play by stepping out (ekbasis) of the
piece and of the limits of the proscenium, ‘a complete interruption and Aufhebung of
the play’. See ibid., p. 248.
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between the trace and the event of language, along other axes: fol-
lowing the guideline of language, concerning the performativity of the
performative and the sacrament of language; following the guideline
of the law, through the two readings of ‘Before the Law’; following
the guideline of the name, concerning the inscription of the trace in
every proper name and the lack of a name for the name; following the
question of matter, the question of the khōra; following the guideline
of the promise, the question of messianism, both between Derrida and
Agamben and between Derrida and Benjamin; following many other
guidelines.27 But had the questions not been so urgent, one would
have had no reason to follow these guidelines to begin with. My own
promise then, urgently.
We have already heard Agamben claiming that the experience of
language that has structured our tradition, an experience that when
made non-thetically thematic constitutes the sought after archē anypo-
thetos — this experience of language is that of an immediate mediation.
Said otherwise, language as the medium that gives access must itself
be immediate, it can posit something only insofar as it is itself not
posited. Were that not the case, rather than letting the existent come
forth, it would hinder this process by its own obtrusiveness, it would
itself appear and conceal the existent. With the assistance of a number
of eminent predecessors, let us designate this conception of language
by the epithet ‘weak’, or, equivalently, by the epithet ‘little’ — not
comparatively, as opposed to a strong one, but absolutely so:
27 For what concerns the question of the performative see, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Specters
of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans.
by Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994) and Giorgio Agamben, The Sacrament of
Language: AnArchaeology of the Oath, trans. by Adam Kotsko (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2011). For the reading of Kafka see Jacques Derrida, ‘Before the
Law’, trans. by Avital Ronell and Christine Roulston, in his Acts of Literature, ed.
by Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 181–220, and Giorgio Agamben,
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). For the question of the name and of the khōra,
see Jacques Derrida, On the Name, trans. by David Wood, John P. Leavey, Jr., and
Ian McLeod (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995) and Giorgio Agamben,
‘Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality’, in Potentialities, pp. 205–19. For an attempt at
the question of the promise, see Damiano Sacco, ‘Highest Openness: On Agamben’s
Promise’, in Openness and Medieval Culture, ed. by Manuele Gragnolati and Almut
Suerbaum (Berlin: ICI Berlin Press, forthcoming), and references therein.
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This movement of language from the withdrawal, this non-
positional and presuppositionless language of freedom, is,
according to one possible reading of Schlegel’s note, ‘little’. It
does not show an object that would be little but shows ‘how
little’ its showing is and thus shows that there is language.28
And again:
The ‘weakness’ of logos [to tōn logōn asthenes, Plato’s Seventh
Letter 343a1] therefore consists precisely in the fact that it is
not capable of bringing this very knowability and sameness to
expression; it must transform the knowability of beings that is
at issue in it in a presupposition.29
And again:
To this presupposing structure of language corresponds the
specificity of its way of being, which amounts to the fact that it
must remove itself in order to make the named thing be. This
is the nature of language Duns Scotus has in mind when he
defines the relation as ens debilissimum and adds that it is for
this reason so difficult to know. Language is ontologically very
weak, in the sense that it cannot but disappear in the thing
it names, otherwise, rather than designating or unveiling the
thing, it would hinder its comprehension.30
And again:
As Meister Eckhart writes, if the form through which we know
a thing were itself something, it would lead us to its knowledge
and turn away from the knowledge of the thing. The risk of
being itself perceived as a thing, and of separating us from
what it should reveal to us, is until the end consubstantial with
language. Not being able to say itself while it says other things,
that is, its being always ecstatically in the place of the other, is
the unmistakable signature and, at the same time, the original
taint of human language.31
28 Hamacher, ‘Position Exposed’, p. 259.
29 Agamben, ‘The Thing Itself ’, p. 33.
30 Agamben, What Is Philosophy?, pp. 9–10.
31 Ibid., p. 10.
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The event of language constitutes an archē anypothetos by virtue of the
weakness of language, that is, by virtue of the impossibility of making
thetic by means of language while, at the same time, making language
itself thetic. The aim of this essay has been to argue that the weakness
of language, its presuppositional economy and the ex-position or trace
that inscribes this economy are coextensive and indissociable from one
another.
Firstly, the weakness of language entails a presuppositional eco-
nomy. Every positing, by virtue of its very being aweakpositing, cannot
be posited insofar as it is positing — it thereforepoints to a presupposed
that must have posited it: a presupposed that can be itself weakly pos-
ited, thus pointing to a new presupposition.
Secondly, the presuppositional economy has always been ex-
posed to the inscription of the trace. The dialectics of positing and
presupposing takes place only by virtue of the écart that separates the
posited from the presupposed before the latter has been posited and a
full difference has been constituted between the two — an écart that is
in fact a self-spacing of positing itself.
Thirdly, the trace or ex-position of positing entails that positing is
always weak positing. Positing, as ex-posed positing, is always inhab-
ited by a self-spacing that distances positing and the presupposed that
must have posited it. This self-spacing of positing precludes positing
from positing itself — it makes positing weak.
There is therefore no presupposition or condition of possibility to
the economy of presupposition (by anhypotheticity), but rather only a
quasi-presupposition, a condition of possibility that, according to the
logic of the quasi-transcendental, is, at the same time, a moment of
impossibility in the economy that it itself makes possible. Positing is
weak positing and positing is ex-posed positing. Or, to repeat Hama-
cher’s words: ‘Positing is exposed positing; abandoned by itself, it is
thus ex-position.’ It is then quite clear that the task can be neither that
of finding a prior presupposed to either version of anhypotheticity
nor that of uncovering the hidden ground of the trace. The very quest
for what the trace has secretly presupposed or pre-excluded is then
irrevocably bound to fail from the start: the logic of presupposition
itself is inscribed by the ex-position of the trace and there can be no
presupposed to an archē anypothetos.
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V
Is this then the whole story? Once again, as for Hegel, Heidegger,
Derrida, and Agamben, the limits of a certain history and of a certain
experience of language have been traced, a new end has been marked:
the end of the history of philosophy, of the history of being, of the
history of presence, of the history of a certain experience of language.
And yet, every time a closure is declared, the very performance of
this gesture seems to backreact on the closure itself, and to propel
its movement one step forward: to a certain extent, the history of
philosophy has not ended with Hegel only because Hegel has marked
its end. Is it then possible that the destruction and deconstruction
of presence might have not left presence unaffected — that the ex-
position of positing might have not left positing itself present in the
same way? Said otherwise, is there a potential for the system ofSetzung-
Aussetzung-Voraussetzung to affect itself, or to be affected — but, of
necessity, neither in the simple mode of an auto-affection nor in that
of a hetero-affection?
The positing of all intentionality, be that linguistic, technical, or
phenomenological, operates according to a certain notion of account-
ability of the medium or contribution that gives rise to the order of
presence of positing. As soon as intentionality posits a certain order
of presence, the accountability of the contribution that gives rise to
this positing points to the presupposed of this order of presence: a
presupposed that corresponds to the subtraction of the contribution
of the linguistic, technological, or phenomenological mediation, and
thus reaches a non-linguistic, external, in-itself presence. The first two
paragraphs of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit present
this notion of accountability for what concerns the mediation that
we are to have with the Absolute, taking as model either the active
reshaping operated by an instrument on a thing (‘it is obvious that
the use of an instrument [Werkzeug] on a thing [Sache] certainly does
not let it be what it is for itself, but rather sets out to reshape and
alter it’)32 or the passive transmission operated by light (‘a more or
less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then
32 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), §73, p. 46. See also Levinas’s discussion of these two technolo-
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again we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it exists
through and in this medium’).33 This conception of the medium that
affords intentionality or positing — once again language, the hand,
light — is the target of the destruction and deconstruction of presence,
of the constant presence (beständige Anwesenheit) that underlies even
the restlessness of Spirit. Most certainly, one should hasten to point
out that Hegel proceeds to argue that this conception of the instru-
mentality of cognition is completely inadequate to think the Absolute,
that we cannot learn how to swim before venturing into the water,
and so forth: we must rather presuppose the Absolute and cognition
not to be separated and in need of external mediation to begin with.
It is nevertheless the case that Hegel, in order to set off the logic of
presupposition, considers only the accountable mediation between
two present ‘things’ — even in the case of the Absolute itself: ‘If we
subtract from a reshaped thing what the instrument has done to it, then
the thing [Ding] — here the Absolute — becomes for us exactly what
it was before this consequently superfluous effort.’34
This notion of mediation comes to lose its status of accountability
once philosophy — or perhaps, as Agamben would have it, ‘centuries
of humble analysis and grammatical education’ — firmly establishes
the lack of any hierarchically prior element that would be able to struc-
ture and complete the differential chain of mediations: there is neither
a ‘transcendental (or, rather, transcendent) signified’ that would af-
ford a linguistic value to every signifier nor a first being that would
afford an ‘ontological’ value to all beings. The mediation or contri-
bution that brings about presence is then revealed as being neither
accountable nor, let alone, transparent or diaphanous. The import of
the medium that brings about presence cannot be determined by any
meta-element, it can be neither accounted for nor be disregarded: the
contribution of the medium that pro-duces presence is, crucially, a
priori unaccountable. Unaccountable means that presence is brought
about or pro-duced through a contribution that is neither null nor ac-
countable, but rather one that is to remain structurally undetermined
gical/optic metaphors in Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or, Beyond Essence,
trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1981), p. 17.
33 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §73, p. 46.
34 Ibid., §73, pp. 46–47; translation modified.
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— for to account for it one would need to resort to an additional
unaccountable mediation. The contributions of language, of the hand,
of light, in bringing about presence cannot be determined: there is no
distillation procedure through which the contribution could be isol-
ated and subtracted from presence in order to restore, or at least infer,
a self-presence anterior to the contribution of the medium. In the order
of unaccountable presence, it becomes impossible to separate what is
medium, and what is substance; what is for-us, and what is in-itself;
what is described, and what is constituted. Crucially, the unaccount-
ability of the medium precludes the subtraction of the contribution
that has brought about the order of presence — a subtraction that
would otherwise point towards the presupposed as to a non-linguistic
and self-present hypostasis. There is no substratum that is changed by
a relation, but only a relation that bars the substratum.
If on the one hand the contribution of the medium cannot be
subtracted to infer a prior order of self-presence that would precede
the mediated presence, it is nevertheless the case that positing, in
taking place, still points to the site of its emergence, to the site of a
presupposition. But since it is not an order of presence that can be pre-
supposed, since a presupposed presence is actually barred by positing
itself, the minimal determination that can be taken to precede the order
of unaccountable presence is then one of potentiality: a tendency or
liability for events of presence to arise through unaccountable contri-
butions. This potentiality is in no way a determination of a substratum
or an attribute of a self-present substance, but rather a possibility for
determinations and attributes to come to presence. This order of po-
tentiality, then, quite clearly neither ‘is’ nor ‘is not’: it is presupposed
by the order of unaccountable presence only to the extent that the
‘sub’ of this pre-sub-position cannot be said to participate in the self-
presence of a substratum, hypostasis or hypokeimenon. On the other
hand, the order of unaccountable presence can be said ‘to be’ only to
the extent that the mark ‘is’ now comes to signal a presence that cannot
be disjoined from the medium that has produced it. The shift at stake
is not simply one between two modes of saying or gathering the ex-
istent: from a saying according to a notion of substance and attributes
(kata ta skēmata tēs katēgorias) to a saying according to potentiality
and actuality (kata dynamin / kata energeian), as dictated by Aristotle.
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It is rather a shift in the horizon of presence that underlies as much
dynamis as energeia, as ousia, as metabolē, as kinēsis, and so forth —
a shift that displaces each and every of these concepts. Metaphysical
presence, constant presence, is in turn promised by the order of po-
tentiality and barred by the order of a shifted actuality, but, as such, it
is never attained.
Crucially, the shift from constant to unaccountable presence
breaks neither with the weakness of language nor with the economy
of presupposition and ex-position of the trace: the order of presence
of the posited and of the presupposed is changed by the inscription
of the trace while respecting the generalized economy of positing, pre-
supposing, and ex-posure. Positing takes place in a different order of
presence, but as weak and self-spaced positing, it still points to a ‘pre-
supposed’ — a presupposed that is not reached by the subtraction of
an accountable contribution, but one that, by virtue of the very im-
possibility of this subtraction, cannot be said to enjoy an autonomous
self-presence: as such, the order of the presupposed is not that of a
self-present substratum, but that of a potentiality for unaccountable
presence to take place. In turn, then, the economy affords the pos-
iting of this presupposed: a positing that itself can only take place
through a new unaccountable contribution and by pointing to a new
prior potential presupposed. At each step, the trace of a difference
distances the unaccountable positing from its unaccountably potential
presupposed. The trace that distances unaccountable presence from its
potential presupposed is neither the same nor different from the trace
that distances constant presence from itself. It can only be said that
the trace respects the presuppositional economy and the principles of
anhypotheticity. Weak and unaccountable language — language that
in positing cannot be posited and language that entails no transcendent
signified or metalanguage — still respects the economy of presup-
position, anhypotheticity, and trace. There can be no more originary
principle that would account for a change or a weathering of presence
and of the trace: the economy of presence and trace has the potential
of affecting itself by means of a hetero-affection.
*
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After having gone through all the figures of presence, it is presence
itself, the order of the posited and of the presupposed — the order
of metaphysics — that comes to be shifted. The image in the mirror,
the reflected image, is still the same — present. As a present image, it
still points to a presupposed of which it is but a reflection. And yet,
the destruction and deconstruction of this order of presence have ex-
posed the un-reflectable condition of possibility of reflection itself: the
tain of the mirror, the opaque foil that covers the back of the mirror,
which, according to Derrida and Gasché, in making reflection possible,
cannot itself be reflected. The opaqueness of the tain precludes the
closure of all chains of reflection: there can be no close system of self-
present substances and reflected images — the tain cannot be reflected.
If the system of values of presence and light cannot be determined,
then the import, the contribution of light cannot be determined — as
Levinas writes: ‘A light is needed to see the light.’35 It is then impossible
to separate, in the presence of the image, what is the reflected and
what is the reflector, what is the result and what is the medium. The
contribution of light does not precipitate at the bottom of the image,
it cannot be removed to infer the presence of that which is reflected.
‘Before’ the reflection there is not something waiting to be altered by
light: this retroactive positing is replaced by that of a potentiality that
can be actualized through different unaccountable contributions. And
yet, the contribution of light is neither null nor infinite, light is neither
transparent nor opaque. In turning to see where the light comes from,
in positing the presupposition through another light, a new unaccount-
able presence appears, and with it a new presupposition is assumed.
The economy of reflection, the economy of positing and presupposing,
is at the same time preserved and transformed. Constant presence
and unaccountable presence cannot be distinguished: the image in
the mirror is still the same, but one can no longer think of it as an
image of any substance. The non-linguistic, the non-technological, the
non-phenomenological are still shadows and presuppositions of lan-
guage, of the hand, of experience — but there is no non-linguistic,
non-technological or non-phenomenological substance, only possi-
35 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. by Alphonso
Lingis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), p. 192.
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bilities for different languages, different hands, different experiences.
The order of presence of the signifier, of the concept, of conscious-
ness are transformed and yet they preserve the economy of positing
and presupposing. Presentation and representation can be claimed
to persist only if presence itself cannot be accounted for: Hamacher
himself puts forward ‘the possibility of thinking about understand-
ing no longer as an archi-eschatological self-appropriation, no longer
as a making-present, as a presentation or appresentation, but as an
always singular alteration and thus an alteration of the very concept
of understanding.’36 In the unaccountability of the present, truth as
unconcealment (alētheia) and truth as correspondence (adaequatio)
correspond to one another: adaequatio of alētheia and adaequatio.
Equivalently, adaequatio is unconcealed: alētheia of adaequatio.37
Whether presence has the potential to change again, whether its
unaccountability can change and persist at the same time, how the
trace is to weather through it all — the contribution of the question to
thinking is neither that of an instrument on a thing nor that of the light
for the eye; the contribution of the question to thinking is rather the
incitement or soliciting of the potential of thinking to produce further
unaccountable questions.
Exposed and abandoned language, lacking a final word, only
comes forth in unaccountable presence.
Exposed and abandoned philosophy, lacking an abiding stand-
point, only takes place through unaccountable contributions.
Exposed and abandoned weather, lacking an unweathered origin,
only takes place through unaccountable weatherings.
36 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, p. 35.
37 Contrast the alētheia of adaequatio and the adaequatio of alētheia and adaequatio of
the order of unaccountable presence with the trace between alētheia and adaequa-
tio/homoiōsis in the order of constant presence. See e.g. Jacques Derrida, Dissemin-
ation, trans. by Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 192.
It is perhaps to be remarked that Derrida will have remained silent throughout this
essay. But then again, the question at stake has been that of the impossibility for the
trace to render justice to itself, a question addressed most evidently not in order to find
the what or the who that could render justice to the trace, but with the aim of halting
that very search.
Glaze
Or Formulas to Get through Bad Weather
UMUT YILDIRIM
On the condition that my words will fully be considered, I can an-
nounce the evidence that I rely on.
The fact that a shadow — too engulfed in an apprehension as dark
as rotten flesh to tend to my shortness of breath, kindly caressing my
hair while I followed him up the two-foot stairs of the dark corridor —
recommends that I not be afraid, certainly counts as evidence! Buried
shadow. Huh. shad. ow. Huh huh shadow. Huh.
Hahahahah hah ha huh. Some shadow! I know from his rapid
heartbeat, his dilated pupils and his tobacco breath, that there is no
shadow. He is my corpulent, yet quite young father and, according to
him, a burglar has broken into our modest rental house. I no longer
remember which, since we moved so many times.
It happens. They always break in. Each time, the light oozing down
the corridor (from where the apartment door, which is meant to be
closed, has been broken) becomes sensory evidence and makes my
father say, ‘A burglar has broken in.’ My father turns into a shadow, and
then something happens to his pupils. Because every time he becomes
a shadow, I turn into a Cyclops who can predict the future with an
adventure-craving weariness, I drop my backpack from my shoulder
with a huff. This is what will happen next: my father will pick up
my bag, hold my hand, and with a nervous smile he will say, ‘Come
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on, darling!’. In quick little steps, he will take me outside, somewhere
he deems safe, and, without actually commanding me, in a curt hiss
between a plea and a recommendation, he will ask me to wait. I will
frown because I do not like to wait, or at least I do not like to be made to
wait. My father will go into the building and then into our apartment.
If there is no burglar, he will come back to where he left me. If there is
indeed a burglar, my father will have to heroically eject him from our
house.
Throughout the years, I have become convinced that he can expel
burglars from our house because, now that I think about it, my dearest
father Cem would cry while watching Akira Kurosawa films in his early
thirties. He gathered bay leaves from inside sea bass, fertilized jasmine,
is an admirer of magnolias, and was an Akiraphile Samurai. A samurai!
If a burglar, may he die of thirst on the steep stairs of the corridor, knew
that he would face a samurai, would he dare break into our home? Not
at all. Even if that’s true, what if Samur Cem needs help?
On one occasion, when I got tired of waiting, I tried to follow him
inside. He picked me up and galloped us away the moment he saw his
Cyclops daughter, standing in the beam of light from the open door at
the end of the stairs, hoping to help him expel burglars. I must have
perceived that he had not appreciated my action, for although he had
not yelled at me, never again did I refuse his request to wait outside.
He needs to be able to take care of himself. As you can understand, I
cannot always save him.
While waiting and thinking about these things, omitting the fact
that he would later become intimately attached to Kurosawa in the
period of early maturity, which neither he nor I have yet reached, I wake
up to his nervous and deep voice, rousing me from my reverie. I find
him with a smile freed of anxiety, his hand freed of anxiety extending
in a soft gesture to my bored of being bored hair. ‘The burglar’s gone,
sweetheart’, he says. High five! I pick up my bag from the floor, he lifts
me to his lap, I throw my arms around his neck, and we enter our home.
The burglars do not take anything from the house. We are tran-
sient, a Cyclops family of three, and we own nothing of value. Before
we came out as Cyclops, we used to receive many visitors: pipes were
smoked, books were discussed, guitars were played to loud cheering,
and raucous laughter would break out — not that they visit anymore,
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whatever. It is true that we have our own features and belongings, and
it is also true that we have nothing worth stealing. These burglars have
been unable to achieve anything other than sticking their bear’s feet
into our home and breaking our things.
Who are these burglars, and what do they want from us?
[An underfired piece requires a lot of glazing.]
~
[First: it is important to know for which body, temperature, and atmos-
phere you are mixing the glazing. Weathered glaze bubbles, cracks, and
crazes over time.]
[Basic glazes: RO, RO2 {PbO, Na2O, K2O, Li2O, BaO, CaO, MgO,
ZnO, SrO}] We are playing remote tickle. No touching is allowed. Only
talking. So we are tickling without touching. While kicking around
on the floor, I am yelling, ‘Father, stop!’ and laughing. He makes up
nicknames for me, too. Ö ZÜ is my favourite. It is uttered in this
fashion, ‘Ööööööööööö Zü!’. In the years that followed, many tried to
repeat this one and failed, because they were unaware of the original
intonation, God bless them. Then, on account of the bread slices I
burnt at breakfast one morning, he called me ‘Coal-master Mustafa’.
But that one did not stick. He called me ‘Ruskating’, after I referred to
Russian figure skating as such. Next, he changed to calling me ‘Özika-
Honorika-Valentinika-Tatata!’.
He had a moderate sympathy for all things Soviet, the kind that
does not recklessly produce hammers and sickles wherever it goes. At
first, I thought it was merely a literary and philosophical interest (he
loves to read) until he bought me Ilin and Segal’s How Man Became
a Giant, as every socialist does for their offspring. It may have been
my first year of primary school. A person is, of course, old enough
to grasp materialist philosophy at seven years old. And I had been
through a pre-curriculum, which was gently anthropological in its
nature. I knew about things like ‘worker uncles’ and ‘worker aunts’,
‘class’,bourjoya, revolutionanny, communix,anarchix, imperialix, and fair
distribution, not merely from the place they occupied in the lexicon of
the militant, but also from personal experience. I have long been aware
that bourgeois women who get their hair blow-dried and wear red nail
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polish have betrayed our cause, to such an extent that right around that
age, my militant’s destiny made me attack my beautiful mother with a
slobbery growl of ‘bourjoya’ as she sat in the hairdresser’s chair.
Later, as I collected Debussy and Schnittke records from the fra-
grant second-hand booksellers in Beyoğlu; as I admired the powerful
fragility of Mümtaz and Nuran’s love in Ahmet Hamdi’s Huzur; as I
looked for C’s footprints on Kumbaracı Yokuşu after reading Yusuf
Atılgan’s AylakAdam, though I cared little for C’s fallen virility; as I was
reading, alternatively, Begoña Aretxaga, Jacques Prévert, J. H. Prynne,
and Audre Lorde in hazy London cafés; as I was cooking mussels with
white wine and sea bass with plums that I collected from Antigoni
Island; as I fell in love with both Sicilian lace and Concrete music; as I
was cloudgazing, doing all these herebys, I would have that militancy
removed. What I mean is, if it is not in the essence of the object, flat-
tening sharpness looks unpleasant on a human being. Therefore, since
most socialists never get the opportunity to have children because
they are murdered, imprisoned, crippled by torture, busy with militant
activities or undergoing a nervous breakdown, as the child of the few
socialists blessed with kids, I quickly neutralize How Man Became a
Giant instead of reading it cover to cover as I ought to because my
mind is perpetually in the sea, in hopscotch, in Chinese jump rope,
in dodgeball and in skittle hide-and-seek — I am completely obsessed
with scheming ways to pluck the cherry tree before it is too late in the
year, obsessed with geometry and the logic puzzles of the magazine Sci-
ence andTechnology and what not, these type of things. I’m an incurable
romantic. I write poetry.
Wherefore these falling leaves?
And, why these endless pains?
Why is it that I miss you,
Every day, once anew?
[Amphoteric glazes: R2O3 {Al2O3, B2O3}] With my hair in a twist
from distance-flirting, and my collar unstarched on my throwaway
school uniform, as a seven year-old je t’aime, I sense it! Samur would
get me started on Ilin and Segal, then he would destroy me with
brick-sized ova-evski books, and, good God, he would prepare me for
Poulantzas or something! Since my vigilant, golden-hearted mother
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Roza swore to protect her offspring from anything unexpected, she has
herself became a panther, subject to the unexpected. She would protect
me from reading banned books. However, concerning these matters,
there’s no trusting Samur — he will just throw a book in front of you,
you may read it with interest just because it came from Samur. So,
what do we learn? Since he knew so much about these things, Samur
would keep these bricks away from me. I am a militant girl-child. If a
sister is the kind of comrade with whom one cannot voluntarily and
openly make love, a child is the kind of comrade who thankfully goes
unnoticed as such. I must take measures, as you will appreciate.
[Acidic glazes: RO2 {SiO2, SnO2, TiO2, ZrO2}] Özika-Honorika-
Valentinika-Tatata! He really likes this nickname. Although it is really
long, he can repeat it without getting bored. He bursts into a crescendo
of laughter at the Tatata. He is wildly happy! I laugh it off. As you know,
there’s no use in being a child around a child. I let him act like a rascal
because he has suffered a lot, though I am not entirely sure why and
how. I may have developed this opinion because his heart went boom
boom BOOM BOOMM while moving up the steep stairs of the dark
corridor. And when the burglars came, something would happen to his
pupils. My eyes are on Samur. Though he does not realize it, I know that
I need to protect him. That’s why my eyes are on myself.
~
[In addition to the raw materials used in glazes, there are also metal
oxides that will render them impervious to crackling effects of weathering.
During the development of the glaze at high temperatures, these oxides fulfil
various functions.]
[Glassifiers: SiO2, B2O3] Hrrr hrrrrr harh h h h h haaaarrhhhh rah
rah rah hhh h. The shadow is running quickly. The orange street light
blends into the sooty black walls — topped with shards of glass — of a
sugar factory on a narrow street. Samur is running hhhhrrr haaarh hhhr.
He is panting. I’m unable to touch his dark shadow. I can’t tell if it’s him
who is running, or if his shadow has taken over him. The silhouette
looks like Samur: his athletic body, his longish hair, his turtleneck
sweater and bellbottom pants, his long-fingered hands extruding from
his jacket. That is Samur! I am not sure. That is Samur! He is running.
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Others are running after him. Samuhhhr hhhhhh haaarhg is running.
The others are right behind him: tap TAP clump CLUMP! Samur runs.
They can’t catch him.
[Fusers and stabilizers, respectively: Na2O, K2O, Li2O, PbO, B2O3;
CaO, MgO, BaO, Al2O3, PbO, ZnO] On that day, when they arrived
in one of the working-class neighbourhoods where I grew up, in a
manner unbefitting a samurai, the policemen put Samur into their van,
pressing his head down and twisting his long swan’s neck. Unlike what
happens in the recurring running dream that has been haunting me for
years, Samur failed to turn into a shadow. He was caught. While huge-
legged and larger-bellied old women stood behind the van, saying:
this happened and that happened, so it happened, ah is that what
happened, did this happen, it did so happen, with my football in hand,
dressed in my shorts and standing on tiptoe, I tried to create a view
through the what-a-shame, what-a-pity hips that blocked me. Finally,
I saw my father. Waving at me from the window, he looked more
perplexed than I had ever seen him. He was gesticulating. I’ll be back
tonight, he said. We will cook before my mom comes home. My father
cooks and does the dishes. I wipe them dry. I’m not tall enough yet to
reach the kitchen cupboards and put them away.
[Matte glazes and opacifiers, respectively: ZnO, TiO2, CaO, BaO;
SnO2, ZrSiO4, ZrO2, TiO2] Oh Samur from the window, from the
police van, from the world that twisted your swan’s neck, why do you
wave? Why can’t I come with you? Alright. I’ll wait if I must. But Samur,
under these conditions, as we both know you may never come home.
[Crystallisers: ZnO, TiO2, CaO, Cr2O3] Her face whitewashed and
grey, my mother comes. She is about to break, and yet she listens to the
women talking, as though the events they speak of have no connection
to us. I hide under her coat. Samur does not come home that night.
With hope, I wait for him. He does not come home for another week.
I could not protect him. My tears flow dry, and my neck twists, like an
intensely green leaf that gently lands on the ground as it gets too heavy
for her huge palm tree.
~
Then his long fingers were all warped
UMUT YILDIRIM 173
crooked, gnarled smitten smitten
the devil got into his hangnails
the nail enveloped his soul
his teeth retreated into their gums and fell off.
In the end, his nose got hairy
his hands were all tied
Then he got a hump
his feet shuffle and stumbled as he walked
his breath faded
his fingers turned yellow
ether, he became ether
Samur went from bad to worse.
The revolution collapsed, and melancholy ate my father up. Samur
settled into a regime of glorious, self-involved pain. Sadness penetrated
Samur, the radiant child, the dissenting genie, the rebel boy fallen in
love with black bile. The bile scorched him and burned him. The bay
leafs wilted, the jasmines faded, the magnolias fainted, the lemons
sagged. And Samur unleashed his anger on everyone.
~
While Samur fell in love with black bile, and burglars kept pillaging our
home, I started my second year at a new primary school. Pretty Erol,
who died from heroin when he was seventeen, and his mother, Nigâr
Hanım Teyze, who forced the neighbourhood indoors on Friday nights
when she cooked tripe, and her daughter, Melek Abla, whose scarred
face was said to be warped from walking on hot embers during the
evening call to prayer; the alcoholic former-policeman, Mr. Dipstick
whose name I cannot recall, and his wife the porcelain fiend, Çiçek
Hanım Teyze, who he regularly beat; the cheerful mother of three
daughters and one son, Mavi Hanım Teyze, who slept with neighbour-
hood men for pocket change while her husband laboured in Libya,
and their daughters, the malicious Hülya, the evil-eyed Oya, and the
supple Nida, who was so educated and graceful that she did not appear
to belong to her family; the donkey-eyed and very smart daughter of
Muzaffer Hanım Teyze from apartment 10, Selma Abla, who always
had a book; and the oldest of the seven children in apartment 9, Pınar
Abla, who Selma eternally loved, the only girl in the neighbourhood




Yusuf Sevinçli, Post 023-Istanbul, 2012, courtesy of the artist.
council estates of an ancient Istanbul slum that embraced these people
and many other similar ones.
Occasionally, the adolescent boys, who communicated by trans-
mitters, played us songs from Orhan, Müslüm, Fikret, the Eagles, and
Chicago. The tunes would get under my skin while we ran around
in the sun with my friends among the oleaster, plum, mulberry, and
cherry trees, and later, in the poppy fields, we heard arabesque melod-
ies when we took off on flying horses. We escaped the tables of evening
drinkers who lived in derelict houses, a bit further away, with curiosity,
we poked our noses into the gypsy neighbourhood. Is there anything
more pleasant than being surprised? Every child should run free in the
streets. Here we are with our heads miles above the clouds, our gravity-
hating knees covered in wounds. In those years, when everything was
a wonder, I forgot about Samur. And the burglars. For ten years or so.
~




Yusuf Sevinçli, Post 024-Istanbul, 2012, courtesy of the artist.
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I am scraping slightly burnt bread slices with a knife, and Samur
is setting the table. My mother is frowning calmly at the newspaper.
We have never been a family that constantly hangs out together, in
close quarters, in each other’s hair, on top of each other, in a tangle.
We each live in our own space, so when we are together, especially
if it happens to be during breakfast at the start of the day, it can be
precious and intense — we turn into a political organization. This is
a breakfast table organization where the recent political conjuncture is
evaluated, literature is discussed, a bit of gossip is exchanged to spice
things up, mind you, Samur only learnt how to gossip with a laugh after
turning sixty-five, which made us very happy, decisions concerning
the household are made, propositions concerning cats, dogs, plants,
trees, and human health and development are discussed, criticisms are
expressed, voices are raised, tears are shed, laughs are full, and kisses
are sweet, and everything is prepared with love. A lot of love.
According to an article in the paper, which my mother left on the
table as she went to the door, a person named Abdullah Öcalan, the
leader of an organization called the PKK, is a supporter of the Galata-
saray football club. So? I think. Two-thirds of the people of Turkey
commit this error. Why is this newsworthy? While I am scraping a
piece of bread, I ask Samur: ‘What’s the PKK, Father?’. He gives me
a look of disappointment that cannot hide his aspirational agenda.
‘What a shame’, he says, to no one in particular; yes, he says that, and
leaves the table.
He did not have to leave in this manner. Samur had previously
taught me the meanings of Kurdistan and Kurdish. On a weekend
when I was confused, attempting to understand the concept of abso-
lute borders separating regions and countries that I was fed at primary
school, I had asked for his help. He did not make my task any easier.
‘This here’, he had said, indicating a place called South Eastern Anato-
lia, ‘is an area in our country. But this place, according to some, is the
northern part of a place called Kurdistan.’
— Why has it been drawn like this, as though it has always
been this way?
— To make it easier.
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— It’s not easy. If it is both this way and that way, why is it only
drawn like this? Who is drawing these borders? Who
is filling in their insides?
— Well, borders are not absolute; they can change.
— (Though I felt that the imperialix and the bosses were
involved in this mess, I did not stray off topic.) How
can they change?
— Referendum.
— (Yay! An unfamiliar word!) How does that work?
— The people who live there can change the boundaries
through democratic means if they so desire.
At first it seemed plausible. Democracy. I knew about that. It meant
that workers would be happy. Other than kids, but not counting my
classmate, Serkan Dal, who worked as a shoeshine boy, everyone I
knew worked: my mother, my granny, Samur. All the adults I knew
worked, or were looking for work, so all adults should be happy. But
what would happen to Serkan Dal? Someone is always left out. Alright,
let’s focus: all creatures on earth live inside these borders, cats and
dogs, granny’s geraniums, even the imagination-deficient people who
drew the borders and filled in their insides. Serkan Dal as well. (Al-
though Serkan Dal did not want to work, and in that case, he may not
have had any connection with a democracy that made people happy,
and he may not have had any connection with the referendum, there-
fore what was supposed to happen to the happiness of those who did
not work and who did not want to work?) Argh, I could not wrap my
head around it. If we leave Serkan Dal to the side, (but how could we
leave him out? We shared a desk. And I know he wants to smash his
shoe-shine brush into five pieces on the floor. CRACK!) While think-
ing through this puzzle of democracy, my teacher’s voice startled me,
asking what we learned over the weekend. I blurted out, ‘Referendum!’
and was sent home for the day. So, what? I threw my schoolbag to
the ground and climbed the cherry tree, getting in my practice before
summertime.
As Samur returned to the table with tea, and my mother returned
with toast, I do not know what it is that touched me, but I could not
contain myself:
— You should not have left me with Mama Rezzan.
— Why do you mention Mama Rezzan now?
178 GLAZE
— You can’t be cross with me, Dad. I can be cross with you.
— You don’t say! And why is that?, said Samur.
— There’s something. If I feel so…
— What does Mama Rezzan have anything to do with this?
— Oh dear!, said my mother. She was a very important, very
lovely person. A bit on the opportunistic side, a bit of
a revisionist, but that’s fine.
— You should not have left me with Mama Rezzan.
— Özgür, what are you saying?
— They shot up the place.
— What are you saying?
— You weren’t there when the fascists fired, only Mama
Rezzan and I were home. She shoved me under the
table. That’s why we made it out alive.
— Darling, what are you saying?
— Özgür, for god’s sake. Is such a thing possible?
— Of course, it’s possible! Plus, that day, as the military police
came in to apprehend you, weren’t you the one who
handed me over to Süheyla Abla who was sleeping in-
side, oblivious to the event? Süheyla Abla and I made
it out alive because we were hiding behind the sofa!
The choir continues rehashing the same motifs: My child, what are you
saying? My child, is it possible? My child, where does this come from
now? While they keep trying to prove that these two tales are not real
as I would come to understand and accept in the upcoming years, I am
turning inside out with a gurgling sound, to-the-point-of-no-return. I
explode like a fire:
— And who were those burglars!? What did they want from
us!?
[Glazing gives the body to which it is applied a shiny and smooth surface.
Since it forms a non-conductive barrier, it protects the body from weath-
ering, insulating it. The glazing also provides mechanical resistance and
electrical isolation. It protects the body from acids, bases, scratches, and im-
pacts. It ensures hygiene, prevents the proliferation of microorganisms and
limits their actions. It prevents dirt build-up and ensures easy cleaning. It
brings colour and textural features to the surface and increases the aesthetic
value of the object.]




Atmospheric Geographies of the Guiana Shield
YOLANDA ARIADNE COLLINS
INTRODUCTION
As the climate changes, so too must our ways of grappling with the
interconnectivities that it lays bare. Increasingly, artistic and academic
renderings of climate change are demonstrating the need for human
beings to rethink, restate, and reshape their connections to their envir-
onments.1 A subset of these renderings has turned towards the weather
to identify the shared atmospheric and lived experiences it orients and
engenders.2 Weather, along with its associated processes of weathering
1 Yolanda Ariadne Collins, ‘How REDD+ Governs: Multiple Forest Environment-
alities in Guyana and Suriname’, Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space,
3.2 (2020), pp. 323–45 <https://doi.org/10.1177/2514848619860748>; Robert
Fletcher, ‘Environmentality Unbound: Multiple Governmentalities in Environmental
Politics’, Geoforum, 85, Supplement C (2017), pp. 311–15 <https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.geoforum.2017.06.009>; Malcolm Miles, ‘Representing Nature: Art and Climate
Change’, Cultural Geographies, 17.1 (2010), pp. 19–35 <https://doi.org/10.1177/
1474474009349997>.
2 Tim Ingold, TheLife of Lines (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015); Astrida Neimanis and Jen-
nifer Mae Hamilton, ‘Open Space Weathering’, Feminist Review, 118.1 (2018), pp. 80–
84; Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering: Climate Change and
the “Thick Time” of Transcorporeality’, Hypatia, 29.3 (2014), pp. 558–75; Christina
Sharpe, In the Wake: On Blackness and Being (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2016); Eliza de Vet and Lesley Head, ‘Everyday Weather-Ways: Negotiating the Tem-
poralities of Home and Work in Melbourne, Australia’, Geoforum, 108 (2020), pp.
267–74 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.08.022>.
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and being weathered, which I will explore in its various aspects, is
largely taken for granted within scholarship that is most concerned
with analysing the spatially differentiated social, cultural, and historical
relationship of human beings with their natural environments. The
air and the ever-changing atmospheric constellations referred to as
weather exist as spaces between physical objects and the human and
non-human beings that form the focus of academic analyses within the
social sciences.3 A focus on weather, however, may provide a useful
window into how these spaces, along with relationships between hu-
man and non-human beings and their natural environments, can be
examined.
In line with scholarship that connected the adoption of fossil fuels
in the United Kingdom centuries ago to current rising temperatures
and melting ice at the earth’s South Pole, I suggest that efforts to re-
think human-environment relationships must recognize that ‘climate
change is a messy mix-up of time scales’.4 The human-environment
relationship is simultaneously immediate and futural, grounded and
atmospheric, fluid and embedded. This instability acts as an opposi-
tional counterpart to the dominant depiction of climate change and
climate policy as a singular, coherent force being rolled out and dif-
ferentially manifested in spaces and places around the world, managed
through coherent logics and top-down governing approaches.5 Atten-
tion to weather, air, and atmosphere in analyses of climate change can
challenge these entrenched ways of seeing the world, such as those
that bifurcate human beings and nature, while troubling assumptions
that enable the dominance of one over the other. This destabilization
resonates, for example, with the challenge presented to any ‘culture’
that is resistant to the incorporation of technological objects by its
recognition of some more useful and welcome aspects of said objects.6
3 Stephen Graham, ‘Life Support: The Political Ecology of Urban Air’, City, 19.2–3
(2015), pp. 192–215; see also Ingold, The Life of Lines.
4 Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital:TheRise of SteamPower and the Roots of GlobalWarming
(London: Verso, 2016).
5 Karin Bäckstrand and Eva Lövbrand, ‘Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change:
Contested Discourses of Ecological Modernization, Green Governmentality and Civic
Environmentalism’, Global Environmental Politics, 6.1 (2006), pp. 50–75.
6 Gilbert Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technological Objects, trans. by Cécile
Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017).
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In what follows, I take natural geographic formations for granted
instead of human-imposed borders. I recognize the messy time scales
of climate change while challenging the ‘false opposition between the
local as immobile or grounded and the global as mobile and ubiquit-
ous’.7 I focus on the term weather(ing), which I define later, in both its
geophysical and linguistic registers in the English language. I suggest
that one of the possible relationships between weather(ing) and cli-
mate change is its operation in, above, through, and on the geological
formation called the Guiana Shield, located in the north of the South
American continent. In so doing, I tease out its peculiar atmospheric
and place-specific qualities. I recognize the interconnectivity of tem-
poralities pointed to by Andreas Malm in Fossil Capital but refrain
from advocating for a ‘collapse (of) any notion of distinct space and
time’8 as do Astrida Neimanis and Rachel Loewen Walker in their
programmatic essay on ‘Weathering’. My arguments do not represent
an attempt to retell the stories told about the earth through the natural
sciences. On the contrary, I pursue an answer to the question of how
paying attention to the English word ‘weather’, in both its noun and
verb forms, can make the relationship between geological, biological,
and social activities perceptible outside of ongoing global efforts by
the social to exploit the resources of the biological and geological. I
construct an image of a circular atmosphere, which is locally accessible
yet locally unbounded, while pushing back on atmosphere’s traditional
limitation of referring to above-ground relations.9 Like Neel Ahuja
in her essay on ‘Intimate Atmospheres’, I recognize the atmosphere’s
‘contradictory figuration as a space of geology and life, and a back-
ground that forges exchange between social and physical processes’.10
Finally, I limit my reflections on the socio-political aspects of weath-
ering to the two independent countries situated within the Guiana
Shield, those of Guyana and Suriname.
7 Ash Amin, ‘Placing Globalization’, Theory, Culture & Society, 14.2 (1997), pp. 123–37
(p. 131).
8 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, p. 569.
9 Neel Ahuja, ‘Intimate Atmospheres: Queer Theory in a Time of Extinctions’, GLQ: A
Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, 21.2–3 (2015), pp. 365–85.
10 Ibid., p. 370.
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A POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF ATMOSPHERES
Investigations into the relationship between the international political
economy and the environment take place within the tradition of polit-
ical ecology, which explores the detrimental environmental and social
effects of the dominant economic system. It does so by integrating
methods from ecological anthropology to examine the role culture
plays in these dynamics and interactions.11 The discipline of political
ecology pays significant attention to the relationship between both
current and historical international political economy on one hand,
and the environment on the other. It focuses especially on the relation-
ship between capitalist and neoliberal endeavours and the societies
supporting them.
Political ecology has been strongly critiqued for focusing too
much on ‘politics’ to the detriment of the ‘ecology’.12 In developing
this critique, Andrew P. Vayda and Bradley B. Walters argued in Against
Political Ecology that the tendency of self-styled political ecologists to
focus on politics in distant view of the environment assumes a direct
connection between politics and environmental change that is not
always there. Instead, they suggest that connections between politics
and environmental change be sought out and proven rather than de-
termined from the outset as a determining factor in that change.13
While the now well-established connection between politics and cli-
mate change, as an example of environmental change, already chal-
lenges the openness to non-political factors advocated for by Vayda
and Walters, I suggest that attention to weather(ing) may form a useful
addition to the political ecology framework due to the weather(ing)’s
simultaneous reference to the earth’s natural and physical processes
of resilience and change, and to atmospheric constellations of nature
and climate change. After all, as noted by political ecologist Raymond
Bryant (1998), ‘unequal power relations are as likely to be “inscribed”
in the air or the water as they are to be “embedded” in the land.’14
11 Raymond L. Bryant, ‘Power, Knowledge and Political Ecology in the Third World: A
Review’, Progress in Physical Geography, 22.1 (1998), pp. 79–94.
12 Andrew P. Vayda and Bradley B. Walters, ‘Against Political Ecology’, Human Ecology,
27.1 (1999), pp. 167–79.
13 Ibid.
14 Bryant, ‘Power, Knowledge and Political Ecology in the Third World’, p. 89.
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‘Weather’ in its noun form is defined by the Merriam-Webster
dictionary as ‘the state of the atmosphere with respect to heat or cold,
wetness or dryness, calm or storm, clearness or cloudiness; state or
vicissitude of life or fortune; and/or disagreeable atmospheric condi-
tions’.15 The verb ‘weather’, on the other hand, is defined as ‘expos[ing]
to the open air: subject to the action of the elements; to bear up against
and come safely through; weather a storm or crisis; to undergo or
endure the action of the elements; and of or relating to the side facing
the wind’.16 Naturally, these definitions of the weather and the process
of weathering have been operationalized in the academic literature in
a variety of ways.
Christina Sharpe, writing from the perspective of critical race the-
ory, has conceived of the weather in terms of social climates. For her,
the weather is ‘the totality of our environments; the weather is the
total climate; and that climate is antiblack’.17 Anthropologist Tim In-
gold, in arguing for greater recognition of how the world is shaped by
weather, challenged the overreliance of some disciplines, among them
anthropology, on ‘the hard physicality of the world’ as it is described
by archaeologist Bjørnar Olsen quoted by Ingold, for understanding
environments.18 He calls into question the manner in which the en-
vironment is interpreted and envisaged as a ‘clutter of solid objects’
ignoring the ‘aerial dimension of bodily movement and experience’.19
He asserts that within the efforts to understand how people engage
with the things of the world through analyses — by taking into account
the agency of people, the agency of objects, or even hybrid people–
object agencies — little attention has been paid to air. In a critique fully
extendable to the interdisciplinary framework of political ecology,20
Ingold states that this is simply because ‘within the terms of accepted
discourse, air is unthinkable’.21
15 ‘Weather’, in Merriam-Webster Dictionary.com (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster,
2020) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/weather> [accessed 20 Feb-
ruary 2020].
16 Ibid.
17 Sharpe, In the Wake, p. 96.
18 Ingold, The Life of Lines, p. 69.
19 Ibid.
20 See Graham’s ‘Life Support’ for an exception.
21 Ingold, The Life of Lines, p. 69.
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Gender and cultural studies theorists Astrida Neimanis and her
co-authors, Jennifer Hamilton and Rachel Loewen Walker, see weath-
ering as useful for conveying how climate change is being felt by
people within ‘the fleshy, damp immediacy of our own embodied
existences’.22 For them, weathering is ‘a particular way of understand-
ing how bodies, places, and the weather are all inter-implicated in
our climate-changing world’.23 The authors argue that weathering
‘describes socially, culturally, politically and materially differentiated
bodies in relation to the materiality of place, across a thickness of his-
torical, geological and climatological time’.24 Particularly useful here
for political ecology is their recognition that ‘not all bodies weather
the same; weathering is a situated phenomenon embedded in social
and political worlds’.25
In a radically different use of the term, architectural theorists
Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow focus on the weathering
of architecture to explain that weathering is not only a subtraction,
insofar it destroys that which was constructed, but that it also has to be
recognized as adding certain qualities to the weathered artefact. Weath-
ering, in this productive sense, is a process of ‘unending deterioration’,
‘the continuous metamorphosis of the building itself ’.26
Hence, while furthering engagement with how bodies, places, and
the weather are implicated in the climate changing world described
by Neimanis and Hamilton and racialized by Sharpe, I join Ingold by
looking past the ‘hard physicality’ of world to follow Mostafavi and
Leatherbarrow’s recognition of weathering as that which produces and
transforms. I interrogate weathering in the Guiana Shield by seeing
weathering as:
• Exposing to the open air and subjecting to the action of the
elements.
• Becoming deteriorated by excessive exposure to bad weather.
22 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, p. 559.
23 Neimanis and Hamilton, ‘Open Space Weathering’, p. 80.
24 Ibid., pp. 80–81.
25 Ibid., p. 81.
26 Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow, On Weathering: The Life of Buildings in
Time (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 16.
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• To become prominent or isolated by the decay or disintegration
of the surrounding rock.
• The breaking down of rocks, soil, and minerals as well as wood
and artificial materials through contact with the Earth’s atmos-
phere, water, and biological organisms. Weathering occurs in
situ, that is, in the same place, with little or no movement, and
thus should not be confused with erosion, which involves the
movement of rocks and minerals by agents such as water, ice,
snow, wind, waves, and gravity and then being transported and
deposited in other locations. 27
And, as I propose in the sections that follow: ‘to influence and generate
weather patterns’.
ATMOSPHERE
The weather is an insufficient signifier of the climate. It is overly mut-
able and short-lived. The significance of the weather in relation to
the climate at any given time needs to be determined by situating
its occurrence into averages qualified according to a linear timeline.
Neimanis and Loewen Walker look to overcome the different tem-
poralities of longer-term climate and shorter-term weather by col-
lapsing them into a conception of ‘thick time’, seen as ‘a transcorporeal
stretching between present, future, and past, that foregrounds a non-
chronological durationality’.28 In my analysis of how the Guiana Shield
weathers, however, I will retain temporal distinctions and adhere to
what might appear to them a rather conventional linear conception
of time. I do this because my effort to facilitate dialogue between the
social scientific discipline of political ecology and the interdisciplinary
concept of weathering requires that the potential for the attribution
of responsibility be maintained. Hence, in order for connections to
be made cross-temporally and for the responsibility of these actions
to be attributed to specific actors operating in particular times and
places, the maintenance of the distinctions embedded in linear time
27 Vladimir A. Obruchev, Fundamentals of Geology: Popular Outline (Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1959), p. 75.
28 Neimanis and Loewen Walker, ‘Weathering’, p. 561.
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is paramount. Overall then, I suggest that focusing on the weather and
processes of weathering has the potential to bring particular places like
the Guiana Shield into view, situating them in the geographic coordin-
ate system of linear latitudinal and longitudinal spatial geographies,
much like observations of the weather within climate models, through
the ordinary linearity of time that retains its capacity for representing
connections between the past and the present. It is through these inter-
actions that atmospheres emerge.
HOW THE GUIANA SHIELD WAS WEATHERED
From sufficient altitude, the Shield resembles an old
weathered island surrounded by flat Tertiary and Quaternary
sediments.29
Politically, the region known as the Guiana Shield is governed by
six states including Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, French
Guiana, and Brazil.30 Geologically, however, the Guiana Shield is
known to be a formation that has been stable in geological terms, un-
affected by mountain building activity for a thousand million years.
A massif of hard Proterozoic rocks, the Shield can mostly be found
between the Orinoco and Amazon river basins. Its parental rocks are
low in mineral content but are susceptible to high rates of weathering,
resulting in poor to very poor nutrient content.31 This, in turn, results
in low nutrient soil since ‘[s]oil is the layer of weathered material
overlying bedrock’ that then goes on to support plant life.32
The gradual weathering undergone by the Guiana Shield is cap-
tured in contemporary art theorist Amelia Groom’s evocative descrip-
tion of the process of fragmentation:
29 Allan K. Gibbs and Christopher Norman Barron, The Geology of the Guiana Shield,
Oxford Monographs on Geology and Geophysics, 22 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press Oxford, 1993), p. 3.
30 Philippa Haden, ‘Forestry Issues in the Guiana Shield Region: A Perspective
on Guyana and Suriname’, 1999 <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/5700.pdf> [accessed 1 July 2020].
31 Ibid.
32 Graham R. Thompson and Jonathan Turk, Introduction to Physical Geology (Fort
Worth, TX: Saunders College Publishing, 1998).
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Pieces of rock keep multiplying through further breakage,
with their insides becoming new outsides. They gradually
leave more of themselves behind, acquiring the edges that
suggest autonomy and self-containment while moving always
into pluralized partiality, via loss, until the undecidable mo-
ment where they become sand, the granular representation of
time itself.33
Through the slow process of loss, multiplication, and transformation,
the Guiana Shield has been weathered over millions of years, as it
continuously has been shaped by interactions with the elements. Yet
the Guiana Shield is representative of weathering not only in terms of
the destruction of rock. It also weathers in ways not captured in the
literary meaning of the term. The Shield influences weather, as I will
show later.
The hard rocks of the Guiana Shield weather as they are subjected
to the natural forces they encounter daily, such as heat, rain, water, and
wind. The rocks are weathered by weather in combination with plants
and minute organisms. On a daily basis, rocks are exposed to sunlight,
which heats them intensely. They then cool down over the course of the
night. These daily fluctuations in temperature ensure that, during the
day, rocks expand and, during the night, they contract. Despite the fact
that these expansions and contractions are hardly noticeable to human
observers, their repeated occurrence over hundreds and thousands of
years take their toll, as rock particles weaken over time.34
Water also helps in the work of weathering since porous, multi-
cracked rock absorbs more moisture, while solid rocks absorb less.
The repeated action of wetting and drying rock also wears down the
internal adhesion of the rocks. Water, in particular, contributes to
the weathering of rocks because it carries with itself gases from the
atmosphere, such as carbon dioxide, which may have been produced
by the burning of fuel or the oxidation of various substances. Through
water, these gases are put into direct contact with the rocks. The water
carrying these gases has a more significant impact on the weathering
of rocks than in the case of water in which these gases are not present.
33 Amelia Groom, Beverly Buchanan:Marsh Ruins (London: Afterall Books, forthcoming
in 2021).
34 Obruchev, Fundamentals of Geology.
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Plant and fungi species also weather rocks as lichens colonize even
the smoothest of rocks. Wind carries spores of lichens into microscopic
cracks, and/or the rain carries them as they stick together on the sur-
face of rocks. As they germinate, they become firmly lodged in the
rocks. Drawing on the moisture they are able to absorb from the rocks,
they eventually corrode the rock’s surface and widen the cracks that de-
velop there. Grains of sand and dust brought by the wind or water more
easily adhere to rock that had been corroded, filling the cracks. Tree
roots also cause rock particles to break down, and eventually dust ac-
cumulates to such an extent that soil appears, necessary for the growth
of further vegetation. The seeds of these plants also fall, through wind
and rain, into the cracks and dust in spaces between lichen colonies
that are situated on the rocks, eventually germinating.35
Vegetation eventually smothers the lichens working their way
down into the cracks of the rock, corroding the surface of the rock fur-
ther. As cracks widen and more dust gathers, along with the remains of
dead grass and their roots, a place emerges where shrubs and trees and
larger types of vegetation can take root. As they grow, their roots act
as wedges, further widening the cracks in the rock. The natural forces
of heat, frost, dew, and water affect the internal cohesion of the rock.
But further, they help other forces of nature to interact with the rock.36
As Vladimir A. Obruchev notes, ‘from a rock subjected to weathering,
the rain washes away liberated grains.’37 He continues, ‘The rain, as it
collects in grooves, slowly wears away nicks in the rock. The wind, on
the other hand, acts to disperse liberated sand and dust particles and
carries them away.’38 Yet, it is as a result of this process through which
the Shield is physically weathered that the Shield is, in turn, able to
generate weather itself, as I describe in what follows.
HOW THE GUIANA SHIELD WEATHERS
The Guiana Shield generates and influences the formation of weather
patterns through its hydrological function, a role that impacts the well-
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 80.
38 Ibid., p. 79.
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Figure 1. Weathered Rock and Emerging Vegetation in Kaieteur National
Park, Guyana, 2010. Photo credit: Oronde Drakes.
being of the wider Amazon basin, one of the few relatively intact
forest ecosystems on Earth.39 The weathering of rock over millennia
generated the soil of the Guiana Shield as ‘granular representations
of time’40 within which tropical rainforest was able to take root. The
rainforest that emerged is remarkable in abundance, diversity, and rate
of botanical endemism.41
39 Haden, ‘Forestry Issues in the Guiana Shield Region’.
40 Groom, Beverly Buchanan.
41 Haden, ‘Forestry Issues in the Guiana Shield Region’.
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Focusing on the weather understood as exposure to air and the
elements calls to mind a hierarchy between the weather and that be-
ing weathered, between that which is above ground and that which is
grounded. This hierarchical, layered approach to weathering is down-
ward facing yet expansive. Hence, although the Shield was formed, in
part, through this downward facing weathering relationship, its vege-
tation also produces weather in a manner that signals a reverse upward
approach to influencing weather. Their combination is, hence, a circu-
lar relationship of different manifestations of weather(ing).
Allan K. Gibbs and Christopher Norman Barron, authors of one
of the few academic texts on the geology of the Guiana Shield, refer
unwittingly to the unidirectional nature of the forests as they quote an
anonymous geologist:
The close-pressing trees, large and small, instinctively draw
one’s gaze upward, looking for light. But the crown of the
forest, 30–40m above, forms a dense canopy. Only where a
forest giant has finally given up the struggle and fallen, drag-
ging down its neighbours in a long roar of sound, only then is
there a chance of seeing clear sky, and a place for the geologist
to read his [sic] instruments without much difficulty, or to eat
his sandwiches beside one of the clear streams that he may be
fortunate enough to find.42
Forests, by and large, stand upright. As the above-quoted geologist
looking for a place to read his instrument finds in the forests of the
Guiana Shield, trees grow upward, standing so densely together that
the search for cracks of light coming through their overlapping can-
opies may prove futile. For the single human standing in these forests,
the forests are giants, forcing her to gaze upward to see the sky beyond
their canopies. While rooted in the soil, forests continually mediate
with air, negotiating between the creation and absorption of oxygen
and carbon dioxide. Forests are fuelled and nurtured within the ver-
tical space between air and land, remaining horizontally stationary but
vertically unconstrained, except perhaps by other trees competing with
each other and with the human within them for access to the sun’s light.
42 Gibbs and Barron, Geology of the Guiana Shield.
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Figure 2. Cracks of Light in the Forests of Brownsberg Nature Park,
Suriname, 2014. Photo by author.
The verticality of the forests as they move from soil to atmosphere
is more than just visible. Emerging vertically from weathered rock, the
forests of the Guiana Shield also influences weather. The forests of the
Guiana Shield are guardians of the water cycle of the South American
continent.43 As hydrologist Isabella Bovolo described:
43 C. Isabella Bovolo, Thomas Wagner, Geoff Parkin, David Hein-Griggs, Ryan Pereira,




Figure 3. A View of Dense Canopy from a Mountain, Mahdia, Guyana,
2014. Photo by author.
[D]eforesting less than a third of the Guiana Shield, in areas
currently under threat from mining, logging, and agricultural
activities, could result in significant changes in the water cycle
across the continent. This includes large variations in tem-
perature and precipitation affecting areas 4000 km away, im-
pacting ecosystems and economies, with consequences for
society.44
Land-use change in the Guiana Shield, ‘even if small in spatial scale,
but occurring in particularly sensitive hot-spots, can alter the flow of
atmospheric rivers, with large consequences’.45 A focus on the cycles
of weather shows that because the Guiana Shield is vulnerable to
immense pressure from extractive activity on and within it, its ability
to prevent and magnify further climatic changes is reduced.
With the unidirectional connections of geology and atmospheres
now outlined, I now turn towards situating these interactions in re-
lation to the actions of the states, people, and colonial histories that
magnify and are magnified by these dynamics.
American Climate’, Environmental Research Letters, 13.7 (2018) <https://doi.org/10.
1088/1748-9326/aacf60>.
44 Ibid., p. 1.
45 Ibid.
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ABOVE AND BELOW GROUND
Political geographers Adam Bobbette and Amy Donovan point out
that the classical conception of geopolitics saw the concept of the state
as a spatial configuration on the surface of the earth, with the polit-
ical dramas of sovereign territories playing out across these territorial
surfaces. Bobbette and Donovan highlight that critical geopolitics have
since challenged this framework. Political geographers, they explain,
such as Bruce Braun, Stuart Elden, and Gavin Bridge, have since
thickened the horizontal and classical spatial understanding of the
state by demonstrating how territory claimed by the state is constituted
vertically, showing how ‘the depth of political processes extend into
and through the geos’.46 I take this further, however, by considering
also how the state and its territorialization also has effects that go from
the surface to the atmosphere.
Claims made by states on subsoil and biological life point to
the need for a vertical, perhaps layered, approach to understanding
territory. Similarly, I argue, these claims should be recognized as
continuing upward past the canopies of trees to include the unrelent-
ingly spatially unbounded atmosphere, especially within the effort to
rethink the human-environment relation in view of climate change.
States and their claims on land, life, and atmospheres also have a key
role in discussions of the geological and linguistic registers of weather-
ing. This is because the process of creating the states that now support
the authority with which the governments of Guyana and Suriname
are able to manage sections of the Guiana Shield (including those
‘particularly sensitive hotspots’ outlined by Bovolo)47 was made pos-
sible through approximately five hundred years of colonialism.48 This
colonial experience went hand in hand with the development and
expansion of geology as a science. I describe this experience in the
following section.
46 Adam Bobbette and Amy Donovan, ‘Political Geology: An Introduction’, in Political
Geology: Active Stratigraphies and the Making of Life, ed. by Adam Bobbette and Amy
Donovan (Berlin: Springer, 2019), pp. 1–34 (p. 1).
47 Bovolo and others, ‘The Guiana Shield Rainforests’.
48 Sidney Wilfred Mintz, Sweetness and Power (New York: Viking New York, 1985).
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COLONIAL GEOLOGY
Since the discovery of the land that became Guyana and Suriname,
in the late fifteenth century to the early sixteenth century, the people
residing on the Guiana Shield have weathered colonial histories and
continue, despite the granting of independence in 1966 and 1975, re-
spectively, to endure postcolonial injustices. It is through this colonial
experience that the population of Guyana and Suriname came to in-
clude non-indigenous groups. The people now residing on the Guiana
Shield and within its forests interact with, magnify, and live with the
natural and social weathering processes of the Shield.
As ‘(in)human geographer’ Kathryn Yusoff explains, geology is
part and parcel of processes of racialization, by no means innocent
with respect to the histories of colonialism, slavery, and environmental
devastation that rely upon it.49 This was also partly demonstrated in
Gibbs and Barron’s The Geology of the Guiana Shield cited earlier.50
Now, almost three decades past its publication date, a re-reading of
this book brings into view the way geology, lauded as a noble but
unrewarding calling, sweeps aside or even propagates the colonial
encounter.
Gibbs and Barron traced geology, recognized as a science in the
beginning of the nineteenth century, back to the demand for finding
mineral deposits in pre-historic times. Gibbs and Barron note that
Alexander von Humboldt ascended the Orinoco in 1800 and dis-
covered the Cassiquiare Canal, ‘linking it with the Negro and hence
with the Amazon’.51 The authors describe him as ‘truly an example for
his present-day successors, and also an example of the many European
and North American geologists who gave up the comforts of homes
and universities to demonstrate by example the internationality of
geology’.52 In recognizing the geological contributions of Venezuelan
nationals in mapping the Venezuelan Amazon, they further describe
early gold exploration in Guyana by Dutch mining engineers and John
49 Kathryn Yusoff, A Billion Black Anthropocenes or None (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2018).
50 Gibbs and Barron, Geology of the Guiana Shield.
51 Ibid., p. 99.
52 Ibid., p. 10.
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Harrison, who discovered Guyana’s bauxite deposits. They continued
by describing how geological mapping of the then ‘colony’ of Guyana
was tied to the search for base metals. According to Gibbs and Barron,
Harrison published ‘many papers on the geology of the country, the
weathering of its rocks, and finally the miner’s bible, “The Geology of
the Goldfields of British Guyana”, in 1908’.53
Notably, Gibbs and Barron draw attention to the fact that, as they
put it, the ‘Guyanaization of the survey of Guyana’s mineral deposits
started in 1959, and the first Guyanese director, Dr. S. Singh, was ap-
pointed in 1966’, the year of Guyana’s independence. They continue by
explicitly tying geological knowledge to mining, stating that ‘Guyana’s
principal gold deposits was published as “Bulletin 38” by Ronald Mc-
Donald’, who they describe as an experienced Canadian economic geo-
logist. This Bulletin was instrumental for summarizing the significant
data on dozens of old gold mines and workings. It still represents, ac-
cording to Gibbs and Barron, the ‘“sourcebook” of prospective mining
companies’. On the Surinamese side, which receives substantially less
attention in this part of their elaboration, the authors write that ‘the
“grand old man” of Surinamese geology was undoubtedly IJzerman’. In
addition, they recognize that aid in mapping Suriname was provided by
Dr. Prem and his team in the Netherlands, Suriname’s colonial masters.
Gibbs and Barron then tie the development of geological maps and
surveys to the large bauxite industry that subsequently developed in
Suriname, along with its hydroelectric scheme and ‘helpful’ petroleum
industry.54
These developments of geology as a science operationalized, in
part, within colonial Guyana and Suriname went hand in hand with the
exploitative practices that defined slavery, indentureship, and coloni-
alism in these two countries. These exploitative practices were enacted
upon populations who simultaneously weathered them and came to




THE PEOPLE WHO WEATHER(ED)
The circumstances of forest-dwelling communities in Guyana and
Suriname are particularly reflective of the circular nature of weath-
ering, as in withstanding oppressive conditions, and in influencing
and generating weather patterns. The indigenous inhabitants of the
forests of the Guiana Shield were diverse, spread over at least nine
different tribes in Guyana alone. They lived in ways that were consid-
erate of the natural environment but that did not conform to utopian
ideas of a harmonious and conflict-free life. Over time, however, as
these communities were confronted by European colonizers, they were
forced to move away from the Shield’s coastal areas. They took up
residence deeper in the forests as conflicts with the newcomers arose
and escalated. Over the following centuries, the colonizers relocated
comparatively vast numbers of people from Africa, Asia, and Europe
to work on the plantations they had developed on the coasts.
Those brought to these lands to work forcibly or under exploitative
conditions also found ways of rebelling. The maroon communities of
Suriname exemplify this rebellion.55 Maroon communities were es-
tablished within the rainforests of the Guiana Shield. They are the
descendants of formerly enslaved Africans who were brought to labour
on the coastal plantations and managed to escape. They fled to the
forests and learned how to survive in them partly from the indigen-
ous communities already living there. This escape was by no means
peaceful. Wars were frequently waged against the emerging maroon
communities whose members made it their mission to attack planta-
tions and to liberate other enslaved people. In the 1760s, peace treaties
were signed between the colonizers and the maroon communities, al-
lowing the latter to live autonomously in the forests, prohibiting future
55 I opted not to capitalize the words ‘indigenous’ or ‘maroon’ because I use these words
primarily as adjectives. Maroon and indigenous groups in Guyana and Suriname have
their own names and titles that they have used for centuries, for example, the Saramaka
in Suriname, now classed as maroon, and the Wapishana in Guyana, now classed as
indigenous. In this paper, I pay careful attention to how people brought to and found in
the Guiana Shield were labelled by external powers according to the demands of capital
accumulation and in the interest of racial hierarchies. I therefore resist the urge to act
in a manner similar to that which I critique by cementing the identities of these groups
of communities through capitalization according to externally imposed groupings and
identities.
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settlers from molesting them, and compelling them to respect the cus-
tomary laws they had established.56 Maroon communities in Suriname
can be said to have weathered forced relocation to unfamiliar lands,
attempts to subjugate them to horrific slave systems, and the challenges
that came with establishing new, cohesive communities within the
forests.
However, Suriname’s independence in 1975 did not see maroon
and indigenous rights included in the constitution of the new Surinam-
ese state. Indigenous communities had also gained autonomy through
peace treaties with the Dutch colonizers. As a result of Suriname’s in-
dependence, the new Surinamese state claimed and continues to claim
the land on which maroon and indigenous communities reside, along
with the resources above and beneath that land. Some of the maroon
communities were further disadvantaged when a few years prior to
the state’s independence, a hydropower dam was built by the colonial
government. The dam, intended to provide cheap electricity for the in-
dustry that intentionally weathered rock by ‘multiplying its insides’57
in the successful search for bauxite, forced the relocation of some
maroon communities to land near a modern-day nature conservation
park. Again, in unfamiliar environments, those maroon community
members turned towards the industry that had magnified their disad-
vantage, joining the effort to ‘multiply the insides of rock’58 but this
time in search of gold. Now, gold mining, known to be the largest
driver of deforestation in both Guyana and Suriname, and the related
issue of land rights, demonstrate the manner in which these commu-
nities both weather (rock) and are weathered (by political climates)
cumulatively throughout their lives in the forests of the Guiana Shield.
Even Suriname’s independent government has recognized the legacy
of previous injustices carried out against these maroon communities in
granting miners from the communities the right to continue mining for
gold within the nearby conservation park. The state government, too,
recognizes that these communities also face the challenge of finding
56 Marieke Heemskerk, Rights to Land and Resources for Indigenous Peoples and Maroons
in Suriname (Paramaribo: Amazon Conservation Team, 2005) <http://www.act-
suriname.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ACT_land-rights-report-2005.pdf>
[accessed 2 August 2017].





Figure 4. Gold Mining Operations taking place near Brownsweg,
Suriname, 2014. Photo by author.
land for gold mining due to the fact that they are often expelled from
lands when large-scale mining concessions are granted by the state
government.59
In Guyana, the development of maroon communities was limited
because some indigenous communities worked with the colonizers to
stop enslaved Africans from seeking refuge in the forests. Nonethe-
less, complications around access to the land remain. While indigen-
ous communities in Guyana benefit from the Amerindian Act, which
serves as the legal basis on which the right to the land of Amerindian
communities is established, the efficacy of the act is challenged by an
organization that represents indigenous people in Guyana. An ana-
lysis carried out by this organization, called the Amerindian Peoples
Association, stated that the discriminatory norms rooted in Guyana’s
colonial period continue to be manifested in the Guyana’s national
legal framework. These norms support the idea that all the land not
59 Interviewee, 2014.
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privately titled land in the country, and hence the sub- and above- soil,
is solely the domain of the state.60
In reference to circumstances similar to those earlier described
for the case of Suriname, the report described that once the British
colonial power seized control of the country from the Dutch in the
nineteenth century, the rights to the lands of indigenous people were
annulled. The power to determine the use of the land, and to pass
the previously mentioned Amerindian Act, passed to the state gov-
ernment, which now grants forestry and mining concessions in the
areas considered customary lands by the Amerindians. In their efforts
to weather the vicissitudes of their lives in the forests, communities
based there use the materials in the forests around them in ways that
contribute to the problem of climate change.
In 2014, I conducted fieldwork in Guyana and Suriname on
forest conservation initiatives taking place there. Eddy, a community
member of a relocated maroon community in Suriname, explained
how the communities use the above- and below-ground resources to
which they have access to survive.61 In these and other ways, people
residing on the Guiana Shield engage in racialized economic rela-
tions that cause the Shield to be weathered and to influence weather.
They are important elements in any effort to rethink the situated and
layered human-environment relationship within the larger framework
of global climate change. The circumstances of forest communities
demonstrate how actions that took place in the colonial past continue
to impact the climate-changing present and future, multiplying vulner-
abilities they faced for centuries through the atmosphere to the rest of
the earth. The communities exemplify particularly well the recognition
60 Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, Forests and Climate Policies in Guyana: A Special Report,
ed. by Kate Dooley and Tom Griffiths (Georgetown, Guyana: Amerindian Peoples
Association, 2014).
61 Eddy explained that ‘We are not waiting for money from the government. We want to
decide for ourselves on what we are going to do and make our own decisions. We were
moved fifty-five years ago. You have to see what kind of house they gave us. We had to
live in it with a husband, wife, three to four children. It is too small. We want to have
our own rights, make our own decisions, build our own houses, and do everything
by ourselves without the government telling us what to do. How is it even possible to
live in this house for a whole family? We try to make our own houses so we use the
rainforests. We use wood, gravel, we use everything that we can find in the rainforests,
we use to build our own house’ (Interviewee, 2014).
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by Neimanis and Hamilton that not all bodies weather the same.62
Moreover, the differentiated weathering of bodies in the Guiana Shield
go on to influence social weather patterns in other parts of the globe,
as I detail next.
SOCIALLY DIFFERENTIATED WEATHERING
Just as continental weather patterns are influenced by the forests of the
Guiana Shield, so are social weather patterns influenced by the events
taking place there. This is demonstrated in how the system of socially
differentiated and racialized weathering of the bodies populating the
Shield went on to influence social climates around the world. This
influence becomes visible once it is situated within the spatial and
social geographies of the dominant capitalist system.
The coloniality of power, as defined by sociologist Anibal Quijano
in Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America, connects
these colonial histories with the creation and institutionalization of
race and global capitalism. Quijano traces how capital became the or-
ganizing principle or axis around which all other social relations took
shape in the Americas, of which the Guiana Shield is a part.63 Hence,
as capitalism expanded and deepened, so did constructions of race as
fundamental to the structuring of social and economic relations. The
exclusive control of the circulation of resources produced in the Amer-
icas by people categorized as ‘Whites’, went hand in hand with the
concentration of the commodification of the labour force for ‘White’
workers. This constellation meant that capital:
[A]s a specific social relation, could be concentrated in the
geographic region that then received the name of Europe.
So Europe or, more specifically, Western Europe emerged as
a new historical entity and identity and as the central place
of the new pattern of world-Eurocentered colonial/modern
capitalist power.64
62 Neimanis and Hamilton, ‘Weathering’.
63 Anibal Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America’, Interna-
tional Sociology, 15.2 (2000), pp. 215–32.
64 Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power’, pp. 217–18.
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These racialized dynamics played an instrumental role in the emer-
gence of modern Guyana and Suriname. As I previously wrote of the
racialized distribution of labour in Guyana, colonial racial structuring
meant that white planters headed the social order with the support
of the colonial authorities, controlling most of the land and capital.
Chinese and Portuguese groups in Guyana, after being freed from laws
that prevented them from acquiring land, became smallholders who
practiced market gardening that led to their eminence in trade and
commerce. Villages established by formerly enslaved people worked
as seasonal labour on the plantations while living on lands considered
marginal to the colonial authorities. East Indian descendants laboured
on the plantations year-round, while Amerindians continued to live in
and to depend on the forests in the interior locations of the country.
In the nineteenth century, a black, middle class developed and came
to dominate the urban areas while East Indians populated some rural
areas, farming rice on land that the colonial masters granted them.
Some of the descendants of the formerly enslaved, as previously de-
scribed, turned to gold mining in the forest areas.65
In the productive and generative sense in which I conceptualize
weathering, the Guiana Shield can be seen to have had a similar at-
mospheric effect of structuring racialized capital relations within the
emergent system of world capitalism. These racialized relations are
situated in but not limited to the spatial geographies of the Guiana
Shield.
As I also wrote of Suriname’s racialized division of labour, Creoles,
as the descendants of formerly enslaved people are called in Suriname,
began to dominate Suriname’s political scene. Maroon communities
remained suspicious of Creole dominance, having been sceptical of the
granting of Suriname’s independence since they had by then developed
an amicable relationship with the colonizers with whom their ances-
tors had signed peace agreements. While racialized economic separ-
ations in Suriname diminished somewhat on the coast where most
of the population lives, they remain strong in the forests where some
maroon communities have established dominance in gold mining and
65 Yolanda Ariadne Collins, ‘Colonial Residue: REDD+, Territorialisation and the Ra-
cialized Subject in Guyana and Suriname’, Geoforum, 106 (2019), pp. 38–47 <https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.07.019>.
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indigenous communities opt largely to work towards maintaining their
subsistence practices.66
This racialized system of categorizing labour that became funda-
mental to the development of capitalism originated in the Americas,
eventually becoming institutionalized in the dominant global capit-
alist system.67 In his particular representation of a temporal schism,
Quijano explained that ‘[t]he relations between European and non-
Europeans suffered a temporal alteration: all non-Europe belonged
to the past, and so it was possible to think about relations between
them in an evolutionary perspective’.68 This resulted in an evolutionary
perspective according to which all-non Europeans could be situated
along a historical chain in comparison to Europeans, ranging from,
‘primitive’ to ‘civilized’, from ‘irrational’ to ‘rational’, from ‘traditional’
to ‘modern’, from ‘magic-mythic’ to ‘scientific’, en route to eventual
Europeanization and modernization.69 Hence, these temporal altera-
tions, cemented in part in Guyana and Suriname, continue to linger
in the modes of production and exploitation characteristic of current
capitalist orders.
ATMOSPHERIC GEOGRAPHIES
Man-made or not, weathering plays a fundamental role in the poten-
tial of the Guiana Shield to affect both physical and social weather
patterns. The weathering and fragmentation of the Guiana Shield un-
earths gold, diamonds, and oil beneath the soil; and has the now
familiar, double-edged effect of increasing carbon in the atmosphere
through the burning of fossil fuels to sustain the mechanized aspects
of these activities. The production of certain commodities, like gold
and bauxite, is made possible through the intentional, human-induced
weathering of rock and soil. Forests and other vegetation become the
victims of economic activity that cause weathering as they are cleared
to access these timeworn minerals beneath the soil. This weathering
then goes on to affect the weather by reducing the capacity of forests
66 Ibid.
67 Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power’.
68 Ibid., p. 221.
69 Ibid.
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in the area to maintain the Amazon’s hydrological function. Oil, also
produced in Guyana and Suriname, is especially notable in how it goes
on to magnify these weathering dynamics, leading directly to increased
carbon in the atmosphere that, completing the loop, increases the
potential to rainfall infused with atmospheric gases to speed up the
weathering of rock, as previously described, and to speed up the slow
process of weathering rock.
Racialized social climates70 are also bound up in biophysical pro-
cess of weathering, as racialized, colonial, and capitalist relations es-
tablished and schematized in the Guiana Shield went on to inform and
support the dominance of capitalist relations on a global scale. I hope
to have demonstrated that reimagining human-environment relations
by focusing on weather and the process of weather(ing) can bring into
view the circular manner through which activities and relations taking
place across linear time and space affect each other and shape particular
places. This attention to weather and weathering has shown that it is
possible to bring different geological, biological, and social activities,
as well as different disciplinary insights into sustained and critical dia-
logue with each other outside of attempts of one to exploit the other.
This endeavour, undertaken by exploring how weather and processes
of weathering culminate in the climate changing social and ecological
atmosphere, arrives at the somewhat unsurprising conclusion: What
goes up must come down.
Nevertheless, with ‘weathering’ representing form, function, and
activity, I posit that attention to the weather might be a useful com-
plementary addition to political ecology frameworks. Weathering rep-
resents a useful prompt for urging political ecologists to refocus on
the iterative and ongoing interaction between the natural environment
and the social, potentially balancing the framework’s current social
leaning to the detriment of the physical, a critique to which the dis-
cipline has found itself susceptible. Weathering can remind political
ecologists that it is possible to interrogate human-environment rela-
tionships without overlooking or over-relying on the social or upon
the capitalist, economic factors that are often the source of their ire.
70 Sharpe, In the Wake.

‘Locked out in nature’
Films on the European Asylum System, Latent Violence,
and Ghosts
ANJA SUNHYUN MICHAELSEN
It is not a case of dead or missing persons sui
generis, but of the ghost as a social figure.
Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters
While watching documentaries about asylum facilities in Europe, I
notice that they are often filmed in the most scenic surroundings. For
example, in Fernand Melgar’s La Forteresse, the ‘Reception and Pro-
cessing Centre’ (Empfangs- und Verfahrenszentrum) for asylum seekers
is located in Vallorbe, Switzerland, at the North-Eastern tip of the Jura
National Park, close to the French border, within a landscape of moun-
tains and forests.1 Zentralflughafen THF documents the temporary
accommodations set up for asylum seekers in the former Tempelhof
Airport in Berlin from 2015 to 2018.2 The building faces Tempelhofer
Feld, a former airfield, which now serves Berliners and tourists as a
unique space for leisure activities, including beekeeping and every type
1 La Forteresse, dir. by Fernand Melgar (2008).
2 Zentralflughafen THF, dir. by Karim Aïnouz (2018) <https://www.zentralflughafen-
thf.de/> [accessed 7 June 2020].
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of recreational sport. The Tempelhofer Feld includes partly wild, grow-
ing nature in the middle of the city, and it offers a rare open sky. In
Forst, the accommodation for asylum seekers is cut off from public
transportation and surrounded by a thick forest near the East German
city of Jena.3 In these documentaries, asylum facilities are located in
or close to landscapes that are often associated with tourism, leisure,
and retreat.4 This proximity to nature could be understood as exterior
or removed from ordinary life — spatially and, as in the case of Zen-
tralflughafen THF, conceptually — as far away from ‘civilization’. The
scenic location of the asylum facilities troubles the notion of nature as
an escape resort — to go ‘off the grid’, free for at least a limited amount
of time from state surveillance.5
The concept of ‘weathering’ implies a relation between interior
and exterior, and a state of exposure to the forces of nature. In
In the Wake, Christina Sharpe conceptualizes ‘the weather’ as all-
encompassing antiblackness, as ‘the totality of our environments’, ‘the
total climate’. This understanding of weathering highlights how sys-
temic racism permeates all boundaries. In Sharpe’s case (she reads Toni
Morrison’s Beloved), it collapses the borders between ‘free’ and ‘unfree’
states.6 Clear distinctions between inside and outside, exposure and
protection are deeply unsettled in Sharpe’s account. In the following,
I ask to what extent systemic racism collapses the relation between
inside and outside of the European asylum system. In the films that
I will discuss, images of nature exemplify different kinds of exposure,
literal and conceptual. Nature, in various ways, becomes apparent as an
instrument of violence, even if one is provided with food and shelter.
We can assume that the locations of the asylum facilities have been
chosen because of state efforts to separate and isolate the world of
3 Forst, dir. by Ascan Breuer, Ursula Hansbauer, Wolfgang Konrad, in cooperation
with The Voice Refugee Forum and others (2005) <http://www.forstfilm.com/> [ac-
cessed 7 June 2020].
4 Another recent example outside of Europe shows a refugee camp in the jungle on
beautiful Easter Island in Australia. See Island ofHungryGhosts, dir. by Gabrielle Brady
(2018) <http://www.christmasislandfilm.com/> [accessed 7 June 2020].
5 I want to thank Alison Sperling, Amelia Groom, and M. Ty for drawing my attention
to this aspect and for generally and substantially furthering the text with their careful
commenting.
6 Christina Sharpe, In theWake: OnBlackness and Being (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2016), p. 200.
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asylum. Nature hides the facilities from plain sight and conceals the
violence within them from view; it functions as a means of physical
separation in La Forteresse and Forst. It also is used to dominate and
control the person in the process of seeking asylum, as exemplified in
the aerial images in View from Above.7 And, nature is used directly as
murder weapon at the European borders, as can be seen in the under-
water shots in Purple Sea.8
A NON-SPACE FOR THE STATELESS
The asylum facilities are not just geographically cut off and remote
from urban life but constitute, rather, a ‘non-space’ in the way Hannah
Arendt describes refugee internment camps. For Arendt, the problem
of the refugee is the problem of statelessness, politically or de facto:
Every attempt by international conferences to establish some
legal status for stateless people failed because no agreement
could possibly replace the territory to which an alien, within
the framework of existing law, must be deportable. All discus-
sions about the refugee problems revolved around this one
question: How can the refugee be made deportable again?
The second World War and the DP camps were not necessary
to show that the only practical substitute for a nonexistent
homeland was an internment camp. Indeed, as early as the
thirties this was the only ‘country’ the world had to offer the
stateless.9
Handling ‘non-deportable’ subjects required the creation of special
places, a foreign ‘country’ of its own kind on the territory of a host
nation, a space outside of the trinity of territory — people — state. The
treatment of Jews and Armenians exemplify, for Arendt, how falling
outside of one distinct state’s responsibility implies the loss of the ‘right
to have (civil) rights’. Such a loss of the very pre-condition of claiming
rights makes the respective subjects vulnerable to both arbitrary vio-
lence and systematic annihilation, in the home country, and on foreign
7 View from Above, dir. by Hiwa K (2017).
8 Purple Sea, dir. by Amel Alzakout and Khaled Abdulwahed (2020) <https://
purplesea.pong-berlin.de/>.
9 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1973), p. 284.
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territory. Without a state authority capable and willing to enforce legal
protection, refugees are de facto ‘outlawed’ — regardless of their ac-
tions, simply because of what they ‘are’ — and exposed to arbitrary
rule.10 The fact that Greece recently declared a ‘state of emergency’
that suspends the Geneva Convention of 1949, as well as additional in-
ternational asylum laws, confirms the continuing relevance of Arendt’s
analysis for the contemporary moment.11 The absence of the right
to have rights enables the intentional killing, systematic neglect, and
letting die of refugees within and at the European borders. The ex-
treme violence must not be understood as exceptional or excessive, but
as a direct consequence of the asylum seekers’ status, fundamentally
unprotected by the law.12 In the German version of The Origins of
Totalitarianism Arendt writes:
The existence of such a category of people poses a twofold
danger to the civilized world. Their unrelatedness to the
world, their worldlessness, is like an invitation to murder,
inasmuch as the death of people who stand outside all
worldly references of a legal, social and political nature
remains without any consequences for the survivors. When
they are murdered, it is as if no one has been wronged or even
harmed.13
I understand Arendt’s notion of ‘worldlessness’ not in a metaphysical
sense but as the name for a situation in which ‘all worldly references of a
legal, social and political nature’ do not apply to oneself in the same way
10 Ibid., p. 282.
11 ‘Greece suspends asylum applications as migrants seek to leave Turkey’, BBC News
(1 March 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51695468> [accessed
7 June 2020]. Whether the numerous attempts to prove the illegality of the ‘suspension’
of international asylum law have consequences remains to be seen.
12 Elliot Douglas, ‘Germany: New Accusations of Police Violence in Death of Asylum-
Seeker’, Deutsche Welle (2 November 2019) <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-
new-accusations-of-police-violence-in-death-of-asylum-seeker/a-51067499>
[accessed 7 June 2020].
13 ‘Die Existenz solch einer Kategorie von Menschen birgt für die zivilisierte Welt eine
zweifache Gefahr. Ihre Unbezogenheit zur Welt, ihre Weltlosigkeit ist wie eine Auffor-
derung zum Mord, insofern der Tod von Menschen, die außerhalb aller weltlichen
Bezüge rechtlicher, sozialer und politischer Art stehen, ohne jede Konsequenzen für
die Überlebenden bleibt. Wenn man sie mordet, ist es, als sei niemandem ein Unrecht
oder auch nur ein Leid geschehen.’ Hannah Arendt, Elemente und Ursprünge totaler
Herrschaft (Frankfurt a.M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1955), p. 766. This passage is
not present in the English version.
ANJA SUNHYUN MICHAELSEN 211
as they do to non-refugees, a situation in which these references and
the world to which they belong — a world that one is at the mercy of
— somehow seem to not concern oneself. To ‘stand outside all worldly
references’ in this sense has far-reaching consequences. For Arendt, it
makes murder permissible, ‘invites’ murder.
To what extent do contemporary asylum facilities constitute a
‘country’ for those ‘without a country’, and hence a space of compar-
able existential threat to its inhabitants? How does the lethal under-
current of statelessness impact the situation in the facilities? And how
does the violent structure of the European asylum system ‘make itself
known’ in the documentaries? In the films mentioned above, images
of ‘nature’, in different ways, indicate a space of being ‘outlawed’, not as
freedom from the law (in the sense of escape) but as existing outside
of the ‘pale of the law’ (which permits indeterminate confinement and
murder). To a certain extent, state territoriality, and thereby protection
(at least in theory) from arbitrary violence, are suspended. This does
not mean that in asylum facilities unrestricted violence is necessarily
enacted but that violence is always latent.
What interests me in these documentaries are the ghostly traces of
the latent possibility of violence. The ghosts here are not Freud’s sup-
pressed unfamiliar familiar, a metaphor for psychic processes. Instead,
my understanding of the ghostly draws closer to Raymond Williams’s
‘structure of feeling’ — something that is present and potent but not
fully ascertainable in conceptual terms.14 In the documentaries, mur-
derous, systemic violence is present without showing itself openly, in
the way Avery Gordon considers haunting as a dimension of violence
whose force exerts itself apart from explicit exploitation and oppres-
sion:
[H]aunting is one way in which abusive systems of power
make themselves known and their impacts felt in everyday
life, especially when they are supposedly over and done with
(slavery, for instance) or when their oppressive nature is
denied (as in free labor or national security). […] Haunting
is not the same as being exploited, traumatized, or oppressed,
although it usually involves these experiences or is produced
14 Raymond Williams, ‘Structure of Feeling’, in Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), pp. 128–35.
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by them. What’s distinctive about haunting is that it is an ani-
mated state in which a repressed or unresolved social violence
is making itself known, sometimes very directly, sometimes
more obliquely.15
In the films, systemic violence makes itself known in images of nature.
In La Forteresse and Forst, mountains and forests separate the world of
the asylum seekers from Europe, on European territory. In Zentralflug-
hafen THF, nature is the space of leisure and recreation from which the
asylum seekers are separated. Repeatedly, across several films (Forst,
View from Above, Purple Sea), aerial images point to the sky as sphere
of surveillance and control in the asylum context. Here, nature, i.e. the
sky, is turned into a tool of domination. In Purple Sea, the Aegean sea
functions directly as murder weapon used by the European asylum
system. Nature is not a metaphor in these films. Silently, in the form
of trees and air, rocks and water, it is the instrument with which sys-
temic violence is enacted. Without showing violence explicitly, nature
in these films, in different ways, indicates its pervasive, latent presence.
SEPARATED BY NATURE
InLaForteresse— ‘Fortress Europe’ resonates in the title — the asylum
facility includes the accommodation as well as the offices where the
interviews are conducted, on the basis of which the asylum seekers are
transferred to other places or are deported. In the housing units, each
room contains four bunk beds. They are cramped, but people help and
support each other. There is a large dining room and a program to keep
the children occupied. The residents learn German, play football in the
courtyard, and pray together. Once, a couple of inhabitants are sent
to do some forest work for a change of scenery. They drink tea from
thermos flasks and eat a kind of picnic of cheese and kiwis, which the
camera captures with a close-up shot (it is puzzling what the camera/I
pay attention to). Back at the shelter there is a lot of hoopla as one
of the asylum seekers is stuck in his rubber boot. The head of the
facility lends a hand to help free him. The staff are obviously trying to
15 Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. xvi.
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create a humane atmosphere. In a team meeting, the traumatization of
asylum seekers is acknowledged and everyone is asked to ‘show some
humanity’ (there seem to be no social workers or psychologists on
site). The fact that the security guards take away the asylum seekers’
musical instruments, to prevent them being used as weapons, causes
laughter all around. The asylum seekers, it seems, are not subject to
abusive treatment. In the interviews they are assisted by translators,
they are listened to.
The facility appears as a mix of a youth hostel, welfare institution,
and prison. The employees serve as social workers, administrators,
judges, police and prison guards at the same time. The facility follows
the rule of ‘carceral humanitarianism’:
Under carceral humanitarianism, detention is shelter and ma-
terializes the double meaning of security, as securing against a
threat through violence and offering security from the threat
of violence. Humanitarian governmentality produces irreg-
ularized bodies as simultaneously a threat to security and a
life to be secured: a life to be saved and made secure, seized,
possessed, fastened to an apparatus of care that is also an ap-
paratus of capture, control, and ruination.16
In the uncomfortable laughter at the idea of music instruments be-
ing used as weapons, the double meaning of security Debarati Sanyal
points to resonates. The security measure prevents obvious abuse of
the refugees but renders them as a potential threat, suspicious, none-
theless.
In this observant, rather quiet representation of the Swiss asylum
system, which includes no spoken commentary, it is above all nature
that suggests that something is wrong. The facility is surrounded by
snow-covered mountains; it is cold, and it rains. Instead of prison walls,
there is thick forest. Nature blocks the view. It separates this world
from the world outside which is Europe. The images of isolating and
confining nature frame the social interactions within the facility. They
remind the viewer of the precarious grounds on which daily life in
16 Debarati Sanyal, ‘Humanitarian Detention and Figures of Persistence at the Border’,
Critical Times, 2.3 (December 2019), pp. 435–65 (pp. 438–39) (emphases in original).
214 LOCKED OUT IN NATURE
 
 
Figure 1. La Forteresse, film still. Image © 2008 Fernand Melgar.
detention takes place.17 Those asked to behave humanely hold, in their
hands, the power over the asylum seekers’ lives.
THE INTERVIEW
Indirect reminders of these precarious grounds permeate the film. Re-
peatedly, La Forteresse shows excerpts of asylum interviews, during
which officers ask refugees to describe their journey to Switzerland.
They inquire about entry routes and state persecution. They compare
earlier versions to the accounts of family members, they point to gaps
and contradictions and register the emotional state of the applicant.
In her book on the European asylum practices, the author Dina Nay-
eri develops a polemical narrative theory in which she compares the
storytelling of asylum seekers to literary writing:
[T]o pass an asylum interview, you don’t just need a true
story. […] To satisfy an asylum officer takes the same nar-
rative sophistication it takes to please book critics. At once
17 There is a spatial inversion happening, built into the hillside, the accommodation
appears as a fortress within the ‘Fortress Europe’. Geography and nature separate the
accommodation — i.e. the socio-political Outside of Europe — and the outside, i.e.
the Inside of Europe.
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logical and judgmental of demeanor, both are on guard for
manipulation and emotional trickery. Stick to the concrete,
the five senses, they say. Sound natural, human, but also dazzle
with your prose. Make me cry, but a whiff of sentimentality
and you’re done.18
At one point in La Forteresse, the decision-maker decides that the story
did not convince her, that it seemed ‘too stereotypical’. It seems im-
plausible to her that the asylum seeker made the journey he recounts.
He talked about it, she explains to her colleague, as if he was telling
another person’s story. She rejects his application on the grounds of
incredibility.19 The problem, however, might not be the story’s validity
but that ‘credibility’ is structurally impossible:
[T]he asylum officer, who appropriates the rules of good
storytelling, fails to realise, when sitting across a petitioning
refugee, that you are speaking to a character in the story, not
the author. […] In practice, much still depends on what each
asylum officer finds credible. For that, the refugee must take
control of the story and behave as the storyteller, not just a
character.20
In the end, the asylum seeker must embody both the position of the
storyteller and of the story’s subject. They must give an objective ac-
count without appearing detached, ‘as if telling someone else’s story’.
Based on Nayeri’s book, we can assume that asylum seekers are well
aware of this impossible narrative requirement. In La Forteresse, sus-
picion takes hold of the entire film. The employees are alert to lies,
contradictions, missing memories, too much emotion, or too little.
The camera participates in the credibility test, as it focuses on the
asylum seekers’ faces and bodies and records their movements, ges-
18 Dina Nayeri, The Ungrateful Refugee (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2019), pp. 242–43.
19 The process might be this trivial and arbitrary. In Die Entscheider (dir. by Susanne
Ofteringer, 1992) the filmmaker asks her interview partners, two ‘decision-makers’
at the Central Admission Point for asylum seekers in Cologne, what enables them to
assess the credibility of asylum seekers. Expert knowledge, professional experience and
knowledge of human nature, they answer. Other disclosures from the film: the inter-
views take place in a friendly atmosphere. They are not interrogations. The decisions
are mostly correct. The decision makers do not consider themselves as in a specifically
powerful position. Die Entscheider exposes their alarming lack of awareness for their
role within the asylum system.
20 Ibid., p. 263.
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tures, and voices as they tell their story. The film’s audience is put into
the position of the judge as well. Is the story true? Are the tears real?
What is revealed by the posture, the facial expressions, the look into
the camera? The asylum seekers tell their story to a triple audience: the
interviewer, the camera, and the film’s audience. But in this paranoid
situation, everyone is tested — the asylum seekers, the staff members
as well as the film and its audience. Everyone turns into subject and
object of suspicion. Is the interviewer ‘humane enough’, ‘unbiased’,
racist? Do I agree with her decision? Is the film ‘biased’, manipulative,
is it critical enough? Am I ‘biased’, manipulated, critical enough? The
testing continues outside of the interview scenes, it makes no differ-
ence which situation is shown. The asylum seekers’ interactions with
one another and with the staff are equally subject to it. Suspicion is
the undercurrent of the entire film despite its humane impression. The
film does not produce a voyeuristic gaze in the proper sense, the fact of
observation is in no way hidden. The story is told for the interviewer,
the camera, and the audience. And still the film creates the most para-
noid viewing situation in which everyone is suspected to deceive and
misjudge.
LOCKED OUT IN NATURE
In La Forteresse, the asylum facility is hidden by Swiss mountains. The
asylum seekers are under constant surveillance and the film uninten-
tionally participates in it. Despite the overtly sympathetic depiction,
the film creates the feeling of being locked in, in this remote space, in
the logic of impossible authentication. The more experimental film,
Forst, helps to understand how nature in the asylum context is the
space of claustrophobia, a space in which one is locked in and out at
the same time. The film, which was made in cooperation with refugee
organizations in Germany such as The Voice Refugee Forum, Women
in Exile, and Caravan for the Rights of Migrants and Refugees, depicts
an accommodation for asylum seekers in the city of Forst. Forst is
the small town’s name, but it is also a German term for ‘forest’. The
accommodation is located in an actual forest. The film gives only a
blurred impression of the building and its surroundings, the images
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of the accommodation and the forest merge into an undistinguishable
entity. The latter extends the former, just like the mountains in La
Forteresse constitute an external part of the facility. In Forst, the forest
is the prison.
Forst is not a typical documentary film. The filmmakers call it an
‘un-documentary’, which could refer to its experimental aesthetics, as
well as to the status of those who are invisible in ordinary life:
Forst is a portrayal. The documentary tells about a forest in
the middle of Europe far from the urban world and from
civilisation which is home to a peculiar community of the
banished — it is a world for the stranded. A diffuse system
that still has total control makes sure that this world doesn’t
show itself, that it doesn’t pop up in our reality and become a
disturbance.21
The film conveys the reality of this ‘community of the banished’, but its
aesthetics — abstract black and white images, with asynchronic sound
and voice-overs — maintains opacity of the scene and its subjects and
prevents objectification by the viewer and exposure to state control.
Unlike La Forteresse the human faces and figures are kept out of the
frame, shown only as silhouettes. By not assigning bodies to stories the
film resists to individualize and authenticate the question of asylum. In
this sense, it documents and ‘un-documents’ at the same time.
The building and its surroundings are abstract to a degree in which
they are still recognizable, but perspective and framing emphasize geo-
metric structures and light patterns, atmospheres. A fragmented narra-
tive plot remains unresolved. Forst begins with an unlocated voice-over
and a black screen that tells of the narrator’s arrival at a place beyond
the reach of public transportation. Other voices follow. They tell of
personal experiences within the asylum system, but they do not give
exactly biographical accounts.
In a central scene, white-clad appearances with unidentifiable
faces slowly emerge from the forest. Forst explicitly stages the refugee
as the social figure of the ghost. The film avoids the credibility logic
21 ForstFilm.com, 2005 <http://www.forstfilm.com/> [accessed 7 June 2020].





Figures 2 and 3. Forst, film still. Image credit: Ascan Breuer, Ursula
Hansbauer, Wolfgang Konrad, Ben Pointeker, Julia Lazarus, wr.
that was exhibited in La Forteresse. Instead, it tells of the current situ-
ation in Europe and of the state practices aimed at isolating the asylum
seekers to prevent solidarity and political organization. ‘I am locked
out in nature’, the first narrator says — not allowed in despite already
having arrived in Europe but instead confined in nature, the space of
the Outside within.
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Figure 4. Forst, film still. Image credit: Ascan Breuer, Ursula Hansbauer,
Wolfgang Konrad, Ben Pointeker, Julia Lazarus, wr.
VIEW FROM ABOVE
In La Forteresse and Forst nature appears as that which blocks the
view, isolates, and confines. As viewers, our view is equally confined
in the paranoid space. In a disorienting way and with very different
aesthetics, both films do not provide access to the world beyond the
mountains and forests, paralleling the asylum seekers’ and the audi-
ence’s perspective. In both films, the camera operates on ground level
but Forst also includes some helicopter shots of the thick forest from
above.
In the films, nature mostly organizes the separation between
Europe’s interior and exterior horizontally. The helicopter shots indi-
cate a vertical dimension of separation which conceptually resonates
with the interview scenes in La Forteresse. To assume the perspective
of the author can also be understood as a change from a (character’s)
view from below to a view, as it were, from above.
ViewfromAbove is the title of an experimental video piece by Hiwa
K, which allows one to understand how the aerial view of surveillance
and the authorial narrator’s bird’s eye view in the asylum interview are
folded into one another. Produced for documenta 14 in Kassel in 2017,
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the video tells the story of M who flees from the northern, Kurdish part
of Iraq and applies for asylum ‘in one of the Schengen countries’. His
application is rejected because Kurdistan is considered a ‘safe zone’ by
the UN, which denies the latter’s inhabitants any claim to asylum. M
applies in a different country. This time he makes the statement that
he comes from the ‘unsafe zone’, which he proves in the interview by
showing detailed cartographic knowledge of the city K in the non-
Kurdish part of Iraq. The decision-maker is impressed and grants him
asylum. View from Above transgresses the border into the fictional.
Its mode remains ambiguous. Perhaps the story is autobiographical,
perhaps it contains a collective experience, or still something other
than that. It remains as fictional and as real as the arbitrary cuts in
the political map of ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ zones, of economic and political
refugees, of subjects worthy or unworthy of living, and living well.
The story, co-written by Hiwa K and Lawrence Abu Hamdan, is
told off screen by K as narrator with calm and gentle intonation. In
the beginning, we hear a disembodied, disorienting voice over a black
screen. It tells the story of M, not chronologically (as I recounted it
above), instead it starts in the middle, jumping back and forth through-
out. Visually, the video consists of slow tracking shots over a curious
miniature model of the war-torn German city of Kassel in 1945. The
model was built in the 1950s, is made out of sand, cardboard, and
plaster, and was commissioned by the city of Kassel. It shows the city
centre in May 1945, when eighty percent of the city was destroyed
by air raids. The model is based on aerial photographs taken by the
same allied forces. Meant to commemorate the defeat of the National
Socialist regime, it was stowed away after its construction in a storage
room in the Kassel City Hall for years, only to be exhibited in 1983.22
During documenta 14, the model and Hiwa K’s video were presented
in adjacent rooms. Both are now part of the museum’s permanent ex-
hibition.23
22 Jörg Steinbach, ‘Kassel in Schutt und Asche: Trümmermodell wieder zu sehen’,
Hessische Niedersächsische Allgemeine (2 March 2016) <https://www.hna.de/kassel/
kassel-schutt-asche-6171148.html> [accessed 7 June 2020].
23 ‘Documenta 14-Arbeit “View from Above” von Hiwa K ist in das Stadtmuseum zurück-
gekehrt (27 May 2019) <https://www.kassel.de/pressemitteilungen/2019/mai/
view-from-above-von-hiwa-k-ist-in-das-stadtmuseum-kassel-zurueckgekehrt.php>
[accessed 7 June 2020].
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Figure 5. View from Above, film still. Image credit: Hiwa K.
View from Above uses explicit aesthetic means to create a ghostly
atmosphere. Hiwa K’s voice stands out from the acoustic environment,
in which otherwise only the technical hum of the camera/drone can be
heard. Visually, this eerie atmosphere is intensified by the slow camera
movements, as well as by the contrasting pitch black background and
the illuminated model, creating sharp, accentuated shadows. Sound
and image technology isolate the voice and the model from their sur-
roundings. The camera travels through the model of the destroyed city,
in which, next to the ruins, a few miniature trees are still standing,
but no human figures are included. The model not only preserves a
war-destroyed city, but a city without survivors — a ghost town. The
relationship between image and narrative is not easily determined.
What does the story of an Iraqi asylum seeker have to do with the
German defeat in 1945? The narrative seems to suggest a fatalist under-
standing. ‘All cities have destruction in common’, the narrator says at
one point.
Narrative and image share a common perspective — the view from
above. M memorizes the city of K by looking at its map from a bird’s
eye view, which, as we learn from the Kassel model, is the perspective
of war. Some of the visuals in View from Above are reminiscent of the
infrared images familiar from various military operations, as part of the
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Figure 6. View from Above, video still. Image credit: Hiwa K.
‘occupation of the skies’, as Achille Mbembe refers to it.24 It is also
the perspective of the authorial narrator as it is required in the asylum
interview. Just as the camera swiftly pans from the ground level of the
city model to a bird’s eye view, M needs to lift himself up into the air,
to leave his position of the powerless to be able to look down on the
map drawn by those in power.
It is a violent change of perspective. Telling one’s own story is
often considered a form of empowerment, possibly even more so if one
masters the ability to obscure the distinction between fiction and truth.
In the asylum interview, telling one’s story requires a form of narrative
mastery unavailable for most. Another version, which can be found in
written form on Hiwa K’s website, reads:
The people from J taught him everything and helped him draw
the map of their town, all the while asking him questions to
confirm that he had mastered everything about J.
When M finally had his refugee interview, the official was
quite surprised, even impressed. He asked M questions about
the geography of the town, and compared M’s answers to a
map. M’s answers demonstrated knowledge of J as it was seen
from above.
24 Achille Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, Public Culture, 15.1 (2003), pp. 11-40 (p. 29).
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It took only twenty minutes for the official to grant M
refugee status. Meanwhile, thousands of people who were
actually from J and other cities in the unsafe zone waited as
long as ten to fifteen years for the same thing, because their
answers only demonstrated knowledge of their towns from
the ground.25
The story can very well be understood as an example of the ‘autonomy
of migration’,26 which will continue despite all efforts to close Europe
off. But it also points to something beyond solidarity and resistance,
raising the question of the costs of the bird’s eye view. By juxtaposing
the Kassel model and today’s asylum system, View from Above points
to the use of the bird’s eye view as equally instrument of domination
and of survival. ‘To lift oneself up’ here requires to adopt a militarized
perspective on life lived on the ground. M must bear to leave behind all
those who have helped him, and with them the life he lived. Ultimately,
in View from Above the bird’s eye view leads to M’s amnesia. While
the narrator repeatedly reminds M how he succeeded in the asylum
process, M seems to have forgotten all about it. The right of residence,
the story suggests, comes at the price of losing all connection with the
asylum seeker’s former life.
POSTSCRIPT
Premiered at the Berlinale film festival 2020, Purple Sea re-examines,
in a shocking manner, the question of violence in the European asylum
system. The film consists of images recorded by the camera which the
artist Amel Alzakout tied around her wrist while crossing the Aegean
Sea, from Istanbul to Lesbos. Alzakout had first fled Syria to Istanbul
where she lived for a couple of years. When she decided to make the
crossing to Europe, the boat fell apart shortly after departure, leaving
a couple of hundred refugees to drown. Visually, the hour-long film
25 Hiwa K, ‘A View from Above’ <http://www.hiwak.net/anecdotes/a-view-from-
above/> [accessed 7 June 2020].
26 Yann Moulier Boutang, ‘No Longer Reserve Army: Theses on the Autonomy of Mi-
gration and the Necessary End of the Regime of Labour Migration’, Jungle World (3
April 2002) <https://jungle.world/artikel/2002/14/nicht-laenger-reservearmee>
[accessed 7 June 2020].
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Figure 7. Purple Sea, film still. Image credit: PURPLE SEA © pong
film/Alzakout 2020.
is comprised almost entirely of the under-water shots taken by the
camera on Alzakout’s wrist.27
In the voice-over, Alzakout narrates a conversational text that she
co-wrote years after she arrived in Berlin with others who were in-
volved in the filmmaking process. She describes personal perceptions
and feelings during the time before the trip, as well as thoughts and
events leading up to the moment at sea, whose images feature in the
film. The shots, which, as Alzakout says, are not hers but those of the
camera, show clothed bodies up to the neck, moving, or not, objects
floating in the water, cigarettes, shoes. I understand these images as
neither from below nor from above. They embody neither the asylum
seekers’ nor the decision makers’ perspective but are technical images
of their own kind. The camera registers, records what floats in front of
it. It films the death zone with maximal absence of intention, without
authenticating, or even witnessing anything, leaving the viewer alone
with the images. Disconcertingly, their immersive quality allows us to
easily forget that what we see are actual human beings left to die. It
requires the audience’s conscious effort to not be carried away by the
beauty of the underwater shots. Abruptly, the viewer is reminded of
their meaning in a couple of moments when Alzakout’s arm with the
27 ‘Synopsis’, Purple Sea, 2019 <https://purplesea.pong-berlin.de/en/16/synopsis>
[accessed 7 June 2020]. The original footage is much longer.
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Figure 8. Purple Sea, film still. Image credit: PURPLE SEA © pong
film/Alzakout 2020.
camera shoots out of the water, as she protests against a helicopter that
circles above.
In the underwater shots, the view is limited to a few metres. The
intense colour and texture of the water and the muffled sounds allows
for the viewer to become lost in the images. Now, the blinding sunlight,
shrill whistling sounds, people in the water shouting, and the noise
of the rotating propeller blades overwhelm the perception. The heli-
copter is not there to rescue. Instead, it creates waves that endanger
those in the water even more. A tiny red dot indicates that someone in
the helicopter is filming, from above.28
In the previous films, nature served as a means of separation
between Europe’s interior and exterior, within Europe, which included
hiding systemic violence from view. Indirectly or directly, La For-
teresse, Forst, and View from Above convey an inherent violence in
the European asylum system, in the housing, the processing, the in-
terviews, as a haunting quality especially of nature images. Systemic
violence strongly makes itself felt in the claustrophobic and eerie atmo-
spheres of the films and in the images of the refugees as ghostly figures.
In contrast, the images inPurple Sea seem haunted by nothing. Nothing
is hidden or latent. The film lays bare the absolute violence that is the
European asylum system, for everyone to see openly.
28 There is much more to be said about Purple Sea.

On BadWeather
Heidegger, Arendt, and Political Beginnings
FACUNDO VEGA
The great trouble is that human nature, which
might otherwise develop smoothly, is as depend-
ent upon luck as seed is upon good weather.
Hannah Arendt
If ‘datability’ made any sense, 2020 will hand down a particular term:
virus. In the domain of thinking, the magnitude of this new crisis in life-
in-common made visible an invariant: the shortcomings in philosophy
to deal with the unexpected.1 The point is, of course, not to suggest
that philosophy should have predicted and offered keys to theoretically
apprehend what could not be fully perceived in advance. Rather, what
is happening — the current events that we are experiencing — invites
theorists to be attentive to the ordinary world they are confronted by.
But this invitation is pending.
Though the extent of the crisis we are traversing is not known,
the contours of the problem I try to illustrate are not brand new. In
1 See, among others, Giorgio Agamben, A che punto siamo? L’epidemia come politica
(Macerata: Quodlibet, 2020) and Alain Badiou, ‘Sur la situation épidémique’, Quartier
général. Le Média libre<https://qg.media/2020/03/26/sur-la-situation-epidemique-
par-alain-badiou/> [accessed 30 March 2020].
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fact, the consequences of the love of philosophy for ‘the extraordinary’
are as old as the laughter of the Thracian girl.2 Enamoured by their
own ‘radicality’, philosophers have purportedly abandoned the world
even for the sake of discovering and scrutinizing it. In dealing with
this issue in an Auseinandersetzung with Martin Heidegger, Hannah
Arendt returned to the promise of politics. For Arendt, the validity
of this question about politics, of great importance in today’s milieu,
is inextricably related to the matter of the ‘beginning’: a beginning,
Arendt notes, which is animated ‘not by the strength of one architect
but by the combined power of the many’.3 By dealing with Arendt’s
‘beginning’ and avoiding exceptionalist stridencies, I hope to open up
a space to re-ask: How to begin anew? What can and should be learned
during this intermezzo? What can and should be the promise of politics
today?
In the current situation, when the very act of ‘beginning’ is con-
fined, the temptation is to deal with the questions I posed by postu-
lating the need of a magnificent event, breaking into and interrupting
the normal course of history. Positing a hiatus in time to found a new
time has, according to Arendt, political implications. In her rendition,
in fact, ‘revolutions are the only political events which confront us
directly and inevitably with the problem of beginning.’4 But revolu-
tions are not only foundationalist events that break history in two.
When Arendt thematizes the revolutionary power to constitute life-in-
common and refers to the Mayflower Compact, she strikingly wonders
whether its signatories ‘had been prompted to “covenant” because of
the badweather’.5 Vis-à-vis the splendour and grandeur of a new begin-
ning, the ‘bad weather’ appears as a vivid reminder that the ‘earliest
2 On the anecdote about the Thracian servant-girl ridiculing Thales for falling into a well
while observing the motion of celestial bodies see, among others: Plato, Theaetetus, ed.
by Bernard Williams, M. J. Levett, and Myles Burnyeat (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett,
1992), p. 44; Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den
transzendentalen Grundsätzen (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962), p. 2; Hannah Arendt, The
Life of theMind, ed. by Mary McCarthy, 2 vols (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1977–78), i:Thinking (1977), pp. 82–83; Hans Blumenberg,DasLachen derThrakerin.
Eine Urgeschichte der Theorie (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987); Jacques Taminiaux,
La Fille de Thrace et le penseur professionnel. Arendt et Heidegger (Paris: Payot, 1992).
3 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 214.
4 Ibid., p. 21.
5 Ibid., p. 167; my emphasis. Arendt adds that ‘the bad-weather theory, which I find
rather suggestive, is contained in the “Massachusetts” article in the Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 11th edition, vol. xvii’ (Arendt, On Revolution, p. 306).
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written constitution in history’ and its creative power also originated
out of contingency and the ordinary variation of fortune.6
In order to erode foundationalist narratives about political insti-
tution, I will re-stage Arendt’s confrontation with Heidegger regarding
‘political beginnings’. Keeping the reference to ‘bad weather’ in mind,
this essay will proceed in three parts. Firstly, I will sketch Heidegger’s
exceptionalist account of ‘new beginnings’. By fusing origin and rule
in the will of a single person, I will claim that Heidegger conceives
of beginnings as extraordinary, exceptional, and singular moments.
Secondly, I will briefly examine Arendt’s dispute with Heidegger’s
work from 1946 to 1958, from manifest enmity due to the latter’s
commitment to German totalitarianism, to recognition of intellectual
gratitude. My aim in this case will be to foreground how, accord-
ing to Arendt, ‘the Heidegger case’ (der Fall Heidegger) conveys the
‘philosophico-political problem’, that is to say, the ineradicable tension
between the domains of ‘philosophy’ and ‘politics’. Arendt’s critical
examination of the ‘philosophico-political problem’, in turn, offers new
insights that reveal two distinctive ways of conceiving ‘beginnings’.
For Heidegger, the ‘beginning’ expresses — either politically or philo-
sophically — a radical event imbued with an ontological dignity that
surpasses any plurality. For Arendt, on the contrary, the ‘beginning’
seems to stage an an-archic display that is political insofar as it happens
‘between’ human beings. Finally, this theoretical trajectory will allow
me to show how, after her confrontation with Heidegger’s work —
which, paradoxically, is both the epitome of the philosophical tradition
and the way to overcome its deadlocks — Arendt provides an original
answer to the question of the status of ‘political beginnings’. Aware of
the particular conditions of political modernity — which, for her, is
6 The article of the Encyclopaedia Britannica quoted by Arendt emphasizes that ‘in the
early winter of 1620 [the passengers of the Mayflower] made the coast of Cape Cod;
they had intended to make their landfall farther south, within the jurisdiction of the
Virginia Company, which had granted them a patent; but stress of weather prevented
their doing so. Finding themselves without warrant in a region beyond their patent, and
threatened with the desertion of disaffected members of their company (probably all
servants or men of the ‘lesser’ sort) unless concessions were made to these, they drew
up and signed before landing a democratic compact of government which is accounted
the earliest written constitution in history’ (TheEncyclopaediaBritannica:ADictionary
of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information, 11th edn, 29 vols (London: The
Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, 1911), xvii, p. 858; my emphasis).
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rooted in an ‘abyssal ground’ — Arendt seeks, time and again, coordin-
ates with which to elucidate the act of political institution. In the face
of current theoretical perspectives that advocate a return to ontology
in order to account for the ‘exceptional’ origin of life-in-common,7
I propose that Arendt invites us to recognize the ‘principle of an-
archy’ innate to ‘political beginnings’. And I claim that this an-archic
matter that animates political foundations, always already exposed to
‘bad weather’, cannot be absorbed by exceptionalist invocations of the
‘history of Being’.
THE TALE OF THE FOX AND THE FASCINATION WITH THE NEW
BEGINNING
After not speaking to each other for seventeen years following a griev-
ous falling out, Arendt and Heidegger reconnect in 1950. Three years
later, Arendt writes a bittersweet parable about Heidegger in her Denk-
tagebuch, a story that hints at the fragility of their ‘friendship’. Seeking
to capture ‘the true story of Heidegger the fox’ (die wahre Geschichte
von dem Fuchs Heidegger), she claims:
[T]he fox who lived in the trap said proudly: ‘So many are visiting
me in my trap that I have become the best of all foxes.’ And there is
some truth in that, too: Nobody knows the nature of traps [Fallenwe-
sen] better than one who sits in a trap his whole life long.8
Arendt’s tale of the fox conjures the endless construction of a bur-
row — one that, because of the fox’s determination to perfect it, ends
up becoming a dead-end. But the story gets even more dramatic if this
particular fox can, thanks to his cleverness, entrap future generations
of thinkers. In the most lugubrious reading of the saga, everything the
fox touches gives into his charms. The corollary of this terrifying ver-
sion of the tale is troubling: even surpassing interpretations guided by
7 See, among others, Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political
Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2007); Marchart, Die politische Differenz. Zum Denken des Politischen bei Nancy,
Lefort, Badiou, Laclau und Agamben (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010).
8 Hannah Arendt, Denktagebuch: 1950 bis 1973, ed. by Ursula Ludz and Ingeborg
Nordmann, 2 vols (Munich: Piper, 2002), i, p. 404; English trans. as ‘Heidegger the
Fox’, in Essays in Understanding: 1930–1974. Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, ed.
by Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2005), p. 362.
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scandal and the ‘anxiety of influence’, Arendt is, shockingly, assimilated
into the ‘destruction of thought’ (destruction de la pensée) supposedly
fostered by her former professor, the fox Heidegger.9
Looking to Arendt’s parable without falling into a conventional
narrative of personal intrigue between the two protagonists, however,
will help us to observe that, by being both ‘faithful and not faithful’ to
Heidegger,10 she offers important insights to delineate the contours of
the Heideggerian trap as well as its implications within the domain of
political foundation. Heidegger’s thought is certainly one of the main
bases from which Arendt challenges the failures of the philosophical
tradition. But she also sees her former professor’s work as the prime ex-
ample of intellectual hubris that utterly failed to heed life-in-common.
Put differently, for Arendt the post-totalitarian political crisis could
not be understood if the crisis of philosophy was not tackled, and Hei-
degger blatantly manifested that theoretical and political quandary.
Several recently-published seminars delivered by Heidegger in
the 1930s as well as the Schwarzen Hefte,11 to be sure, complicate
Arendt’s ambivalent stance toward him. Heidegger, malgré Arendt,
9 See Elzbieta Ettinger, Hannah Arendt/Martin Heidegger (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1995); Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children.HannahArendt, Karl Löwith,
Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015);
Emmanuel Faye, Arendt et Heidegger. Extermination nazie et destruction de la pensée
(Paris: Albin Michel, 2016).
10 By sending a copy of Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben to Heidegger via her publisher,
Arendt made a confession to him: ‘Re Vita activa: The dedication of this book has
been omitted. | How could I dedicate it to you | trusted one | to whom I was faithful |
and not faithful [dem ich die Treue gehalten | und nicht gehalten habe] | And in both
cases with love’. See Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt/Martin
Heidegger. Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann,
1998), p. 319; English trans. as Letters: 1925–1975, ed. by Ursula Ludz (New York:
Harcourt, 2004), p. 261; my emphasis, translation modified.
11 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, 102 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1975–),
xxxviii: Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache, ed. by Günter Seubold
(1998); xxxvi/xxxvii: Sein und Wahrheit, ed. by Hartmut Tietjen (2001); ‘Hegel,
“Rechtsphilosophie”’, ‘Hegel, Rechtsphilosophie. WS 34/35. Mitschrift Wilhelm Hall-
wachs’, ‘Hegel, Rechtsphilosophie. WS 34/35. Protokolle’, lxxxvi: Seminare. Hegel-
Schelling, ed. by Peter Trawny (2011), pp. 55–184, pp. 549–611, pp. 613–55; xciv:
Überlegungen ii-vi (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938), ed. by Peter Trawny (2014);xcv:
Überlegungen vii-xi (Schwarze Hefte 1938/1939), ed. by Peter Trawny (2014); xcvi:
Überlegungen xii-xv (Schwarze Hefte 1939-1941), ed. by Peter Trawny (2014);xcvii:
Anmerkungen i-v (Schwarze Hefte 1942-1948), ed. by Peter Trawny (2015); ‘Über
Wesen und Begriff von Natur, Geschichte und Staat. Übung aus dem Wintersemester
1933/34’, in Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus. Dokumente, ed. by Alfred Denker
and Holger Zaborowski (Freiburg: Alber, 2009), pp. 53–88.
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can no longer be envisioned as the ‘hidden king’ (heimlicher König)
of thought, who took a brief detour around Syracuse due to a dé-
formation professionnelle.12 After all, he explicitly links ‘ontology’ and
‘politics’ through the notion of ‘beginning’. By conflating both realms,
Heidegger’s position on the ‘history of Being’ takes a narrative bent:
it is encompassed by a ‘beginning’ (Anfang) and an ‘end’ (Ende) or,
more accurately, by two ‘beginnings’ — erster and anderer — and an
‘end’ embodied by what he terms machination (Machenschaft). This
narrative, which of course has protagonists — namely, ‘the Greeks’
and ‘the Germans’ — is animated on a metapolitical level.13 What
Heidegger’s metapolitics (Metapolitik) — understood as both rejec-
tion and constitution of the world — names is his own ‘onto-historical’
(seinsgeschichtliche) reflection on the Anfang. For Heidegger, then, ‘the
history of Being’ invigorates political life; tuned into the implications
of the Greek ‘first beginning’, Germany, understood as an ontological
force, should effect a ‘second beginning’.
The essence of the German people, epitomized by the leader, is
the groundwork for Heidegger’s preaching on the ‘foundation’ and
the ‘new beginning’. This exceptionalist rendition of Anfänge cannot
be weathered; it cannot be subjected to the action of the elements: it
seems to be incorruptible. The absolute power of the Führer and the
fusion of governmental command in one person were salient features
of the new German reality. At the time, in Über Wesen und Begriff
von Natur, Geschichte und Staat (Wintersemester 1933/34), Heidegger
upheld the idea that the leader’s will knew no bounds since he was
the ontological interpreter of the people and the state.14 The Führer-
prinzip praised by Heidegger, in turn, instantiates the ‘onto-historical’
and extra-political foundation of ‘the political’, as well as the political
institution of the will of a single man. One man, or better, this man,
is not the shepherd of Being; Being, rather, seems to be shepherd
of the leader. The leader is the ‘preparer of the danger, the decider
12 Hannah Arendt, ‘Martin Heidegger ist achtzig Jahre alt’, in Antwort. Martin Heidegger
im Gespräch, ed. by Günther Neske and Emil Kettering (Tübingen: Neske, 1988), pp.
232–46 (pp. 233 and 243–45).
13 See Heidegger, Überlegungen ii-vi, pp. 115, 116, and 124.
14 Heidegger, ‘Über Wesen und Begriff von Natur, Geschichte und Staat’, p. 77.
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of the struggle (Kampfes), and the guardian of its new truths’.15 In
‘Hegel, “Rechtsphilosophie”’ (Wintersemester 1934/35), in particular,
Heidegger will assert:
The unification of powers in the Dasein of the leader is not a mere
coupling and heaping up (quantitative), but rather in itself already the
starting point [Beginn] of the development of an originally new [ur-
sprünglich neuen] — but still undeveloped — beginning [Anfangs].16
The German ‘revolution’, as Heidegger conceived it, laid the foun-
dation for more than the mere seizure of power.
Crucial, in this sense, is the distinction that Heidegger draws
between the notions of ‘starting point’ (Beginn), ‘beginning’ (Anfang),
and ‘origin’ (Ur-sprung) of the state.17 For Heidegger, the ‘starting
point’ is left behind as the ‘occurrence’ (Geschehen) unfolds. The
‘beginning’, meanwhile, irradiates unparalleled energy in its own ‘oc-
currence’. The radicalism of the Heideggerian ‘beginning’ is evidenced
in a foundational act that rests on the figure of the leader. According
to Heidegger, the leader does not contemplate the political reality but
shapes it. His intervention is historical and reveals a truth embodied
in danger and pólemos.18 If Heidegger once spoke of an event that ‘can
only be compared to the change at the beginning [Anfang] of the intel-
lectual history of the Western human being in general’,19 he now uses
the notion of ‘another beginning’ (andererAnfang) to refer to that same
phenomenon. Heidegger’s thinking takes this new turn in the context
of a discussion of what he envisions as ‘our people’ (unser Volk), which
is at once the ‘most endangered people’ (gefährdetstes Volk) and the
‘metaphysical people’ (metaphysisches Volk).20 Later, for Heidegger,
not only the statesman, but also the poet and the thinker will be the
15 Heidegger, ‘Hegel, “Rechtsphilosophie”’, p. 170.
16 Ibid., p. 73.
17 Ibid., pp. 74–75. Richard Polt states that ‘the main point here is that the chronological
beginning of a process, its “starting point”, is not necessarily an “inception” in the
Heideggerian sense’. See Richard Polt, ‘Self-Assertion as Founding’, in Martin Heideg-
ger, On Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: The 1934–35 Seminar and Interpretative Essays,
ed. by Peter Trawny, Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, and Michael Marder (London:
Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 67–81 (p. 74).
18 Heidegger, ‘Hegel, “Rechtsphilosophie”’, p. 177.
19 Heidegger, Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache, p. 132.
20 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, 102 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1975–),
xl: Einführung in die Metaphysik, ed. by Petra Jaeger (1983), p. 41.
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ones who express the radical self-affirmation and self-foundation of
the people: all of them must grapple with the question of who can
initiate the ‘beginning’. But, beyond any good or bad weather, in the
previous and foundationalist instance that we examined, Heidegger
assumes that philosophy — or rather, his philosophy — in conjunction
with the creation of the new leader is what drives the ‘new beginning’.21
LOOKING INTO THE EXCEPTIONALIST TRAP: THE
PHILOSOPHICO-POLITICAL AS PROBLEM
Centred on the ‘anxiety of influence’ and personal intrigue, the most
catastrophic interpretation of the tale of the fox lets out a deafening cry
in response to Heidegger’s exceptionalist description of the ‘beginning’
of a ‘we’ evident in Über Wesen und Begriff von Natur, Geschichte und
Staat, and ‘Hegel, “Rechtsphilosophie”’. The cleverness of this animal,
combined with its evil nature, is adduced to entrap everyone wander-
ing around under its spell. Heidegger’s trap, the philosophical positing
of a political beginning as ontologically exceptional, appears in this
rendition as a totalitarian realization imbued with unavoidable mag-
netism. Arendt, considered merely under Heidegger’s shadow, cannot
but accentuate the predicament. Subjugated to her former professor’s
enchantment, she, according to this version, ‘advocate[s] a form of
salvation, based on a superficially seductive — though equally Heide-
ggerian — vision of being-with (Mitsein). This vision leads her to
conceive a paradigm of the polis that excludes most of humanity: long
ago, the slave, the foreigner, the barbarian; today, the worker, the em-
ployee — in short, the multitude of those not immortalized by the
heroic grandeur of political action [la grandeur héroïque de l’agir po-
litique].’22 Conflating Heidegger’s and Arendt’s theoretical impulses,
this interpretation disregards her Auseinandersetzung with der Fall Hei-
degger — which is symptomatic since, even today, in the wake of a
new episode of it due to the recent publication of the Schwarzen Hefte,
interpretations tend either to denounce or to exculpate.
21 This tendency culminates when he asserts that ‘in sixty years, our state will certainly
not be led by the Führer anymore; but what happens then is up to us. This is why we
must philosophize [Deshalb müssen wir philosophieren]’ (Heidegger, ‘Hegel, Rechts-
philosophie. WS 34/35. Mitschrift Wilhelm Hallwachs’, p. 560; emphasis in original).
22 Faye, Arendt et Heidegger, p. 512.
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Even notions like ‘metapolitics’, which Heidegger ties to the ‘end
of “philosophy”’ (Ende der ‘Philosophie’), the ‘metaphysics of Dasein’
(Metaphysik des Daseins), the ‘historical people’ (geschichtliches Volk)
and, of course, the ‘new beginning’ (neuer Anfang),23 are envisioned
as part of a dispute that can, under no circumstances, be allowed to
sully philosophy. Heidegger’s defenders assert time and again that
the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century never scrutinized
political issues explicitly — which is simply false. Heidegger’s accusers
contend that his work can in no way be conceived as philosophy, since
the author was an enthusiastic supporter of German totalitarianism.24
Although one of Heidegger’s post-war aspirations was to protect his
philosophical project from readings that emphasize its political impli-
cations, Arendt herself had, by 1946, started to examine this issue.
Far from the praise of Heidegger’s philosophical endeavour voiced
in, for instance, her 1930 essay ‘Philosophie und Soziologie’, Arendt
challenges what she terms ‘Heideggerian functionalism’ in her 1946
text ‘What Is Existenz Philosophy?’.25 Central in her argument is the
inability of Heidegger and, mutatis mutandis, of philosophy, to rigor-
ously interrogate the status of plurality and life-in-common. Heidegger
is, according to Arendt, the last German Romantic and, as such, he is
completely irresponsible politically. The most patent expression of this
‘oblivion of politics’ is the fact that Heidegger’s thinking focuses on the
question of the ‘Self ’. ‘This ideal of the Self follows as a consequence of
Heidegger’s making of man what God was in earlier ontology’, Arendt
argues. And she adds that ‘a being of this highest order is conceivable
only as single and unique and knowing no equals’. In sum, ‘the essential
character of the Self is its absolute Self-ness, its radical separation from
23 Heidegger, Überlegungen ii-vi, pp. 115 and 124.
24 The paradigmatic cases of this dyad, which ultimately safeguards the immaculate site
of philosophy are: Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and Francesco Alfieri, Martin
Heidegger. La verita’ sui Quaderni Neri (Brescia: Morcelliana Editrice, 2016) and
Emmanuel Faye, Heidegger, l’introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie. Autour des
séminaires inédits de 1933–1935 (Paris: Albin Michel, 2005). Exceptions to the afore-
mentioned impasse are, among others: Peter Trawny and Andrew Mitchell, eds, Hei-
degger, die Juden, noch einmal (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2015); Andrew Mitchell
and Peter Trawny, eds, Heidegger’s Black Notebooks. Responses to Anti-Semitism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2017).
25 Hannah Arendt, ‘Philosophie und Soziologie. Anläßlich Karl Mannheims Ideologie und
Utopie’, DieGesellschaft, 7.1 (1930), pp. 163–76; ‘What Is Existenz Philosophy?’, in her
Essays in Understanding, pp. 163–87 (p. 178).
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all its fellows.’26 The climax of this invective is the brief tale in Arendt’s
Denktagebuch where, as noted, she compares Heidegger to a fox.
The Arendtian tale of the fox, nonetheless, is not her last word
about Heidegger nor is it a fate she was condemned to. For Arendt, the
figure of Heidegger represents an enigma at the core of the irresolvable
dispute between ‘philosophy’ and ‘politics’. Arendt will never cease to
theorize what is at stake in the ‘philosophico-political problem’ — a
crucial aspect of her critical interpretation of Heidegger’s project in
later essays.27 To fully understand this ‘problem’, we must bear in mind
the series of works she wrote starting after the war and through the
publication of The Human Condition in 1958.28
Of those writings, ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European
Philosophical Thought’ deserves special attention.29 In it, Arendt
discusses Heidegger’s emphasis on ‘historicity’ (Geschichtlichkeit) to
show that, for him, human history coincides with the history of Being.
Expressing a new critical approach — one at odds with her vision in
‘What Is Existenz Philosophy?’ — Arendt argues that neither a tran-
scendent spirit nor an absolute are revealed in Heidegger’s ontology. A
philosopher informed by the Heideggerian lesson would not attempt
to institute a vision of herself as a wise being who searches for eternal
patterns to understand human affairs that are, by definition, perishable.
For Arendt, this new understanding ‘opens the way to a reexamination
of the whole realm of politics in light of elementary human experi-
ences [and the discarding of] traditional concepts and judgments’.
Heidegger, then, is envisioned as an author who reads the old texts
26 Ibid., pp. 180 and 181.
27 See Arendt, OnRevolution; Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in PoliticalThought
(New York: Penguin, 1993); The Life of the Mind.
28 In reference to that last work, Arendt lets Heidegger know that it ‘came directly out of
the first Freiburg days [Freiburger Tagen] and hence owes practically everything to you
in every respect [schuldet Dir in jeder Hinsicht so ziemlich alles]’ (Arendt in Hannah
Arendt / Martin Heidegger, p. 149; Letters, p. 124). Remarkably, Arendt mistakenly
writes ‘Freiburger’ instead of ‘Marburger’.
29 See Arendt, ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’, in Es-
says in Understanding, pp. 428–47. See also ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European
Philosophical Thought’, in Perspektiven politischen Denkens. Beiträge anläßlich des 100.
Geburtstags von Hannah Arendt, ed. by Antonia Grunenberg, Waltraud Meints, Oliver
Bruns, and Christine Harckensee (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang Verlag, 2008), pp. 11–
31; ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’, in TheModern
Challenge to Tradition: Fragmente eines Buchs, ed. by Barbara Hahn and James McFar-
land (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2018), pp. 560–92.
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with new eyes. In response to a patent expression of the ‘philosophico-
political problem’ — mainly, the observation that philosophy mostly
deals with human being in the singular, whereas politics deals with
human beings in the plural — Heidegger’s notion of ‘world’ (Welt) is,
for Arendt, insightful. Insofar as Heidegger ‘defines human existence
as being-in-the-world’, Arendt claims that ‘he insists on giving philo-
sophic significance to structures of everyday life that are completely
incomprehensible if man is not primarily understood as being together
with others’.30
With this extended prolegomenon, I attempt to explicitly release
Arendt’s argument from any possible subordination to the process of
coming to terms with Heidegger’s totalitarian commitment. Arendt’s
work should function neither as mere repercussion of Heidegger’s
nor as protection against its most inadmissible tendencies. Indeed,
many theorists have considered how Arendt thinks both with and
against Heidegger.31 Stressing her critical stance, my examination of
the Arendtian notion of ‘political beginning’ shows its intertwinement
with the ‘an-archic principle’ of politics, a term to which I will return
in the third part of this essay.
Beyond any personal impulse that might have animated Arendt’s
endeavour,32 her discussion of the concept of ‘beginning’ can only be
30 Arendt, ‘Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought’, in Essays
in Understanding, pp. 432 and 443.
31 See, notably, Simona Forti, Vita della mente e tempo della polis (Milano: Franco Angeli,
1996), pp. 43–87; Peg Birmingham, ‘Heidegger and Arendt: The Birth of Political
Action and Speech’, in Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, ed. by François Raffoul
and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 191–
202; Miguel Abensour, Hannah Arendt contre la philosophie politique? (Paris: Sens
& Tonka, 2006); Miguel Abensour, ‘Contre la souveraineté de la philosophie sur
la politique. La Lecture arendtienne du mythe de la caverne’, in Hannah Arendt.
Crises de l’état-nation. Pensées alternatives, ed. by Anne Kupiec, Martine Leibovici,
Géraldine Muhlmann, and Etienne Tassin (Paris: Sens & Tonka), pp. 341–68. See
also Margaret Canovan, ‘Socrates or Heidegger? Hannah Arendt’s Reflections on
Philosophy and Politics’, Social Research, 57.1 (1990), pp. 135–65; Dana Villa, Arendt
and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1996); Antonia Grunenberg, Hannah Arendt und Martin Heidegger. Geschichte einer
Liebe (Munich: Piper, 2006); Taminiaux, La Fille de Thrace et le penseur professionnel;
Jacques Taminiaux, ‘La Déconstruction arendtienne des vues politiques de Heidegger’,
Cahiers philosophiques, 3.111 (2007), pp. 16–30; Dieter Thomä, ‘Hannah Arendt.
Liebe zur Welt’, in Heidegger Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung, ed. by Dieter Thomä
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 2013), pp. 397–402.
32 Strikingly, Arendt affirms that ‘sometimes I ask myself what is more difficult — to teach
the Germans a sense of politics [einen Sinn für Politik] or to impart to the Americans a
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properly understood if her persistent confrontation with the philo-
sophical tradition is taken into account. While Arendt’s engagement
with the question of the ‘beginning’ is not systematic, it does run
through all of her work, as does her interest in the related ‘principle’ or
‘principles’ of action. From Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin through The
Life of theMind, along with mentions in her key texts,33 the ‘beginning’
is omnipresent in the Arendtian world. While many have examined this
notion in her political theory,34 one aspect of it — Arendt’s dispute
with Heidegger over the ways of narrating the ‘beginning’ — has been
largely overlooked.
Considering her former professor’s radical stance on the Anfang,35
Arendt’s dictum that ‘against philosophy only philosophy helps’ (Ge-
light dusting of philosophy [einen leichtenDunst auch nur vonPhilosophie]’. SeeHannah
Arendt–Karl Jaspers Briefwechsel. 1926–1969, ed. by Lotte Köhler and Hans Saner
(Munich: Piper, 1985), p. 165.
33 See, among others, Hannah Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. Versuch einer philo-
sophischen Interpretation (Hildesheim: Olms, 2006); Was ist Politik? Fragmente aus
dem Nachlaß, ed. by Ursula Ludz and Kurt Sontheimer (Munich: Piper, 1993); The
Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian, 1958); ‘On the Nature of Totalitari-
anism: An Essay in Understanding’, in her Essays in Understanding, pp. 328–60; The
Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998); On Revolution; Between
Past and Future, The Life of the Mind.
34 See, among others, Bonnie Honig, ‘Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida
on the Problem of Founding a Republic’, The American Political Science Review, 85.1
(1991), pp. 97–113; Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her
Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 136–55; Linda
Zerilli, ‘Castoriadis, Arendt, and the Problem of the New’, Constellations, 9.4 (2002),
pp. 540–53; Allan Keenan, ‘Promises, Promises: The Abyss of Freedom and the Loss of
the Political in the Work of Hannah Arendt’, in his Democracy in Question. Democratic
Openness in aTime of Political Closure (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003),
pp. 76–101; Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max
Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008), pp. 187–300; Patchen Markell, ‘The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê, and
Democracy’,TheAmericanPolitical ScienceReview, 100.1 (2006), pp. 1–14; Lucy Cane,
‘Hannah Arendt on the Principles of Political Action’, European Journal of Political
Theory, 14.1 (2015), pp. 55–75; Claudia Hilb, ‘El principio del initium’, in Revolución
y violencia en la filosofía de Hannah Arendt, ed. by Marco Estrada Saavedra and María
Teresa Muñoz (México D.F.: El Colegio de México, 2015), pp. 67–102.
35 See, in particular, Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, 102 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann,
1975–), xxxv: Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie. Auslegung des Anaxim-
ander und Parmenides, ed. by Peter Trawny (2012); lxv: Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom
Ereignis), ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (1994); lv: Heraklit. Der Anfang
des abendländischen Denkens. Logik. Heraklits Lehre vom Logos, ed. by Manfred Frings
(1987); lxx: Über den Anfang, ed. by Paola-Ludovika Coriando (2005); lxxi: Das
Ereignis, ed. by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (2009); lxxiii.1–2: Zum Ereignis-
Denken, ed. by Peter Trawny (2013).
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gen Philosophie hilft nur Philosophie) must not be disregarded:36 to
interrogate the question of the politicality of the ‘beginning’ in an
Arendtian fashion requires scrutinizing its philosophical vein in order
to deactivate the exceptionalist impulses inherent to the act of begin-
ning. Arendt acknowledges this important facet of the ‘philosophico-
political problem’ against the backdrop of modern revolutions and
totalitarianism. She does not brush aside the pitfall of exceptionalism
when she returns to Heidegger’s thinking only to go beyond it since,
for her, the politicality of the ‘beginning’ lies in its plural character:
beginnings are, in Arendt’s view, set off by the ‘endless variety of a
multitude whose majesty resided in its very plurality’.37
Bypassing the scandal sparked by a catastrophic interpretation
of the tale of the fox, I have attempted to bring to light a theoret-
ical impasse: either interpreters have disregarded how Arendt’s notion
of ‘beginning’ is rooted in her Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger or
they have taken that dispute into account but overlooked the risks
inherent to the Heideggerian understanding of the ‘beginning’ as an ex-
traordinary event. In order to fully address the question of ‘beginning’,
it is, I argue, vital to return to that impasse. Once it is disentangled,
it becomes evident that both a ‘principle of an-archy’ and the basic
experience of its common institution animate political foundation. It
is at the core of ‘bad weather’, then, that a promise to withstand and
multiply beginnings lies.
WEATHERING BEGINNINGS OR THE AN-ARCHIC PROMISE
The story of Heidegger and Arendt was re-written more than once.
During her first semester at the Philipps-Universität Marburg, Arendt
attended Heidegger’s seminar on Plato’s Sophist, which included a
reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. This first encounter had last-
ing theoretical consequences in Arendt’s work and, particularly, in her
contention with the philosophical tradition. Indeed, her interest in the
36 See Arendt’s letter to Dolf Sternberger dated 26 August 1949 in Hannah Arendt,
Wahrheit gibt es nur zu zweien. Briefe an die Freunde, ed. by Ingeborg Nordmann
(Munich: Piper, 2013), p. 86.
37 Arendt, On Revolution, 93. See also Hannah Arendt, ‘Philosophy and Politics’, Social
Research, 57.1 (1990), pp. 73–103.
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notion of ‘beginning’ emerged precisely during the ‘Marburg days’. As
Arendt reminds us, though, intense engagement with this topic is not
incidental: the question of ‘political beginnings’ is as old as philosoph-
ical concerns with politics in general.38 Approaching the atavisms of
tradition as a means to engage the abyssal character of political mod-
ernity, Arendt undertakes a far-reaching theoretical investigation that
releases ‘political beginnings’ from the pure spontaneity of the great
event and the given.
Despite not having access to the recently published seminars and
notebooks in which Heidegger advocates a fusion of ‘ontology’ and
‘politics’ as a key to understanding the ‘new beginning’, Arendt refutes
some of his basic assumptions on founding moments in politics. If, in
the Heideggerian constellation, grasping an extraordinary beginning
and the great mission of a ‘we’ is based on the repudiation of clumsy
repetition and requires ‘destroying destruction’ (détruire la destruc-
tion),39 if that neuer Anfang is inextricably related to a ‘fundamental
experience’ (Grunderfahrung) expressed in the figures of ‘danger’ (Ge-
fahr), ‘self-affirmation’ (Selbstbehauptung), and ‘destiny’ (Schicksal),40
then, by contrast, the Arendtian endeavour focuses on what, in refer-
ence to the formulation of one of her most sophisticated collaborators,
Reiner Schürmann, we might call the ‘an-archic principle’ inherent in
every ‘beginning’.41 Arendt’s ‘political beginning’ lies beyond an excep-
tionalist scene that seeks to bring to a halt the decline of the West and,
to that end, exacerbates the intimate fusion of ‘ontology’ and ‘politics’,
of the Dasein and the German people.
In releasing ‘beginning’ from its ontological substratum, Arendt,
thinking with and against Heidegger, returns to the question of ‘polit-
ical inception’. She observes that the Anfang is based on the paradox
of its self-institution. This realization, I argue, evidences that Arendt’s
rendition of ‘political beginnings’ constitutes one of the highest points
38 In her 1969 birthday tribute to Heidegger, Arendt states: ‘Plato once remarked that
“the beginning [Anfang] is also a god; so long as he dwells among human beings, he
redeems all things” (Laws 775)’ (Arendt, ‘Martin Heidegger ist achtzig Jahre alt’, p.
232; my emphasis).
39 See Jean-Luc Nancy, Banalité de Heidegger (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2015), p. 42.
40 Heidegger, Überlegungen ii-vi, pp. 160–62.
41 See Reiner Schürmann, Le Principe d’anarchie. Heidegger et la question de l’agir (Paris:
Éditions du Seuil, 1982).
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in her examination of the ineradicable tension between ‘philosophy’
and ‘politics’. Without absolutes — which implies questioning philo-
sophical intervention in the political domain — ‘beginnings’ cannot
be grounded on the itineraries of an exceptionalist ‘history of Being’
or of ‘history as drama of being’ (l’histoire comme drame de l’être).42
‘Beginnings’ undergo, rather, the an-archic pluralization at stake in
any extra-ordinary act of political foundation. ‘An-archic’ has a specific
meaning: to ‘begin’ with, the archē of a principle inheres the fusion
of ‘its beginning (commencement) and its rule (commandement)’.43
Conversely, the anarchic ‘lacks simple ultimacy’ and counteracts any
principial reference by being a ‘force of dislocation, of plurification’
regarding fully constituted archē as point of origin and governance.44
Through an understanding of ‘beginning’ as a conjunction of in-
augural actions governed by an ‘an-archic principle’, Arendt can elabor-
ate a response both to the widespread confusion regarding the domains
of labour, work, and action, and to the traditional representation of the
Platonic myth of the cave where the polis, grounded on the agáthōn,
is, ultimately, assumed to be the founding myth of every political the-
ory. Arendt’s critical assessment of the philosophical tradition — from
Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes, Marx, and Heidegger — shows that, in
elaborating the notion of ‘beginning’, she is trying to find ways of the-
matizing political groundings without upholding a principle that lies
beyond human affairs. The ‘an-archic principle’ innate to the ‘begin-
ning’ can only exist in confrontation with the provenance of the One
as fusion of origin and rule. Politically, it implies that ‘power under the
condition of human plurality can never amount to omnipotence, and
laws residing on human power can never be absolute’.45 Detecting the
limits and promises of an an-archic ‘beginning’ — a ‘beginning’without
banisters— means, then, bringing to the fore the contours of the excep-
tionalist Heideggerian trap. And that is no mean feat. Arendt herself
42 For this formulation, see Alain Badiou, Le Séminaire. Heidegger. L’Être 3 — Figure du
retrait. 1986–1987 (Paris: Fayard, 2015), p. 122.
43 Schürmann, Le Principe d’anarchie, p. 42.
44 Schürmann, ‘Technicity, Topology, Tragedy: Heidegger on “That Which Saves” in the
Global Reach’, in Technology in theWestern Political Tradition, ed. by Arthur M. Melzer,
Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zimman (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1993), pp. 190–213 (p. 199); Le Principe d’anarchie, p. 16.
45 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 39.
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pointed out the risks of her former professor’s siren song: ‘Come here,
everyone; this is a trap, the most beautiful trap in the world [die schöns-
te Falle der Welt].’46
One way of circumventing the magnetism of a trap that offers
the ecstasy of the extraordinary is to associate the ‘an-archic prin-
ciple’ of ‘beginning’ with the basic experience of ‘bad weather’ —
a weather that, expressing the force of contingency, ameliorates ex-
ceptionalist myths around the grandeur and singularity of political
foundations. Arendt vehemently contests narratives that constrict the
‘manyness of beginnings’. The figure of the great founder understood
as an ontological supplement of ‘the political’ must give way to the idea
of democratic ‘ordinary glories’. Arendt’s commitment to a ‘politics of
the ordinary’, to be sure, does not mean suppressing that which erupts
unpredictably or that which challenges the status quo.47 At stake in the
‘an-archic principle’ of ‘political beginnings’ is not the contraposition
of ordinary and extraordinary moments, but rather recognition of ‘an-
onymous glory’. That is why Arendt appreciates the ‘nameless heroes’
(namenlose Helden), the ‘common man’ (gewöhnlicher Mensch), the
‘anybody and everybody’ (irgendwer und jedermann) who is ‘ruled by
his laws and not by mysterious forces [geheimnisvolle Kräfte] emanat-
ing from above or from below’.48
Ultimately, my returning to Arendt’s Auseinandersetzung with Hei-
degger, to the sotto voce dispute between them over how to narrate the
experience of the ‘beginning’, was not merely an exegetic matter. It was
46 Arendt, Denktagebuch, p. 403; ‘Heidegger the Fox’, p. 362.
47 Arendt makes this point crystal clear by affirming that ‘the common and the ordinary
must remain our primary concern, the daily food of our thought — if only because it is
from them that the uncommon and the extraordinary emerge’. Hannah Arendt, ‘Action
and the Pursuit of Happiness’, Paper delivered at the Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, The Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library of Congress, MSS Box
61, 1960, pp. 1–21 (p. 2; my emphasis). See also Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of
the Extraordinary, p. 224; Bonnie Honig, Emergency Politics: Paradox, Law, Democracy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. xviii.
48 Hannah Arendt, ‘Franz Kafka, von neuem gewürdigt’, Die Wandlung, 1.12
(1945/1946), pp. 1050–62 (pp. 1058 and 1062); ‘Franz Kafka’, in her Die verborgene
Tradition. Essays (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), pp. 95–116 (pp. 108 and 115);
‘Franz Kafka: A Revaluation. On the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of his
Death’, in her Essays in Understanding, pp. 69–80 (pp. 76 and 80). See also Étienne
Tassin, ‘Les Gloires ordinaires: Actualité du concept arendtien d’espace public’,
Cahiers Sens Public, 15–16 (2013), pp. 23–36; Patchen Markell, ‘Anonymous Glory’,
European Journal of Political Theory, 16.1 (2017), pp. 77–99.
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also an attempt to open up a space to re-ask what the promise of politics
should be today. Current struggles against climate change, exploita-
tion, neo-colonialism, extractivism, patriarchy, and racism, prove that
a ‘politics of the ordinary’ cannot rely on redemptive figures that incar-
nate the myth of leadership. Beginning anew, thus, can only commence
if we accept that, not anymore univocal, ‘political beginnings’ should
stage and enact the plural ‘power of the many’. The storms can only
be weathered if beginnings appear as they are: common and mundane
occurrences that hold in them the potential to interdigitate, proliferate,




Representing theWorld,Weathering its End
Arthur Bispo do Rosário’s Ecology of the Ship
MARLON MIGUEL
PRE SCRIPTUM
If one looks at the definition of the word ‘weather’, one will find an
intrinsic relation to the sea and the ship.1 ‘Weather’ is, on the one hand,
a noun that refers to ‘the state of the atmosphere at a particular place
and time’, and, on the other, a verb, meaning:
1. to expose to open air and, therefore, to begin a process of trans-
formation or alteration due to ‘long exposure to the atmosphere’
2. ‘to bear up against and come safely through’, commonly referred
to a ship coming ‘safely through a storm’ (‘the sturdy boat had
1 I would like to acknowledge the support of some people that made this text possible.
First of all, the team of the Museu Bispo do Rosário Arte Contemporânea, in particular,
the curator Ricardo Resende for authorizing the publication and sending the images of
Bispo’s works, as well as the coordinator for education and curatorship of the Museum,
Diana Kolker. The latter kindly received me in the Museum in November 2019 and was
a crucial interlocutor for writing this text. I thank also Tania Rivera for the essential
exchanges around Bispo’s work, as well as Eleonora Fabião and Márcio Seligmann-Silva
for sending me their papers, which are quoted in this chapter. Finally, I thank Delfina
Cabrera and Claudia Peppel for their crucial commentaries and for the discussions
around this piece during the last year.
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weathered the storm well’); ‘to make good, bad, etc. weather of
a ship’; to behave well or ill in a storm. And then, by extension
and, more metaphorically, ‘to live through a difficult situation or
a problem’, ‘to undergo or endure the action of the elements’.2
Etymologically, ‘weather’ comes from the old English weder (air,
sky, breeze, storm, tempest) and the Proto-Germanic wedra (wind,
weather). In the seventeenth century, it was associated with the idea
of ‘coming through safely’ and often with ‘a ship riding out a storm’. In
nautical use, it appears also as an adjective, meaning ‘toward the wind’
(opposed thus to ‘lee’). An expression such as ‘under the weather’,
for example, also comes from nautical vocabulary and before evolving
to the connotation it carries today of feeling unwell, it originally ex-
pressed the action of going down, below, under the deck and away
from the elements. Later, in the course of the eighteenth century,
‘weather’ gets tied to exposure as a metaphor. In Latin, tempestas
means ‘season’, ‘weather’, ‘bad weather’, ‘tempest/storm’, but also time,
and we know how the French temps, Spanish tiempo, Portuguese and
Italian tempo mean both the time and the weather — the only ex-
ception in Latin languages is the Romanian, which has timp and
vremea, meaning ‘time’ and ‘weather’, although strangely vremea can
also be used as ‘time’. Latin languages also have the derived terms of
tempestade/tempest/tempête/tempesta/tormenta/temporal(e)/etc. It is
thus remarkable that the terms in both Latin and Germanic languages
evolved in a nearly parallel fashion; and even though the Germanic
languages make the distinction between ‘time’ and ‘weather’, the latter
remains associated with the passing of time and the idea of ‘going
through’. As verb, ‘weather’ condenses the two meanings and synthe-
tizes them into a certain contradiction: it relates to both the passing
and the effects of time and the resistance to time and its effects.
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I would like to explore a constellation of issues that
run through Arthur Bispo do Rosário’s work and posit how these
2 See Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 2020)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/>, OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2020) <https://www.oed.com/>, and Online Etymology Dictionary <https:
//www.etymonline.com/> [accessed 28 June 2020].
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works — and the topics they engage — reveal an intriguing relation-
ship between weather/weathering, sea, memory, and artistic produc-
tion. These terms are to be read, on the one hand, in the context of
Bispo’s eschatological narrative: his ‘mission’ of representing the world
through objects that can weather till the end of times. But, on the other
hand and beyond the artist’s assumed discourse, his constructions are
also a way of weathering obliteration and oblivion — of weathering
the ‘natural’ fate he was destined for because of his racial, social, and
clinical status. His objects — and among them, several types of ships
— contribute to an inventive strategy to deal with memory and the
process of recollection.
In 2017 and 2018, I collaborated on the exhibition Lugares do
delírio (Places of Delirium), curated by the researcher and psycho-
analyst Tania Rivera. The exhibition combined works of well-known
artists from the established art circuit (such as Cildo Meireles and
Lygia Clark) and those of more or less well-known ‘mad’ artists. In fact,
the curator’s aim was not so much to talk about madness, but rather
about delirium, or about how, in her words:
[T]he field of the artistic production can be rigorously taken
as cultural field of the construction of reality. In the art, one
has deliriums [delira-se, a verb in Portuguese], the thought
leaves its usual rails, the imaginary rails that fix the ‘common’
reality in which we alienate ourselves.3
By shifting, thus, the perspective from madness to delirium, Rivera
reactivates the Freudian gesture, which looks at psychiatric ‘disorders’
as positive phenomena. In the case of the delirium, this means seeing
it as a form of the production of subjectivity, an ‘attempt at a cure or a
reconstruction’.4
3 Fatima Pinheiro and Tania Rivera, ‘In Situ | Lugares do Delírio — Entrevista com Tania
Rivera’, Subversos (2017); my translation <http://subversos.com.br/in-situ-lugares-
do-delirio-entrevista-com-tania-rivera/> [accessed 28 June 2020]. See also Tania
Rivera, ‘Museu dos delírios — notas sobre a exposição Lugares do delírio’, Ao Largo,
6 (2018) <https://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/33478/33478.PDF> [accessed 28
June 2020].
4 Sigmund Freud, ‘Neurosis and Psychosis’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psy-
chological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London:
Hogarth, 1953–74), xix: The Ego and the Id and Other Works (1923–25) (1961), pp.
147–54 (p. 151).
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To my surprise, when I arrived at the Art Museum of Rio de Janeiro
(MAR), in the beginning of the exhibition’s installation, I found
mainly boats. The patients of the public mental health system, many
of whom were Afro-descendants — as is common in the Brazilian
psychiatric system — had built most of these objects. There were boats
by, among others, Maurício Flandeiro (from Cariri in northeastern
Brazil and patient of the public mental health system), Arlindo Oliveira
and Luiz Carlos Marques (both attending the therapeutic space Gaia
Atelier, at the Colônia Juliano Moreira, in Rio de Janeiro). Alongside
these works, one could see also those built by Bispo do Rosário. They
were very prominent, and it was clear that he was a key figure in the
exhibition — he gave coherence to that strange ocean of objects dis-
played in the museum space. That particular institution seemed also
the perfect place to host the exhibition as it is called MAR — ‘sea’, in
Portuguese — and was recently built in the renewed waterfront district
of Rio de Janeiro.5
My first association when observing this emerging milieu was
Michel Foucault’s History of Madness, its discussion of the ship of
fools, and the mysterious relationship between water, navigation, and
madness stressed therein.6 And indeed, in the exhibition, by collect-
5 The exhibition was originally proposed by curator and art critic Paulo Herkenhoff,
curated by Tania Rivera. It was first shown at the Museum of Art of Rio (MAR), from 2
February to 17 September 2017 and subsequently, in an expanded version, at the SESC
Pompeia, in São Paulo, from 12 April to 2 July 2018. About the MAR, see footnote 9.
6 ‘So the ship of fools was heavily loaded with meaning, and clearly carried a great
social force. On the one hand, it had incontestably practical functions, as entrusting
a madman to the care of boatmen meant that he would no longer roam around the
city walls, and ensured that he would travel far and be a prisoner of his own departure.
But there was more: water brought its own dark symbolic charge, carrying away, but
purifying too. Navigation brought man face to face with the uncertainty of destiny,
where each is left to himself and every departure might always be the last. The madman
on his crazy boat sets sail for the other world, and it is from the other world that he
comes when he disembarks. This enforced navigation is both rigorous division and
absolute Passage, serving to underline in real and imaginary terms the liminal situation
of the mad in medieval society. It was a highly symbolic role, made clear by the mental
geography involved, where the madman was confined at the gates of the cities. His
exclusion was his confinement, and if he had no prison other than the threshold itself
he was still detained at this place of passage. In a highly symbolic position he is placed
on the inside of the outside, or vice versa. A posture that is still his today, if we admit
that what was once the visible fortress of social order is now the castle of our own
consciousness. Water and navigation had that role to play. Locked in the ship from
which he could not escape, the madman was handed over to the thousand-armed river,
to the sea where all paths cross, and the great uncertainty that surrounds all things. A
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ing ships, Rivera also tried to reframe the question of madness — as
already noted — towards that of delirium, emphasizing the productive,
creative force of the latter. In this way, she also echoed the proposal of
the curator and art theoretician Frederico Morais, primarily respons-
ible for the acknowledgement of the importance of Bispo’s works, as
well as for their reception in the art world. According to Morais, Bispo’s
deliriums should be seen as an attempt at ‘ordering of ideas, [an]
elaboration of concepts’.7 As we will see, Bispo’s production is a way
of (re)building a world, a form of organizing what the medical order
called his ‘disorder’ — ‘paranoid schizophrenia’, ‘delusion of grandeur’,
etc. according to the several diagnoses he had received throughout his
life.
However, I think there is more. Bispo’s objects (and among them,
ships) can be also the source of a series of radically different questions
sending us to other seas. These questions relate, in particular, to a
reflection on the ocean and the water beyond their only ‘metaphysical’
dimensions — or as a ‘paradigmatic metaphor for existence’.8 They
relate also to memory in a world that is, we must more than ever
acknowledge, necessarily marked by the transatlantic slave trade.9
prisoner in the midst of the ultimate freedom, on the most open road of all, chained
solidly to the infinite crossroads. He is the Passenger par excellence, the prisoner of the
passage. It is not known where he will land, and when he lands, he knows not whence
he came’ (Michel Foucault, History of Madness, ed. by Jean Khalfa, trans. by Jonathan
Murphy (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 10–11).
7 Frederico Morais, Arthur Bispo do Rosario: arte além da loucura (Rio de Janeiro: Livre
Galeria e Nau Editora, 2013), p. 66; my translation.
8 Hans Blumenberg, Shipwreck with Spectator: Paradigm of a Metaphor for Existence,
trans. by Steven Rendall (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
9 In this sense, the position of the MAR in Rio de Janeiro’s social and political geography
adds a layer of complexity to my analysis that I should at least acknowledge. The
museum was opened in March 2013 as part of the renovation project of Rio’s city centre
for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. This area of Rio is historically very
important. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, not far from the Museum,
a large slave market used to take place. Close to it, there was a vast slave cemetery
(Cemitério dos Pretos Novos), which was built over and for a very long time forgotten,
to be found again only at the end of the 1990s. It became, in 2005, the institute for
black (or ‘negro’, preto) memory Instituto de Pesquisa e Memória Pretos Novos. The
city centre renovation project was very ambiguous and highly problematic, based on
a neoliberal agenda preoccupied more with attracting investments and tourism to the
city than with progressive social change. Many people in the region were expelled from
their homes. The populations living in the favelas around the area — such as the Morro
da Providencia, the first favela built in Rio de Janeiro at the end of nineteenth century
— were targeted in particular. The Institute became undesirable because it stood in the
252 REPRESENTING THE WORLD
 
 
Figure 1. Vinte e Um Veleiros (Twenty-One Sailboats), Museu Bispo do
Rosário Collection. Photography: Rodrigo Lopes.
In this sense, I would like to suggest, inspired by the reflections of
other contemporary thinkers, to look at Bispo do Rosário’s production
through the prism of decolonial critique and blackness. I propose to
emphasize an aspect that was for a long time avoided in the analyses
of Bispo’s works, namely, that they are produced by a black man, in
a society profoundly marked by racist and colonial elements.10 The
many ships he produced throughout his life can be read as part of
an ‘ecology of the ship’. They constitute forms that deal with, that
assemble, and reassemble mnemonic elements inscribed in his body.
way of a projected new line of the tramway system. Now, without public resources since
2017, the Institute is at risk again of being shuttered for good and hence exemplifies the
national agenda of an erasure of memory and counter-memory. Despite having been
born of this very city project, the MAR itself is now also at risk and has been targeted
by the current municipal government.
10 I am of course not the only one emphasizing this dimension, neglected for too long.
Ricardo Aquino, for example, also remarked upon the ‘efforts in whitening Arthur
Bispo do Rosário; of not evidencing his Negritude or his African background’: Ricardo
Aquino, ‘From Picturesque to Points in Time: A Biographical Image’, in Arthur Bispo
do Rosário, ed. by Emanoel Araújo and others, curated by Wilson Lazaro; trans. by
Regina Alfarano (Rio de Janeiro: Réptil, 2012), pp. 48–105 (p. 51).
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BISPO DO ROSÁRIO, THE MAN AND HIS MISSION
Bispo spent most of his life inside psychiatric institutions, and there
is an important nexus between elements of his life, his psychotic deli-
riums and his production of hundreds of objects, many of them ships
or forms that relate to the sea. For a long time, little was known about
the artist, but archival research, interviews with those who knew him,
in addition to the few interviews Bispo gave himself, and a more thor-
ough analysis of his oeuvre have made it possible to at least partially
reconstruct his biography.
An important work regarding his trajectory is that of his bio-
grapher Luciana Hidalgo, who assembled key data and managed to
shed light upon Bispo’s mysterious past. Arthur Bispo do Rosário Paes
was born around 1909–11, in Japaratuba, Sergipe, in northeastern
Brazil.11 The city of Japaratuba was originally a Tupi village, whose
population was diminished by a smallpox outbreak in the eighteenth
century. Following the outbreak, the city was occupied by a Carmelites
mission for a period of time — the JaparatubaMission, a name that ap-
pears in one of Bispo’s embroideries — and it remained a very Catholic
city. Bispo spent his first years immersed in a religious environment
of processions, moral customs, stories of sins and blessed martyrs,
mixed with elements of African and indigenous traditions. The small
city also developed an important tradition of embroidery. Some years
later, records say that his parents moved with him to Bahia to work
at a cacao farm.12 At the age of fifteen, he joined the Navy, and then
moved to Rio.13 He also became a pugilist and, after being expelled
from the Navy for ‘disciplinary reasons’ — according to Navy records
— he started to work at the Rio’s electricity company and later as a
11 Three registers were found concerning Bispo’s birth date: 14 May 1909 (Navy register),
16 March 1911 (electricity company register) and his baptism certificate found in the
church of Japaratuba from which one can deduce that he was born most probably in the
first week of July. Cf. Luciana Hidalgo, Arthur Bispo do Rosário. O senhor do Labirinto
(Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 2011), pp. 30–31.
12 For an analysis of the different documents and texts regarding these records, see
also Viviane Trindade Borges, Do esquecimento ao tombamento. A invenção de Arthur
Bispo do Rosário (doctoral dissertation, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul,
2010), pp. 36–59 <https://www.lume.ufrgs.br/handle/10183/22989> [accessed 28
June 2020].
13 He started to work at the Navy in 1925. Records say that he was sent by his father,
although some speculate that he was sold to the Navy, a common practice at the time.
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domestic worker for a bourgeois family (the Leone family) — where
he would clean the house, go to the market, and serve as bodyguard of
the patriarch (not for a salary, which he refused as a matter of principle,
but for food and lodging). He finally worked for two years as a handy-
man at a clinic owned by the patriarch’s brother-in-law, again refusing
a salary, since he saw salaries as the origin of all sins. The attic of the
clinic became his living place and studio.
One night, on 22 December 1938, he had what was probably
his first ‘episode’: seven angels descended on the Earth, transported
and left him at the Botafogo neighbourhood, from where he began a
peregrination to a church in the city centre. This crucial event consists,
for him, in a moment of revelation: he is Jesus Christ — or, in other
variants he gave, his son or ‘Arthur Jesus’, as he would sign some of
his works — and had come to Earth to judge the dead and the living,
to govern a new world, which he would recreate after its destruction
through fire. Like many other biographical details of his life, which
appear in his works, this date and the tale narrating the event were
embroidered in a big banner (Figure 2) and repeated by himself in
interviews given at the Colônia towards the end of his life.14
From this moment on, Bispo claims that he started to hear voices
obliging him to work and to produce his objects. In an interview, he
claims that it was not an option not to work, even if he did not want to.
He was given a divine task by these ‘voices’ and had no other choice
but to comply — thus he would claim to be their ‘slave’ or also ‘slave of
the Lord’.15
After what could be considered his major episode, Bispo wandered
for two days before being arrested by the police. The police record
defines him as such: a ‘wandering black beggar [“indigent”], bearing no
documents’.16 He was then sent to the Hospital Nacional dos Aliena-
dos in December 1938 and to the Colônia Juliano Moreira in January
14 See O prisioneiro da passagem: Arthur Bispo do Rosário, dir. by Hugo Denizart (Centro
Nacional de Produção Independente, 1982) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
PjgP1LYLZOU> [accessed 28 June 2020], a title (The prisoner of the passage) that
echoes Foucault’s passage about the ship of fools quoted above; as well as O Bispo,
dir. by Fernando Gabeira (Globo TV, 1985) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
x9wc-_XoCcw> [accessed 28 June 2020].
15 O Bispo (1985), at ca. 8:00.






Figure 2. Above: Eu Preciso Destas Palavras. Escrita (I Need This Words in
Writing), Museu Bispo do Rosário Collection. Photography: Rodrigo
Lopes. Below: Detail.
1939, becoming patient number 01662. As a typical poor, black fig-
ure of Brazilian society, he was just another person without a name,
history, or identity — a mere black ‘indigent’, according to the police
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record, to be locked away. When he died, fifty years later, his clinical
record amounted to barely a few words.
Bispo would go back and forth between these two institutions
(with some stays also at the Centro Psiquiátrico Nacional/Centro
Psiquiátrico Pedro II) until 1948.17 In 1964, he came back to the
Colônia, where he then stayed until his death in 1988. In 1967, accord-
ing to research conducted by Frederico Morais, he was put into a small
cell of six square meters. In this period, he again started to hear voices
obliging him to work, to produce his objects and reminding him about
his salvation mission on Earth:18
My mission is that, it is to achieve that, what I have to the
following day [is] to represent the existence of Earth that is
there, everything I did. […] I will be preparing and packing
[encaixotando, boxing] the things. Because the order is to
pack.19
17 The psychiatrist Nise da Silveira ran a studio (which later, in 1952, would become
the Museum of Images of the Unconscious) inside the Centro Psiquiátrico Nacional.
Silveira emphasized the creation of a favourable working environment for artistic en-
deavours and considered the patient’s production crucial instruments for the scientific
study of psychosis. She organized permanent exhibitions and collaborated with fig-
ures such as the art critic Mário Pedrosa and the artist Almir Mavignier. Bispo was
interned in other sections, and there is no evidence of an encounter with Silveira. The
Colônia Juliano Moreira also contained an art section, with occupational activities
and a painting workshop, being used in particular in the 1950s. See João Henrique
Queiroz de Araújo and Ana Maria Jacó-Vilela, ‘The Experience of Art at the Juliano
Moreira Colony in the 1950s’, trans. by Rebecca Atkinson, História, Ciências, Saúde-
Manguinhos, 25.2 (2018) <https://doi.org/10.1590/s0104-59702018000200002>.
However, Bispo was not there during this period. In fact, he went back to Colônia
within a week of the 1964 military coup and remained institutionalized during the
‘years of lead’, coinciding with the worst period of the Brazilian psychiatric system.
18 For a certain time, researchers would consider this moment key to the beginning of
his production. Photos taken by Jean Manzon in 1943, however, show Bispo already
dressed in his ‘presentation mantle’ next to a big ship built by him, Bianca Bernardo,
‘Quem você deixaria entrar em sua cela sem precisar acertar a cor da sua aura?’, in Das
virgens em cardumes e da cor das auras, ed. by Daniela Labra (São Paulo: WMF Martins
Fontes, 2016), pp. 122–35 (p. 126). Ricardo Aquino also mentions a drawing of a boat
dating from the 1930s, in his ‘From Picturesque to Points in Time’, p. 87.
19 Bispo do Rosário interviewed by Conceição Robaina, quoted in Flavia dos Santos
Corpas, Arthur Bispo do Rosario: Do claustro infinito à instalação de um nome (doctoral
thesis, Pontifícia Universidade Católica PUC-Rio, 2014), p. 90; my translation <https:
//www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/35039/35039.PDF> [accessed 28 June 2020]. Ac-
cording to Corpas, Bispo talks about a mission at least since 1938 and a medical record
of the Centro Psiquiátrico Nacional (without date, but certainly between 1938 and
1948) states, in principle, his claim: ‘it is a mission to reform the world we live’ (ibid.,
p. 57).
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After a certain period of time, he left this cell and started to pro-
gressively occupy other larger cells and spaces at the hospital — up
to eleven cells at the end of his life — that constituted at the same
time his living space and studio. He transformed this enclosed space
into a living installation, a sort of labyrinth of hallways, galleries, and
passages, which were constantly rearranged. In some cells, he stocked
objects and raw materials (bricks, tiles, glass shards, wood sticks, syr-
inges, etc.); others were rearranged and installed with the different
pieces; in others, he lived, kept kitchen appliances, which allowed him
to barter coffee, for example, for materials and tools from other pa-
tients. This generous allotment of asylum spaces only became possible
thanks to the particular position he managed to occupy at the Colônia:
he cleaned the space, took care of other patients, and also played the
role of ‘sheriff ’, beating, for example, patients in moments of crises, or
administering medication prescribed by the doctors. Patients, doctors,
and the personnel accepted and even respected Bispo’s strange man-
ners, giving him space to do things more or less as he wanted.
Bispo exercised a sort of ascetic practice, eating very little, and
even entering long periods of fasting. He believed he needed to, in
his words, ‘dry’ in order to achieve ‘his transformation’ and become
a ‘saint’. He avoided the same medications he gave to other patients,
afraid of ‘lulling his senses’. His cells constituted also a fortified terri-
tory and only those capable of ‘naming the colour of his aura’ — blue
— were given access to it. Whenever he felt the voices were again too
strongly present, he would lock himself in his cell and avoid contact
with others, sometimes lasting several months. That is, as I am tempted
to put it, whenever he felt he was excessively under the weather, that his
inner turmoil had become unbearable, he would seek refuge in his cell.
The conditions of the psychiatric asylums in Brazil at the time
were truly terrible and the way in which the Brazilian system was
structured early on implemented principles of eugenics and ideas of
a necessary ‘cleansing of the race’, which undoubtedly explains why
Bispo remained confined over so many years, just as in general black
subjects spend disproportionately more time in asylums than white
subjects.20
20 For more precise data and a history of the Brazilian psychiatric system, I refer to
another article recently written: Marlon Miguel, ‘Psychiatric Power: Exclusion and
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That said, in contrast, for example, to Antonin Artaud, Bispo him-
self did not view his confinement at the psychiatric hospital was as a
torment but as a ‘sign of recognition’ and recognition, in particular, of
his ‘mission on Earth’. Through his deliriums — or, in Bispo’s words,
his ‘visions’ and ‘voices’ that ordered him to work — and the objects he
produced, he found a way, at the same time, to survive and to stabilize
his madness: he found a way, his own and singular way, to be in the
world, that is, to construct a world for himself.
BISPO’S INVENTORY: WEATHERING THE END OF THE WORLD
Bispo do Rosário’s objects speak about the asylum, his own history,
about the people he met throughout life, lived with and talked to in
the asylum and elsewhere. These objects are all part of a unique and
rigorous system that aim at a ‘representation of the existent material
on Earth’, as he often claimed himself.21 I do not propose to read his
work uniquely through a biographical lens, but the elements recalled
above should help better situate his production and draw attention to
the colonial and racial elements profoundly marked in his trajectory:
from his childhood in Japartuba and later in a cacao plantation, from
the Navy to footman, ‘indigent’, and to the oblivion in an asylum, slave
of voices.
In order to produce his pieces, Bispo assembled everyday objects
like tapes, forks, knives, fabric, shoes — everything he could put his
hands on. More than eight hundred artistic objects were preserved
over the years. After his death, in 1989, the asylum personnel wanted to
dismantle the objects to return some of the everyday objects to their
customary use. Thanks to the effort of several people, an association
was created in 1989 and, in order to preserve his works, they were
sent to the Nise da Silveira Museum, located at an old pavilion of the
Colônia.22 A first solo exhibition, Registros deminha passage pela Terra,
Segregation in the Brazilian Mental Health System’, in Democracy and Brazil: Collapse
and Regression, ed. by Bernardo Bianchi, Jorge Chaloub, Frieder Otto Wolf, and Patri-
cia Rangel (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2020).
21 Bispo do Rosário in Hugo Denizart, O prisioneiro da passagem, at ca. 16min; my
translation.
22 Later, in 2000, renamed Bispo do Rosário Museum, and in 2002, Bispo do Rosário
Museum for Contemporary Art, located at the Colônia Juliano Moreira.
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was then, at the end of the same year, curated by Frederico Morais
at the Parque Lage Visual Arts School, comprising some five hundred
objects.23 Morais, along with the psychologist Denise Almeida Correa,
responsible for the Nise da Silveira Museum, started to organize and
classify Bispo’s works. In particular, they classified the series of works
giving them names as, for example, ‘O.R.F.A.’ (objects wrapped by
blue threads, also called ‘mummified’ or ‘embalmed’ objects), ‘ban-
ners’, and ‘assemblages’. Bispo himself called the latter ‘showcases’ or
‘display windows’ (vitrines) combining different sorts of items such
as powdered milk tins, packages, cleaning products, shoes, miniature
saints, and other religious items, but also sometimes organic elem-
ents, such as apples. By organizing, classifying, and naming Bispo’s
production, Morais’s tried to inscribe Bispo’s work within the context
of modern and postmodern artistic production, an ambiguous gesture
one might want to critique, yet has to also understand as strategic, a
question that will not be my focus here.24
23 The work of Bispo was first exhibited in the 1982 collective exhibition À margem da
vida at the Museum of Modern Art of Rio (MAM) thanks to the efforts of the artist
Maria Amélia Mattei. The exhibition, made in a context of re-democratization process
and movements for a psychiatric reform, reunited works from people living at penal
and mental institutions. Bispo never visited the exhibition, but chose which works
should be exhibited and how they should be displayed. Morais discovered the pieces
at that exhibition and invited Bispo to go live and work at the MAM, offer that he
refused. After the 1989 exhibition, Bispo became quickly recognized in the art world
and had his work exhibited in different countries, in particular, at the 1995 Venice
Biennale. Despite this worldwide recognition, most of his works, stored at the Bispo
do Rosário Museum for Contemporary Art, lack of funding and interest to get the
deserved attention and restoration work they need.
24 Transforming Bispo into a contemporary artist risks losing the starting point of his
work, that is, the psychiatric institution. The danger is to lose the situatedness of his
practice. This does not mean that his work would not have value in itself or that one
has to make paternalistic concessions in order to see it as ‘art’. On the contrary, Bispo
engages in very complex conceptual and artistic procedures. But by situating them,
one can better appreciate their critical quality. Indeed, as has often been pointed out,
his work can be compared to (neo)dadaist work, Duchampian ready-mades, Warholian
pop, Oiticican parangolé, or a total work of art such as that of Kurt Schwitters. Bispo,
however, never tried to question the codes of art history and did what he did for
other reasons. At the same time, one must recognize the strategy implied in Morais’s
gesture: to give symbolic prestige by inscribing it into art history and hence to attract
interest to his work. By doing this, he achieved recognition for a black ‘madman’s’
work produced at the periphery of capitalism and, above all, he secured a chance of
saving it from oblivion and destruction. Kaira Cabañas critically engages, but also in
a nuanced way, this discussion in a chapter about Bispo’s work in her book Learning
from Madness: Brazilian Modernism and Global Contemporary Art (Chicago: Chicago
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Figure 3. Talheres (Cutlery), Museu Bispo do Rosario Collection.
Photography: Rodrigo Lopes.
Bispo also created mantles and cloaks, sceptres, different kinds of
maps, small installations, miniature representations of things on Earth
(kites, carousels, ox carts, etc.), pieces, sashes, and tissues about Miss
World pageants and participants — that construct a ‘Pop Geography’,
according to curator and art critic Paulo Herkenhoff.25 The works on
fabric constitute often very complex, detailed, and repetitive embroid-
eries. Among the mantles, one can find the ‘Exu cape’ or the famous
‘Mantle of presentation’, which he worked on for several decades. On
the inside part of the latter, he inscribed the names of people he chose
University Press, 2018). This book gives a recent and very good account in English of
the Brazilian history of the relationship between art and madness.
25 Paulo Herkenhoff, ‘The Longing for Art and Existing Material in the World of Men’, in
Arthur Bispo do Rosário, ed. by Araújo, pp. 140–83 (p. 145).
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for redemption. This mantle was the object of his final performance:
he would wear it before dying and presenting himself before God.
Finally, Bispo produced also several kinds of ready-mades, such as
the Roda da fortuna (Wheel of Fortune), of a stunning resemblance to
Marcel Duchamp’s Roue de bicyclette.
The O.R.F.A are particularly interesting in respect to Bispo’s
‘archive fever’. These three-dimensional objects are often related to the
domestic sphere and labour. They constitute, as Frederico Morais first
pointed out, a kind of ‘total inventory of a certain stage of Brazilian
society’, a ‘double or shadow’ of objects that existed and will disappear
after the end of times.26 There are around five hundred objects of this
type, all wrapped by a blue thread, which mostly came from patients’
hospital gowns, the uniform of the hospital — when Bispo started
making them, he would use his own uniform as source for the thread.
He identified these objects by a number and its corresponding name:
Moinho de Cana (Sugar Cane Mill, Figure 4), Pá de Lixo (Dustpan),
Pião (Spinning Top), Rolo de pintar (Paint Roller Brush), etc. All of
the objects were produced in the enclosed space of the asylum and
‘embalmed’ with the blue thread as a way to resist weathering — as
a way to make them survive the end of times; to, in a certain sense,
weather the weathering; to weather both the passing of time and the
end of times.
Bispo’s world is strongly and rigorously organized, and it is re-
lated to what he calls his ‘mission’, that is, of representing the ‘existent
materials on Earth’. By ‘representing’ them — and Bispo, as we saw
earlier, makes use of the word — he means in fact the work of archiving
these objects or creating an inventory in order to save them for Judge-
ment Day. A significant amount of his objects also has text on them:
letters, words, names, notes, fictional and biographical descriptions.
The names often refer to the people Bispo met and who are also to
be ‘saved’. Several women’s names are inscribed in his objects, women
that he considered important and pictured in his religious imaginary as
‘pure’ and ‘virgin’ — in one famous banner, one can read how he wel-
comes the ‘school of virgins’, as one would talk of a ‘school of fishes’.27
26 Corpas, Arthur Bispo do Rosario, p. 193 [my translation], paraphrasing Frederico
Morais, Registros de minha passagem pela Terra, Catalogue (1989).
27 Virgens em cardumes, in Portuguese. This banner gave the name of an exhibition Das
virgens em cardumes e da cor das auras, curated by Daniela Labra in 2016–17 at the
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Figure 4. Example of an O.R.F.A (object wrapped by blue threads):
Moinho de Cana (Sugar cane Mill), Museu Bispo do Rosário Collection.
Photography: Rodrigo Lopes.
This task of creating an inventory of the world follows a logic of
a ‘poetic of accumulation’ or of repetition through which he aims to
repeat in order both ‘to understand’ and ‘to include himself in history
(which excluded him)’.28 The inventory process is ‘his way of rewriting
the world’.29 Flavia dos Santos Corpas identifies in Bispo’s production
three types of actions — ‘extracting’, ‘reuniting’, and ‘registering’.30
Through these actions, Bispo creates a very complex and coherent
Museu Bispo do Rosário. See Labra, ed., Das virgens em cardumes. The exhibition
emphasized in particular the performative dimension of Bispo’s works and a series of
performances took place around the Museum during the exhibition.
28 Márcio Seligmann-Silva, ‘Arthur Bispo do Rosário: a arte de “enloquecer” os signos’,
ArteFilosofia, 3 (2007), pp. 144–55 (p. 149; my translation) <https://periodicos.ufop.
br:8082/pp/index.php/raf/article/view/761/717> [accessed 28 June 2020].
29 Ibid. See also Maria Esther Maciel, ‘A enciclopédia de Arthur Bispo do Rosário’,
Outra travessia, 7 (2008), pp. 117–24 <https://doi.org/10.5007/2176-8552(0.7.
2008)(117-124)>, who emphasizes the (anti)encyclopedic dimension Bispo’s work
and the way he incorporates the ‘registers of the margins’.
30 Corpas, Arthur Bispo do Rosario, p. 203; my translation.
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work, through which at the same time he constructs his own world and
takes position in it — or, perhaps more accurately, takes position in
history. The accumulation of these everyday objects does not consti-
tute a mere reproduction or reification, but present an artistic choice,
removing them from their usual context, arranging, organizing, and
displaying them in deliberate fashion. This way of taking a position in
his delirium is a form of ordering his disorder, or how Louise Bour-
geois puts it, ‘he was looking for order in chaos, for the structure and
rhythm in time and thought. One could say his was a pursuit for sanity,
the very principle of organization behind all his work.’31
One could also add a fourth action to Corpas’ list: that of perform-
ing. Indeed, Bispo also uses the word ‘representing’ in a performative
sense and, as already noted above, his mantles are objects he wears and
that convey a certain disposition or figure. Also, one knows how he
chose precisely how pictures of him and his objects had to be taken
— often capturing his shadows rather than his body, thus emphasizing
the objects — how to arrange his objects in space, how to represent
and perform actions during these shootings.
The Exu Cape (see Figure 5) is of particular importance in this
context. It is not known how exactly Bispo imagined the spiritual entity
of Exu — an orisha — how much the artist knew about him, and
whether he also ‘performed’ Exu with this cape. In any case, not only
does Bispo explicitly engage with the Afro-descendent tradition of the
Candomblé — as he does also with other works, such as the display
window Macumba (referring to a form of black witchcraft)32 — but he
chooses this very specific orisha: Exu, who is the messenger between
the human and divinity realms, who has an important relationship
31 Louise Bourgeois, ‘Arthur Bispo do Rosário’, in Arthur Bispo do Rosário, ed. by Araújo,
p. 27.
32 We can also mention here a work that remained unknown to the public until the
exhibition Quilombo do Rosário at the Museu Bispo do Rosário Arte Contemporânea
(August 2018–March 2019, curated by Roberto Conduru): an embroidery of the map
of the African continent. Unfortunately, no catalogue was made for this exhibition.
Conduru is also the author of a short entry on Bispo, written for The Dictionary of
Caribbean and Afro-Latin American Biography, ed. by Franklin W. Knight and Henry
Louis Gates, Jr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) <https://doi.org/10.1093/
acref/9780195301731.013.74989>.
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Figure 5. Capa de Exu (Exu Cape), Museu Bispo do Rosário Collection.
Photography: Rodrigo Lopes.
to word and language, as well as to time, travelling between past and
present, and deeply connected to ancestrality.33
It is interesting to look at what Eleonora Fabião, referring to Bispo
do Rosário, calls a ‘performative historiography’. She has in mind a
form of historiography performed by a body as it is traversed by past,
present, and future, by individual, collective, imaginary, and sensorial
33 Cf. Florence Marie Dravet, ‘Corpo, linguagem e real: o sopro de exu bará e seu lugar
na comunicação’, Ilha Desterro, 68.3 (2015) <https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8026.
2015v68n3p15>.
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marks; by a body that actualizes these dimensions through its move-
ments and gestures. Building on Hélio Oiticica’s objectact and Lygia
Clark’s quasi-corporeal objects, she proposes to look at Bispo’s works
as constituting an ‘object-archive’ to be thought as an ‘open circuit of
acts’.34 What is at stake here, following Fabião’s suggestion, is the very
gesture of the inventory, but also how these objects, in a certain sense,
ask to be performed and what they re-actualize through this perform-
ance. Furthermore, these objects engage, re-organize, and re-actualize
the marks of the past, those traversing and constituting Bispo’s body.
Like other mentally ill patients, Bispo (re)organizes his inner tur-
moil by producing objects.35 That is the form he finds to weather
his storms. And in this singular (re)construction of the world, his
world, ships play indeed an important role. Drawings of boats were
found scratched on the walls of his cells; he produced different sorts
of rafts, ships, boats, vessels, arks (of Noah), frigates, sometimes com-
plex structures consisting of several boats; he also embroidered many
ships in his fabric works. In a certain sense, his cell had also become
a boat. And even his bed, in his last years, became, as he claimed, a
‘(space)ship’ taking part in his final performance,36 and which would
carry him, as he would also wear his mantle of presentation, to the
Judgment Day. While a lot has been said about the metaphors of the
passenger or of the adventure at sea, I propose to read these objects also
as surfaces of re-inscription of histories, memories, marks that certainly
belong to the subject ‘Bispo’, but that exceed his only personal and in-
dividual biography. These boats thus also reveal a form of dealing with
the history of the Atlantic Ocean and the consequences that he himself,
as a black poor man in Brazilian society, suffered. These boats can
be read in a long series, inside a constellation of several ship-objects,
constituting, thus, a certain ecology and his own way of traversing the
34 Eleonora Fabião, ‘History and Precariousness: In Search of a Performative Histori-
ography’, in Perform, Repeat, Record, ed. by Amelia Jones and Adrian Heathfield
(London: Thames & Hudson, 2012), pp. 121–36 (p. 126).
35 I should also add that even though Bispo spent most of his time at the asylum, he was
not entirely cut off from the world. He kept reading newspapers and magazines, and
his work contains several ironic references to politics and even mundane events — he
was, for example, particularly obsessed with beauty pageants.
36 His bed was also the ‘stage’ of a ‘performance’ he did as a form to say goodbye to
psychologist Rosangela Maria Grilo Magalhães at the end of her internship at the
Colônia in 1983. It consisted in a kind of reenactment of Romeo and Juliet (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Cama de Romeu e Julieta (Romeu and Juliet’s bed), Museu Bispo
do Rosario Collection. Photography: Rodrigo Lopes.
oceans of history. I think it is no mere coincidence that ships are so
recurrent in his artistic representations and productions — as well
as in those of the other artists who are part of the Lugares do delírio
exhibition.
Noah’s ark, which appears in the film O Bispo, built with fabric
and cardboard, was destined to ‘save the world’. One can imagine that
it would carry the inventoried objects chosen to weather the end of
times. Also, on the raft (Figure 7), one can see the word ‘representation’
used once more: ‘[It] represents the maritime departments of all states.
Universe. Raft.’ It is the universe, the totality — a certain totality chosen
by Bispo — which is represented and which will be saved. In his
eschatology, Bispo inverts established positions, he is the master of
representation, the redeemer, and chooses who and what will be saved.
This totality or whole certainly counters both the ‘social death’37 and
37 Cf. Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) as well as Fred Moten, The Universal Machine
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2018), in particular chapter 3.
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the psychotic dismantlement experienced by him as black, poor, mad
subject.
ECOLOGIES OF THE SEA
Rather than advancing any further, I would like to digress before con-
cluding with a proposal. If one wants to take Bispo’s work seriously,
one has to assume that there is no such thing as a ‘mad artist’ outside
culture. In Bispo’s case, this is especially evident, and his work deals
with historical, social, geographical marks; his work takes position in,
with, against them. It takes position in a very aggressive climate.
Christina Sharpe’s book In the Wake: On Blackness and Being is
entirely built around metaphors relating to the sea and to boats. To
begin with the title: ‘wake’ means ‘the track left on the water’s surface
by a ship.’ She conceptualizes ‘weather’ in a specific pessimistic way
as ‘the totality of our environments’, as ‘the machine in which we
live’ and this weather-machine, this ‘total climate’ ‘is antiblack’, ‘slavery
undeniably became the total environment’.38
I find the way she relates ‘memory’, ‘weather’, and the ‘sea’ particu-
larly interesting. In the beginning of the fourth chapter (The weather),
Sharpe takes a passage from Toni Morrison’s Beloved and constructs
her argument around ‘watered’ images. Following Morrison’s descrip-
tion, Sethe, the novel’s protagonist and a former slave, tries to protect
her daughter from the memories of the past. However, this past is not
really a past, it persists in the present. As a consequence, Sethe has this
‘thought picture’, or, as she puts it, this ‘picture floating around out here
outside my head’.39 Interestingly, this picture is, first of all, character-
ized as floating and, secondly, it is not in her head, but out there. Sharpe
concludes: ‘It is weather, and even if the country, every country, any
country, tries to forget […], it is the atmosphere.’40 Sharpe emphasizes
that, despite the end of slavery, its logics persist, it constitutes the
atmospheric condition where one lives — with its consequences con-
stantly affecting black bodies. Even if the state or a conscious subject
38 Christina Sharpe, In theWake: OnBlackness and Being (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2016), p. 104.
39 Ibid., p. 105, my emphasis.
40 Ibid.
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Figure 7. Jangada (Raft), Museu Bispo do Rosario Collection.
Photography: Rodrigo Lopes.
tries to obliterate the memory, there is such a thing as the weather, the
atmosphere, where these questions and traces remain present. More
than haunting, they structure the space, the world in which one lives;
they give form to this ‘one ecology of the ship that continues into the
present’.41
*
The relationship between the sea and death is a recurrent one in con-
temporary black literature. The Angolan writer Agostinho Neto writes
the following in his short story Nausea (1985):
Mu’alunga. The sea. The death. This water! This salted water is
perdition. The sea goes so far away, out there. Until it reaches
the sky. It goes to America. Above, it’s blue, below, it’s very
deep, black. […] Cousin Xico died there, in the sea, when
the raft sunk, there in the great sea. Died swallowing water.
Kalunga. Afterwards, ships came, ships left. And the sea is
always Kalunga. The death. The Sea took grandfather to other
41 Ibid., p. 106.
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continents. Slavery is Kalunga. The enemy is the sea. […]
Kalunga chained people in the hold and the people only had
fear. Kalunga whipped their backs and the people could only
heal the wounds. Kalunga is fate. And why didn’t the people
flee the sea? Kalunga is really death. […] And Kalunga don’t
know Man. It does not know that people suffer. It only knows
to make them suffer.42
Neto makes an interesting move in this text by introducing the word
Kalunga and making it resonate. In Kimbundu, ka’lunga, means ‘sea’,
but it is also used in the sense of ‘immensity’ and ‘grandeur’, both re-
lated to its cosmological connotation. Clyde Ford recalls that Kalunga
is often associated with death, but also with a feminine creative force,
relating to ‘the cosmic waters [...], the yolk inside the egg, the am-
niotic fluid of the womb’.43 The sea, in Yoruba myths, is also where
Yemọja dies at the same time as her womb dilates due to the salty
water — giving birth, in the process, to the other Orishas of the African
pantheon.44 Likewise, Édouard Glissant, in the opening pages of his
Poetics of Relation, inevitably associates the sea with an abyss, but also
makes it a principle of memory, knowledge, and shared history.45
While the sea is marked by the history of slavery and the trip to the
hold, it also represents the connection to the homeland, the trace of a
return or, in Martin Lienhard’s words, the possibility of ‘an archaeology
of the discourse of slavery’.46 Agostinho Neto is well aware of this
and in his poem ‘Havemos de voltar’ (We shall return) describes the
42 Agostinho Neto, Náusea (Luanda: UEA, 2006), p. 25; my translation.
43 Clyde W. Ford, The Hero with an African Face (New York: Bantam, 2000), p. 197.
44 Cf. Antologia do mar na poesia africana de língua portuguesa do Século xx, ed. by
Carmem Lucia Tindó Secco (Rio de Janeiro: Programa de Letras Vernáculas/UFRJ,
1996), i.
45 Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, trans. by Betsy Wing (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 8–9: ‘For though this experience made you, original
victim floating toward the sea’s abysses, an exception, it became something shared and
made us, the descendants, one people among others. Peoples do not live on exception.
Relation is not made up of things that are foreign but of shared knowledge. This
experience of the abyss can now be said to be the best element of exchange. […] And
for this Relation made of storms and profound moments of peace in which we may
honour our boats. [...] We cry our cry of poetry. Our boats are open, and we sail them
for everyone.’
46 Martin Lienhard, ‘O mato e o mar: apontamentos para uma arqueologia do discurso
escravo’, in Brasil: um país de negros?, ed. by Jéferson Bacelar and Carlos Cardoso (Rio
de Janeiro/Salvador: Pallas/CEAO, 1999), pp. 113–23: ‘For the enslaved Africans in
America, the sea, which reminded them undoubtedly of the trip to the hold, appeared
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coming back to the homeland through specific words that rematerialize
the land: mulemba (a fig tree), marimba (a percussion instrument),
quissange (also an instrument).47
The sea triggers what, in Portuguese, one calls saudade and, in
Kimbundu, banzo, the affect of melancholia, nostalgia, homesickness,
but also that which enables what the black Brazilian poet Conceição
Evaristo names, with a neologism, escrevivência — writing to survive,
writing to experience, writing to reconnect. ‘The banzo stirs in me. |
From the black ink ofmy oceans | the pain, revisited, submerges | flaying
my skin | that surges in suns | and lofty moons of a | time that is now’,
she writes in the first verses of ‘Filhos na rua’ (Children in the street).48
Or her ‘Recordar é preciso’ (Remembering is a necessity):
The sea wanders rolling beneath my thoughts.
Turbulent memory sets sail:
Remembering is a necessity.
On the waters of recollection the to and fro
of my weeping eyes crashes over my life,
Curing my face and my taste. I am an eternal shipwreck.
But the ocean depths do not frighten me or paralyze me.
A profound passion is the buoy that rises before me.
I know mystery lies beyond the waters.49
Conceição Evaristo does not succumb to the deadly attraction of the
mysterious deep sea and, through her passion, she writes, making a
also as bond to the original land and to the utopic path of a “return”’ (p. 118; my
translation).
47 Agostinho Neto, ‘Havemos de voltar’, Fundação Dr. António Agostinho Neto (FAAN)
<http://www.agostinhoneto.org/index.php?option=com_content&id=561:
desterro> [accessed 28 June 2020].
48 Conceição Evaristo, ‘Children in the Street’, in Conceição Evaristo, ‘Poems’, trans.
by Tamara Mitchell, Hiedra Magazine, 1 (2013), pp. 65–68 (p. 67; my emphasis)
<https://www.hiedramagazine.com/conceicao-evaristo> [accessed 28 June 2020].
49 Conceição Evaristo, ‘Remembering Is a Necessity’, in Evaristo, ‘Poems’, p. 68. In the
original: ‘O mar vagueia onduloso sob os meus pensamentos. | A memória bravia lança
o leme: | Recordar é preciso. | O movimento de vaivém nas águas-lembranças | dos
meus marejados olhos transborda-me a vida, | salgando-me o rosto e o gosto. Sou
eternamente náufraga. | Mas os fundos oceanos não me amedrontam nem me imobi-
lizam. | Uma paixão profunda é a boia que me emerge. | Sei que o mistério subsiste
além das águas.’ See also Conceição Evaristo, Poemas Malungos — Cânticos Irmãos
(doctoral thesis, Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2011) <https://app.uff.br/riuff/
bitstream/1/7741/1/Tese_Dout.Concei%C3%A7%C3%A3oEvaristo_def.pdf> [ac-
cessed 28 June 2020].
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twist inside a long history. She takes over the ancient prescription
‘navegar é preciso, viver não é preciso’ (sailing is necessary, living
is not necessary) and subverts it by emphasizing life and memory.
The prescription first conveyed, according to Plutarch, by the Roman
consul Pompey (‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non est necesse’), later im-
mortalized by Petrarch, then commonly used by Portuguese sailors,
immortalized by Fernando Pessoa, reworked by Caetano Veloso in
the form of a Fado, finally becomes with Conceição Evaristo a matter
of recollection, a question of survival — a struggle both for life and
memory.
CONCLUSION: ESCREVIVÊNCIA
In the total climate of antiblackness that comprises Brazilian society,
within which Bispo evolved as an artist,50 he develops his weathering
techniques in confinement; he performs his escrivevência, inscribing
his name, through his works, in history, and searching to represent the
world that should be saved.
Against the simplicity of very few words — thirteen, to be precise
— defining Bispo in his medical record, he writes. His embroideries
weave memories, reconnect constantly to (his) history, assemble and
re-assemble mnemonic and historic marks. That is precisely what one
realizes with the famous banner Eu preciso destas palavras. Escrita. One
does not know if Bispo miswrites the last word and means ‘I need
these words written’ or if he chooses to emphasize the noun ‘writing’:
‘I need these words. Writing’ (Figure 2). Among the series of words
in the banner, one notes the strange sequence of words: ‘In The Chest
50 I could not develop here the question of differences between the Brazilian, USA and
other countries’ contexts, but they exist and are crucial. One must remember that
Brazil was the last country in the world to abolish slavery (in 1888) and the largest
importer of slaves coming from Africa. Despite these facts, since the beginning of the
twentieth century, the myth of ‘racial democracy’ — in a great extent derived from
Gilberto Freyre’s seminal work from 1933 Casa grande e senzala, in English as The
Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization (New York:
Knopf, 1964) — helped to, on the surface, soften racial tensions and, above all, to
conceal, even to deny for a very long time structural racism. At the same time that
whitening practices, hygienics and racist discourses shaped Brazilian institutions —
psychiatry perfectly exemplifies this — there was little organized struggle against these
same structures. And when there was, they were often brutally repressed.
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Carries Water Is the Word’ (No Peito Traz Água É Nome; transformed
into an orderly syntax — but should it be? — it could read: ‘In the
chest, water is carried, that is the word’). And as Paulo Herkenhoff first
noted, the word ‘Africa’ also appears in the banner along with ‘tasks’
(afazeres) and ‘afflicted’ (aflito) — one can also add that, in the same
line, the word ‘fogamento’ appears (probably ‘afogamento’ misspelled,
i.e., drowning). Far from a mere association, the need of words, of
writing, expresses a positioning charged with historical meaning.
Here, the inexplicable list of ideas would not just be a sur-
realistic ‘free association’ to trigger the unconscious. Bispo do
Rosário is black. In that association, the artist needs words
that can both build and synthesise the ultimate memory of
slavery time. From the name Africa the following words are
all read concurrently: origins, works (tasks such as slavery
economic reasons) and punishment or suffering (afflicted). It
is a triple incorporation — physical, spiritual, and political —
in the anatomy with a body and a soul. […] Black is another
perception in Bispo do Rosário’s anatomy, it is the designa-
tion of the non-colour, of the absence of colour or of slaves
from Africa.51
The understanding of antiblackness as climate also explains how Bispo
could spend so many years in confinement. And the Colônia Juliano
Moreira was a typical psychiatric hospital designed according to the
‘colony’ model. Conceived at the beginning of the twentieth century
and isolated from the urban centres, this sort of asylum constituted
places where patients were meant to work as part of their treatment,
in accord with the motto Labor/Praxis Omnia Vincit (work conquers
all). Like many other institutions across Brazil, the ‘colonies’ were
conceived as places not only for the mad, but for all those branded
as undesirable: alcoholics, the mad, the retarded, delinquents, pros-
titutes, indigents, ‘enemies’ of the state or of powerful men, women
pregnant as a result of rape — frequently by their bosses or lovers — or
the daughters of influential landowners who had engaged in premarital
sex. These spaces became very quickly over-populated over the course
51 Herkenhoff, ‘The Longing for Art’, p. 152. Bispo’s words appearing in the banner,
placed below and on the left side, are in fact, as indicated above, ‘Africa’, ‘Afazeres’
(Tasks), ‘Aflito’ (Afflicted), as well as ‘Fogamento’ (probably ‘Drowning’ misspelled)
in the beginning of the same line.
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of the twentieth century; they were characterized by the use of abusive
disciplinary methods and they took part, particularly from the 1960s
onward, in what has been called the ‘industry of madness’, a model for
the reproduction of mental illness and ‘chronification’ based on long-
term hospitalizations — a lucrative business for hospitals receiving
money from the state for each patient hospitalized.52
The term ‘colony’ is even more brutal in the case of the Juliano
Moreira asylum, as the institution was created in an area that had
indeed decades before been a colonial plantation. The new pavilions
coexisted with the other old buildings of the slave master’s house
(casa grande), the slaves’ quarters (senzala), the church in the central
square… The asylum, as a result, was grafted onto this essentially
colonial topology.
Taking these elements into account, Bispo’s works can be under-
stood in a new light. The re-utilization of iconic items from the asylum
(uniforms, syringes, blankets) signals resistance to the psychiatric
order. His boats (some of them resemble caravels and also point to-
wards the colonial ‘age of discovery’), as well as the Exu cape, for
example, signal an attempt to re-actualize the marks referring to his
roots — marks that were constantly obliterated by his surrounding
society. Representing the world in his own way, he invents a way of
rewriting it, he (re)constructs reality. And, in a certain sense, despite
his stated or not stated intentions, he seemed aware of this narrative
power as a strategy to counter all the effects of social death. As he used
to claim, ‘one day I simply appeared’. Through this constructed (but
vital) narrative and auto-fiction, Bispo anchors himself in the world,
his works are marked by an attempt to rewrite his biography. His work
weaves his own history, resists the forced obliteration of memory and
ancestrality imposed upon racialized subjects in racist societies.
The several boats Bispo built over and over are therefore to be
read inside this ever-expanding, indefinite and interminable marine
ecology — it is curious, apropos, as some ships appear in series inside
a single object (see, for example, Figures 1 and 8). Hence, under no
condition, his work is to be interpreted as a sort of final reparation
52 See, for example, Loucos pela vida: a trajetória da reforma psiquiátrica no Brasil, ed. by
Paulo Amarante (Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz, 2000).
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Figure 8. Distroey — Rio Grande do Norte, Museu Bispo do Rosário
Collection. Photography: Rodrigo Lopes.
or reconciliatory synthesis. Bispo until the very end does not present
himself as artist, citizen or mad, but rather as, at the same time, ‘slave’
— this indelible mark — and ‘redeemer’. It is this endless struggle
and contradiction that is inscribed in and through his work. And if
he names the ‘universe’, recreates a whole, it is only to counter the
dismantlement, both social and psychic, of his body.
The escrevivência is neither in this sense a reparative narrative that
could be absorbed into the easiness of cultural memory, but consti-
tutes a gesture of suspension in order to survive and to persist. To be
‘an eternal shipwreck’, but, at the same time, to become apt to look at
ocean’s abyss and not getting paralyzed anymore. Buoy for Evaristo,
ship for Bispo. In both cases, remaining in the sea, but finally attempt-
ing to navigate.
POST SCRIPTUM
During the years in which Bispo remained confined at the Colônia
Juliano Moreira, another figure, another black ‘indigent’, was locked up
there, as well, and wandered in those spaces, a woman by the name of
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Stela do Patrocínio. Born in 1941, she was the daughter of a housemaid
considered mad and sent to the Colônia, before she herself would
suffer the same fate: she became a housemaid herself and was sent to
the Colônia in 1966, remaining there until her death in 1992. The two
figures, Bispo and Stela, probably never met since they lived in different
pavilions.
Stela do Patrocínio kept erring in the asylum spaces and talk-
ing. She was known to practice a powerful way of talking, which
she opposed to quotidian speech and defined as fazendo falatório (a
very rough translation could be ‘making chattering’) or as colocando o
mundo para gozar (‘putting the world into jouissance’). Her speeches
were ultimately recorded in 1991 and later transcribed and published
as a book. They are poetic, ferocious, raw, powerful. They constantly
play with language, can hardly be translated and give form to a life
marked by continuous gendered and racialized violence. As with
Bispo’s objects, these speeches refer to a poetic form of reaction to the
arbitrariness of a violent society that incessantly locked up people like
them.
Eu sou Stela do Patrocínio
Bem patrocinada
Estou sentada numa cadeira
Pegada numa mesa negra preta e crioula
Eu sou uma nega preta e crioula
Que a Ana me disse
(I am Stela do Patrocínio
With a good patronage
I am seated on a chair
Attached to a table, black, negro, creole
I am a black, a negro, a creole
That’s what Ana told me)53
*
53 Stela do Patrocínio, Reino dos bichos e dos animais é o meu nome (Rio de Janeiro:
Azougue Editorial, 2001), p. 66; my tranlation.
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É dito: pelo chão você não pode ficar
Porque lugar da cabeça é na cabeça
Lugar de corpo é no corpo
Pelas paredes você também não pode
Pelas camas também você não vai poder ficar
Pelo espaço vazio você também não vai poder ficar
Porque lugar da cabeça é na cabeça
Lugar de corpo é no corpo
(It is said: on the floor you cannot stay
For the head’s place is in the head
The body’s place is in the body
Around the walls you also cannot
Around the beds you also cannot stay
Around the empty space you also cannot stay
For the head’s place is in the head
The body’s place is in the body)54
54 Ibid., p. 52; my translation.
Enduring Rain
On Vajiko Chachkhiani’s Living Dog Among Dead Lions
CLAUDIA PEPPEL
In bad weather, you can’t be casual.
Martin Parr
A wooden hut in the rain. An unusual, weathered hut jacked up on
bricks. The four sides have high filigree lattice windows. Small steps
at the front and the back lead to closed doors with window panes,
through which, like the windows on the sides, one can peep inside: A
large front room with an enclosed porch, sparsely furnished. A single
bed with a metal frame takes up a lot of space on one side, a portrait of a
woman is hanging over the bed. The opposite wall has only a curtained
window and a small framed picture. A dining table in the middle of
the room with four different wooden chairs is covered with a plastic
tablecloth. An oil lamp and a small pot are placed on top of it. A narrow
daybed, a chair, and a side table are out on the porch, some kitchen
utensils, plates, glasses, and enamel metal bowls are piled up on the
chair as well as on the side table. The two rooms convey a certain
frugality; their rustic decoration looks forlorn and from times past.
Except for the two pictures and some bunches of dried herbs on the
walls there is no decoration, no books. The hut is devoid of people,




Figure 1. © Vajiko Chachkhiani, Living Dog Among Dead Lions,
57th Venice Biennale, Venice, 2017. Photo credit: Sandro Sulaberidze.
the gloomy and almost stage-like setting, suggests that something is
anticipated, that at any given moment someone might arrive — or
return — to animate the abandoned scenery.
Instead, bad weather has taken hold of the interior and the viewer
witnesses heavy rain pouring inside. Over the six months in which
Vajiko Chachkhiani’s Living Dog Among Dead Lions was on display
in the Georgian Pavilion at the 57th Venice Biennale in 2017, it was
‘soaked in water and exposed to the elements’.1 In Georgia, the Cau-
casus region of Eurasia, one still regularly encounters old wooden
houses of this type (some nearly a hundred years old) made of greyish
brown boards and prominent lattice windows. Originally located in
the mountains, this particular abandoned hut was found in a village
close to the manganese-mining town of Chiatura. It was purchased,
taken apart, rebuilt in a factory hall in Tbilisi, and then had the irri-
gation system hidden in its ceiling. Apparently, the house came with
1 Text accompanying the official Biennale video, Vajiko Chachkhiani, ‘Georgia — Vajiko
Chachkhiani — Living Dog Among Dead Lions — Venice Biennale 2017’, at 3:03 min,
YouTube <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eryvtbZv5y0> [accessed 30 March
2020].
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some basic furnishings, though it is not known what was kept, added,
or taken away.2 Both the hut and the rain were translocated, ‘placed’ in
an unusual setting — Is this simultaneity intended? The idea of the
‘natural’ decay of materials is conjured in order to have the viewer
wonder about the possible results of this performative deterioration.
And although probably no visitor (nor any Biennale staff) recorded
the exact appearance of the installation in all its different stages of
decay over the course of the more than six months of the Biennale,
this time span inevitably provokes the imagination, generating ideas
on what would or might happen to the hut. However, there is no storm
coming, no apocalyptic culmination, no tipping point, and an end of
the weathering is nowhere in sight.3 This work of art has no apparent
beginning or end or rather the end is being transferred into the viewer’s
imagination.
At first sight, nothing moves, except for the jars and glasses that
shiver while slowly filling with water. The dripping water creates a
constant, evocative background noise. Strangely, while observing the
unfamiliar scenery, the continuous rain is heard and then forgotten,
heard, and then forgotten again. One’s mind is wandering, recalling
leakages in ceilings, water butts — distracting, frightening, or strangely
soothing side effects of heavy rain fall.4 How different places can look
with a sudden, furious change in weather. The rain swamps the senses,
the viewer feels sucked up and finds herself in a state of absorption,
trying to keep all details in view. Some sodden lengths of wallpaper are
peeling off the walls. And despite the floors being covered with plastic
sheeting, the water seeps right through. Almost magically, nothing
escapes, the floor of the exhibition hall stays dry. The viewer’s gaze
is lingering on the jars and bowls collecting the water. Does it ever
change: the speed or shape of the drops? A delay, a subtle decoupling
2 Julian Heynen, ‘Georgia — Vajiko Chachkhiani: LivingDogAmongDead Lions’, in Viva
Arte Viva, 57th International Art Exhibition La Biennale di Venezia 2017: Catalogue,
Participants, Countries, Collateral Events, ed. by Flavia Fossa Margutti (Venice: SIAE,
2017), pp. 62–63.
3 Many thanks to Delfina Cabrera, Christoph Holzhey, Marlon Miguel, and Arnd We-
demeyer for their astute and generous comments on the subject.
4 I wish to thank Amelia Groom for suggesting the apocalyptic film The Hole (Dòng),
dir. by Tsai Ming-Liang (Fox Lorber, 1998, 95 min) to me, which depicts the life of two
neighbours in a rundown apartment block in Taiwan during times of a strange disease
— while outside rain is pouring heavily.
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of seeing and hearing takes place. Usually, during bad weather, one
retreats indoors, but in this case, one is better off outside. The indoor
space, the very definition of human shelter, is itself being exposed to
weather and weathering, uniting contradictions and admitting the un-
expected. Opposing impressions are evoked simultaneously and play
out in different intensities: the steady pitter-patter of rain drops on the
scattered pieces of furniture while the surroundings appear perfectly
silent. There is a constant dampness that seeps through the entire hut
while the beholder stays dry. There is also a dim expectation of the
possible arrival of people or other creatures, coupled with the intuition
that this house has been abandoned a long time ago. Sensing a kind
of nostalgic coziness within its remains, blurry traces suggesting that
‘[c]ontemporary nostalgia is not so much about the past as about the
vanishing present.’5 A subtle relief and sense of comfort results from
being located outside of the hut, yet is mingled with a discomfort at ob-
serving and witnessing its destruction. The pouring rain evokes pangs
of longing. It intimately links the eerie strangeness of an atmospheric
happening to the human condition in order to have the viewer sense
the fictional dimension of the real or the real in its fictional dimension.6
Within this inversion, the outside turned inside, there is a moment
of irritation — of something weird happening. The inverted normality
of the house has a certain reality and persuasiveness and, at the same
time, a dream-like fantasy to it. One feels caught between what one
sees or hopes to see, between one’s expectations of what may happen,
and an exceptional time zone where ‘natural’ weathering is being per-
formed as a subject of meditative observation. Eventually, the spaces
and furniture exposed to rain and water stagnation will begin to rot
and disintegrate, and mould and moss might grow over them. This
artificially generated process provokes thoughts about the nature of
the here and now as well as of the future appearance of the hut’s water-
sensitive insides. In a similar vein, Emanuela Zanon suggests,
[T]he natural process of rotting of the materials exposed to
moisture and water stagnation generated a sort of spontaneous
5 Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 351.
6 In a similar vein, in the exhibit The Last Day nature invades human spaces.
Helmut Wimmer at Kunsthistorisches Museum Wien in 2018/19 <http://www.
helmutwimmer.net/the-last-day-galerie> [accessed 10 January 2020].
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dramaturgy that led to meditate (or rather to perceive) the
existential implications of resistance and change.7
Assuming that nature informs and ‘re-forms the “finished” artwork’,8
this installation ‘cannot perform without the assistance of its environ-
ment’,9 involving spectators and forcing them to imagine or anticipate
what is going to happen. One recalls Marcel Broodthaers La pluie
(Projet pour un texte) [The Rain (Project for a Text)] from 1969,10
and similar to Hans Haacke’s Condensation Cube11 — an installation
from 1965 inviting viewers to discover ‘the marvels that occur as water
inside the cube condenses’12 — Living Dog Among Dead Lions is kept
from further human or external interference, hermetically sealed as in
a lab experiment. Visitors are kept outside and can only watch, wait,
and witness the changing state of disintegration. The work invites a
slow, obsessive kind of contemplation, a penetrating observation. A
gaze that adds and subtracts, a weathering gaze. Slowly, a relationship
between a firm object that sits passively, waiting to be destroyed and
the spectator, demanding some kind of damage to be observed, seems
to be forming. Suddenly, one thinks of crowds of gawkers who cannot
take their eyes from accidents, natural disasters, or acts of violence. The
space outside the house feels like a waiting room; and the steady gaze of
the audience suggests a kind of mastery of the situation: where nothing
7 Emanuela Zanon, ‘Vajiko Chachkhiani: The Poet of Absence at the de’ Foscherari
Gallery’, Juliet, 30 January 2019 <https://www.juliet-artmagazine.com/en/vajiko-
chachkhiani-de-foscherari-gallery/> [accessed 3 January 2020].
8 Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow, On Weathering: The Life of Buildings in
Time (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 64. For Mostafavi and Leatherbarrow the
informing and reforming applies to buildings.
9 To quote Hans Haacke, for whom the concept of change proved to be the ideological
basis of his work, Untitled Statement, in Linda Weintraub, To Life! Eco Art in Pursuit
of a Sustainable Planet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), p. 71. This
statement stems from Haacke’s exhibition manifesto for his exhibition in Cologne in
1965.
10 La pluie (Projet pour un texte), dir. by Marcel Broodthaers (Collection Centre Pom-
pidou, inventory number: AM 1996-F1310, 1969, 2 min). A digitized replica of the
16mm black and white, silent film was posted by Matthias Planitzer, ‘La pluie’, Castor&
Pollux (5 December 2009) <http://www.castor-und-pollux.de/2009/12/la-pluie/>
[accessed 20 December 2019].
11 Hans Haacke, Condensation Cube, 1963–65, perspex, steel, and water, 305 x 305 x 305
mm, Tate Modern, London.
12 Linda Weintraub, Eco Art in Pursuit of a Sustainable Planet (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2012), p. 70.
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will happen to me as long as I stand outside and observe the disaster
that takes place at a distance — and not to me. Omer Fast has framed
it as feeling safe ‘as long as you are in the waiting room like in a womb,
what happens outside is not what actually happens to you’.13
Once the scenery is observed more closely, it becomes clear that
the beds are tightly wrapped in plastic sheeting, as are the floors and
tables, perhaps to delay the weathering or to shield the wrapped ob-
jects from being worn out too quickly, from re-forming, and from any
rampant deterioration by the rain.14 A former life now vacuum-packed
and preserved. The protective layers insert a distance, a shield against
outside influences, and hint at the conservation of tradition.15 At the
same time, it feels as if these objects cannot breathe, as if obsessive
precautions were taken against dirt or unwanted affection. Can the
inside of the hut be seen ‘as metaphor for the interior life of an indi-
vidual, the rain as metaphor for a slowly nagging threat but also for
an enduring ablution’, as Christine Macel suggests?16 An invocation of
healing through ablution? Or rather a cage of domesticity weathered
in order to ‘transcend its core phoenix-like’?17 The scenery refers to
complex inter-relationships of past, actual, and anticipated events and
to weathering as an inscriptive and imaginative force.
‘The weather’, to quote Christina Sharpe, ‘necessitates change-
ability and improvisation: it is an atmospheric condition of time and
space.’18 How does rain invoke spheres of meaning? Rain is rest-
less, all-permeating, and, by virtue of being liquid, ‘flexible in form
and embracing in scope’, it comes with the ‘extreme power for self-
13 Cristina Baldacci and Claudia Peppel, ‘Zwischen den Wasserlilien. Ein Interview mit
Omer Fast’, in Die Kunst desWartens, ed. by Brigitte Kölle and Claudia Peppel (Berlin:
Wagenbach, 2019), pp. 98–107 (p. 105).
14 Mostafavi and Leatherbarrow, On Weathering, p. 64.
15 The wrapping of furniture in plastic sheeting is used in the Georgian countryside in
order to protect objects. See Vajiko Chachkhiani and Claudia Peppel, ‘Life Never Stops
Being Violent. A Conversation’, in this volume, pp. 293–94.
16 Christine Macel, director of the 2017 Venice Biennale, see Heynen, ‘Georgia — Vajiko
Chachkhiani’, p. 62.
17 Gerhard Matzig, ‘Geist aus der Asche. “Yakisugi” ist die Kunst des Verkohlens: Warum
Architektur brennen muss, um zu leben’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 124, 30 May – 1 June
2020, p. 56; my translation of: ‘Das Kunstwerk wird an der Oberfläche zerstört, um es
im Kern phoenixhaft über sich hinauswachsen zu lassen.’
18 Christina Sharpe, In theWake: OnBlackness and Being (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2016), p. 205.
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transformation and transformation of its resistant opponents’.19 Rain
— as weather in general is — is experienced as a ‘highly affective phe-
nomenon that can evoke a strong sense of wonder, delight, or terror, as
well as a myriad of minor perceptions every moment’.20 ‘Memories of
certain weather events are often nostalgically framed, they haunt and
persist.’21 Weather shapes the perception of people in their environ-
ment, it causes sensations, creates spaces of experience, triggers pain,
and influences mental states: The rain orchestrates emotional reactions
such as feelings of abandonment and loss of control as well as a general
awareness that things are being worn down. A recent study referred to
rain as being the ‘background noise of human history’, and its results
suggest that the sound of rain can even improve people’s memory,
promoting relaxation as well as stimulating concentration. In fact, for
those of us lacking sleep or having trouble concentrating, YouTube
videos offer anywhere from three to ten hours of non-stop rain fall.22
Despite the impressive number of artworks in the past decades
that involve rain as a fluid material and substantial weather element,
art-historical research has hardly paid close attention to the atmos-
pheric phenomenon.23 In recent years, a new genre called ‘weather
art’ or ‘meteorological art’ has appeared in art criticism. Works that
19 Chung-ying Cheng, ‘Chinese Philosophy and Symbolic Reference’, Philosophy East
and West, 27.3 ( July 1977), pp. 307–22 (p. 317) <https://doi.org/10.2307/
1398001>.
20 Janine Randerson, Weather asMedium: Toward aMeteorological Art (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2018), pp. xvi and xiv.
21 Georgina Endfield and Simon Naylor, ‘Climate and Cultural Heritage: An Experiment
with the ‘Weather Memory Bank’, in The Future of Heritage as Climates Change: Loss,
Adaptation and Creativity, ed. by David C. Harvey and Jim Perry (London: Routledge,
2015), pp. 62–77 (p. 72).
22 One example is Heavy Rain atNight, a ten-hour video to reduce stress and/or insomnia
as well as to improve concentration, Mermaid Waters, YouTube, 14 February 2020
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9QneqUhCVtU> [accessed 20 June 2020].
For more information regarding the study see Alex Rühle, ‘Flüssige Freude’, Süd-
deutsche Zeitung, 140, 20–21 June 2020, p. 17.
23 Instead, disproportionately more art-related research was done on fluids, fog, and blur.
See State of Flux: Aesthetics of Fluid Materials, ed. by Marcel Finke and Friedrich
Weltzien (Berlin: Reimer, 2017); Markus Finke, ‘Im Nebel. Fluide Materialien und die
Kunst der Zerstreuung’, in WessenWissen? Materialität und Situiertheit in den Künsten,
ed. by Kathrin Busch, Kathrin Peters, Christina Dörfling, and Ildikó Szántó (Pader-
born: Fink, 2018), pp. 97–114; Einfluss, Strömung, Quelle: Aquatische Metaphern der
Kunstgeschichte, ed. by Ulrich Pfisterer and Christine Tauber (Bielefeld: transcript,
2018).
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are classified under this (rather broad) term range from land art to
recent eco-critical art forms and consist of, or include, meteorological
elements and/or engage with environmental components and/or cli-
mate change and its consequences. Janine Randerson conceptualizes
weather as a medium within these artworks in the two-fold sense of a
constitutive ‘material’ as well as an operating force. On the one hand,
weather is contained within the materiality of its conditions, which
connect us ‘to the world and to each other through the rain, wind,
and sunlight that carry sensations to our human and machinic recep-
tors.’ When represented in the media, for example in the news or in
forecasting, weather takes on a different quality, as nature and human
technology meet and ‘atmospheric phenomena are foregrounded and
not a given’.24 Randerson suggests that we ‘treat the weather as a lively
provocateur, collaborator, and catalyst for vital ecocritical conversa-
tions’.25 For her, meteorological art refers to ‘social encounters with
live weather’ and ‘sustains an inter- and intradisciplinary perspective
in which art is lately infused with atmospheric science and social polit-
ics’.26 Perhaps too far-reaching a claim.
Although Randerson strives to delineate ecocritical tendencies as
well as socio-political statements in weather art, Matthew Bower —
in what he describes as ‘curious obsession’ — opts for a more playful
approach: ‘As far as aesthetic subject matters go, weather is just beg-
ging for interactivity, some movement and spectacle that don’t just
portray the elements, but actually imitate them.’27 One example is
Ryan Gander’s INeed SomeMeaning ICanMemorise (The Invisible Pull)
at documenta (13) in 2012, which consisted of a light breeze in the
large, completely empty room situated just after the entrance of the ex-
hibition hall ‘Fridericianum’. As far as rain installations are concerned,
however, two types can be roughly distinguished, some — like Living
Dog Among Dead Lions — keep the spectator observing at a distance,
with no direct involvement. Others, building on the traditions of inter-
24 Randerson, Weather as Medium, p. xvii.
25 Ibid., p. xiv.
26 Ibid., pp. xvi and xvii.
27 Matthew Bower, ‘A Storm in a Jar: 10 Very Cool Art Installations That Imitate Weather’,
The Atlantic, 9 November 2012 <https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/
archive/2012/11/a-storm-in-a-jar-10-very-cool-art-installations-that-imitate-




Figure 2. © Vajiko Chachkhiani, Living Dog Among Dead Lions,
57th Venice Biennale, Venice, 2017. Photo credit: Sandro Sulaberidze.
active art, create a situation in which the viewer physically enters the
installation, moves around, and makes the artwork ‘respond’ to the hu-
man presence or movement. Rain Room, for instance, is an immersive
artwork by Hannes Koch and Florian Ortkrass for Random Interna-
tional, in which visitors, upon entering the space, are given a sense of
control over the weather, as the falling rain stops once a human body
is detected. Viewers find themselves ‘simultaneously exposed to and
protected’ from the heavy downpour.28 Another example is Symphony
in D Minor, a set of interactive hanging sculptures by Chris Klapper &
Patrick Gallagher, which works in a similar way: ‘the hanging cylinders
respond to movement, intensifying the effects of heavy rain, lightning,
and thunder as the audience leaps and flails beneath.’29 Without refer-
ring to any particular event, existential ‘weather’ implications of fixity
and change, of endurance and resistance are at play.
28 The first exhibit of Rain Room by Random International took place at Barbican, Lon-
don in 2012 <https://www.random-international.com/rain-room-2012> [accessed
20 June 2020].
29 Bower, ‘A Storm in a Jar’.
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LivingDogAmongDeadLions— as will be explained in more detail
in the following interview — stems from an idea for a film called Heavy
Metal Honey, which Chachkhiani could realize only much later.30 In
Heavy Metal Honey, rain is falling inside a living room and disturbs
a family’s gathering at the table. The meal ends abruptly when the
mother shows up with a gun and kills several members of the family.31
Blood, wine, and rain are mixed on the table. Only once the rain stops,
the violence ends. It remains unclear whether the family members
are still alive or whether this is the fantasy of the female protagonist
(who is herself obviously doomed to die). Both works refer to rain
water damaging confined territories and allude to the devastating flood
in Tbilisi in 2015, when torrential rainfall bloated the river and led
to it bursting its banks, dragging nineteen people to their deaths and
flooding many homes. The city zoo was destroyed, some three hun-
dred animals escaped and found themselves enjoying an unexpected
freedom, ‘roaming the streets for the following days, seeking shelter
between the ruins’, until they drowned or were shot.32 Only very few
could be recaptured.33 One might interpret the title of the work, Living
Dog Among Dead Lions, a quote from the Bible (Ecclesiastes 9. 4), to
be suggesting that it might be better to adapt and not to take risks
rather than being exposed to the danger of wilderness and supposedly
being killed. The title may imply that ‘humble individuals […] thanks
to their meekness, manage to stay alive’ in harsh living conditions.34 ‘A
traumatic experience changes the interior life of a person’, Chachkhi-
ani said in a press release, and it seems that the confined heavy rain
in the hut expresses the self-absorbed quality of the human psyche,
30 For his solo exhibition Heavy Metal Honey in 2018, see the interview with the curator
Susanne Kleine at the opening at Bundeskunsthalle, YouTube, 28 June 2018 <https:
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=-naE2m5l89w> [accessed 20 December 2019].
31 Renate Puvogel, ‘Bonn, Vajiko Chachkhiani, Heavy Metal Honey, 29 June – 7 October
2018 Bundeskunsthalle’, Kunstforum, 256 (2018), pp. 260–62 (p. 260).
32 In Vajiko Chachkhiani’s recent exhibition Glass Ghosts, the catastrophic flooding is
again evoked, this time without rain but remnants of cages hanging from the ceiling
populated with wooden animal figures (Zanon, ‘Vajiko Chachkhiani’).
33 Rein Wolfs, ‘Preface’, in Vajiko Chachkhiani: Heavy Metal Honey, ed. by Kunst- und
Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Kunst- und Ausstellungs-
halle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2018), pp. 11–12.
34 Anna Battista, Irenebrination: Notes on Architecture, Art, Fashion, Fashion Law&Tech-
nology, 17 May 2017 <https://irenebrination.typepad.com/irenebrination_notes_
on_a/2017/05/vajiko-chachkhiani-venice-biennale.html> [accessed 10 May 2020].
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and reminds the viewer how traumatic incidents tend to constantly
reappear, linger, and reshape the remains.35 The performance captures
both the nostalgic grip within the process and its ongoing endurance, a
landscape of a former life, witness to moments of irrevocable dramatic
action that is somehow, nonetheless, withstood. It puts the viewer in
a state of quiet reflection, a state of a rare and fleeting exposure to
psychic metamorphoses, in which what once was has to be related to
the exhausting awareness of change. What remains and what weathers?
In Living Dog Among Dead Lions, rain acts as a malleable agent to ex-
plore existential questions: Weathering is the desire for re-covery and
the road to transformation.
35 Ibid.

Life Never Stops Being Violent
A Conversation
VAJIKO CHACHKHIANI AND CLAUDIA PEPPEL
The interview was supposed to take place in Berlin on the occasion
of the ICI Workshop On Weathering. However, in the late summer
of 2019, Vajiko Chachkhiani received a Villa Aurora fellowship and
moved to Los Angeles. Therefore, the interview was conducted on-
line. Vajiko Chachkhiani (born in 1985 in Tbilisi, USSR now Georgia)
studied art at the Gerrit Rietveld Academie in Amsterdam and at the
Universität der Künste Berlin. Chachkhiani received a DAAD schol-
arship in 2013 and the ISCP Residency Program in 2016. He was
awarded the prestigious 7th Rubens Promotional Award of the Con-
temporary Art Museum Siegen in 2014. His latest exhibitions include
Heavy Metal Honey, Bundeskunsthalle, Bonn (2018), Moment in and
out of time, SCAI The Bathhouse gallery, Tokyo (2018), Glass Ghost,
Galleria de’Foscherari, Bologna (2019), and Winter which was not
there, Gallery Cork, Ireland (2019).
Claudia Peppel: In the context of the presentation of your work
Living Dog Among Dead Lions at the 57th Biennale ‘Viva Arte Viva’
in 2017, you said that setting up this hut was driven by your personal
experiences. How did you come up with the idea of reconstructing one
of these typical Georgian wooden huts in Venice?
Vajiko Chachkhiani: It all started with an idea for a film called
Heavy Metal Honey, which I could not make at the time. For the film,
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a family would gather in a living room, and eventually it would start to
rain inside the room. And then some other things would happen. That
was the idea. Then, when we applied for the Georgian Pavilion, I first
had a different proposal in mind, but when I saw the space, I thought,
‘ok, maybe it would be cool to have a kind of big sculpture.’ And as my
works often deal with history and somehow also psychology, I thought
the best thing would be to come up with a house, which has its own
history. Then, the idea of the rain came back, and I thought, there
should also be rain inside that would deform the interior; the wooden
hut in this context is important because it has this authentic aura and
also has a very intense wooden smell when it gets wet.
CP: After a heavy rainfall in 2015, Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia,
experienced a torrential flood; the river Vere overflowed its banks and
the city’s zoo was also inundated. Nineteen people and more than
three hundred animals lost their lives. Because of the flood, several
zoo animals experienced an unusual and unexpected freedom, like the
white tiger that was eventually shot after assaulting and killing a man.
Did this exceptional situation influence the outcome of this work or its
title? I have read that you called the flood a mythical event?
VC: This flood affected me in a profound way. It was really tragic
to see a worker eaten by a tiger. And as you mentioned, it was like a
mythological encounter. There is no need to write mythologies any-
more because they happen on their own. That flood really stayed with
me for a long time. And I think unconsciously that could be the reason
I brought rain into my work. After the piece, Living Dog Among Dead
Lions, I did the solo show in the Bundeskunsthalle in Bonn, which was
dedicated to the worker who was eaten by the tiger. It consisted of a
different set of sculptural installations calledHeavyMetalHoney, which
is the same title as the film I mentioned above. The title of the piece I
presented in Venice comes from the Bible. In the Old Testament, there
is one section where it says that it is better to be a dog and live than a
lion and die. When you are alive, you still have the possibilities to do
things or change them. You have more potential, essentially.
CP: The rain pouring down inside the hut inverts our expecta-
tions of how weather unfolds: Usually you would seek shelter indoors
from pouring rain; here it is the opposite, outside one stays dry and
everything remains intact, while inside everything gets wet and is
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slowly rotting. Within this inversion — the outside made inside —
there is a moment of irritation. One knows it’s not real, but it convinces
you at the moment of the performance. What role does this reversal or
inversion of reality play for you? Does the tension within the work arise
from the fact that you know it is not real but pretend that it is?
VC: In my work, I often use open and direct metaphors. And I
don’t reflect upon what is fictional vs. what is real because I believe
fiction turns into reality, like mythology or stories. When stories refer
to real human problems or conflicts, that’s when they have impact.
The piece consists of two narrative strands, an outer, where the hut
remains inaccessible and untouched, and an inner one, where things
change with a lot of dynamics and eventually become deformed. When
I developed the idea, I had a couple of things in mind: I was thinking
about the way history creates tendencies and affects someone’s psyche
and the present-day life. It is generally inscribed in a certain way. The
past can deform a person’s interior but you don’t perceive these effects
on the exterior. I think mostly we consider the impact of history on
society, while we neglect the personal inflictions. On a personal level,
you never really know what’s going on. And the piece is a metaphor of
that duality of inner and outer narration. What we present to the world
vs. how we are feeling on the inside, that’s really a different story. The
secret story of a person is the psyche, and in the end, that’s what I’m
trying to understand, and what I am really interested in: the psychic
life, and the way it is affected by history. It could be political or social.
CP: Viewers cannot enter or interact, they literally remain outside
and can only watch the pouring rain and wait to witness the destruc-
tion or state of disintegration. Even though little happens, it is very
suspenseful. I felt this suggests an obsessive, almost intrusive kind of
observation, which is gazing rather than looking. Slowly, a bond seems
to form between an interior that passively sits there, waiting to be
destroyed, and the gaze from the outside, demanding to see something.
What role do you assign to the audience? Are the viewers an active
ingredient merging gaze and destruction into a situation on a greater
scale?
VC: Conceptually I thought of making a classic sculpture, one
that you look at but you cannot walk through, a space you observe
that refuses entry. Because metaphorically the house stands in for the
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interior of a human being. It is about looking at it from the outside,
and yes, I think people really enjoy watching tragic things. They don’t
enjoy but are captivated by them. But as long as the tragedy is distant
you aren’t pulled in. But when you are involved in a disaster, you don’t
want to be observed. I think that is an interesting twist: to be watching
while at the same time being immersed. In reality, if you watch the news
and a tragic thing happens, that’s a very different thing, but in this case,
I wanted people to feel the tension and the subtle violence that happens
to the interior, while at the same time the hut is almost sentimental and
has this romantic appeal.
CP: Living Dog Among Dead Lions is a rather process- and time-
based work, it is not a finite object. Does it address environmental
concerns?
VC: I did not intend to address any environmental concerns, but
somehow the work does. But this was not my intention, it happened
independent of me. The work raises these concerns by itself.
CP: The weathering caused by the artificial rain accelerated a
process that would have happened sooner or later without the rain:
the hut would have eventually been destroyed ‘by nature’. Why did you
want to accelerate this process or make it so vividly perceptible? Can
weathering be seen as a neutralizing destiny or as a ‘romantic form of
aging’ like ruination, or rather as an act of inscription?
VC: What I find interesting about rain is that it is romantic. It
can make the city very beautiful because of the reflections produced.
Especially at night if you have wet streets. But on the other hand, it can
also destroy or ruin everything, if there is a flood, for example. And that
was the anchor. I have used the motif of water a lot in my work. Because
it has this duality that it is beautiful, romantic, and sentimental, but
on the other hand, in an instant it can become violent. And it also
refers metaphorically to human nature. In the piece, the acceleration
of decay adds an important dimension, the idea of the piece is based
on the weathering process, without rain, it would be just a hut with just
a history. Involving weathering aspects creates the drama of an interior
human psyche.
CP: Weathering therefore adds to and subtracts from the ‘finish’:
for example, it takes away colours, destroys the surfaces, but adds
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the finish of the environment.1 In this sense, the rain or what grows
out of it re-forms the artwork although it is artificially controlled by
the artist. What was the idea behind this process and what did you
think the hut would look like at the end of the performance, after six
months on display at the Biennale? Many people imagined right from
the beginning that moss and mould might grow.
VC: This piece is somehow a sculpture but at the same time a
performative installation. And the role of weather is really important
because it makes the work function. It is the inner life of the piece to
deform, change, and transform. And that is also my observation of how
history works. It is an authentic house, which was inhabited by people
for a long time. It was my idea to use this duality of the rain to create
romantic ambiance, while at the same time it deforms the interior. The
whole idea of the sculpture is that it is performative.
CP: Atmosphere refers on the one hand to meteorological facts,
on the other hand to the characteristics that a space or place radiates
and to the immediate perception of these characteristics. In your piece
these aspects seem to come together. Any thoughts about these ‘atmos-
pheric’ dimensions?
VC: Previously, I made a piece called Rite (Dog Days) (2014),
which was a kind of heat sculpture, an empty space filled with hot
air. The humidity and heat were based on historical data from differ-
ent geographical sites (two prison sites) and combining them created
a corridor, a transitory experience, somehow a rite of passage. This
passage was immaterial and intense and through the intensified atmos-
phere the piece tried to evoke empathy. In Living Dog Among Dead
Lions, the atmospheric dimension is also important since the concept
of the deformation of the interior stems from this intensified atmos-
phere.
CP: Your installation remained not only untouched from the out-
side and devoid of people but was also closed as if hermetically sealed
in a kind of vacuum-packaging. Some of the furniture was actually
wrapped in plastic sheeting as if to protect it from too much weathering
or destruction. Why?
1 Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow, On Weathering: The Life of Buildings in
Time (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 64.
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VC: In houses in the countryside, people normally put plastic
sheeting on the furniture and on the ground because they don’t want
to wear it out. That’s a very common thing they do there, a kind of
preservation and conservation of the interior. Mostly in the living
room and the porch. I used it to create more authenticity. That was the
idea — to do a replica of what countryside people do in their houses.
CP: The German artist Hans Haacke once said that weather is a
prototypical example of a system of interactive physical components
with metaphorical significance, while Susanne Kleine, the curator at
Bundeskunsthalle of Heavy Metal Honey, suggested that the perman-
ent rain in the house can be read as a metaphorical condensation of
living conditions or traumatic events and their consequences.2 Can
you tell me more about the metaphorical impact and about the role
the artificial rain plays within this setting? Does it reflect an interplay
or continuity of violence and vulnerability?
VC: The permanent rain is a reflection on nature and of the way life
unfolds. Life never stops being violent; it never stops being vulnerable.
It is always about motion, about transformation, about dynamics. The
artificial rain somehow cleans up the environment, but on the other
hand, it also can be violent in excess. But it depends also on the
geography: in some places, you don’t have so much rain, or you would
like to have rain because there are a lot of fires. In other areas, you have
cities with too much rain, and it could cause problems. Metaphorically,
it suggests human psychic life is like a process of permanent inner
salvation. It always runs. The rain represents the inner dynamics, the
way it is in nature, and that history can be really traumatic and deform
the interior. That is what the rain does in this piece.
2 Jack Burnham, ‘Hans Haacke — Wind and Water Sculpture’, in Art in the Land: A
Critical Anthology of Environmental Art, ed. by Alan Sonfist (New York: Dutton, 1983),
pp. 105–25 (p. 109). Susanne Kleine, ‘Interior and Exterior Spaces’, in Vajiko Chach-
khiani: Heavy Metal Honey, ed. by Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (Bonn: Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
2018), pp. 33–43 (p. 33).
ConfinedWeathers
Graciela Iturbide and Mario Bellatin’s The Bathroom of
Frida Kahlo/Demerol without Expiration Date
DELFINA CABRERA
WEATHERING AT WORK
The images evoked by the word ‘weathering’ rarely refer to interiors.1
They are often accompanied by the belief that weathering must be
fought, stopped, or controlled. But perhaps the only successful battles
against this pervasive enemy are those that join forces with it. Many
artists have understood this and rather than avoiding the supposed
evils of weathering, they have copied them, turning the work of unseen
powers and the feared passage of time into creative devices. Weather-
ing, in this sense, is at the very heart of art. It dwells inside the work, in
its most sheltered intimacy.
When in 1954 the Mexican painter Diego Rivera decreed that
Frida Kahlo’s bathroom should remain locked for fifteen years after his
death, he could not foresee that this period would stretch into almost
five decades. In 1958, the house where they had lived was turned into
1 I am grateful to Claudia Peppel, Marlon Miguel, Christoph Holzhey, Arnd Wedemeyer,
and Graciela Goldchluk for their generous readings and insightful comments on this
essay.
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a museum, but the bathroom was made accessible to the public only in
2005 when the museum invited photographer Graciela Iturbide and
writer Mario Bellatin to engage with it. Their excursions resulted in a
double-sided book that readTheBathroomof FridaKahlo, when turned
in one direction, and Demerol Without Expiration Date, when turned
in the other. The first title corresponds to a series of photographs by
Iturbide and the second to a text by Bellatin.2 Both, the photographs
and the text, address the work of weathering on one of the most iconic
artistic legacies of the twentieth century.
This book, at first touch, entails an altering gesture, a certain
disorder: from the first bourgeois fortress of privacy, the ultimate
architectural element, the bathroom, Iturbide and Bellatin extract and
expose objects that had been concealed. Frida’s dried corsets, the rus-
ted enema pots, a box of Demerol painkillers, a poster of Stalin warped
by humidity, an anatomy chart of intra-uterine life (intact), the metal
crutches, the stained hospital gown, an orthopaedic leg leaned against
the wall, two stuffed birds, and a turtle are some of those things, now
part of the museum’s permanent collection and protected under strict
conservation rules. But The Bathroom of Frida Kahlo/Demerol without
Expiration Date offers to the eye what the display cases cannot show.
Within Iturbide and Bellatin’s book, Kahlo’s ambivalent presence bears
witness to this effort and opens up questions about how art, improper
bodies, and medicalization mingle, but also the relations between art,
the process of weathering, and the art market.3
After her death, Frida Kahlo was captured in a continuous present.
She became an international celebrity, a trademark — licensed by
the Frida Kahlo Corporation — and since 2010, her portrait can be
found on billions of five hundred Mexican peso banknotes.4 Likewise,
2 Graciela Iturbide and Mario Bellatin, El baño de Frida Kahlo/Demerol, sin fecha de
caducidad (Ciudad de México: Galería López Quiroga/Editorial RM, 2008).
3 For a pioneering analysis of Iturbide and Bellatin’s book, see Paola Cortés-Rocca, ‘La
insoportable levedad del yo. Iturbide y Bellati en El Baño de Frida Kahlo’, Filología,
44.1 (2012), pp. 121–38.
4 The Frida Kahlo Corporation owns the trademark rights and interests to the name
Frida Kahlo worldwide <https://fridakahlocorporation.com/> [accessed 18 June
2020]. As to the five hundred peso banknote, it features a self-portrait of Diego Rivera
on the reverse alongside a fragment of his painting Desnudo con alcatraces (Nude with
Calla Lilies). The motif on the reverse is a self-portrait of Frida Kahlo accompanied




Figure 1. © Graciela Iturbide, El baño de Frida vii. Courtesy of the artist.
her personal belongings, including the ones that were found in her
bathroom and that allegedly unveil her most guarded secrets, are spec-
tacularly displayed and consumed.5
It could be then inferred that Diego Rivera’s order to board up her
bathroom was intended to protect his wife’s intimacy from public view.
y el Señor Xólotl (Love’s Embrace of the Universe, Earth (Mexico), I, Diego, and Mr.
Xólotl). The banknote will soon be replaced by a new one featuring former Mexican
president, Benito Juárez, on the front and a gray whale with its young on the back.
5 The 2018 exhibition, Frida Kahlo: Making Her Self Up, at the Victoria and Albert
Museum in London is indicative of this way of presenting Kahlo’s legacy: <https:
//www.vam.ac.uk/exhibitions/frida-kahlo-making-her-self-up> [accessed 25 May
2020]. For a thoughtful discussion on the ‘Fridomanía’, see Margo Glantz, ‘Frida
Kahlo. Diseminación y amplificación’, Revista de laUniversidad deMéxico, 104 (2012),
pp. 15–25.
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Perhaps, but Iturbide and Bellatin seem to suggest otherwise. Instead
of protection, Rivera was seeking exposure, and let weathering do the
work. Changes in temperature, humidity, the lack or excess of light, the
effects of microorganisms, among other natural agents, subjected the
silent dwellers of the bathroom to a series of unpredictable, discrete,
and continuous metamorphoses.
Who would have thought that with this intended closure and de-
ferred opening, one of the fathers of Mexican muralism, the archetype
of the committed Latin American artist, from the centre of Coyoacán
— the centre of the periphery — would be more than two decades
ahead of the pop art icon, Andy Warhol, who packed more than
three hundred thousand items of his possessions — clothes, bounced
checks, toys, letters, acne medicines, nail clippings, a mummified
foot, used condoms — into some six hundred sealed cardboard boxes
archived with rigorous compulsion during the last thirteen years of his
life?
Once closed, Frida’s bathroom and Warhol’s Time Capsules, be-
come acephalous laboratories of transformation and contingent inter-
actions. Bacteria, humidity, mould, pests — the villains of art preserva-
tion — push the artist out of frame. Iturbide photographs the ragged
corsets that once supported Frida’s body and which now hang in the
shower, on a rusted nail, on a coat rack. The hospital gown (are the
stains on it paint or blood?) is held by a hanger. Three entangled enema
hoses come out of the rusted enamel pots. A stuffed turtle whose shell
is falling into pieces rises from the bathtub. Stalin, on a bent poster,
sinks into it. The placements of the objects have been sensibly orches-
trated and the photographer’s attentiveness to the dryness of plastic,
the stiffness of leather, the consumed paper and the stained fabric, to-
gether with the rather promiscuous arrangements, instead of pointing
towards decay and death, infuse a breath of life into the weathered
objects that, like the Demerol box, have ‘no expiration date’.
Literary critic Paola Cortés-Rocca situates Iturbide’s series within
the history of still life painting, traditionally relegated to the lowest
level in the hierarchy of art genres as it dealt with ‘low forms of life’ —
inanimate or non-corporeal objects — and as it took private property
as its main subject-matter.6 Accordingly, Iturbide’s photographs trans-
6 Norman Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked: Four Essays on Still Life Painting (London:
Reaktion Books, 1990).
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form the mundane things of Frida’s bathroom into aesthetic objects,
emphasizing in them the articulation between property, exhibition,
and gaze:
This articulation that the still life genre stages — a series of
objects are exhibited as someone’s property and, in turn, are
contemplated as if they could be consumed or appropriated
— is transferred to the figure of the artist. In other words:
since an institution like the museum is wary of a rusty tin can,
an old prosthesis or a worn poster [...], if a series of hoses for
making enemas becomes aesthetic material, if they are worthy
of occupying the photographic field it is because they once
belonged to Frida Kahlo.7
But also, these photographs of weathered things locked up in ‘the most
psychosexually charged room in a building’, as Beatriz Colomina and
Mark Wigley name it,8 might be mapping a cartography of desire that
does not conform to the canonical image of the painter. Taking Cortés-
Rocca insights one step further, it can be said that Iturbide’s disturbing
series subtly pay homage to Kahlo’s overlooked naturalezas muertas.
Undoubtedly, there has always been a question of life or death
at stake in the still life genre, and the ways of naming it in different
languages and art traditions account for this tension. Instead of the
English term ‘still life’ (derived from the Dutch stilleven) that connotes
immobility but also survival; Romance languages such as French or
Spanish adopted, later in time, the term nature morte, which brings
immobility closer to death. Aware of this, Kahlo, who spent much of
her life in beds, at hospitals and at home, named one of her naturalezas
muertas Naturaleza viva (Living Nature or Nature vivante, 1952), and
wrote on a slice of watermelon, in her last painting (a still life), Viva la
vida (Long Live Life).
Kahlo began painting naturalezas muertas at an early age, the first,
Charola de amapolas (Tray with Poppies), dating from 1924. None-
7 Cortés-Rocca, ‘La insoportable levedad’, p. 128; my translation.
8 In contrast to the generalized disregard that the bathroom has received in architectural
thought, Beatriz Colomina and Mark Wigley go as far as to state that ‘the history
of Modern architecture could be written from the point of view of the toilet’. As
an introduction to their original perspective on this topic, see ‘Toilet Architecture:
An Essay about the Most Psychosexually Charged Room in a Building’, PIN–UP
Magazine, 23 (Fall/Winter 2017/18), <https://pinupmagazine.org/articles/toilet-
modern-architecture/> [accessed 17 July 2020].
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theless, as art historian Nancy Deffebach notes, considering the large
number of still lifes that Kahlo created over a period of thirty years
(more than twenty-five out of a total of one hundred forty-four art-
works) few studies have been done on these pieces, which comprise, in
addition, many generic transgressions.9 According to Deffebach, this
omission is probably due to the fact that ‘Kahlo’s still lifes resist the
predominant biographical interpretations that have been applied to
her self-portraits’.10 By the same token, the rare analyses devoted to
these works disregard their pictorial specificities and privilege instead
popular themes of Kahlo’s biography such as her turbulent marriage
with Rivera or her physical martyrdom.11
However, Kahlo’s naturalezas muertas undermine the markers as-
signed to the artist’s public figure: the betrayed wife, the restless rebel,
the sufferer. In these works, the protagonists are the transformative
affinities between diverse forms of life, as in the weathering process:
in Naturaleza muerta (tondo) (Still Life (Round)), for instance, vari-
ous vegetables and other species, such as mushrooms and flowers,
open up to each other like the sliced squash in the middle, a butterfly,
and a moth hovering over them; in Naturaleza viva (1952), a pigeon
hatches into a sweet potato while some roots write ‘Living Nature’ on
the ground; in Tunas (Prickly Pears, 1938), two half-cut cactus fruits
ripe open like an open heart. Iturbide, in her photographical series,
echoes the contagious force of these disregarded paintings. She with-
draws from the widespread representations of Kahlo and by freeing
the artist’s objects from a pre-established meaning, she mobilizes new
9 For a detailed analysis of Kahlo’s still lifes, see Nancy Deffebach, María Izquierdo and
Frida Kahlo: Challenging Visions in Modern Mexican Art (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 2015), pp. 135–39.
10 Ibid., p. 135.
11 Deffebach argues that this analytical framework predominates in the works of Helga
Prignitz-Poda and Salomon Grimberg. To this respect, she notes: ‘Prignitz-Poda lit-
erally sees Diego Rivera in the watermelons in Viva la vida (Long Live Life) of 1954
and asserts that in all the slices of melon he “turns around himself as if in a macabre
dance of dismemberment”, a vision that rather ingeniously facilitates her conclusion
that “for Kahlo there is no more room in the world”. In a 2004 article titled “Frida
Kahlo’s Still Lifes”, Salomon Grimberg declares: “Kahlo’s still lifes often read like pages
in a diary.” To illustrate his claim, he alleges that a small piggy bank represents Rivera
while a figurine of a horse stands for Kahlo in Still Life with Piggy Bank and BlackHorse





Figure 2. © Graciela Iturbide, El baño de Frida xiv. Courtesy of the artist.
lines of interpretation and interrogates the tragic immobility to which
Kahlo’s oeuvre has been subjected since her death.
At this point, one might suspect a certain archivist drive in The
Bathroom of Frida Kahlo, a need to delve into a space where weath-
ering has done its work, and to look for new constellations in what
is left. Iturbide acutely reads in the sealed room the construction of
a confined weather that would only preserve what matters. Sensitive
as he was to the productive architecture of spaces, Rivera decided to
make an archival one for Kahlo. He knew, like Warhol, that the archive
guarantees the oeuvre’s survival, emptying it of its many mystifications,
even of the most resistant of all: the authority of the name of the author.
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WEATHERED NAMES
Demerol without Expiration Date is the second text that Bellatin wrote
about Kahlo — the first, which bears the title of one of the painter’s
most celebrated work, Las dos Fridas, tells the story of a writer who
has been commissioned by the Mexican Council for Culture and the
Arts (a request officially made to Bellatin) to write Kahlo’s biography,
and who searches, camera in hand, for a living Frida who is supposed
to be working in a Mexican food market.
Las dos Fridas interrogates the mediations between reality and
fiction, as well as the causal relationship between a single author-
producer and her corresponding ‘original’ work. This problem is not
new to Bellatin, but rather, it traverses all his texts and artistic in-
terventions.12 Demerol without Expiration Date is no exception. In it,
Bellatin calls into question the artifices of originality and the figure of
the author through another recurrent creative strategy in his writing:
the re-utilization of his own texts. Demerol, as we shall see, combines
fragments that have already appeared in many of his other books, rep-
licated in such a way that it becomes almost impossible to determine
which fragment came first. In this same vein, many of Bellatin’s books
are advertised as translations of non-existent texts or biographies of
fictional characters that are presented as real ones. In other cases, the
characters seem to be replicas of Bellatin himself — like the writer
of Flores, who uses an orthopaedic leg — or become the authors of
Bellatin’s books, like frida kahlo who, in Demerol, is virtually alive and
has painted three artworks (Damas chinas,Salónde belleza andEl jardín
de la señora murakami) that are indeed novels published by Bellatin in
1995, 1994, and 2000 respectively:
Once a conference was organized where a teacher introduced
himself with a singular didactic apparatus. It was an artefact
supplied with a screen, through which a sort of film of reality
was shown. [...] Suddenly, the screen began to show images,
fragments, of the life of the artist frida kahlo, which was pre-
12 Bellatin is a writer who makes films (such as Bola Negra. Ciudad Juárez’s Musical,
co-directed with Marcela Rodríguez in 2012), works as a curator (as in dOCU-
MENTA/13, where he exhibited the project Die hunderttausend Bücher von Bellatin),
puts on performances (such as the famous Writers’ Doubles Congress in Paris in 2003




Figure 3. © Archivo Mario Bellatin, Las dos Fridas [The Two Fridas].
Image credit: Mario Bellatin.
cisely the theme that had gathered the public that night. The
curious thing was that a rather old kahlo was shown, as if she
had continued to live after her death. At a certain moment,
always through the screen, the image of the Russian leader
joseph stalin was seen, placed behind two pewter pots for clys-
ters, and a very old demerol box. The rubber hoses necessary
for the enema pots to perform their functions were detached
from the receptacles. But the biggest surprise for those present
at the conference occurred when three unknown pictorial
works were seen through the apparatus. They were entitled
Damas chinas, Salón de belleza, and El jardín de la señora
murakami.13
13 Mario Bellatin,Demerol, sin fecha de caducidad, in Graciela Iturbide and Mario Bellatin,
El baño de Frida Kahlo/ Demerol, sin fecha de caducidad (Ciudad de México: Galería
López Quiroga/Editorial RM, 2008), p. 2; my translation.
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During the conference, frida shares with the audience her thoughts
on the creative process, shows some of her most renowned works and
stresses her constant search for ‘painting without painting’, a phrase
that recalls Bellatin’s guiding principle ‘writing without writing’.14 Fol-
lowing the pattern of many proper names in Bellatin’s work, hers is
written in lowercase: frida kahlo. The author becomes a common noun
and an empty placeholder to be potentially occupied by any other
name.15
Bellatin, like Iturbide, always delves into what is left, and what
might seem a simple cut-and-paste exercise — the replacement of a
proper name by another, the repetitions of chunks of text over which
the reader stumbles again and again — is a complex weathering pro-
cess. For instance, the cited fragment of Demerol also appears in an
undated manuscript, probably from the same period. It is named after
Malcolm Lowry’s famous closing quote from Under the Volcano: ‘Do
you like this garden that is yours? Don’t let your children destroy it.’
Bellatin writes:
Once a conference was organized where a teacher introduced
himself with a singular didactic apparatus. It was an artefact
14 Paradoxical as it may seem, ‘writing without writing’ is the way in which Bellatin
has labelled his complex creative process, which he succinctly summarizes as fol-
lows: ‘a constant concern for highlighting the voids, the omissions, rather than the
presences’. See Mario Bellatin, ‘Escribir sin escribir’, in Obra reunida 2 (Barcelona:
Alfaguara, 2014), pp. 3–12. For a detailed analysis of Bellatin’s writing strategies, see
Delfina Cabrera and Graciela Goldchluk, ‘Una mortaja de papel: la emergencia del
archivo en la escritura de Mario Bellatin’, in Bellatin en su proceso: los gestos de una
escritura, ed. by Palma Castro, and others (México-Buenos Aires, Benemérita Uni-
versidad de Puebla-Prometeo, 2018), pp. 121–46; Juan Pablo Cuartas, Los comienzos
de Mario Bellatin: tiempo y consistencia en Efecto invernadero (unpublished thesis,
Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina, 2014) <http://www.memoria.fahce.
unlp.edu.ar/tesis/te.1044/te.1044.pdf> [accessed 14 April 2020]; Graciela Gold-
chluk, ‘Lecciones de realismo para una liebre muerta (sobre la obra de Mario Bel-
latin)’, I Simposio Internacional Imágenes y Realismos en América Latina, 29 de
septiembre al 1 de octubre de 2011, Leiden, Países Bajos, in Actas online, ed. by Miguel
Caballero Vázquez, Luz Rodríguez Carranza, and Christina Soto van der Plas <https://
imagenesyrealismosleiden.wordpress.com/> <http://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.
ar/trab_eventos/ev.13717/ev.13717.pdf> [accessed 11 June 2020].
15 In Demerol, frida kahlo’s paintings carry the titles of Bellatin’s novels; she rewrites
Kafka’s The Metamorphosis and awards samuel beckett the authorship of one of her
paintings (La jornada de la mona y el paciente (The Day of the Monkey and the
Patient)) which is named after a short story by Bellatin. She also stages a theatre piece
based on her painting Beauty Salon, which is the title of Bellatin’s most famous novel,




Figure 4. © Graciela Iturbide, El baño de Frida xii. Courtesy of the artist.
supplied with a screen, through which a sort of film of reality
was shown. [...] Suddenly, the screen began to show images,
fragments, of the life of the writer mario bellatin, which was
precisely the subject that had gathered the public that night.
The curious thing was that a rather old bellatin was shown, as if
he had continued to live after his death. At a certain moment,
always through the apparatus, the covers of three books were
seen: Damas chinas, Salón de belleza and El jardín de la señora
murakami.16
And again, in Biografía ilustrada de Mishima, a novel almost immedi-
ately following Demerol:
16 La Plata, Archivo Mario Bellatin, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, fol. 13; my
transcription and translation.
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[Mishima] is now in an educational institution where a lec-
ture will be given on Yukio Mishima. [...] Suddenly a professor
who gives the impression of being Japanese appears in the
room. Mishima notices that he brings with him an apparatus
through which, once installed, he begins to show a sort of film
of reality. The attendees stare at the screen. The first image is of
the schoolyard where we are gathered. It is a highly prestigious
institution. [...] Mishima stays in the room showing a definite
sense of superiority. He looks like a middle-aged man. He
wears a military uniform and has no head.17
The correspondence of the texts is almost perfect, like a piece of tracing
paper that reveals the one underneath, we can spot certain silhouettes
that coincide, although this coincidence is never fully achieved. As
we compare the fragments, we may think at first glance that they are
almost the same, but no: Bellatin’s project aims at setting in motion a
weathering force capable of eroding any supposed origin or originality
of writing. Through overexposure, Bellatin weathers the author’s place
in order to show the traces, not of a discourse, but of the movements
of an improper body in writing, always in progress, errant, incomplete.
In this sense, together with the notions of author and oeuvre, what
is also challenged in Demerol is the fiction of the normal, organically
whole body (even the textual body). Perhaps this explains why, in his
more than forty published books, Bellatin has concentrated on creating
worlds of his own, confined weathers that only respond to the fiction
that sustains them.
CLAUSTROPHILIA
Since his first novel, Efecto invernadero (Greenhouse Effect), which
takes place almost exclusively in one room, Bellatin has locked his char-
acters in places of confinement that are somehow makeshift. Some-
times, one could even say that it is the characters who lock themselves
in, perhaps as a counterbalance to the history of confinement of non-
normative bodies: the transvestite hairdresser whose beauty salon,
surrounded by aquariums, becomes a moridero (a place to die); the
17 Mario Bellatin, Biografía ilustrada de Mishima (Buenos Aires: Entropía, 2009), p. 4;
my translation.
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paralytic dog trainer of Perros héroes (Hero Dogs) who never leaves
the house, or the deaf and blind twins locked up in the Colonia de
Alienados Etchepare, the madhouse-school-asylum of his most recent
book, Carta sobre los ciegos para uso de los que ven (Letter on the Blind
for the Use of Those Who Can See). In Demerol, frida is locked into
a ‘singular didactic apparatus’ or, at least, there is no clear indication
that her life (her afterlife), can be detached from this machine.
For this reason, even if in Demerol, there are rather few direct
references to Frida’s bathroom (only the hoses for making enemas, the
orthopaedic leg and Stalin’s poster are mentioned in some passages),
the text revolves around an atmospheric problem in its most basic
sense: how is life possible in a closed space? Such a problem also
intrigued Roland Barthes, who references it in his famous 1977 lecture
series How to Live Together, which explores the tension between the
individual and the common through several confined spaces, such as
the monastery, the bourgeois house, the hotel room, or the desert.18
Indeed, Barthes considers the desert to be the archetype of a closed
space, precisely because it appears to be an open space, but one from
which it is impossible to escape and which denotes, etymologically,
extreme solitude (from the Greek eremos and from the Latin eremus:
desert, solitary).
Hence, it is no coincidence that this space becomes the landscape
of the last performance of frida in Demerol: while preparing an artistic
presentation for a congress on cinema and mysticism to which she
had been invited, frida recalled the column prop of Luis Buñuel’s film
Simon of the Desert:19
frida remembered that someone had told her that the column
of buñuel’s film — a film she had not been able to appreciate
in life — was abandoned in the desert. kahlo then set about
the task of getting a recent image of the column. As one might
imagine, she was not in a position to go personally to the place
where the column was, but she asked for a picture of it. Finally,
a perfect image arrived. [...] frida kahlo, after admiring it for
a few days, had it framed as if it were a religious image. She
18 Roland Barthes, How to Live Together: Novelistic Simulations of Some Everyday Spaces,
trans. by Kate Briggs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
19 Simón del desierto, dir. by Luis Buñuel (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Producción
Cinematográfica, 1965).
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also made a series of saint cards of the column and distributed
them among her neighbours. The next day she photographed
them one by one holding the saint cards. kahlo pretended that
her neighbours were members of a brotherhood that had been
created around the lost column. The text that accompanied
the photos mentioned that a group of people had decided to
flee the city in order to improve their living conditions. On the
way to their pilgrimage they found the column from buñuel’s
film. These people decided to take this astonishing event as a
sign and settled in the column’s surroundings.20
Bellatin carried out a similar performance himself, using a picture that
had been taken by Graciela Iturbide:
I remembered that someone had told me that in the pachuca
desert there was still the column from which Luis Buñuel had
made his film Simon of the Desert. [...] Simon of the Desert is
one of my favourite films and it perfectly fits into the category
of cinema and mysticism. In the research I undertook, I found
that the photographer Graciela Iturbide had images of the
column that she herself had taken. I asked her to give me one
as a present and had it framed as a religious picture. I printed
out a series of those framed images and I distributed them
among my neighbours. [...] Then, I photographed the people
to whom I had given the images to pass them off as members
of a brotherhood that had been created from the forgotten
column.21
In the desert, the ‘realm of weathering’ par excellence, Demerol goes
back to The Bathroom of Frida Kahlo. The survival of works of art,
Bellatin and Iturbide suggest, depends not only on its display but on its
opening up to a commons. Contrary to the logics of the museum, their
archival operations contest aseptic protocols. Theirs is an invitation to
a living archive that welcomes time and weather, and shelters what can
be shared: ‘Another tenant lives now in your house’, such is the final
line of Simon of the Desert. The devil’s daughter speaks it to the son of
God. In the column, writes Mario Bellatin, thousands of tenants now
live.
20 Mario Bellatin, Demerol, p. 14.
21 Mario Bellatin, ‘Escribir sin escribir’, in Mario Bellatin, Obra reunida 2 (Barcelona:
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